Strategic Latency Unleashed: The Role of Technology in a Revisionist Global Order and the Implications for Special Operations Forces by Davis, Zachary S. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2021-01
Strategic Latency Unleashed: The Role of
Technology in a Revisionist Global Order and
the Implications for Special Operations Forces
Center for Global Security Research
Davis, Z. S., et al. Strategic Latency Unleashed: The Role of Technology in a
Revisionist Global Order and the Implications for Special Operations Forces. No.
LLNL-BOOK-818513. Lawrence Livermore National Lab.(LLNL), Livermore, CA (United
States), 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/67922
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
STRATEGIC LATENCY UNLEASHED
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN A REVISIONIST GLOBAL ORDER  
AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
EDITED BY ZACHARY S. DAVIS, FRANK GAC, CHRISTOPHER RAGER,
PHILIP REINER, AND JENNIFER SNOW
CENTER FOR GLOBAL
             SECURITY RESEARCH
This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in part 
under Contract W-7405-Eng-48 and in part under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. The views and opinions of the author expressed 
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC.  
ISBN-978-1-952565-07-6   LCCN-2021901137   LLNL-BOOK-818513  TID-59693
To download the ebook: See cgsr.llnl.gov
S T R A T E G I C  L A T E N C Y  U N L E A S H E D    |    1 
STRATEGIC LATENCY UNLEASHED
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN A REVISIONIST GLOBAL ORDER  
AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
EDITED BY ZACHARY S. DAVIS, FRANK GAC, CHRISTOPHER RAGER,
PHILIP REINER, AND JENNIFER SNOW
Center for Global Security Research
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
January 2021
2   |   D A V I S ,  G A C ,  R A G E R ,  R E I N E R  &  S N O W
EDITOR'S NOTE  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   1
FOREWORD .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .    2
DEDICATION   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   4 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .   5
INTRODUCTION
Latency Unleashed: What It Means for Special Operations Forces
Zachary S. Davis, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL),  
Research Professor, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .    8
S E C T I O N  1
GEOPOLITICS OF STRATEGIC LATENCY FOR SOF: CONTEXT IS EVERYTHING
Winning and Losing in Counterproliferation
Zachary Davis, LLNL/NPS, and Michael Greene, Naval Special Warfare Command (ret.) .  .  .  .  .  .  15
The Role of Special Operations Forces in Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
Brendan Melley, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction,  
National Defense University (NDU) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  22
Identity and Virtual Nations: Implications of Digital Citizenship and  
Developing Global Autonomous Communities for Special Operations Forces
Jennifer J. Snow, AFWERX/CTO .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  34
Special Forces and Strategic Deterrence
Brad Roberts, LLNL, Center for Global Security Research (CGSR)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  51
Quantum Corps: Consequence and Superiority in the Theater of Applied Imagination
Marshall M. Monroe, Marshall Monroe MAGIC  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  61
Russia’s Special Purpose Forces: A Strategic Weapon
Glenn Chafetz, Ridgeline; Michael Nacht, University of California, Berkeley; and  
Jonathan Fagins, US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  82
Table of Contents
S T R A T E G I C  L A T E N C Y  U N L E A S H E D    |    3 
Sharp Swords of the Future Battlefield:  
The Chinese Military’s Special Forces and Psychological Operations
Elsa Kania, Center for a New American Security, and Peter Wood, Bluepath Labs  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 94
S E C T I O N  2 
BIOLOGY AND THE BODY POLITIC: MESSING WITH MOTHER NATURE
What COVID-19 and China’s Grand Strategy May Teach about a History of the Future
James Giordano, Georgetown University, and L. R. Bremseth USN SEAL (ret.) .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   109
Cyborg Soldier 2050: Human-Machine Fusion and Its Implications
Peter Emanuel, Army Futures Command, and  
Diane DiEullius, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, NDU .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  121
Contemporary Global Food Systems as Contested Space:  
Implications for Special Operations Forces
Molly Jahn, University of Wisconsin–Madison;  
David A. Bray, Atlantic Council GeoTech Center and GeoTech Commission;  
Joseph Byrum, Principal Financial Group; LTG (ret.) Edward Cardon;  
Tom Creely, US Naval War College;  
Colonel Michael S. Gremillion, US Air Force; Aaron M. Kelly, Jahn Research Group;
Budhikka “Jay  Jayamaha, United States Air Force Academy;  
Megan Konar, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign;  
Seth C. Murray, Texas A&M University;  
Tony Nguy-Robertson, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;  
William L. Oemichen, Jahn Research Group and University of Wisconsin–Madison;  
Michael J. Puma, Center for Climate Systems Research, Columbia University; 
Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Hofstra University;  
Matthew A. Rose, General Services Administration’s Centers of Excellence;  
Gregory F. Treverton, Center for Strategic and International Studies and  
University of Southern California .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  148
As the Helix Turns:  
How New Biology, Biometrics, and DNA Analysis May Forever Prevent Anonymity
Brad Hart and Brian Souza, LLNL .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   159
”
4   |   D A V I S ,  G A C ,  R A G E R ,  R E I N E R  &  S N O W
S E C T I O N  3
THE MATERIALS WORLD: POSSIBLE SOF APPLICATIONS
Additive Adversaries:  
Enabling and Supporting the Warfighter with Additive Manufacturing
Lawrence E. Bronisz and Dominic S. Peterson, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)  .  .  .  .  .  167
Nanotechnology and SOF: Is Smaller Really Better?
P. Randall Schunk, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   182
 
The Disruptive Potential of Advanced Energetics
Bryce C. Tappan and Patrick R. Bowden, LANL .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  193
Metamaterials: How Close Are We to a Klingon Cloaking Device  
or Harry Potter Invisibility Cloak?
Michael T. Valley, SNL  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  209
Armor of the Future: Spider Webs, Buckyballs, Nanotubes, and Beyond
S. Robert Skaggs and Frank D. Gac (ret.), LANL  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  225
Emerging Trends in Flexible Electronics:  
Opportunities and Challenges for a Clandestine Community
Brian T. Holmes and Michael W. David, National Intelligence University .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  241
 
Adapting SOCOM to an Electrified World
Karen Swider-Lyons, US Naval Research Laboratory; Joshua Lamb, SNL; and  
Yet-Ming Chiang, Massachussetts Institute of Technology .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  253 
S E C T I O N  4
GLOBAL BUSINESS AND THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR  
IN NATIONAL SECURITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR SOF
Cryptocurrency: Will the Digitization of Currency Allow Malign Actors  
to Achieve Strategic Effects?
Sara Dudley, USASOC .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  269
Table of Contents
S T R A T E G I C  L A T E N C Y  U N L E A S H E D    |    5 
Blockchain and the Battlefield
Girish Nandakumar, Old Dominion University, and Jon Cederquist, Clearspeed  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  283
The Significance of 5G for Special Operations of the Future
Toby Redshaw, Verizon.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   293
On Being Stretch Armstrong:  
Innovating Successfully inside Bureaucratic Organizations
Brad Chedister and Tambrein Bates, SOFWERX, and Jennifer J. Snow, AFWERX/CTO .   .   .   .   .   .   .  305
 
Special Operations Forces as a Rapid Prototyping Laboratory
Leo Blanken, NPS, and Phillip Swintek, USASOC  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  322
S E C T I O N  5
DIGITAL DOMAINS: THE SOF ROLE
Special Operations Forces and Cyber-Enabled Influence Operations
Herb Lin, Stanford University, and Trisha Wyman, USASOC.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   333
The New COIN of the Realm: The Future of Technology and Insurgency
Peter Singer, New America Foundation .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   352
“Cyber FID  : The Role of Cyber in Foreign Internal Defense
Philip Reiner, Institute for Security and Technology, and Whitney Kassel, Morgan Stanley   .  .  .  .  370
Open Minds, Open Societies, and Hybrid Conflict
David Bray and Vint Cerf, People-Centered Internet Coalition .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   384
Artificial Intelligence: Risks and Opportunities for SOF
Paul Scharre, Center for a New American Security.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   398
Weaponized Information: Influence and Deception in the Age of Social Media
Pablo Breuer, Donovan Group; David Perlman, Copsycon; and  
Sara-Jayne Terp, Bodacea Light Industries   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  410
”
6   |   D A V I S ,  G A C ,  R A G E R ,  R E I N E R  &  S N O W
Table of Contents
S E C T I O N  6
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR MULTIDOMAIN WARFARE
Irregular as the New Normal: How Technology Will Change the Prevalence  
and Character of Irregular Warfare
Richard A. K. Lum, Future Vision, and Edwin Churchill, Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) .  .  447
Intelligence for Special Operations Forces
John Tullius, NPS .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   457
Systems of Systems: Coping with Pervasive Technology in Operating Areas
Mark W. Maier, Aerospace Corporation, and Edwin Churchill, JSOC.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   465
 
The Whole World Is Watching:  
Special Operations in a Ubiquitous Surveillance Environment
George duMais, FTS International.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   479
The Growing Importance of Subterranean Warfare and the Integration of  
General Purpose Forces in Subterranean Operations
Michael Alexander, USASOC.   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   486
Chaos and Constraint: Special Operations and “The Convergence    
Dan Leaf, USASOC .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  492
Few Weapons Are as Deadly as a Good Clock: Military Implications of 1:10^19 PNT
Robert G. Kennedy III, Tetra Tech .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  501
Megacities and Special Operations Forces
Margarita Konaev, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University .  .  .  .  .  522
FINAL THOUGHTS ON LATENCY UNLEASHED
What Have We Learned?  
Strategic Latency and the Future of Special Operations Forces
Zachary Davis, LLNL/NPS   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  536
”
S T R A T E G I C  L A T E N C Y  U N L E A S H E D    |    1 
Editor’s Note
Zachary S. Davis
The Timing of This Manuscript
We started this project in 2018. It took two years to write and publish the chapters. 
Now it’s 2021, and things have changed. The irony is not lost on us that while we were 
writing, the world kept spinning, and many of the things we predicted have since come 
to pass. Cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns have occurred as predicted, with 
devastating results. The global pandemic unfolded as some predicted. The global 
order is in further disarray. The scholars in this volume picked up on issues that were 
fresh and new when we started, and new issues have emerged since. It seems that, 
in some cases, the pace of events has compromised our ability to develop careful, 
reasoned, and thoughtful insights, at least in traditional forms of scholarship. These 
days, two years is a long time.  
With this in mind, we created a digital multimedia version of the book in a format 
called a Mixonium, which includes additional materials for each chapter and can be 
updated by the authors. You can find the Mixonium for this book here: https://www.
mixonium.com/#/public_clubs/599 (password: Beyond;20).
Technology channels people’s motives and intentions at whatever pace of 
innovation they desire. The good news is that US SOF are also built for rapid 
adaptation, as noted by Hondo Geurts in his Foreword. And we take some comfort 
in the solutions we have proposed to accompany our warnings. But we need to take 
action on multiple fronts to ensure that we understand the threats and implement 
creative strategies that put us ahead of the curve instead of lagging behind it.  
Let’s move out, before it’s too late.
January 2021
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Foreword
The Honorable James “Hondo” Geurts
“The ability to learn faster than competitors may be  
the only sustainable competitive advantage.”
—Arie de Geus12
Many saw it coming—the technology revolution, and its disruptive effects. Visionaries 
like Alvin Toffler, H. G. Wells, and Arthur C. Clarke gave the world decades of strategic 
warning, as they each, in their own ways, predicted how a new technological age 
would disrupt traditional thinking about national security. Private-sector innovators, 
not constrained by status quo or traditional bureaucracies, are now accelerating 
innovation at scale and in a way most previously believed possible only through 
government-funded megaprojects. Technologies, and the means with which they 
are being developed, are transforming both societies and the everyday activities 
of individuals at a dizzying pace. While there is consensus in the national security 
community that these vectors provide both new threats and new opportunities, the 
means and principles to adapt to them at the speed of relevance are far less clear. 
Nowhere is the need for rapid adaptation more urgent than in our special 
operations forces (SOF), which serve as the touchpoint for so many of the nation’s 
efforts to sense and cope with emerging threats and opportunities. Since their 
inception, special operations forces have been the nation’s early adopters, 
leveraging curiosity, an unrelenting drive to experiment and improve, and tightly 
integrated teams of operators, acquirers, and technologists to lead the Department 
of Defense’s transformation. From the early days of the Office of Strategic Services 
to the rapid adaptations of special operations forces in the post-9/11 conflicts 
around the globe, America’s SOF have proven their ability to pivot, invent and adapt, 
and, where it makes sense, accelerate transition of these capabilities to other 
organizations to amplify innovations with scale and depth.  
The success of special operations forces over the last several decades does 
not ensure future victory, however. Past success naturally leads to overvaluing 
the status quo and underappreciating the means and pace in which new thinking, 
driven by technological opportunities, can erode previous competitive advantages. 
Left unchallenged from within, the very things that have made the nation’s special 
operations forces successful will likely become inhibitors to crucial transformation 
needed for future victories. Global competitors have seized the chance to enhance 
their competitiveness by exploiting technological opportunities others do not yet 
understand. If an organization’s only sustainable competitive advantage is the ability 
to learn faster than its competitors, then it is imperative US SOF understand both 
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the future operational environment and the opportunities to blend new technologies, 
new thinking, and potential new relationships into winning strategies. That is why 
this book is so important. 
In the chapters that follow, thought experts and experienced operators offer 
their insights into how special operation forces can exploit strategic latency 
to fight and win the conflicts of tomorrow as emerging technologies redefine 
operational environments, from the deep seabed to deep space. Through a wide 
variety of perspectives, the authors illuminate the opportunities to harness the 
latent potential of an expansive innovation ecosystem, from private start-ups 
to legacy providers, traditional lab organizations, and emerging nodes such as 
SOFWERX, AFWERX, NavalX, Defense Innovation Unit, and In-Q-Tel. The authors 
make the case that SOF must also similarly adapt from transactional and 
stovepiped approaches to highly integrated processes that close the distance 
between technologist, acquirer, and operator. Most important, these chapters 
reinforce the enduring power of teams and highlight SOF’s proven ability to build 
and connect teams of highly capable people spanning traditional boundaries—
now more than ever, this ability will enable SOF to lead the transformation to new 
systems, technologies, and thought processes.  
The ability of US SOF to adapt and thrive in the age of technology is a harbinger 
of the larger challenges we face, in the military, the government, and society. Our 
special operations forces are uniquely positioned to lead the way in addressing 
these challenges and, in doing so, enable the United States to continue to be free, 
secure, and prosperous. This book—and all the contributers who have worked so 
hard on its content—will help guide special operations forces on its most critical 
missions for our nation.
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This book, Strategic Latency Unleashed: The Role of Technology in a 
Global Revisionist Order and the Implications for Special Operations 
Forces, is dedicated to Lisa Owens Davis, wife of Zachary (Zack) S. 
Davis, mother to Max and Sam Davis, daughter of Bill and Wendy 
Owens, friend to many, a national security expert, and a “special 
forces operator” in her own right.
Lisa succumbed to pancreatic cancer on February 26, 2020, after fighting valiantly 
for her life for seven months. Her story is inspiring for all. Lisa was born on the first 
day of spring in 1966, in Santa Barbara, California. She graduated from University of 
California, Santa Barbara with a degree in Spanish literature and a love for languages. 
She lived in Spain and worked at the Spanish consulate in Los Angeles, which 
sparked her interest in diplomacy. She taught English in the Czech Republic soon 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall and traveled extensively throughout eastern Europe 
and Russia in the days immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Her 
adventures shaped her career, are indicative of her “special forces operator” skills, 
and made for long conversations during security-clearance reviews.
Lisa pursued he master’s degree at the Monterey Institute of International Studies 
(now Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey) and was one of 
William Potter’s early graduates from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, which 
he founded. She was an intern at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
later returned to the US Embassy in Vienna, Austria to work on nuclear safeguards 
policy. Lisa was selected to the Presidential Management Program, which enabled her 
to serve in the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy (DOE), where 
she accepted a position managing nuclear safeguards support to the IAEA. At DOE, 
Lisa led delegations to numerous countries, funded research at national laboratories, 
served as lead DOE representative to the negotiations on the Additional Protocol, and 
chaired the interagency committee on safeguards technology. It was during the latter 
that she met Zack. In 1995, Lisa moved to the State Department and served as the 
chief of staff to Ambassador Norman Wulf, the US representative to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Lisa and Zack returned to their native California to work at Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory’s Z Division, where Lisa quickly rose through the ranks to manage 
a wide range of analytic and operational intelligence support program. Throughout her 
professional career, she earned high praise for building bridges among diplomatic, 
military, intelligence, and technical agencies. Lisa also took delight in many hobbies 
and activities and will be missed by all.
Lisa A. Owens Davis, 1966-2020
Wife, Mother, Daughter, Friend,
and National Security Expert
Dedication
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and, in fact, recommended me for this project. She is missed by all of us who knew her.
A note about style. In general, I’ve tried to adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style 
17th edition (online) and the Merriam-Webster online dictionary. Regarding endnotes, 
I mostly let author’s determine the style of and format for endnotes in their respective 
chapters, though I often made slight adjustments for clarity and consistency. As you may 
notice, there is not a uniform bibliographic style to which I’ve asked authors to adhere. 
Philip Reiner
There are requests for your time, then there are requests from Zack Davis for your time. 
Without pause, when asked to contribute to this effort, I could only be excited at the 
opportunity. Knowing Zack, and the Ron Lehman tradition he carries forward, has been 
both a personal and a professional gift for me, so I was more than honored to help lend 
a hand. What is at stake with this iteration of the Strategic Latency series is no less 
than the future success of our nations’ special operations forces. There was a time 
when our men and women of the special operations community were always the first to 
receive the most cutting-edge tools and capabilities—this, unfortunately, is no longer 
the case. This book is in part an attempt to remedy that situation and to empower 
those who fight in the darkness on our behalf with tools they deserve, as adversaries 
move quickly to take advantage of our distracted and nearsighted current reality. 
None of this would come together without the sheer unbridled force of will that 
Zack brings to all he does—nor would it have been possible without the deep love and 
affection that his wife Lisa gave to him and to all who knew her. Her loss hurt deeply. 
We all miss her immensely and dedicate this work to her commitment to serving 
her nation and ensuring its men and women had the tools they needed for the fight. 
To Zack, you have my steadfast loyalty, trust, and admiration—as a friend, father, 
husband, and patriot. Thank you for letting me be a part of this effort.
Lt. Col. Jennifer “JJ” Snow
When I approached Zack about taking this project on, I was aware of how much time 
and effort would be involved. I also knew Zack has zero quit in him, and he always turns 
out projects that exceed expectations. This latest edition of the Strategic Latency series 
is, by far, his best yet. Within these pages are the lessons that will guide and shape 
the next generation of technology influence operations for special operations forces, 
conventional forces, and our allies. I am exceptionally grateful for Zack’s mentorship, 
friendship, and guidance on this project and the ones that came before and those yet to 
come. I miss Lisa greatly. She was a bright, vibrant, and strong innovator and leader. Her 
legacy will inspire many young women who chose to follow her path in national security. 
I am so glad I had the opportunity to know her. Thank you, Zack, for always standing 
strong for our special operations community even in the middle of your own battles and 
loss. You are someone who always inspires me to bring my best self to the fight.
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Latency Unleashed:  
What It Means for Special Operations Forces
Zachary S. Davis
“Is it me, or is it getting crazier out there?”
—The Joker (2019)
It didn’t have to be like this. The world could have evolved in different ways—toward 
a tranquil state marked by peace and cooperation, or on a trajectory of expanding 
chaos and violence. The current geopolitical situation is somewhere in the middle. 
While scholars analyze global politics and policy makers set the course of action, US 
special operations forces (SOF) adapt to both the peaceful and chaotic aspects of the 
operational environment to achieve mission objectives. This book contemplates the 
changing conditions under which SOF must operate and the role technology plays in 
making their jobs harder in some ways and easier in others. 
“Strategic latency” refers to the potential for technologies to shift the balance of 
power among nation-states.i1 “Strategic” effects have major, long-term consequences 
(in contrast to tactical effects that may be important but not game-changing). Latent 
power—expressed in the full range of military, economic, and political forms—can 
be unleashed to enable tools that people use to achieve their objectives. From the 
Stone Age to the Information Age, humans have wavered between peaceful and violent 
goals. Technology magnifies humanity’s dual nature, predisposed to perform both 
good and evil deeds. Peering into the future, nothing suggests this fundamental truth 
will change. Thus, we should expect both conflict and warfare to endure and for SOF 
to play a leading role in future conflict. If war is an expression of “politics by other 
means,” then technology will provide the soft- and hard-power tools with which wars 
will be fought. Therefore, SOF will have to employ appropriate technologies to ensure 
success in the evolving operational environment. 
While human nature stays the same, other things are changing. The operating 
environment of world politics is undergoing a historic transformation. Nation-states 
remain the primary actors on the world stage, but the global balance of power is in 
flux. The “Long Peace” of the Cold War yielded to an interlude of American supremacy, 
followed by the current period of shuffling and realignment in which state and nonstate 
actors are challenging the norms, institutions, and alliances favored by the United 
States. The rules established to support the post–World War II global order are 
showing signs of weakness and decay. Countries and nonstate actors have violated 
i   We normally associate this shift in power with nation-states. However, we have learned that it can also be associated with 
regions and nonstate actors or entities like organized crime or business competitors. 
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international norms and treaties such as those prohibiting chemical weapons use, 
nuclear testing, and nuclear proliferation.
How much longer will the postwar norms hold, especially without verification or 
enforcement? Increasingly, key US allies question the security guarantees provided 
to address their fears of hostile neighbors, raising concerns they may break ranks to 
acquire nuclear, chemical, or biological capabilities. Rising powers, such as China, and 
revanchist states such as Russia and Iran welcome the demise of the aging American-
led order, while nationalist movements around the world reject the core values of 
freedom and democracy that defined the American century. Tectonic geopolitical shifts 
are underway in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, spilling into Africa and the Americas. 
Multicontinent mass migrations from poverty and violence have sparked fear and 
resentment from those who see refugees and immigrants as threats. Climate change is 
producing extreme weather, causing natural disasters and resource scarcity that directly 
affects the operational environment.2 This is the new world that SOF encounters. 
Further complicating the situation, a new generation of nonstate actors populate 
the landscape. Global corporations, many with no allegiances beyond their bottom 
line, pursue interests largely beyond the reach of nation-states. Activist groups 
advocate on behalf of people, animals, and myriad social causes, forming identities 
more tied to particular ideology than to national allegiance. Violent extremist 
organizations continue to thrive in the chaotic and ungoverned corners of the world, 
yet their messages of hate reach millions through social media, sometimes inspiring 
terrorism and rebellion. A common theme running throughout this changing ecosystem 
of states, groups, and individuals is the role of technology in giving force to their 
actions. How can US SOF find advantage amidst these conditions? 
In contrast to the constancy of human nature, technology is changing at breakneck 
speed. Scientific discovery is accelerating, aided by the input of massive resources 
from governments and industries aimed at winning global competition for markets 
and influence, be it in communications, artificial intelligence, manufacturing, or health 
care. While US government–sponsored research and development has declined,3 
rising powers such as China pour human and financial resources into science and 
technology intending to reap the military and economic benefits.4 Progress in the 
biological sciences, artificial intelligence, robotics, computation, and basic research 
fuels innovation in medicine, transportation, manufacturing, communications, 
and even entertainment. As the futurist Alvin Toffler predicted, a third wave of 
technology-inspired revolutions is remaking societies on a global scale.5 The highly 
structured, brick-and-mortor industrial age is giving way to an era of nonhierarchical, 
individualized, instantaneous, global connectedness. 
Often, technological changes reflect “the better angels of our nature” and bring 
improvements to the human condition. Sometimes, they serve the dark side of 
human nature and find expression as weapons of war. For example, fire, atomic 
energy, and computers have all fueled both peaceful and warfighting innovations. 
Gene editing and artificial intelligence may possess similar latent power. 
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Interconnectivity ensures the latest scientific discoveries will be available to all and 
puts the commercial applications of those discoveries in the hands of anyone with 
a credit card. Facebook, Google, Amazon, and their competitors have often forgone 
notions of privacy to create new levels of association among people, places, and 
things. Such witting and unwitting connectedness empowers all-encompassing 
surveillance systems used simultaneously for communication, commerce, and 
repression. How will SOF navigate this shifting landscape?
The Internet of Things promises even more connectivity. On the battlefield, a 
military version of the Internet of Things spans multiple domains, from subterranean 
and undersea, across the earth’s surface, and into the atmosphere and outer space. 
The latent potential of drones and robots has already caused rapid innovation from 
both nations and nonstate actors. Interconnectedness begets data, which may 
soon challenge oil for its value as a strategic game changer. Echoing the words of 
the famous maritime strategist Alfred Mahan, “Whoever rules the waves rules the 
world,”6 Russian president Vladimir Putin proclaimed “Whoever rules in artificial 
intelligence will rule the world.”7 Control of data may indeed be a strategic asset, 
but its value lies in the insights it provides into human behavior. New tools may not 
change humanity’s fundamental nature, but they are changing how we live, govern, 
communicate, and fight. 
Some scholars argue the risks associated with these global trends pale in 
comparison to the prosperity that defines our age.8 Others view the risks as 
indicators of a gathering storm. One thing is certain: large-scale changes in 
geopolitics, spurred by technology, are changing the operational environment and, 
with it, the nature of warfare. For starters, the beginning and end of conflicts are 
getting harder to define, with gray-zone tactics becoming commonplace even in 
peacetime. Borders provide little protection from agressors, and the distinction 
between friends and enemies, be they nation-states or otherwise, is similarly 
blurred. Relatedly, the distinction between combatants and noncombatants has 
grown increasingly unclear. Even the rules of war are blurring, raising ethical 
questions about the uses of force, especially as the battlefield becomes less 
defined by physical or temporal boundaries and new weapons open uncharted paths 
of conflict and competition. To further confuse the situation, social media distorts 
perceptions of reality, exacerbating political differences. 
US SOF must be prepared to meet a broad and growing array of challenges. When 
shadow wars are a constant background to international relations, and the spectrum 
of conflict extends from great power and peer competition through regional conflicts 
and proxy wars, calibrating effective SOF capabilities is more complex than ever. 
With more parties using an expanding toolbox of measures short of war to shape 
the environment, understanding the evolving threats to US security requires new 
insights. We must think differently. The purpose of this book is to open pathways 
for those new insights as they apply to the mission of US SOF. Fortunately, adapting 
to new threats is a notable strength of American SOF. Innovation is a defining 
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trait. SOCOM’s experience fighting terrorism in the post-9/11 world provides many 
examples of the type of adaptation that is required for the new environment. 
Countering terrorism requires constant innovation in tactics and tools, in part 
because the practicioners of terror are themselves motivated innovators. Similarly, 
SOCOM’s evolving role in countering weapons of mass destruction has spurred new 
approaches. This book is part of the effort to understand the threats, mobilize a 
response, and prepare US commandos with the tools they need to win. 
To cope with these changes, however, it is not enough to perfect the “hyper-
enabled operator”9 or simply increase the range and lethality of the warfighter. 
Fortunately, the enduring SOF Truths10 provide sturdy concepts for dealing with 
today’s chaos and complexity. The five SOF Truths are listed below in quotations, 
followed by the authors comments as to how they apply to this chapter and book. 
•“Humans are more important than hardware.”  
 
Technology tools simply enable people to achieve their objectives. 
Understanding the constants of human nature provides insight into the 
intentions of our allies and adversaries. Tools are never more important 
than people. Technology must serve strategy. 
•“Quality is better than quantity.” 
 
What makes SOF special is the ability to understand and exploit the 
operational environment. Knowing which tools/technologies to use 
in specific circumstances and how to apply them requires uncommon 
knowledge of multiple disciplines. Such knowledge is rare but essential 
for SOF to deal with complexity and chaos. Knowledge is power. 
•“Special operations forces cannot be mass produced.” 
 
SOF are effective for certain missions but are not suited for all forms of 
conflict. Small teams of extraordinarily skilled, trained, equipped, and 
supported operators are tailored for speed, precision, stealth, and low 
visibility. This specialized capability augments general purpose forces 
and represents a small faction within the broader context of military, 
diplomatic, intelligence, and economic tools of statecraft. One objective 
of this project is to identify tools to maximize the reach, effectiveness, 
and resiliance of limited SOF resources.  
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•“Competent special operations forces cannot be created after 
emergencies occur.” 
 
The Covid-19 pandemic of 2020 illustrated the problems that arise 
from trying to compensate for a lack of preparedness after the crisis 
has already struck. SOF cannot wait and react to the changes that are 
occurring in the world. We are preparing now for tomorrow’s challenges. 
This book takes stock of the emerging operational environment and 
offers possible solutions to prepare SOF for future exigencies.  
•“Most special operations require non-SOF assistance.” 
 
To cope with complexity, SOF must deepen its relationships with a broad 
swath of society that is knowledgeable about the technologies and social 
movements behind the changes taking place in the world. This includes the 
private sector, academia, and people associated with unconventional points 
of view who can provide insights into the current situation. Beyond relying 
on general purpose forces, foreign partners, and the full range of capabil-
ities available in the US government, SOF must engage with an expanding 
range of diverse, multidisciplinary, global perspectives, such as those 
presented here.
Taking guidance from these SOF Truths, and with full appreciation for SOF’s Core 
Activities,ii11 we have gathered a group of top experts from multiple disciplines, 
along with current and former SOF operators, to view developments in geopolitics, 
technology, and business through the eyes of American SOF. The book provides a 
compendium of SOF-relevant topics to illuminate important trends for irregular and 
unconventional warfare. The accompanying Mixonium multimedia platform offers 
additional insights and resources to those interested in these topics. The project 
intends to spark conversation and debate about these issues, so we invite you to 
join the discussion. Our contact information is available in this volume and on the 
Mixonium pages.
ii   SOF Core Activities include Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Civil 
Affairs Operations, Counterterrorism, Military Information Support Operations, Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Security Force Assistance, Counterinsurgency, Hostage Rescue and Recovery, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.
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C H A P T E R  1
Winning and Losing in Counterproliferation
Zachary Davis and Michael Greene
What does “winning” look like in the current counterproliferation (CP) mission space? 
This book is rich with insights into the geopolitical context within which special 
operations forces (SOF) must operate. How is “winning” defined in this megacomplex, 
hyperdynamic operational environment, when SOF are finding their place in the broad 
context of US national security and defense policy? What metrics and measures of 
performance are even appropriate? How do we distinguish between success and 
failure in an endless gray zone where wars are unacknowledged? One SOCOM mission 
that provides a useful case study in winning and losing is countering weapons of 
mass destruction (CWMD). We examine what it means for SOF to “win” in the effort 
to prevent more countries (or groups) from acquiring nuclear, chemical, or biological 
weapons and to mitigate the consequences if they do. 
Nonproliferation (NP) refers to the mainly diplomatic efforts to persuade countries 
not to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The primary nonproliferation 
tools are security guarantees, alliances, multilateral agreements, international 
organizations, treaties, and global norms. Superficially, nonproliferation appears 
easy to measure: either a country gets WMD or it doesn’t. In practice, however, 
countries may either acquire the capabilities needed to produce WMD covertly or 
develop latent production infrastructure that enables them to produce the necessary 
materials without violating any rules. Traditionally, preventing countries from crossing 
the boundary between civilian and military applications is considered a win for those 
trying to maintain global nonproliferation standards. 
For SOCOM’s CWMD mission, illicit acquisition of WMD production capabilities 
falls under the upstream defeat category. Wins and losses are measured in terms 
of a particular country or group’s progress toward having WMD options. For example, 
persuading Japan or South Korea not to use their civilian nuclear infrastructure to 
produce nuclear weapons is a nonproliferation win. Failure to prevent them, or North 
Korea, or Iraq, from using their civilian nuclear capabilities to advance their covert 
weapons programs rank as NP failures. Iran hangs in the balance. But SOCOM would 
not have played much role in these failed nonproliferation efforts because SOF would 
not normally play a leading role in blocking illicit transfers of dual-use equipment, and 
no policy directive authorized attacks on their facilities. Where does SOF come into 
the picture?
Counterproliferation is oriented toward countries or groups that evade NP efforts 
and acquire WMD capabilities. “Winning” or “losing” in this context is harder to 
measure but focuses on limiting adversary abilities to deploy or use WMD in ways 
that threaten US interests. This is often a losing battle against a determined 
proliferator who is willing to resist NP pressures and pay the price required to get 
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WMD technologies. For example, Pakistan, India, North Korea, and Iran defied 
international pressure to advance their WMD aspirations. Counterproliferation 
includes policies and actions to roll back, disrupt, contain, and cope with adversary 
WMD programs that are advancing toward possession and stockpiling of nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons and delivery systems. This includes upstream 
efforts against latent programs that give the possessor the option of rapidly 
transforming civilian infrastructure into military weapons. For nuclear weapons, this 
includes the ability to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium from spent reactor 
fuel. For chemical and biological weapons, CP focusses on industrial production 
of chemicals and pharmaceuticals for a wide variety of civilian purposes. If CP 
starts after NP has failed, SOF contributions to CP might be doomed to fail unless 
decision-makers are willing to authorize direct action against industrial sites, as 
occurred in the case of Israel’s bombing of a covert Syrian reactor in 2007, the 
Stuxnet episode that disrupted Iran’s centrifuges at Natanz, and possibly the 
reported 2020 damage at that same facility.1 However, short of direct action, a 
more circumspect definition would give credit to disruption, interdiction, and other 
measures designed to slow down and complicate the weaponization process.
Categorizing SOF Priorities
Importantly, CWMD is a Department of Defense (DOD) construct not shared 
throughout the US government (USG). Most agencies are organized around NP and 
CP terminology, so measuring CWMD differs from either of the more established 
concepts. Therefore, determining the success or failure of SOCOM’s role in DOD 
CWMD starts with identifying what is included in the SOF mission space—and what 
is not. SOF priorities fall into three categories: crisis response, pathway defeat,  
and early detection.
Crisis Response
Crisis response refers to the quick-reaction, technically prepared, and highly trained 
units that would be deployed to assess and render safe WMD that are not under 
the control of a nation-state. SOCOM has long prepared for such “loose-nuke” 
scenarios. The United States possesses a robust domestic and overseas CWMD 
crisis-response capability comprising numerous teams from various departments 
across the USG. Significant communication and collaboration exists across the 
crisis-response enterprise, resulting in a formidable whole-of-government capability 
postured for success. Nevertheless, there is room for improvement in the policy and 
communication aspects of the crisis-response mission, which we address later in 
this chapter. 
Pathway Defeat
While the crisis-response effort is mature, robust, and coordinated across the whole 
of government, pathway defeat is a relatively new addition to the SOCOM lexicon, 
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although the term originated within the Naval Special Warfare community. For 
pathway defeat, operators trace back the proliferation networks and technological 
pathways that support the development of WMD programs to target critical nodes. 
Key DOD strategy documents embody this approach.2 As we shall see, this mission 
space is already crowded with interagency collaboration, and the SOF role remains 
largely a work in progress. 
Early Detection
Winning in CWMD depends on early detection. CWMD is not only crisis-response and/
or pathway-defeat capabilities but also a coalition of foreign partners who possess 
similar (if not exact) capabilities able to detect and counter these threats away from 
the homeland. Essential to this vision is the USG and DOD’s ability to exchange 
technological capabilities, communicate openly, and share sensitive intelligence. 
Outdated policies and a lack of requisite authorities prevent the effective and timely 
exchange of technology and/or intelligence.
Defining SOF Priorities for Success in CWMD
NP and CP focus generally on countries attempting to acquire prohibited weapons 
illicitly. While much attention has been given to the idea of “moving to the left of 
boom” to prevent adversaries from acquiring WMD capabilities in the first place—
the nonproliferation realm—early detection and interdiction of WMD production 
equipment is already covered by an existing whole-of-government approach.3 SOCOM 
can contribute to these ongoing efforts but is not replacing or competing with them 
via its concept of upstream defeat. A win for SOCOM in this mission space comes 
from supporting the coordinated efforts of intelligence, diplomatic, financial, and law 
enforcement agencies. 
SOCOM has a rich legacy of such support in counterterror and counterdrug 
missions and can play a critical but niche role in executing CP policy. However, CP 
policy priorities are set by policy decisions, so relevant resources and authorities 
are directed and coordinated according to White House policy directives. In practice, 
this means no agency or department, including SOCOM and its subelements, is 
entirely free to pursue disruptive upstream actions without policy guidance. By 
contrast, SOCOM elements play a preeminent role in most crisis-response actions, 
although those too are guided by White House oversight and direction. Crisis-
response roles and responsibilities are more clearly defined for nuclear weapons 
and less stringent with respect to actions involving chemical weapons, especially 
with respect to contaminated operational environments such as in Syria, where 
force-protection considerations are a priority. Biological threats present increasingly 
complex problems for readiness, whether human-made or naturally occurring. The 
ability to execute missions successfully in a WMD battlefield would constitute a 
major win for SOF. Conversely, the inability to execute missions because of WMD 
use, or threatened use, must be considered a loss. Advancements in detection, 
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personnel protective equipment (PPE), vaccines, decontamination, and other force-
protection technologies are needed to limit the impact on SOF mission execution, 
whether focused on CP objectives or other urgent priorities.
As SOCOM adjusts its focus from CT to major-power competition, the SOF role 
in countering the WMD systems of peer competitors remains unclear, but would 
present major challenges. For example, upstream defeat has not traditionally 
focused on the strategic systems of de jure nuclear-weapon states, as defined 
under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Interdiction 
of proliferation networks and materials is directed mainly at nations and groups 
attempting to acquire WMD beyond the scope of their treaty commitments. 
Similarly, no major power admits to possessing chemical weapons, and all but a 
few countries have forsworn them via obligations under the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. Similarly, the Biological Weapons Convention outlaws all offensive 
biological weapons, but it lacks verification and enforcement mechanisms. SOCOM 
CWMD efforts are naturally directed at such illicit nuclear, chemical, and biological 
programs as part of the broader NP/CP policy of the USG. Winning in that context 
generally means contributing to the overall success of interagency collaboration.
Two Levels of Threat: Tactical and Strategic 
These CP, NP, and CWMD issues can usefully be divided into two categories: tactical 
and strategic. There is a significant gap between the tactical capability to protect 
against or defeat a limited chemical threati and a strategic threat from a yield-
producing nuclear device that can be delivered on a missile. When assessing wins 
and losses, priority must be given to strategic threats that carry potential to damage 
the homeland and the American way of life significantly. One can imagine a wide 
range of nuclear, chemical, or biological threats that could achieve strategic effects, 
including economic and political damage. These contrast with important tactical 
threats that merit a vigorous response but are less likely to cause irreparable harm 
to core American interests. Below we outline several strategic threats that merit 
high priority for CWMD policy and operations and give examples of tactical threats 
that fall below the threshold of vital interest.
A Sampler of Strategic Threats from WMD: A SOF Perspective
Loose Nukes from Anywhere
A key element of existing and ongoing SOCOM responsibility in CWMD is the threat 
of “loose nukes”: nuclear weapons not under the control of the nation that produced 
them. Because of the harm that a single such weapon could do to US or allied/
partner forces, locating and disarming these weapons must rank as a top priority 
and a “no fail” mission for SOF. As stockpiles of nuclear weapons grow, the risk also 
i   For example, ISIS chemical weapons use in Iraq and Syria.
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increases that imperfect security measures will result in a weapon being removed 
from custody. Growing arsenals in Russia, India, China, Pakistan, North Korea, and 
perhaps elsewhere could present appealing targets for those seeking to acquire a 
nuclear weapon. The render-safe mission also includes improvised devises either 
based on a stolen state weapon or constructed from illicitly acquired weapons-
usable nuclear materials. This mission has rightfully ranked as a top priority for 
many years, and American SOF are positioned to win. However, current capabilities 
are limited and could be overwhelmed if more than a few weapons were to escape 
from custody and require multiple, simultaneous render-safe operations. 
North Korea
While any hostile state that possesses the ability to threaten the US homeland with 
nuclear weapons must be considered a strategic threat, North Korea combines a 
number of factors that puts it in a class of its own. Historical animosities, the US-
South Korean alliance, regional allies and adversaries, the risk of conventional war, 
and Pyongyang’s decades-long commitment to its WMD programs have all made NP, 
CP and CWMD largely ineffective against North Korea’s continued advancement of 
its WMD and missile programs. Despite successful interdiction efforts, determined 
proliferators overcome CP obstacles. Moreover, coping with North Korea’s WMD 
during a war poses daunting challenges. In our view, the USG, DOD, and SOF are not 
postured for success and could actually fail to prevent a catastrophe if North Korea 
is able to use its WMD against the United States, South Korea, or Japan. 
Peer Competitors
As stated previously, NP, CP, and CWMD policy has not focused on disrupting the 
WMD systems of peer competitors in peacetime. The presumption that deterrence 
is essentially a defense posture suggests major power’s WMD are not intended as 
first-strike weapons. Of course, in wartime, limiting damage on the US homeland, 
troops, and allies makes foreign WMD systems fair game. Blunting Warsaw Pact 
WMD use in Europe was a US priority during the Cold War, one that diminished 
as Soviet forces withdrew. A reevaluation of peer and near-peerii competitor WMD 
threats could suggest reprioritization of the threats from existing stockpiles. 
Biological Wildcards
Whether of natural or human-made origin, biological hazards can cause strategic 
effects. As such, preparedness should be a national priority, and SOF should take 
steps to remain effective in the event of a wide spectrum of biological threats. To do 
less is to accept failure. 
ii   At least in terms of WMD capabilities.
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A Sampler of Tactical Challenges from WMD: A SOF Perspective
Loose Chemical Weapons: A Tactical Problem
The term WMD lumps together a wide variety of dissimilar problems. Because of the 
challenges associated with using chemical weapons successfully on the battlefield, 
national chemical weapons programs may not constitute a strategic threat to the 
United States. Terrorist use of chemical weapons against military or civilian targets 
also is likely to be limited in its destructive effects. We believe terrorist use of 
chemical weapons would not necessarily meet the standard of strategic effects. 
Therefore, loss of control over chemical weapons, as was the case in Syria, should 
be considered a tactical threat. In the case of Syrian, ISIS’s, and other group’s 
use of CW in Iraq and Syria, the USG and DOD, specifically, enjoy a significant 
competitive advantage, as PPE is able to protect operators and render the enemy’s 
chemical weapons ineffective. This constitutes a tactical win. 
Radiological Weapons Not Strategic
Radiological dispersal devices have little military value and are mainly effective 
in producing fear in civilian populations. Granted, widespread fear of radiological 
exposure could be disruptive, including significant potential for economic harm. 
However, these are considered manageable risks that do not constitute strategic 
threats to the United States and are unlikely to undermine the effectiveness of 
SOF operations. Moreover, multiagency investments in consequence-management 
methods are in place to limit the effects of radiological hazards. We consider this a 
win against a tactical threat. 
Biological Risks Can Be Managed
Many lessons can be drawn from the Covid-19 pandemic. For SOF, longstanding 
focus on readiness contrasts with the preparations that could have greatly reduced 
the impact of COVID-19 on society at large. But for SOF, aggressive force-protection 
procedures, vaccines, monitoring, and other specialized equipment can greatly 
reduce the threat posed by biological hazards, rendering them more of a tactical 
than a strategic threat. This, too, constitutes and important win for SOF.
What It Takes for SOF to Win against WMD
Counterproliferation is a team sport. Success requires the full range of USG 
capabilities and authorities to cover the full WMD development cycle, from cradle 
to grave, inception to employment. The selection of targets—which countries 
and proliferation networks to counter—and the methods used against them are 
policy decisions. The toolbox available to policy makers includes both positive 
and negative economic incentives, diplomatic agreements (such as the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran or the Agreed Framework with North Korea), 
multilateral treaties such as the NPT and CWC, positive and negative security 
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assurances, and cooperative measures (such as Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR] 
programs and the Proliferation Security Initiative [PSI]). Specific actions can include 
interdiction, sanctions, export controls, diplomatic engagement, military show 
of force, alliance cooperation, and covert action. Each of these depends on the 
specific skills, authorities, and resources available to the appropriate agencies of 
the USG, usually from the State, Defense, Treasury, Energy, Justice, and Commerce 
Departments as well as the intelligence community. Where do the activities of DOD, 
SOCOM, and its SOF elements fit in this mix? 
US SOF possess a number of specialized skill sets that can contribute to the 
overall CP policy effort. Some are well-known and longstanding within the CP/
CWMD community, such as the render-safe mission, countering terrorist WMD, and 
the ability to interdict ships suspected of carrying illicit cargo. Other capabilities, 
however, have not been exploited fully for CP purposes. For example, SOF teams 
regularly access remote areas where intelligence about local WMD-related facilities, 
organizations, and people may be hard to collect. Also, SOF training, support, and 
collaboration with local military and law enforcement provides an ideal platform for 
sharing best practices for a wide range of CP skills, as is done via CTR, PSI, and 
other partnership-building activities. Foreign internal defense training and exercises 
could include CP-related training modules where appropriate. Psychological 
operations could influence local perspectives on WMD, portray proliferation 
network operatives as corrupt, and support cooperative efforts. Preparation of the 
operational environment could be instrumental in planning CP operations, especially 
in hard-to-reach areas. A win for SOF would be to fill additional niche roles in the 
overall USG CP policy. A win for DOD CWMD is to bolster interagency collaboration 
on NP and CP.4
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C H A P T E R  2
The Role of Special Operations Forces in  
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
Brendan G. Melley
The use of nuclear, chemical, and/or biological weapons against the United States 
and our allies and partners continues to be perceived as a low-probability event in 
the national security community. Yet, at a time when international norms and other 
constraints on the use of these weapons have grown weaker, they are becoming more 
accessible and attractive to adversaries because of their potential utility against 
a range of vulnerable targets. Major US strategy documents—including the 2017 
National Security Strategy (NSS), 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), 2018 
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), 2018 National Military Strategy (NMS), and 2018 
National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism—identify 
countering the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a critical 
priority for the United States.i
Emerging technology with WMD applications will further complicate the ability 
of the United States to prevent the acquisition of WMD capabilities by state and 
nonstate actors, contain and reduce WMD threats, and respond to crises, which are 
the core objectives of the 2014 Department of Defense (DOD) Strategy for Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD).1 WMD threats will become more challenging 
to counter as technologies develop—from capabilities that enable rapid analysis of 
massive amounts of data, to advances in the life sciences and new delivery methods, 
to cite a few important areas of innovation. Technology development cuts both ways, 
however, as US efforts to keep pace or gain advantage over adversaries’ capabilities 
can assist with detecting and responding to WMD threats that may arise.
The WMD-related objectives identified in the national and DOD strategies rely 
implicitly on the roles of US special operations forces (SOF), whose capabilities 
are critical for competing and winning in this WMD-infected security environment. 
Core SOF capabilities work to shape the operating environment in the current 
“steady-state” landscape in a manner that serves to deter, dissuade, and frustrate 
adversaries from pursuing or aquiring WMD. US SOF’s close relationships with foreign 
forces enable stronger partnerships to complement broad DOD or US government 
efforts against adversaries who possess or seek WMD capabilities. Below the 
level of armed conflict, SOF can disrupt the efforts of state and nonstate actors, 
including terrorists, who pose a threat of acquiring, developing, and employing WMD 
capabilities. In a crisis, SOF can counter imminent WMD threats through direct action, 
i   The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and are not an official policy or position of the National Defense 
University, the Department of Defense, or the US government. The author is grateful for the advice of Mr. Paul Bernstein,  
Mr. John Caves, Dr. Diane DiEuliis, Senior Chief Petty Officer, USN (Ret.) Michael Greene, and Mr. Dain Hancock in crafting 
this paper.
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sabotage, unconventional warfare, or counterterrorism operations. With their global 
presence and reach, SOF remain a critical capability for meeting the United States’ 
priorities for countering WMD. 
The Emerging Strategic Environment and WMD
As we enter the third decade of the twenty-first century, US national security is being 
challenged as never before. The federal government’s “fundamental responsibility is 
to protect the Amercian people, the homeland, and the American way of life.”2 The 
2018 NDS summary presents a significant change in focus from that of the post-Cold 
War period, stating that the “central challenge to US prosperity and security is the 
reemergence of long-term, strategic competition” with China and Russia, shifting from 
the emphasis on counterterrorism following 9/11.3 Not only are competitors seeking 
to compete with the United States militarily, they and some other state actors seek 
to undermine what we take for granted—rule of law, freedom of speech, a robust 
economic foundation, domestic stability, accurate information, and fact-based reason. 
WMD threats are transregional and global, without regard to borders, designated 
areas of responsibility, or bureaucratic authorities, and the global community cannot 
wish away or uninvent these weapons. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons often 
are attractive to actors who seek advantage over their rivals or protection from outside 
intervention. With few exceptions, history has shown that states in possession of 
WMD will not give them up unilaterally.ii The perceived and real advantages to a 
state’s security often outweigh external sanctions and pressure because possession 
of WMD are believed to create demonstrable deterrence or other leverage against 
foreign influence or attack. Analysts have long argued that North Korea uses its 
nuclear program to advance its political, diplomatic, and security interests.4
The continued threat from terrorist or other violent extremist organizations 
(VEOs) obtaining WMD remains a significant concern. The 2018 National Strategy 
for Countering WMD Terrorism, complementing the 2018 National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism, emphasizes “the need for continuous pressure against WMD-
capable terrorist groups.”5 The strategy includes reducing and securing the agents, 
precursors, and materials needed by terrorists to acquire WMD, deterring states from 
providing support to terrorists with WMD ambitions, and detecting and defeating 
terrorist WMD networks.6 
Moreover, the proliferation behavior of bad actors is increasingly putting pressure 
on the international nonproliferation regimes. Syrian and Russian use of chemical 
weapons show a flagrant disregard for their commitments under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC). Since the 1990s, the testing and deployment of nuclear 
weapons in South Asia, and North Korea’s aggressive nuclear weapons program, have 
ii   For example, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan removed or dismantled Soviet nuclear weapons on their territory after the fall 
of the Soviet Union, and South Africa’s President De Klerk ordered the dismantling of its nuclear weapons in 1990.
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demonstrated that states can successfully develop these capabilities outside of the 
constraints of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 
The increasing pace of technological developments across all sectors of society, from 
the information sphere to public health, creates a significant potential for surprise to 
US security interests.7 The United States will face challenges identifying and countering 
the rapid development of new and innovative technology with WMD applications. 
States will continue to accord the highest security protection to prevent discovery and 
disruption of their most sensitive programs; advances in computing power, encryption, 
and manufacturing capabilities can serve to hide secret programs, leading to fewer 
detectable signatures. Even as the United States harnesses these advancements for 
its own security needs, federally funded technology developments to detect and counter 
adversary WMD programs may not be sufficient. Close and continuous collaboration 
with innovators in the private sector will be essential, as markets likely will drive the 
commercial breakthroughs that provide the possessor with a competitive edge. 
Since the early 1990s, several US initiatives, programs, and strategies have been 
created, to include more explicit guidance to SOF and joint forces to address emerging 
WMD threats in a post–Cold War environment.iii Concerns ranged from the security of 
WMD, associated materials, and expertise in the former Soviet Union, to the rise of 
“rogue” states who already possessed or were seeking nuclear, chemical, or biological 
weapons programs that would present a threat to US forces. Although the risk of an 
existential nuclear war may have declined, the likelihood of the use of WMD, especially 
chemical and biological weapons, by rogue states in regional conflicts had increased. 
United States’ WMD-Related Priorities
The United States’ priority efforts, as stated in the 2017 NSS, include detecting 
and disrupting WMD, enhancing counterproliferation measures, and targeting WMD 
terrorists.8 The NDS includes as a DOD objective, “dissuading, preventing, or deterring 
state adversaries and nonstate actors from acquiring, proliferating, or using weapons 
of mass destruction.”9 DOD cannot meet this objective on its own, as other federal 
agencies and departments have specific authorities for their nonproliferation and 
counterproliferation responsibilities.
By integrating and coordinating with the range of national security organizations across 
the US government, DOD must prepare to counter WMD threats before they materialize, 
while also preparing to “fight and win”10 conflicts with WMD-armed adversaries and 
develop response capabilities needed to mitigate and recover from WMD use.11 
Because the five prioritized challengers identified in the NDS—China, Russia, North 
Korea, Iran, and VEOs—already possess or are seeking nuclear, chemical, or biological 
weapons capabilities, joint force strategies and plans must recognize the range of 
WMD-use challenges across all levels of competition and conflict. 
iii   See, for example, the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative of 1993, the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.
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Nuclear Threats 
Competition among nuclear-armed states can negatively affect important US 
security interests, including relations with allies receiving assurance of US extended 
deterrence. Without a common view on geopolitical stability, there is potential for 
lasting damage to the global nonproliferation regime as more states consider nuclear 
weapons programs to defend their interests or pursue their goals.  
• The actions of China and Russia to erode US reach, influence, and allianc-
es simultaneously occur as they increase resources to develop and deploy 
advanced nuclear weapons and delivery systems, as a means to both co-
erce at the political level and to counter US and coalition advantages at the 
military level. 
• North Korea is already a nuclear-armed state (though not a “nuclear-weap-
on state” as defined in the NPT). North Korea has successfully weathered 
decades of international pressure to develop nuclear weapons that can 
hold the United States and its allies at risk and protect the Kim Jong-un 
regime. Pyongyang also is suspected of supporting the nuclear program of 
Syria (set back by Israel in 2007) and Iran.12 
• Iran may still aspire to possess nuclear weapons.13 Preventing Iran from devel-
oping such weapons and delivery means has been a leading preoccupation of 
international diplomacy and US alliance relationships for over two decades. 
• The dangerous potential of VEOs developing or acquiring WMD capabilities 
will not diminish, and preventing this will remain one of the nation’s highest 
priorities. As stated in the National Strategy for Countering WMD Terrorism, 
“The growth in terrorists’ capabilities and aspirations and the spread of 
dual-use technology have made the threat of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) terrorism progressively more acute.”14 
• Allies under the US nuclear umbrella have raised questions about the cred-
ibility of US extended deterrence commitments. Some have mused openly 
about their potential need to acquire their own nuclear weapons, as have 
some other states who do not enjoy formal US security guarantees.15 
The potential need for joint forces to operate in a nuclear environment should 
not be discounted. Adversaries may choose to employ nuclear weapons in a limited 
way to disrupt or defeat conventional military operations. The 2018 Nuclear Posture 
Review (NPR) directs that the joint force “will plan, train, and exercise to integrate 
US nuclear and nonnuclear forces and operate in the face of adversary nuclear 
threats and attacks.”16 
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Biological Threats
The ability to understand, manipulate, and utilize living organisms is ever increasing 
in capacity, worldwide dissemination, and economic penetration.17 The application 
of advances in biology are driven largely by commercial interests, rather than 
government investments or policy, and science will continue to provide regular 
surprises. Technologies than can enable an adversary’s biological weapons program 
are more widely available and less expensive, can reduce technical hurdles, and are 
increasingly accessible to small states and nonstate actors.18 For example, improved 
aerosolization techniques for medical purposes has direct application to weaponizing 
and delivering biological agents. 
Detecting and attributing biological attacks will become even more difficult as novel 
or a combination of agents can be developed and employed with few signatures. The 
ability to develop medical countermeasures rapidly will be challenged. In the early 
phases of a new infectious disease, governments may not be able to distinguish 
between a natural outbreak, accidental release, or deliberate attack. While the 
COVID-19 pandemic is the result of a naturally occuring disease, it is easy to see 
how a biological attack could overwhelm the joint force’s ability to protect itself and 
accomplish assigned missions.
Chemical Threats
The bold and deadly use of chemical weapons in the last decade—by Syria and the 
Islamic State (ISIS) against foes and innocent civilians and by North Korea and Russia 
for assassination—demonstrate blatant contempt for international prohibitions on 
chemical-weapon employment. Russia’s use of the lethal, nontraditional chemical 
agent Novichok in the United Kingdom in 2018 was another indication of Moscow’s 
belligerent and brazen willingness to ignore the CWC.19 Moreover, the Kim regime is 
responsible for the use of the lethal nerve agent VX to assassinate Kim’s half-brother 
in Malaysia in 2017.20 Diplomatic pressure, sanctions, and other legal action, have 
been the primary responses, though the United States twice struck Syrian military 
targets in response to highly lethal sarin attacks by the Bashar al-Assad regime. 
In 2002, Russia used aerosolized chemicals with apparent incapacitating intent 
but deadly results to end a hostage siege (approximately 130 hostages died from 
exposure). While Moscow has never confirmed the agent that was used, analysis 
of survivors points to a mixture of fentanyl analogs.21 Although “law enforcement 
including domestic riot control purposes” is not a purpose prohibited by the CWC,22 
the Scientific Advisory Board to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW) has found the aerosolized use of central nervous-system acting 
chemicals (CNSAC), like fentanyl and its analogs, cannot be done safely, with the clear 
implication they are inappropriate for law enforcement use.23 CNSAC, a subset of 
pharmaceutical-based agents, fuel concern that the CWC’s law enforcement exemption 
could be exploited in ways unforeseen when it was negotiated. (The United States, 
Australia, and Switzerland are leading a diplomatic effort to preclude this.24) 
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These actors, and others carefully watching, may have concluded impactful 
responses to chemical and perhaps biological weapons use are unlikely without 
clearly attributable violations of the treaties leading to punitive United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions. They may come to judge the advantages of the use of 
such weapons outweigh international consequences. 
In this WMD security environment, the United States cannot discount that state 
actors that do not possess WMD may seek to acquire them, and states already 
in possession could seek more advanced capabilities. It is conceivable that new 
chemical and biological threats could emerge rapidly and be used in ambiguous or 
nonattributable ways across the spectrum of competition and conflict. Advances in 
chemical technology, including nanotechnology and microreactors, could yield new 
and superior forms of chemical weapons that are more capable against existing 
defenses, more discriminate, and/or harder to attribute. Nonstate actors, adversary 
SOF, or pseudoprivate specialized units may also use chemical and biological weapons 
clandestinely to avoid direct engagement with US joint or partner forces. 
The United States should not assume that great-power competitors and rogue 
states will wait until armed conflict has begun to employ chemical or biological 
weapons. Given that adversaries have seen the United States overwhelm 
opponents in regional conflicts, they may choose, in a crisis or prior to the 
onset of armed hostilities, early use of WMD to disrupt joint and partner forces. 
Limited, plausibly deniable asymmetric attacks have the potential to prevent the 
United States from gaining air supremacy, denying territory, assembling offensive 
capabilities, supplying forces, or maintaining freedom of maneuver.25 Chemical 
or biological attacks on partner soil could induce panic, impede movement, and 
destabilize friendly populations.
How SOF Can Contribute 
The 2014 DOD Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction identifies 
pathway defeat, a concept that originated in the 1990s, as an important task for 
the department. It defines pathway defeat as “deliberate actions against actors 
of concern and their networks to delay, disrupt, destroy, or otherwise complicate 
the conceptualization, development, possession, and proliferation of WMD, related 
expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery.” Pathway defeat activities 
are intended to “create layers of complex barriers to impose recurring, collectively 
reinforcing, and enduring costs and setbacks on those seeking to acquire or 
proliferate WMD or related capabilities.”26
Several core SOF activities can contribute to WMD pathway defeat objectives. 
The analysis and appreciation of the operational environment assists the joint 
force in planning and executing a range of military operations within a joint or 
multinational task force. 
Their ability to understand regional dynamics through foreign internal defense 
and civil affairs activities, such as understanding the language and culture of 
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friendly nations, enable long-term relationships that engender trust in US forces. 
These efforts not only can prepare partners to counter insurgencies, defend against 
external attacks, and engage in coalition operations, but also provide the tools to 
help identify and respond to regional WMD risks before they materialize into threats. 
Additionally, it has been recognized that SOF missions are “almost always coalition 
in nature,” which points to the strength that SOF bring to combined operations.27 
Maintaining local and regional relationships enables SOF to influence adversary 
perceptions and behavior regarding WMD through activities such as military 
information support operations (MISO). These tactical and operational capabilities 
support overall strategic efforts to dissuade and deter competitors and adversaries’ 
“conceptualization” of WMD intent,28 and from developing, acquiring, or attacking 
with WMD. Influencing an adversary’s cognitive end-state—that is, the perception of 
the costs and benefits of a WMD capability—is intended to reduce an adversaries’ 
incentives to pursue, possess, and employ these weapons.
These global capabilities can quickly lead to the effective employment of military 
resources to “delay, disrupt, destroy, or otherwise complicate” WMD threats. When 
directed, SOF can respond rapidly around the globe to disrupt the early development 
and acquisition of WMD capabilities, and deliver kinetic and nonkinetic (e.g., 
cyber) effects on the WMD programs of hostile actors. SOF can employ long-range 
reconnaissance assets, conduct direct action and sabotage against WMD delivery 
and supporting systems (including command and control and logistics nodes), and 
disrupt adversary maneuver and logistics—all of which could be critical capabilities 
early in a crisis or prior to an imminent attack.
Moreover, US SOF are uniquely postured to counter adversary SOF activities, 
including the staging and use of WMD against targeted populations or joint and 
partner forces. SOF’s rapid response to imminent WMD threats could reduce 
incentives for actors to employ WMD against US forces and interests. Adversaries 
also may hesitate to escalate with WMD if they understand that their weapons 
and delivery systems may be held at continuous risk of disruption or destruction. 
SOF’s relationships with allies and partners built and maintained throughout its 
historic counterterrorism responsibilities are key to understanding and responding 
to today’s VEO efforts to acquire WMD. As the commander of US Specical 
Operations Command (USSOCOM), General Richard D. Clarke, USA, stated, severing 
the “financial, messaging, and foreign terrorist fighter networks that enable and 
sustain VEOs” will “degrade and disrupt VEO attacks,”29 including those with WMD. 
Importantly, continuous and aggressive US-led counterterrorist actions deny VEOs 
the time, space, and resources to develop or plan effective use of WMD.
In 2016, President Barack Obama authorized the transfer of responsibility 
for coordinating countering WMD activities in DOD from US Strategic Command 
(STRATCOM )to USSOCOM. According to the Joint Staff, a coordinating authority 
is the “designated lead for representing a problem set including topics such as 
planning, risk, prioritization, resourcing, synchronization of activities in plans, and 
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transition to contingencies.”30 In this capacity, SOCOM produced the DOD Functional 
Campaign Plan to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2018, which “nests 
under, cross-cuts, and complements the NDS, the NMS, and global and other 
functional campaigns.”31 This responsibility, along with the SOCOM commander’s 
other coordinating authority roles for countering violent extremist organizations and 
MISO/WebOps, provide SOF the ability to understand and influence the planning for 
a range of DOD activities for addressing WMD threats. 
In his April 2019 congressional testimony, General Clarke stated:
Our worldwide access and placement, our networks and partnerships, 
and our flexible global posture enable the department to understand 
adversary actions and intent and to respond across the spectrum of 
competition, especially below the threshold of armed conflict.32
Since the end of the Cold War, SOF have maintained a high degree of focus on 
WMD contingencies and circumstances where their unique strengths can be applied. 
Alongside joint and partner forces, and other federal organizations, SOF provide 
robust, mature, and adaptive capabilities against WMD threats.
DOD’s efforts to prevent and respond to WMD threats can take advantage of 
unique SOF capabilities to assist the joint force in planning and executing a range of 
military operations. Specific notional SOF roles,iv if directed, can consist of:
• Foreign internal defense and civil affairs activities, to include understanding 
the language and culture of friendly nations, enable long-term relationships 
that engender trust in US forces and provide the tools to help identify and 
respond to regional WMD risks before they materialize into threats. 
• Cyber and military information support operations (MISO) that support over-
all strategic efforts to dissuade and deter adversaries’ intentions for a WMD 
capability, shape the perspectives of leadership and the population on WMD 
activities, and reduce the incentives to pursue or employ these weapons.33 
• Rapid responses to imminent WMD threats, including direct action and sabo-
tage, can influence adversary perceptions of the costs and benefits of a WMD 
capability, demonstrating that their systems may be held at continuous risk 
from disruption or destruction. 
• Countering adversary SOF activities can disrupt operational plans to stage or 
use WMD against targeted populations or US joint and partner forces. 
• Continuous and aggressive counterterrorist actions can deny VEOs the time, 
space, and resources to develop or plan effective use of WMD. 
iv   Author’s notional application of USSOCOM “Core Activities” (USSOCOM, https://www.socom.mil/about/core-activities)  
to NDS priorities.
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SOF, Great Power Competition, and WMD
SOF’s role in countering WMD threats from great powers likely will be more evident 
during an emerging crisis or actual conflict than in peacetime. While SOF can support 
US efforts to influence Russian and Chinese perceptions of the utility of developing, 
proliferating, or using WMD, direct action against the internal WMD activities of 
Russia or China may be limited because of the risk of escalation, absent a significant 
crisis leading to a presidential directive. Under precrisis conditions, diplomatic and 
economic activities likely would remain the preferred courses of action. A caveat to 
this judgment is warranted if chemical or biological attacks, traced to great powers, 
occur against allies or partners in situations short of armed conflict. Evidence of 
responsibility may negate efforts at deniability, and the president may desire SOF 
options for a response, which could involve asymmetric or direct actions. 
Moreover, Russia and China play an important role with regard to achieving the 
US goals of denying North Korea and Iran’s WMD ambitions. As permanent members 
of the United Nations Security Council, their veto power—and growing regional 
influence—complicates efforts to dissuade Iran from restarting its nuclear program, 
and to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea.34 
There is unfortunately a wide generational gap between today’s military 
professionals and those who experienced the Cold War standoff between the United 
States and Soviet Union. During the Cold War, US and NATO forces prepared for 
operations involving tactical nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in an effort 
to disrupt and destroy a rapid advance of Warsaw Pact forces in a crisis.35 Today, 
as joint force leaders with active service prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
retire, DOD is undertaking the process of refining, adapting, and planning for both SOF 
options and DOD efforts against WMD capabilities during a crisis, a skillset new to 
many active-duty service members.
Conclusion
In the evolving security landscape, global tensions can increase as a result of 
miscommunication, mistrust, miscalculation, and the weakening of the rules-
based international order. The breadth of SOF capabilities must be coordinated 
and integrated with all instruments of state power, and with allies and partners, 
to counter WMD threats effectively. Adversaries are not likely to risk major, force-
on-force confrontation with the United States, in the near future, moving them to 
pursue asymmetric actions in the “gray zone.”36 In this environment, SOF likely will 
play a larger role for DOD. As potential adversaries sidestep US military superiority 
by competing below the level of high intensity armed conflict, and potentially employ 
ambiguous and targeted chemical and biological attacks to disrupt US military 
operations and weaken US resolve, SOF will be necessary to support early warning 
through partner relationships, and conduct SOF-unique asymmetric actions.
As Clint Eastwood’s character famously said in the 1986 movie Heartbreak Ridge, 
“You improvise. You adapt. You overcome.”37 Reportedly an unofficial US Marine Corps 
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slogan, Eastwood’s famous quote also aptly describes the capabilities SOF bring to 
deter and counter adversary WMD use. As the 2018 NDS reminds us, the security 
environment demands adaptation to “develop a lethal, agile, and resilient force 
posture and employment.”38 
Uncertainty demands being agile and flexible, and, as the NDS states, “strategically 
predictable but operationally unpredictable,” and to “out-think . . . out-innovate” 
potential adversaries.39 Confronting WMD threats before they fully materialize always 
will be preferable to responding to actual use. Once again, SOF activities make an 
important contribution to this task.
Although adversary use of nuclear, chemical, and/or biological weapons is often 
perceived as a low-probability event, there is a need for increased attention to the 
dramatic, potentially massively disruptive or even existential consequences of such 
use. Normative reluctance to use these weapons is eroding, and technological 
developments with WMD applications are advancing at breathtaking speeds. 
The global COVID-19 pandemic, marked by surprise, speed, and mass disruption, 
demonstrates that both individual and unit preparedness for biological threats—whether 
naturally occuring or weaponized agents—requires the ability to rapidly detect, mitigate, 
and attribute biological agents. A reduction in force readiness caused by any biological 
release will negatively affect SOF and other forces deployed globally. This is perhaps a 
requirement that has not received necessary attention among junior and senior leaders, 
but the need is urgent—especially if SOF is to maintain its effectiveness against WMD 
threats in all levels of competition and conflict described above.
This outbreak highlights that education and leader development on WMD issues 
must keep pace with the demands of this new security environment. The NDS states 
unequivocally that professional military education (PME) has “stagnated, focused 
more on the accomplishment of mandatory credit at the expense of lethality and 
ingenuity.”40 Military officers (commissioned, noncommissioned, and warrant) and 
DOD civilians require a broad understanding of deterrence and countering WMD 
concepts, techniques, and strategies throughout their careers. Without this, the 
nation’s leaders may not receive the best risk-informed military advice, and strategic 
and operational risk will be higher. 
Because the United States may not be able to predict how the convergence 
of scientific and technological innovations may produce dangerous new WMD 
applications that terrorists may choose, “we must remain vigilant in identifying and 
responding to technological trends with nefarious applications.”41 SOF must pursue 
relentless innovation to prevent and disrupt proliferation and prepare for offensive 
actions to defeat WMD threats. 
SOF has long recognized that “humans are more important than hardware,”42 which 
naturally extends to the development of trained professionals who are prepared to 
develop and execute operations to counter adversaries’ WMD capabilities. With its 
increased attention on the demands of the new security environment, SOF will remain 
one of the most effective weapons in the US arsenal to counter WMD threats.
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Identity and Virtual Nations:  
Implications of Digital Citizenship and Developing Global 
Autonomous Communities for Special Operations Forces
Lt Col Jennifer “J. J.” Snow
Introduction
Virtual nations are the latest in a series of unusual emerging global actors. An 
addition to the well-known nation-state, aspiring nation-state, and more recent rise 
of violent extremist organizations (VEOs), virtual nations pose unique challenges to 
the future of governance and the role of the nation as the sole grantor of identity and 
citizenship. In the context of this chapter, I define a virtual nation as an individual, 
group, or corporate entity that derives power from high capital resources or high data 
resources, allowing for the influence and successful massing of decentralized digital 
power to achieve physical effects at the state, national, or regional level. 
Virtual nations may be self-, state, or nonstate sponsored or self-assembling 
entities. Examples may include high-net-worth individuals like Mark Zuckerberg; 
alternative governance entities like Bitnation, eCitizens of Estonia, and Cyprus and 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) real-estate-for-citizenship schemes; corporate entities, 
including Facebook, Google, Amazon, or Apple; and certain self-assembling groups 
with specific shared goals, such as the hacker collective Anonymous. These entities 
are focused on the pursuit of specific individual or group goals to influence or 
shape key events, drive change, or, in a worst-case scenario, seek to cause chaos 
or decision paralysis to limit the effectiveness of traditional governance structures 
and tools. This chapter examines the latest radical developments in identity and 
governance and the challenges these pose for special operations forces (SOF), the  
U.S. military, and U.S. allies.
Drivers of Change: How Exclusion Birthed the Rise of Global Citizenship
“I believe the nation-state oligopoly is being phased out naturally,  
due to the forces of globalization, and we’re obviously trying  
to help fast-forward that process.”
—Susanne Tarkowski Tempelhof, Bitnation founder1
Susanne Tarkowski Tempelhof grew up in a family considered stateless—people living 
at the margins without the identification, benefits, or the security that comes with 
being a national citizen. According to the United Nations, at least 10 million people 
globally live in this condition. Stateless populations continue to grow as policies 
designed to secure countries against terrorism block immigration, ethnicity restrictions 
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limit options to obtain citizenship, and regional conflict and crises zones contribute to 
massive displacement events, leaving many with no place to go.2 
In Tempelhof’s case, growing up stateless led her on a quest  to fix these issues 
for others suffering the same challenges. She began a career in advertising, 
seeking opportunities to learn how to gain support and influence for ideas by smart 
branding. After a time, Tempelhof earned a position in government hoping to be 
able to drive policy change on immigration from within the system. Her work for 
the US government landed her a lucrative opportunity that she turned into a highly 
successful strategic communications company that conducted specialty projects 
across the Middle East.3 Her involvement in various conflict zones, where she 
undertook nation-building tasks, taught her not only how states operate but also 
how they can be successfully deconstructed and rebuilt anew. This experience gave 
Tempelhof the expertise and know-how necessary to navigate international law using 
information operations and unconventional warfare, especially gray-zone operations, 
to create new governments on the fly. 
While her company was successful at reshaping governments in conflict, 
Tempelhof still could not create the changes for immigration policy she so 
desparately hoped to achive. Frustrated by her lack of progress and determined 
to find a solution that would make citizenship an open option for those without, 
Tempelhof sold her company. Next. she announced she would begin an experiment, 
the goal of which would be to create a government that was a viable alternative to 
the existing nation-state system, one in which anyone who wanted citizenship could 
have it. Her goal was to establish nonterritorial, corporate-like governance models as 
a successor to the nation-state model. Her believe that this could be done was driven 
by the emerging models founded on recent sweeping technological advances seen 
in the internet, blockchain, and cloud computing communities. Tempelhof’s initiative, 
Bitnation, provides digital identity solutions, notary services, and birth, marriage, and 
death certificates on the blockchain. It also provides smart contracts for businesses 
and various nonstate actors and stateless populations.4 Of the many communities 
that convinced her to change her tactics, the most influential was the Facebook 
community and founder Zuckerberg.5
Facebook provides an example of how communities can assemble at a local, 
national, or regional level using digital space around shared areas of interest to 
influence and drive change—for better or worse. The internet has long been a home to 
the displaced, the isolated, those seeking acceptance, and tribes built around shared 
values, ethics, and beliefs. These groups create transnational digital communities 
capable of driving tangible change across national and regional boundaries. Some are 
organized based on refugee migration patterns and keep immigrants connected to 
family and cultural or religious belief systems they left behind. Others organize around 
specific goals, ideologies, or politics. All have the population to mass decentralized 
power and project influence rapidly if appropriately incentivized to do so. With the right 
leadership, these populations have the potential to change the world.
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Simple examples of the effects of individuals marshalling new power—the ability 
to harness the energy of digitally connected populations to drive change in the 
real world—include the #MeToo movement; the Ice Bucket Challenge; Movements.
org, a site that connects human-rights activists with supporters around the globe to 
establish partisan networks; and the Global Climate Strike, the latter of which was 
inspired by social media postings of 16-year-old Swedish environmental activist Greta 
Thunberg, leading to 2,500 events worldwide and attended by almost four million 
people.6 New power is transparent, available, and easily accessible to everyone who 
knows how to use it. And it just might be the next factor to change what government 
looks like and how identity works in the future.7
In a model that looks strikingly similar to Bitnation, Zuckerberg announced his plan 
to establish an alternate financial infrastructure that will be interoperable with most 
global currencies and will enable the execution of smart contracts between parties. In 
essence this effort building off of existing Facebook communities constitutes the first 
true attempt at a nonterritorial corporate state. Zuckerberg’s Libra cryptocurrency—
which has financial backing from Visa, Spotify, PayPal, and others—will be the first 
true global digital currency. There are multiple opportunities here: Facebook could 
establish new forms of governance, new digital economies, and alternative financial 
options for the unbanked; it could create an entirely novel global financial system. 
If Libra is launched successfully, these combined actions could allow Facebook to 
maintain primacy by leapfrogging ahead of traditional financial services to capture 
businesses seeking greater fiscal agility in emerging markets and resulting in an 
overmatch situation.
The use of nongovernment-influenced banking options are expected to be in high 
demand from massive unbanked populations in Africa and Southeast Asia.8 The 
joined populations of these regions constitute 2 billion people and growing, a massive 
untapped market.9 If Zuckerberg choses to move forward with this plan, will existing 
nations even be able to stop it? His ability to mass decentralized digital new power 
from online populations, scale it, and build the first global sovereign virtual nation is 
entirely outside old power nation-state control. There are no rules for these kinds of 
actions because this kind of power didn’t even exist before 2000.10
Many argue that such an initiative will never succeed, that there are no grounds 
to support the creation of a virtual nation or alternative forms of identification, that 
Templehof and Zuckerberg are just two extreme dreamers. And they would be wrong. 
Multiple examples already exist of virtual nations and alternative identities that are 
not just surviving but thriving, backed by both nations and nonstate actors aiming 
to capitalize on these new technological opportunities to boost growth, access, and 
power on the world stage.11
Estonia was the original adopter of digital identification and the construct of the 
“nation as a service” (NAAS), starting with its e-residency program and then their 
establishment of digital embassies to back up blockchain-based services securely. 
The Estonian government successfully moved a majority of services to the blockchain, 
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including benefits and tax filing; marriage, birth, death, and divorce certificates; 
smart contracts for business interactions; and even voting. Services are more or 
less transparent and work in the background, automatically providing the appropriate 
benefits and forms, while also allowing citizens to have full access to all their records, 
all the time, in a secure environment.
Eventually, NAAS models may drive competition between virtual nations and actual 
nations as they compete to provide the best services, drawing the best and brightest 
to their countries to benefit them economically, militarily, and diplomatically. Early 
adopters and some fast followers will have the advantage, making them ever more 
competitive as they fine-tune their campaigns to citizen needs and wants. These 
efforts will be further advanced by leveraging the growing sea of data available on 
every individual as they interact with the internet, their phones, and other peripherals 
during daily life. Identity controlled by the nation-state, exemplified by the the Social 
Credit System popularized in China to “improve security,” will benefit closed societies 
in maintaining control, while liberal democratic states may choose to advocate for 
individual control of one’s personal data. In the latter case, having control of one’s 
personal data is a plus and may also function as a mechanism for monetizing specific 
aspects of that data for nations, researchers, or companies to lease or buy from the 
owner. It may also allow the owner to see where their data resides, who is interested 
in it, and potentially for what purpose.
As of 2020, all of Estonia’s citizens (1.3 million), 6,000 new companies, and 
50,000 digital citizens from its e-residency program are using their identification 
to access the Estonia digital services environment globally. Azerbaijan has also 
implemented an e-residency program after seeing the economic advantages 
experienced by Estonia, including the savings gleaned from reducing the amount of 
government administration by lessening the process and paperwork required. Bitnation 
has slowly grown and now has 15,000 digital citizens using its infrastructure for 
vital records, smart contracts, identification, and other licensing. Bermuda started a 
citizen authentication program in 2019 to test an e-ID system. As of 2019, Catalonia 
was building a decentralized identity platform with online government services called 
IdentiCAT. Thirty-three other nations, including Belgium, Finland, Germany, Israel, 
Nigeria, Poland,and Malta all have e-ID systems in place. These systems allow citizens 
to access government benefits, banking, and personal records, and they allow citizens 
to sign digital documents electronically for business contracts. These e-ID cards have 
varying applications within each nation, some strictly for banking, others covering a 
wider area of government applications as well as business and banking. As these 
kinds of identification become more prevalent globally, the ability to travel discreetly 
or under an alternate name that is accurate to an individual’s biometrics will become 
much more difficult, limiting criminal and blackmarket operators but also impacting 
clandestine intelligence operations.12
This is not the only new development in the rise of digital identity and virtual 
nations. The real-estate citizenship market is a growing sector. Cyprus, Greece, the 
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UAE, and Estonia offer citizenship options through real-estate purchases. In Cyprus, 
newly constructed or yet-to-be-constructed apartments and condominiums come with 
something called a “golden visa.” This concept was originally set up in the Caribbean 
and has been adopted in parts of Europe, allowing foreigners to buy their way to 
citizenship through the purchase of property. For example, an investor in real or virtual 
real estate (properties not yet built) in Cyprus also conveys citizenship to the buyer in 
not just one country but also in the European Union. In this version of virtual identity 
or virtual nation, the citizens derive their rights and benefits from investment and legal 
charters without having to ever step foot in the country or do business there.
Greece, Portugal, and the UAE all have various fees for their golden visa programs; 
some are legitimate and some are black-market scams. This space is not well 
regulated. China also has invested heavily in this space and provides a sliding 
payment scale of options depending on the kind of citizenship one is looking for, 
their ability to travel, and their Social Credit score if they are a Chinese citizen. 
These types of virtual citizenships are recognized and may grant tax advantages 
and other benefits; however, they can also provide a mechanism to evade national 
or international law for those engaged in illicit activities, especially if the state of 
alternate citizenship lacks an extradition policy. While in some cases identification 
may make it easier to track individuals globally, in others, it may make them equally 
untouchable under existing legal frameworks.13
Beyond these nation-states attempting to create hybrid systems that leverage 
old and new structures of governance or those growing digital states that extend 
far beyond their physical borders exists one more category of virtual nation: the 
corporation. These are global companies that are changing roles, moving from 
participant status under existing nation-state rules to market maker status, where 
they begin to set and establish their own rules outside of state influence and control. 
Data is king, and companies like Facebook, Google, Apple, and Amazon are pushing 
the boundaries of governance. In many instances they seek opportunities to remove 
government in favor of their own functional sovereignty.14
As a nation cannot or will not fulfill specific regulatory or policy obligations, private-
sector powerhouses are stepping in to create their own form of legal jurisdiction. 
These controls are designed to address a problem, but unlike a nation, the primary 
consideration is always to protect and advance the corporation’s agenda in the digital 
political economy. This is a perfect mechanism by which an entity can accumulate 
decentralized power, via the customer or end user, and apply it globally to achieve 
tangible results. For example, Amazon is a global corporation, an international 
marketplace, a logistics provider, a cloud-service solution, a creditor, an electronic-
payment provider, a data collector, a crowdsourced workforce (Mechanical Turk), and 
more. It is such a distributed, transnational actor that no one government can claim 
control over it. In essence, Amazon has replaced the government as the primary 
broker of law because no single entity can provide the same level of service or control. 
As Frank Pasquale, University of Maryland law professor notes in one of his articles:
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Rory van Loo has described the status of the “corporation as 
courthouse”—that is, when platforms like Amazon run dispute 
resolution schemes to settle conflicts between buyers and sellers. Van 
Loo describes both the efficiency gains that an Amazon settlement 
process might have over small claims court, and the potential pitfalls 
for consumers (such as opaque standards for deciding cases). I 
believe that, on top of such economic considerations, we may want to 
consider the political economic origins of e-commerce feudalism . . . 
.The evisceration of class actions, the rise of arbitration, boilerplate 
contracts—all these make the judicial system an increasingly vestigial 
organ in consumer disputes. Individuals rationally turn to online giants 
for powers to impose order that libertarian legal doctrine stripped from 
the state. And in so doing, they reinforce the very dynamics that led to 
the state’s etiolation in the first place.”15
Entities like Amazon are enjoying a rapid transfer of power from government 
because government is limited in ways that make its ability to operate successfully at 
speed in a technology-influenced environment an impossibility. So instead of reducing 
barriers inside the bureaucracy, government organizations slowly start to give away 
power to contracted corporations to execute on its behalf. This began at the end of 
World War II and is a legitimate threat to national security. Examples include Amazon 
Cloud for Department of Defense (DOD) or Google’s Project Maven. What happens 
when critical DOD processes, logistics, acquisitions, and equipping functions are 
completely taken over by Amazon in the future? Does Amazon have the ability to 
leverage this power as control? The more power given to these actors the less power 
and control the government has to operate independently. What happens if a certain 
division decides to strike because they do not believe in supporting a specific mission 
set? What if another nation-state pays for them to strike to cripple the capability or 
another state? What recourse will a commander have if a company decides to turn off 
or withhold a capability? How much of the DOD intelligence and operational capability 
is currently reliant on outside entities that they do not control?
Pasquale concludes his observations of this transfer of power from government to 
the private sector with the following cautionary note:
Understanding the bigger picture here is a first step. Political economy 
clarifies the stakes of Amazon’s increasing power over commerce. We 
are not simply addressing dyadic transactions of individual consumers 
and merchants. Data access asymmetries will disadvantage each of 
them (and advantage Amazon as the middleman) for years to come. 
Nor can we consider that power imbalance in isolation from the way 
Amazon pits cities against one another. Mastery of political dynamics 
is just as important to the firm’s success as any technical or business 
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acumen. And only political organization can stop its functional 
sovereignties from further undermining the territorial governance at the 
heart of democracy.16
Is Amazon a potential threat to national security? Probably not. Could it become 
one in the future? Yes, it could, especially if governments continue to give away their 
power and allow external entities to decide legal and governance procedures based 
on company policy. These kinds of revolutionary changes will require entirely new ways 
of thinking, new laws, and policy to deal with transnational, borderless sovereigns 
who may also seek to engage in novel forms of warfare to further erode traditional 
nation-state systems to their advantage.17 One of the ways such entities may attempt 
to do this could be through the control and employment of emerging disruptive 
technologies.18
Leveraging Technology-Influenced Environments for Competitive Advantage
“After weeks of speculation, megacorporation Google is claiming  
to have achieved ‘Quantum Supremacy’ in a paper published  
in the prestigious journal Nature.”
—Victor Tangermann19
“The possession of great power necessarily implies great responsibility.”
—William Lamb,  
2nd Viscount Melbourne, prime minister under Queen Victoria, 181720
Whoever controls the technology, information, and access will control economies, 
governments, industry, and warfare. As more and more powerful technologies 
come online, those who find themselves as creators or owners of such capabilities 
will be confronted with the age-old question of how to employ them ethically, for 
society and to improve the human condition, or for self-gain, power, and control and 
subjugation of others. These narratives are playing out on the global stage between 
nations like the United States and China. What most nations have yet to realize is 
that the stage is about to get more crowded, and not with additional nation-states 
but with virtual nations.
A recent example of a technological advantage is Google’s breakthrough in 
quantum computing. This solution will enable users to solve extremely complex 
problems that mathematically would have taken thousands of years but now can 
be done in minutes to seconds.21 A second example, also from Google, is the 
employment of the DeepMind AI to successfully beat 98.8 percent of all human 
players in a complex video game called Starcraft II.22 Such technologies pose an 
overmatch advantage that, when combined, could easily outcompete existing nations 
in a variety of strategies and consistently lengthen the gap between technology 
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owner and potential rivals. Imagine the advantage DeepMind would have if combined 
with quantum computing and then applied to international financial markets or 
multidomain operations on the battlefield. The owner of this capability would have an 
unbeatable solution, because it would constantly feed new data about competitors 
into the system, learn and adapt faster than competitors, and essentially anticipate 
and defeat moves before they are even tried. If that owner is a corporation, a high-
dollar individual, or a nonstate group, the Westphalian rules that have governed the 
nation-state system since 164823 do not apply. A revolution in capability that impacts 
multiple sectors, rapidly dethrones current incumbents, and leads to a consolidation 
of power in the hands of a few regional or global leaders could dramatically alter the 
diplomatic, information, military, economic, and political landscape.
Using the quantum-computing example, it is expected that entities will race to be 
the first to employ these new technologies to gain and keep an advantage. Those 
that succeed will not be burdened with extensive rules and regulations and may not 
be concerned with morals or ethics, either. Bureaucratic, slow-moving, and highly 
regulated entities will fall by the wayside to be subsumed by the winners. Quantum 
computing owners will have the advantage in creating new processes, tactics, 
materials, and drugs. This advantage will enable them to corner key markets by 
anticipating trends and individual and group behaviors to out-maneuvering others with 
ease. The early adopters get the win and are able to maintain their position because 
the technology keeps them multiple steps ahead of their rivals.
In this scenario, quantum prescience becomes the norm, moving from science 
fiction into science fact. Early versions of these technologies already exist and are 
being used successfully by hedge-fund managers and private-sector strategists. 
Quantum computing will serve to amplify those effects and grant the owners the 
power to dominate in multiple sectors, especially if their competition is late to the 
game or lacks similar access and capability. In game theory (even in a sequential 
game), with an overmatch technology like Quantum that gives a transparent, 
proactive, predictive view of all other player moves, a first-mover advantage is the only 
advantage, and everyone else comes in last.24
These are just a few examples of how identity and governance are radically 
changing without government input and in ways that could pose significant risks to 
international security and special operations. So how did we arrive at this place? And 
where do we go from here?
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Traditional Governance versus Virtual Governance
“There is only one global superpower these days: the public opinion  
of 7 billion people. The question is how to marshal that power.”
—Simon Adholt, 
founder of the Good Country Party Virtual Nation25
Simon Adholt is another marketing expert who sees the potential of new power 
and believes it can be harnessed in ways that can drive both positive and negative 
changes globally. In a 2014 interview, Adholt argued public opinion has become a 
force for driving change in and external to existing systems.26 When large groups of 
people come together as they did in Arab Spring, there is not much that can stop 
them. Science-fiction novels initially postulated the existence of a global citizen, but 
until recently, the technology did not exist to make this a reality. Today, virtual nations 
and digital identity are becoming fact and moving from thought experiment into viable 
foundations for future forms of governance that are not dependent on a nation-state 
system. More than ever, the internet is bringing us closer together, uniting millions in 
cyberspace. Social media platforms host billions of users who can connect with each 
other on shared interests across the world. Over four billion people were using the 
internet as of 2018; 67 percent of the world has access to a mobile phone, and over 
half of those are smartphone devices; and over three billion people are using social 
media on their mobile devices every month.27 
Public space is no longer just a physical place, it is digital as well. This means 
enhanced interconnectivity is making physical boundaries less relevant. Emergent 
technologies necessary to establish digital identities are creating the basis for 
the adoption of a legally recognized international identification. For the first time, 
individuals could be connected to each other voluntarily, choosing their form of 
governance and freeing themselves from traditional governance structures. Previously, 
nations were the basis for this shared sense of community, but today people are 
more likely to see themselves as global citizens than national citizens, joining together 
on complex issues involving the environment or human rights.28 Following recent 
economic and political challenges, there is a growing belief that online transnational 
communities present viable options to replace what many perceive to be outdated, 
failing, and corrupt national governance and identity models.29 As Liav Orgad noted 
in his work, “By showing global responsibility, even if limited and with a weak sense 
of agency, individuals are participating in activities whose scope and target audience 
go beyond national boundaries. The changing public opinion thus goes hand in 
hand with changes in individual actions motivated by a sense of global political 
responsibilities.”30
Citizens have traditionally derived their identity and their legal status from where 
they are born. Their state provided them with certain guarantees, benefits, and legal 
protections. In exchange, each citizen may be required to provide a service or pay 
S T R A T E G I C  L A T E N C Y  U N L E A S H E D    |    43 
taxes to support the state. With citizenship also comes a certain amount of power. 
A US citizenship will convey more rights, freedoms, and soft power than some other 
citizenships might. This is because countries like the United States or the United 
Kingdom also have diplomatic and military tools to protect their sovereignty and 
their citizens. The powers granted to citizens also extend to their ability to travel 
freely around the world. But what if power was no longer tied to traditional forms? 
Jeremy Heimans and Henry Timms explore this topic in their book, New Power: How 
Power Works in Our Hyperconnected World and How to Make it Work for You (2018). 
While traditional forms of power are held by state actors, new power is available to 
everyone; it is distributed and decentralized. Most important, it can be massed rapidly 
in the digital realm by nonstate actors and used to achieve physical effects at the 
state, national, and regional levels. The Ice Bucket Challenge, #MeToo, Black Lives 
Matter, Facebook, AirBnB, Cambridge Analytica, Occupy Movement,and the Parkland 
Students for Gun Control initiative are all recent example of new power in action.31 As 
Decca Aitkenhead notes in an interview with Heimans:
“The future . . . will be won by those who can spread their ideas better, 
faster, and more durably. . . . It’s really hard not to make the argument 
that the forces of misinformation and extremism and nativism are in 
the lead.”
He invites us to contrast the success of the new power recruitment 
strategy of ISIS with the failure of the US State Department’s old 
power effort to thwart it; ISIS recruits through a peer-to-peer network 
of youngsters sharing seductive intimacies on social media, which the 
State Department sought to defeat with a calamitously ill-judged Twitter 
account bearing an image of its official seal and the instruction: ‘Think 
Again, Turn Away!”32
The key is to navigate when it is appropriate to stay with traditional power 
structures and when new power tools should be employed. Governments tend to 
be inexperienced at this, while the private sector and virtual nations excel. Those 
entities that understand new power will have a vast advantage when working to spread 
their message, building loyalty across communities and turning these groups into a 
movement to force change. And that includes establishing borderless nations and a 
global citizenry. Understanding these new entities and how they will play into military 
operations is also crucial, especially for special operations.33
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Virtual Nations, Digital Identity, and the Implications  
for Special Operations Forces
As these new actors begin to play larger roles on the world stage, it will be important 
to understand their impact on military strategy and plans. Special operations teams 
will be the first forces likely to encounter and be forced to deal with the effects 
of virtual nations and digital identity. New technology,training, and access to the 
right experts and information are crucial to the future success of SOF. Some of the 
expected features of this new landscape include the following challenges:
• Impaired ability to conduct covert operations because of restricted 
freedom of movement as digital identity and biometrics facilitate tracking 
through social media, adware, digital fingerprinting, cell-phone and com-
puter usage, global transportation trackers, and open-source space and 
intelligence resources. 
• Compromised ability to surprise a near peer or peer competitor or to mass 
forces rapidly for an operation without being detected.
• Increased risk of warfare on the home front with individual leaders or teams 
and their families targeted through cyber or other means. 
• Non-nation-state actors that emerge from corporations or individuals and 
small groups entering conflict zones, as ease of access to new technologies 
and new power grant capability to successfully compete with nation-state 
modern militaries.
• Increased military use of cyber tactics, partisan forces, proxy wars, and 
“new frontier” wars (i.e., conflicts in the polar regions, conflict through mis-
information, conflict in emerging zones such as space, and satellite-based 
warfare and subterranean warfare).
• Increased use of nonkinetic combat (economic, legal, and social methods) 
to cripple enemies from within.34
The way of warfare as we know it is changing permanently. But there are measures 
that can be taken to remain competitive and transition to a more agile force for the 
future. Tactics and methods to consider include:
• Incorporate nontraditional experts into strategy, planning, and futures dis-
cussions to understand state of art and what is to come.
• Ramp up cyber foreign internal defense and build global partisan networks 
with friendly hackers and makers to maintain forward posts for intelligence 
and information purposes.
• Build innovation and forecasting into special operations at the team level 
up through headquarters staff.
S T R A T E G I C  L A T E N C Y  U N L E A S H E D    |    45 
• Consider the implementation of special teams operating under Title 60 
(Title 10 and 50) authorities for extreme crises events.
• Prioritize the biggest threat areas for SOF today, and implement targeted 
efforts to create teams that are empowered to move forward on radical 
solutions that will reclaim the lead, and if possible gain and maintain 
overmatch; this includes cyber, misinformation and psyops, targeted 
countering-weapons-of-mass-destruction efforts, artificial intelligence and 
autonomous systems, novel covert operations, interoperability, advanced 
communications, and avatar driven operations.35 
Conclusion
While virtual nations and digital identity may become a positive for hybrid national 
governance structures in the future, ignorance of the dual nature of these 
developments is no excuse for dismissing them and ignoring their potential. Virtual 
nations could be tremendously beneficial in reducing global conflict and granting 
stateless populations the rights and benefits all humans deserve, saving lives, cutting 
costs, and streamlining government administration for the better. Or they could pose 
the next major threat to democracy, polarize populations, and lead to advanced forms 
of conflict that will scale similar to the digital spaces they derive from and cause 
massive disruption in ways previously not seen.
The digital space has quietly turned into a powerhouse, and it is hard for global 
leaders to realize the threat because the powers aligning against them don’t wave a 
flag, wear a uniform, or even operate according to national and international law. And 
yet they exist, and they are growing stronger daily. Special operations forces will be 
the first to confront these challenges because of where they sit and the operations 
they execute. Policy, regulation, acquisitions, and authorities must catch up quickly, 
and only by radically changing the mindset of how we view the current and future 
battlespace will SOF continue to command the advantages they hold today and the 
ability to operate successfully.36
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C H A P T E R  4
Special Forces and Strategic Deterrence
Brad Roberts
What role, if any, do special forces play in underwriting strategic deterrence as 
practiced by the United States? What role should they play? In recent decades, 
most experts in the defense community would probably have answered both of 
these questions with “little, if any, role,” given the close association of strategic 
deterrence with nuclear weapons and of special operations forces (SOF) with the war 
on terrorism. The Department of Defense’s joint operating concept for deterrence, for 
example, makes no mention of a role for SOF.1 Similarly, the joint publication setting 
out the roles of SOF makes just a single reference to the role of SOF in helping to 
“prevent and deter conflict or prevail in war” and no mention of strategic deterrence.2 
Analyses of the potential contributions of SOF to strategic deterrence are few and far 
between.3 The major shift in national defense strategy from the war on terror to major-
power rivalry has only reinforced a widespread perception that SOF’s role is in decline.
But this answer is wrong. Special forces can, and should, play a significant role in 
meeting the strategic deterrence requirements of the United States in the emerging 
security environment. However, their precise role has not yet been defined, partly 
because the new challenges of strategic deterrence have not yet been defined with 
sufficient specificity to characterize the particular contributions of SOF. This lack of 
definition exists partly because US strategy toward conflict in the gray zone—that is, 
in conflict short of armed hostilities—remains underdeveloped. But a simple mental 
picture of the main challenges in the emerging security environment can help add 
some fidelity to the consideration of SOF roles.
This chapter begins with a review of developments in US defense strategy bearing 
on the question of SOF roles and provides a short list of the key roles for SOF in 
the new security environment. The chapter then turns to the problem of strategic 
deterrence in this new environment. This is a problem different from the Cold War 
problem. In the Cold War, strategic deterrence addressed the problem of preventing 
Armageddon-like massive nuclear exchanges. In the new security environment, 
strategic deterrence must address the problem of securing the interests of the 
United States and its allies in conventional regional conflicts against nuclear-armed 
adversaries. Next, the chapter turns to an exploration of the particular deterrence 
challenges of such conflicts. It then explores the potential contributions of SOF to the 
achievement of US objectives.
The Changing Place of SOF in US Defense Strategy
A casual reading of the Donald Trump administration’s strategic documents leaves 
the impression that SOF will be of declining relevance in the years ahead. The 
2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) reflected the administration’s assessment 
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that “inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern 
in US national security.”4 The reduced concern about the threat from radical 
violent extremists implies a reduced role for the forces at the center of the fight 
against them. The increased emphasis on interstate rivalry implies a resurgence 
of general purpose and strategic forces. Thus, the 2017 National Security Strategy 
(NSS) emphasizes “the growing political, economic, and military competitions we 
face around the world” and a “peace through strength” strategy aimed at military 
preeminence.5 
A closer reading of these documents tells a different story, however. The NSS 
commits the United States to retain a full-spectrum force:
The Joint Force must remain capable of deterring and defeating 
the full range of threats to the United States. The Department of 
Defense must develop new operational concepts and capabilities 
to win without assured dominance in air, maritime, land, space, and 
cyberspace domains, including against those operating below the level 
of conventional military conflict. We must sustain our competence in 
irregular warfare, which requires planning for a long term, rather than 
an ad hoc, fight against terrorist networks and other irregular threats.6
Similarly, the NDS argues, “the reemergence of long-term strategic competition, 
rapid dispersion of technologies, and new concepts of warfare and competition that 
span the entire spectrum of conflict require a Joint Force structured to match this 
reality.”7 This leaves open a basic question: What is the necessary and appropriate 
place of SOF in that structure? 
Most obviously, SOF still has a central place in the fight against terrorist networks 
and other irregular threats. The precise level of effort cannot be anticipated, but 
excellence at this mission for the long term remains a key national priority. Less 
obviously, SOF has a place in the fight against rogue states—that is, regional powers 
controlled by regimes hostile to US interests, US allies, and US-backed regional 
orders. Currently, North Korea and Iran are two primary examples of rogue states. 
SOF has a central place in the effort to combat rogue-state ambitions for weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) through an aggressive counterproliferation effort aimed at 
suppressing trade in sensitive materials, technologies, and expertise and collapsing 
existing WMD and missile-development programs. 
Even less obviously, SOF has a place in meeting the challenges posed by rivalry 
and long-term strategic competition with Russia and China. To understand that place, 
we must understand the ways in which Russia and China have prepared for regional 
wars against the United States and its allies. They have prepared for conventional 
wars under the shadow of risk cast by their nuclear and other strategic capabilities. 
Rogue states have made similar preparations. This is the hardest new problem 
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brought to us by a changing security environment and the evolution of US defense 
strategy. What can SOF contribute to meeting this set of challenges?
Defining the New Challenge of Strategic Deterrence
Russia, China, and North Korea have strong motivation for a credible deterrence 
posture vis-à-vis the United States. In their common assessments, the end of the Cold 
War ended the counterbalancing of American power, and, since then, the United States 
has been on an ideologically driven campaign to remake the world in its image and to 
encircle and contain them as a prelude to attempts at regime change. Thus, for three 
decades these states have been seized with the question of how “to deter and defeat 
a conventionally superior nuclear-armed major power and its allies.”8 
Having started on this project in the 1990s, at a time when these three countries 
had little money or technology to throw at this problem, they focused first on putting 
their intellectual houses in order. The result is a set of concepts, hypotheses, and 
some wishful thinking about how to succeed in that effort. Think of these collections 
of theories of victory in the spirits of Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Clausewitz 
defined victory as the “culminating” political point in a conflict when one state 
chooses to no longer run the costs and risks of continued war. Sun Tzu defined victory 
as subduing an enemy without fighting. A theory of victory in the spirit of Clausewitz 
is a set of ideas about how to bring the United States and its allies to a culminating 
point to accept war termination terms offered by its adversary. A theory of victory in 
the spirit of Sun Tzu is a set of ideas about how to remake regional and global orders 
without engaging in overt armed conflict. 
Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran all have such theories to deter and defeat the 
United States and its allies. Despite important differences among them in orientation, 
interest, and capability, these states face a common problem and, therefore, have 
come to similar strategies. Boiled down to their essence, these strategies reflect the 
following core hypotheses.
• First, if war with the United States and its allies appears inevitable, or if some 
local prize can be won opportunistically, an adversary can accomplish a fait ac-
compli at a reasonable cost and can prevent a decisive response by the United 
States and its allies by presenting them with a credible image of a terrible cost 
to be paid in the attempt.to reverse the fait accompli.
• Second, if the United States and its allies choose unreasonably to try to 
reverse the fait accompli, an adversary can break weak links in these allianc-
es, thereby putting the United States in a position of having to decide to fight 
alone (or nearly so) or not at all.
• Third, if the United States chooses unreasonably to fight on, an adversary can 
compel it to stop short of doing grievous damage by inflicting high costs on its 
power-projection forces.
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• Fourth, if the United States chooses to put the regime at risk or to significantly 
punish it for aggression, an adversary can persuade it to back down by illus-
trating the vulnerability of the American homeland to attack.
• Fifth, this entire pathway can be avoided by success in the gray zone—that is, 
through the use of a creative mix of hard and soft power tools to remake re-
gional security orders in a manner that breaks encirclement and entanglement 
without running the costs and risks of war. If the United States and its allies 
resist militarily, and consider bringing to bear their full military potential, they 
must contemplate the credible counterescalation capabilities now in place to 
deter and defeat them.
Underpinning Russian, Chinese, and North Korean confidence in their escalatory 
threats is an assessment about asymmetries of stake and geography. In their 
assessment, regional conflicts would involve important interests for the United States, 
but not vital interests in the way they would be seen in Moscow, Beijing, or Pyongyang. 
The asymmetry of geography follows from the fact that the United States must attack 
their homelands to prevail in a regional conflict, which would lend credibility to their 
threats to respond with attacks on the American homeland. They imagine the use of 
force as a way to “sober” the United States to these asymmetries. 
In short, these three potential US adversaries have developed strategies for nuclear 
blackmail and brinksmanship and multidomain escalation in time of crisis and war that 
they apparently believe would deter and, if necessary, defeat the United States. In time 
of crisis and war, the United States would find itself in a multidomain, multidimensional, 
and transregional conflict (to cite former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph 
Dunford).9 In the gray zone, Russia, China, and North Korea use the cover provided 
by these strategies to push up to the brink of war to try to remake political facts on 
the ground. Given their increased assertiveness regionally and, in the case of Russia 
and China, globally, the leaders of these three countries apparently have newfound 
confidence in their ability to accept the risks of confrontation with the United States.
The task for US strategy is to strip away this confidence. The United States and its 
allies must have the means to:  
• Erode the conditions for success in the potential fait accompli, so that it looks 
like an unattractive quagmire instead;
• Reinforce the expectation of alliance solidarity in time of escalating conflict;
• Ensure the ability of the United States to surge forces into the theater in a 
timely manner, despite the contested environments and domains;
• Protect the American homeland from limited attack and ensure a credible 
threat of nuclear retaliation;
• Render unrewarding Red (defined below) efforts to alter regional security or-
ders through gray zone tactics.
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Put differently, the United States and its allies must have the means to affect 
the deterrence calculus of its potential adversaries in conventional regional conflicts 
under the nuclear shadow. The Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept 
describes this deterrence calculus as containing three primary variables: 
• The adversary’s perception of the benefits of a course of action.
• The adversary’s perception of the costs of a course of action.
• The adversary’s perception of the consequences of restraint or inaction (i.e., 
the benefits and costs of not taking the course of action in question).10 
In meeting the new strategic deterrence challenge of conventional regional wars 
against nuclear-armed adversaries, these three factors should be understood as 
the adversary’s deterrence and escalation calculus. Adversaries must be denied the 
confidence that the costs and risks of war against the United States and its allies, of 
escalating and counterescalating in war, and of pressing demands in the gray zone are 
acceptable, especially relative to the expected gain. 
Defining SOF’s Potential Contributions
What can SOF contribute to the achievement of these objectives? Little thinking 
appears to have been done on this question, not least because little thinking has 
been done about the character of these new challenges or of the needed response by 
the United States and its allies. New thinking is needed. For the time being, some old 
thinking has come into play.
In the period between 9/11 and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the United 
States focused its military innovation on the challenges of counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency. As military planners have come back to the problem of state-to-
state conflict in an era of major-power rivalry, they have fallen back on some thinking 
that began to take shape in the 1990s when a new problem took shape: rogue-state 
challengers and the possibility of major theater wars with a WMD dimension.11
The 1993 Bottom Up Review of US defense strategy, conducted after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, both highlighted the new threat posed by leaders such as Saddam 
Hussein armed or arming with WMD and launched the Defense Counterproliferation 
Initiative to adjust deterrence strategies to this new problem. The first Quadrennial 
Defense Review in 1994 defined a new planning focus: major theater wars. Rogue-
state acquisition of long-range missiles added urgency to this problem. As a matter 
of national policy, the United States rejected mutual vulnerability with rogue states 
and, in 1998, set out to develop a national missile defense posture sufficient for this 
purpose, motivated in large part by the assessment that nuclear deterrence might 
prove unreliable against a leader who fears defeat and ejection (or death) by a US-
led coalition enjoying conventional supremacy. For such an adversary, no war with the 
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United States could be expected to remain limited in a meaningful way because it 
would automatically involve questions of regime survival.
In the period between 9/11 and 2014, the United States did not neglect this 
topic completely. The George W. Bush administration continued the focus on rogue 
states and the rejection of mutual vulnerability but also added the terrorist aspect. It 
emphasized “the nexus” of rogue states, terrorism, and WMD and embraced preventive 
and preemptive military action as necessary complements to deterrence and defense. 
Like its predecessor, it emphasized strategic cooperation with Russia and China, while 
also hedging against a turn for the worse. In contrast, the Barack Obama administration 
did not embrace the term “rogue state” or “the nexus.” But it set out a comprehensive 
agenda for adapting and strengthening regional deterrence architectures to deal with 
the threats posed by regional challengers. It too rejected mutual vulnerability with such 
states while seeking cooperation with Russia and China to strengthen strategic stability. 
After 2014, US defense planners began to return to the problem of major-power 
rivalry and conflict. In 2015, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter called for “a new 
playbook” for Russia, while also leading an effort for a “third offset” to restore 
conventional deterrence of major-power rivals. Since then, the ideas from the 1990s 
have enjoyed a resurgence in the defense community, including an emphasis on 
deterrence by denial (with missile defense and resilience in the new domains), with 
a reluctance to rely heavily on nuclear deterrence, and with the expectation that 
adversary WMD employment would likely come only in a last-resort effort to prevent 
regime removal. These ideas fit poorly with the new challenge.
The 2018 NDS proved helpful in shifting military thinking onto the new challenge 
of strategic deterrence. The congressionally mandated bipartisan National Defense 
Strategy Commission hailed the NDS as “a constructive first step” that “points the 
Department of Defense and the country in the right direction.”12 But the commission 
went on to deliver a sharp critique. The NDS may point us in the right direction, but “it 
does not adequately explain how we should get there.” Its criticism is especially sharp 
on the absence of concepts for translating deterrence objectives into meaningful 
outcomes.13 To cite further: 
• The NDS “leaves unanswered critical questions regarding how the United 
States will meet the challenges of a more dangerous world.” 
• “Although the NDS states that deterring adversaries is a key objective, there 
was little consensus among DOD leaders with whom we interacted on what de-
terrence means in practice, how escalation dynamics might play out, and what 
it will cost to deter effectively.” 
• “DOD leaders had difficulty articulating how the US military would defeat ma-
jor-power adversaries should deterrence fail.”
• “There are numerous unmet operational challenges such as . . . deterring, and 
if necessary defeating, the use of nuclear or other strategic weapons in ways 
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that fall short of justifying a large-scale nuclear response.”
• “The United States . . . urgently requires new operational concepts that ex-
pand US options and constrain those of China, Russia, and other actors.”
• “Put bluntly, the US military could lose” the next state-to-state war.
• “The Department does not appear to have a plan for succeeding in gray zone 
operations . . . nor does the administration as a whole.”
• “The NDS asserts that DOD will ‘expand the competitive space’ but offers 
little evidence of how it will do so.”14
The NDS Commission’s assessment has a clear implication for the exploration of 
SOF’s contribution to the new challenge of strategic deterrence. Assuming the NDS 
Commission is correct, SOF cannot simply fit in to existing concepts, strategies, or 
approaches. It cannot “plug and play.” It must help the Department of Defense, and 
national leadership more broadly, chart a new SOF course. The central question is, 
what can special operations core activities contribute to meeting these challenges? 
For the following analysis, “Red” and “Blue” are used to put in abstract terms the 
adversarial parties in these conflicts. Red refers to potential US adversaries. Blue 
refers to the United States and its allies. 
SOF and the Fait Accompli
What can SOF contribute to the Blue objective of eroding the conditions for success in 
the potential fait accompli? Blue’s deterrence objective should be to strip away Red’s 
confidence it can achieve a quick and decisive victory and avoid a quagmire that gives 
Blue time to play to its strengths. To accomplish this objective, Blue must have robust 
and reliable means to impose early and crippling costs on Red and to rapidly reinforce 
its own forces. 
SOF can contribute to both of these missions. With special reconnaissance, it 
can help provide timely warning to Blue. With foreign internal defense, it can disrupt 
and delay Red force flow and logistics support. With security force assistance, it can 
strengthen the capacity of allies and partners to support these tasks. Additionally, we 
should note the prominent role that Red (especially Russia and North Korea) attach 
to the role of their SOF in accomplishing the fait accompli; this suggests an additional 
preventative role for SOF direct action. 
SOF and Alliance Solidarity
What can SOF contribute to the Blue objective of reinforcing Red’s expectation of Blue 
solidarity in time of escalating conflict? Blue’s deterrence objective should be to strip 
away Red’s confidence that its efforts to impose costs and risks on US allies and 
alliances will not generate an unwelcome reply from Blue. In part, this requires steps 
to address the misperceptions that those alliances are weakly linked, that allies are 
weakly led, and that allied publics can be counted on to pressure governments not to 
58   |   D A V I S ,  G A C ,  R A G E R ,  R E I N E R  &  S N O W
respond forcefully to Red actions (the most important tasks necessary to accomplish 
this objective are outside the military domain). This partly requires military means, 
first, to reduce Red’s expected benefits from attacking US allies and alliances and, 
second, to increase Red’s expected costs.
SOF can contribute to both of these tasks. To meet the fait accompli challenge, 
special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, and security-force assistance can 
play significant roles. 
SOF and “Surge”
What can SOF contribute to ensuring Blue’s ability to “surge” its forces in a timely 
manner and despite contested environments and domains? Blue’s deterrence 
objective should be to prevent attacks on US power-projection forces—as well as 
other forces (allied, coalition, or United Nations) that may be brought into play—
that would compromise the military campaign they are executing. To accomplish 
this objective, Blue must be able to strip away Red confidence such attacks would 
cripple Blue capability to provide timely defense to US allies and result in costs 
Red considers bearable. This implies the ability to defend critical infrastructure in 
CONUS, supporting power projection, especially from cyberattack, to defend ports of 
debarkation and embarkation and to strike critical Red nodes and other assets across 
the theater and in a manner that keeps them out of operation.
SOF can contribute both defense and offense to these tasks. It can also help to 
counter Red SOF operating in support of this mission. 
SOF and Homeland Defense
What can SOF contribute to the protection of the US homeland from limited attack 
and to ensuring a credible threat of nuclear retaliation? Blue’s deterrence objective 
should be to prevent both limited strikes intended for coercive purposes through 
deterrence by denial and large-scale strikes intended for decisive military and political 
effect through deterrence by threat of retaliation, including nuclear. To accomplish this 
objective, Blue needs effective limited homeland missile defense as well as a nuclear 
deterrent that can retaliate at the major thresholds Red might perceive.
SOF’s contributions to these tasks are more limited but not nil. SOF can play an 
essential role in “left of launch” defense against missile attacks (that is, preventive 
and preemptive attacks) and in eroding Red confidence in its ability to command and 
control its forces in time of war with the United States. 
SOF and the Gray Zone
What can SOF contribute to the effort to render unrewarding Red efforts to alter 
regional-security orders through gray-zone tactics? Blue’s deterrence objectives must 
be modest in this context, as the gray zone is, by definition, one in which military 
forces are not employed to impose costs on the enemy (therefore making threats 
to employ them not credible). But deterrence is not irrelevant. Red prosecutes its 
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interests in the gray zone in part by projecting confidence in its ability to manage the 
transition into overt hostilities and, thus, Blue preparations for such a transition can 
help to strip away Red confidence in safeguarding its interests if war erupts. Moreover, 
Blue may calculate that military action in the gray zone is necessary and warranted 
because it finds the cumulative effect of Red actions in the gray zone unacceptable. 
Thus, Blue’s deterrence objective should be to strip away Red confidence that its gray 
zone actions will result in gains that are not reversible. To accomplish this objective, 
Blue must have the means to recover its regional position and/or to damage Red’s 
regional position by other means.
SOF could make potentially numerous contributions in this realm. Special 
reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, direct action, and security-force assistance 
are all likely to play a role. Given the high priority Red attaches to information campaigns 
in its gray zone strategy, SOF’s military information support operations may be especially 
critical, particularly if they can be knit into a whole-of-government approach. 
Conclusions
In the new security environment, a new problem of strategic deterrence has emerged: 
conventional regional wars against nuclear-armed adversaries. The US military 
response to the present environment is still taking shape. A look at theories of 
victory of potential US adversaries reveals the specific new challenges of strategic 
deterrence. Meanwhile, a simple picture of the needed response from the United 
States and its allies reveals a broad range of potential contributions by special 
operations forces. Beyond this simple picture, greater fidelity is needed to tailor the 
further develop of SOF core activities to the new security environment.
The views expressed here are the personal views of the author and should not be 
attributed to the laboratory or its sponsors or any other US government agency.
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C H A P T E R  5
Quantum Corps: Consequence and Superiority  
in the Theater of Applied Imaginationi
Marshall M. Monroe
Introduction 
There is a novel and multilevel initiative underway to unify successful real-world 
innovation models in a practical pattern language that can enhance and accelerate 
transformation management and performance. Merriam-Webster1 defines science 
as “knowledge or a system of knowledge covering general truths or operation of 
general laws especially obtained and tested through the scientific method.”ii Given this 
definition, one might describe this new focused inquiry of innovation success models 
as nothing short of the dawn of a new field of science. It is resulting in a unified 
practical framework and doctrine relevant to agile problem-solving, mission planning, 
product development, scientific discovery, personal performance, content creation, 
strategic planning, perception management, new concept operations, systems 
development, economic competitive advantage, and enterprise transformation. 
All these topics are relevant to the planning, direct action, and optimal performance 
of special operations forces (SOF). This emerging science is of strategic value in 
high-delta environments such as the ones we face today resulting from globalism, 
advanced software, and digital information systems proliferation. Within the domain 
of national security, this doctrine is proving applicable in both kinetic (traditional 
military) and “soft-power”iii or “gray-zone”iv competition and conflict. Based on the 
nascent study and heuristics outlined herein, recommendations include advancing 
the new scientific domain in this space. Additionally, recommendations call for further 
development of new practical doctrine in this field, refinement of practical tools 
supporting “innovation velocity,”v and a coherent experiential training regimen for a 
new class of freedom defenders deployed in multiple theaters and contextual settings. 
i   The investigations, original concepts, and intellectual property disclosed herein are being commercialized under the trade name 
Quantum Leap Mechanics (QLMx), and this article is an excerpt from the upcoming M. Monroe book currently entitled Making 
Magic.
ii   The steps of the scientific method are question, hypothesis, experiment, observation, analysis, and conclusion.
iii   Cambridge Dictionary defines soft power as “the use of a country’s cultural and economic influence to persuade other countries 
to do something, rather than the use of military power.” Joseph Nye of Harvard University first coined the term in Bound to Lead: 
The Changing Nature of American Power (1990). https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/soft-power.
iv   The Cambridge Dictionary defines the gray zone as “activities by a state that are harmful to another state and are sometimes 
considered to be acts of war, but are not legally acts of war.” https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictioinary/english/gray-zone. 
v   Innovation velocity is a widely accepted term in the business world and refers to the speed and direction of growth that an 
innovation creates.  
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We recommend creating a Quantum Corps, a new special force with specialized 
training for unconventional situational response and planning.vi 
Background
The practice of conceiving new ideas and bringing them to fruition has a unique 
history. As a phenomenon, it has happened since recorded or known human 
existence, whether in the marshaling of fire as a heat source, in the forging and 
furnace of new types of tools (wrought from stone, iron, bronze, and titanium, or the 
semiconductor), or in the construction of great works, like the pyramids in Egypt and 
Central America, the Notre Dame cathedral in Paris, or the Burj Khalifa in Dubai. 
Defined in a realistic way, “applied imagination” includes a vast sweep of endeavor 
and consequence. From winning strategies for catching prey in the interest of survival, 
calculated war strikes, and in the growing of crops to social structures, political 
models of governance, great works of fine art, the discovery of the double helix, and 
the silly commercial success of the Pet Rock,vii “applied imagination” touches all 
areas of academia yet has not been declared a subject in itself. Today, the topic has 
been confined conceptually as a reference to dot-com-type digital-software-enabled 
start-up companies, but we endeavor to maintain the wider view. We reflect on how the 
9/11 Commission labeled the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 a “failure of 
imagination”—leaders did not understand “the gravity of the threat.”2
Upon simple observation, we can see the practice of applied imagination largely 
precedes any attempt to understand what it is that is actually going on, or any inquiry 
of how to get better at the practice of it. It is a fascinating phenomenon because 
it generally results in something new that never existed before. It is about not only 
“design thinking” but also conceptual breakthroughs that can take a multitude of 
forms—thus, it is a superset of “design.” As a practice, applied imagination has 
left us countless expressions of itself at work, yet its ubiquity means it escapes our 
focused attention. We can begin to think of it like atmosphere, sunlight, procreation, 
consciousness, electrons orbiting a nucleus, or gravity. At once common and every 
day—ubiquitous—yet deeply miraculous if observed and studied at a deeper level.
The Invention of Creativity
In the mid-twentieth century, the topic of applied imagination, or innovation, or what 
has also been called “industrial problem-solving,” took a significant leap forward 
with a set of observations and inquiries.viii Since then, a dynamic, scattered, and 
fragmented set of studies of the topic have taken shape.3 Beginning with the 
landmark work of George Prince and William Gordon and their concept of “Synectics” 
vi   We expand on this concept in the Recommendations section.
vii   The Pet Rock was a collectible toy made in 1975. It was marketed like live pets in a cardboard box equipped with straw and 
breathing holes.  
viii   We include a curated reading list in the bibliography. It offers a cross section of publications on the applied imagination or 
innovation topic. 
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in the 1950s, many authors and subject-matter experts have taken their pass at 
defining “creativity” and how to at least consider, if not master, it.4 These inquiries 
exist in a broad cross section of fields of endeavor, in many cases focusing only on 
generating new ideas—some in the arts, some in the practice of writing, some in 
“start-up incubators,” some in business schools, and some in engineering or science 
discovery. Sometimes the topic is treated on a small scale, as in the arranging of 
flowers, a new software service, or in works of literature or personal self-discovery. 
Other times it is large in scale, as in political history, industrial strategic planning, 
or mass social movements. Sometimes the domain is intensely technical, as in the 
SR-71 aircraftix; other times it is more artistic or procedural. Each is of interest, but 
the most fascinating aspect of these studies is that none of them share a meaningful 
cross-reference or set of unifying and adaptive articulated themes.
Amid this backdrop, we began an effort in the 1980s to explore this topic, seeking 
to identify resonant themes that could begin to converge into a unifying framework. An 
analogy to this effort was the study of the physical laws of gravity, which began with 
a ubiquitous physical phenomenon, and, then, through structured observation and 
evaluation—such as documenting the motion of the planets—a set of equations could 
be derived to profile a new physical law.
High-Delta Environments
Over thousands of years of human history, the phenomenon of applied imagination 
can be seen at work in myriad domains. Because of the physical, molecular nature 
of the construction of new worlds, and in the physical or “oral tradition” forms 
of information distribution, the context for the actions could be described as a 
punctuated equilibrium. A seismic type of new concept like the Archimedes’ screwx—
or the printing press, or concrete, or live theater, or the flying buttress—would alter or 
impact a domain and would remain as a novel concept of operations for many years, if 
not decades or even centuries. But today, something new is happening. In the context 
of digital networks and information systems, ideas propagate faster. They come to 
fruition, especially in the case of software applications, at higher speed, condensing 
development times. Additionally, as the new concepts are absorbed and propagated, 
they are copied or built upon more quickly, resulting in a more fluid “theater” of 
operations for the innovator.
One way to illustrate this basic phenomenon is shown in the two diagrams in  
Figure 1, where “Q” represents quantum-type improvements and “t” is time. On the 
left we see what punctuated equilibrium looks like—with long periods of relative 
stasis in a domain, then specific, quantum-type improvements, followed by relatively 
ix   The CIA developed the secret A-12 OXCART in 1965. The SR-71 Blackbird was the Air Force’s two-seat follow-on version. The 
OXCART program’s innovations (there’s that word again) both produced the two fastest, highest-flying, piloted jet aircraft and 
pioneered stealth technology.
x   The Archimedes’ screw is a helical surface wound around a cylindrical shaft (i.e., a screw) fitted inside a hollow pipe or trough. 
The unit is set up at an angle to the water. Turning the shaft raises the water up the helical structure to the top end.  
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long periods of relative stasis. An example of this might be in the travel domain, 
with the sequence being first walking barefoot, then walking in shoes, then riding a 
domesticated horse, then riding in a carriage, then in a car, in a plane, in a jet, and 
so on. On the right we see something more akin to the innovator’s environment today, 
where new ideas are appearing more frequently, and the “half-life” of novelty, and 
any subsequent competitive advantage generated thereby, is much, much shorter. 
Examples of this might be the graphics processing unit (GPU), machine-learning 
algorithms, or multirotor drones, where improvements keep coming and seemingly 
not a week goes by that another innovation does not improve the performance, 
opportunity, and threat implications of these devices.
Figure 1. Punctuated equilibrium vs. fluid iteration, where Q represents quantum-type improvements and t is time. 
We identified the modern high-delta environment context three decades ago, which 
formed the motivation to investigate this topic and build practical frameworks to help 
navigate the current and near-horizon world.
The Emerging Framework—Quantum Leap Mechanics (QLMx)
After three and a half decades of study as a practitioner in this innovation field, 
including consideration given to existing thought and resources on the broad topic, 
we have identified that the nature of optimal conceptual progress is best described 
as a pattern language. This means a number of concurrent critical “factors” are in 
play and at work as new concepts are formed, refined, developed, and deployed. This 
observation has come from an intentional investigation at the professional practitioner 
level in a multitude of application areas, including: 
• Private-Sector Entertainment Content and Product Development
• Commercial Industry Resorts and Theme Parks (Innovation at Municipal Scale)
• National Security Intelligence Tradecraft
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• Industry Transformation—Agriculture Technology Systems
• Nonprofit Advancement, Operations, and Communications
• eRetail and Mobile Application Development
• Illusioneering
• Venture Capital Investing—Start-up Acceleration
• Real Estate Development
 
Special Operations Strategic Planning across Multiple Domains
At the highest level, the concept of innovation can be compared to how an electron 
orbits a nucleus in an atom, as shown in Figure 3. The electrons seem—for reasons 
not entirely understood—to prefer certain levels (n) of sustainable motion pattern, 
or orbitals. Upon the injection of sufficient energy (E) an electron can be moved up in 
energy level, but this transition generally happens in an all-or-nothing shift. Similarly, 
when an electron drops in energy level, it moves to a lower orbital and a unit of energy 
is released in the form of light, or electromagnetic energy (hv; where h is Planck’s 
constant and v is the frequency of the electromagnetic radiation). This is the origin of 
the concept of “quantum” transition.
Figure 3. Illustration of electron orbitals around the nucleus of an atom.
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Because of the symbolic value of this pattern found in nature, and because it is 
consistent with the nature of consequential innovation for purposes of this study, the 
quantum-physics model became a foundational element of our present investigation.
In the process of observing and working across these domains, and within this 
notion of Quantum Leap Mechanics, the resuting framework is communicated visually 
in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Mandala of Quantum Leap Mechanics framework.
This diagram, or mandala, represents the simultaneous workings of seven different 
core-quality patterns that together constitute what we have dubbed the Quantum Leap 
Mechanics model for innovation velocity. These concurrent core-quality patterns are 
given basic, familiar names, with each representing broad and deep compartments of 
endeavor. The core orbitals are summarized as follows:
SketchPad, SP (circle)
• Ideation; including Beginner’s Mind and Scribbles; Blue Sky, Concept Formation
• Includes Aesthetics, Multi-Modal Communication and Visualization—Design 
and Style
• Includes Tools for Seeing Problems in New Ways—Brainstorming, Art of the 
Possible
• Persona for this is an enthusiastic child, Charles Eames,xi crayons to the 
paper’s edge
TextBook, TB (“Diamond” tip)
• Science, Technology, Natural Laws, Mathematics—Height of Abstraction
xi   Charles Eames (1907-1978) was an American designer, architect, and filmmaker.  
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• Can’t fake this, requires education—Calculus, FFTs,xii Dif. EQs,xiii Physics 
• Enables leaps in performance, transcending intuition; Experimentation Rigor
• Persona for this is J. Robert Oppenheimer, Albert Einstein, or Richard Feynman
Balance Sheet, BS (little square in bigger square)
• Business, Profit Motive, Accounting, Law, Regulatory Context, Tax, Capital Formation
• Various models for reward, Risk Management, Project Delivery, Human 
Resource Management
• Persona for this is Warren Buffett, Michael Boskin, or Jim Cramer 
WorkBench, WB (rectangle)
• Prototyping, Tools, Testing, Crafts, Shop Space, Garage, and Scale Fluency
• Includes Fabrication Skills—Code, Shop, Machines, Materials, Attitude, Work Ethic
• Think of a construction foreperson or general contractor—a good one 
• Persona for this Leslie Groves, director of the Manhattan Project
MarketPlace/COTS,xiv MP (“line”/extended rectangle) 
• Available Components, Expertise, Products, Services—Supply Chain
• Search Engines, Machine-Learning (ML) Tools, Trade Shows, Worldliness, Image 
and Video Libraries
• New Tools for Search and Reference Cataloging, Prior Art, Competitors
• Persona for this is Lily Tomlin as the switchboard operator Ernestine,xv Connectors
PlayBill—“ART”, PB (ring)
• Myth, Mystery, Primal Urges, Biological Drives, Emotion, Intuition, Subconscious
• Fear, Love, Addiction, Obsession, Desire, Lust, Tragedy, Greed, Glory
• Gender Affordances, Attractions, Life, Birth, Death, Procreation, Generational Lines
• Symbolic and Archetypal Elements—Hero, Mentor, Guardian, Villain, Siren, Muse
• Persona for this is Rafiki in Lion King, Yoda, and William Shakespeare
xii   FFT is an acronym for fast Fourier transform, an efficient algorithm used widely in engineering, music, and science for  
signal processing.  
xiii   Dif. EQs stands for differential equations. This is a mathematical equation that relates one of more functions and their 
derivatives. The function typically represents physical quantities, the derivatives are the rate of change, and the differential 
equation defines the relationship between the two. Applications include modeling cancer growth, the transfer of electricity, and 
modeling investment returns.
xiv   i.e., commercial off-the-shelf.
xv   A recurring character on the television show Rowan & Martin’s Laugh-In (1967-1973).
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GoodLife, GL (triangle)
• Values, Ethics, Trust, Community, Morality, the “Soul” of Motives
• The Inherently Social Aspects of Change and Transformation
• The benefits and risks of peer pressure, purpose, conformity
• Faith (rapidly becoming an undiscussable topic), Deep Significance, Spirit
• Critical Factor for High and Ultimate Risk Environments (Pilgrims)
• Persona for this is Stephen Covey, Billy Graham, Mother Teresa
Beyond the individual core-orbital qualities outlined above, the key is to train 
conceptual thinkers to shift among these various mindsets and consider any idea or 
initiative with each in mind. A key framework for this understanding is the “Monroe 
Muscle Theory of Mind,” where multiple cognitive modalities work in concert with one 
another—and often in opposition to one another—to effect functional results. One 
will quickly notice that in our consciousness, these modalities do not appreciate, or 
even care to acknowledge, one another. Over time, and with structured training, the 
skills develop to enable quick and agile changes in perspective, for rapid triage and 
refinement of concepts. An omni-lateral awareness develops and serves the process. 
This framework also informs team design. 
A Preliminary Mathematical Framework
The exploration of this topic begins with understanding the roles of time and “degrees 
of novelty,” which form the basis for measurement and prediction. In this model, the 
basic form of a parabola is used to approximate the energy profile of an innovation 
initiative, as illustrated in Figure 5. As defined in Figure 1, “Q” represents quantum-
type improvements, and “t” is time. This premise of a parabola is taken as a broad 
approximation only and is used to assist in the development of a model framework 
for early evaluation. In this approach, the time duration (t) of an innovative project 
is taken as “P,” which, in the diagram, is P1 for the slower, longer type of project and 
P2 for an accelerated, high-speed implementation. The latter is a desired relative 
outcome of this project, with innovation delivered at a sustained high quality, but in a 
shorter amount of time. 
The formula portrayed in the figure is the vertex form of a parabolic equation, where 
Q is the peak of the parabola, P/2 is the midpoint of the parabola, -Q/(P/2) is the 
vertex of the downward facing parabola, and -Q/(P/2)2 is the factor, KQ, that determines 
the width of the parabola, identified as the “Kink.” The “x” in the formula is really “t,” 
time. By further extension, the equation for calculating the concurrent investment, I, and 
resultant value derived by a full-spectrum innovation project would be:
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Figure 5. A normalized, parametric view of the journey from initiation to fruition in creative projects. 
On first exposure, this type of mathematical treatment of a largely amorphous 
phenomenon, like “degrees of novelty,” seems somewhat far-fetched. Yet when we 
compare it to the early concepts of measuring and deriving universal constants 
related to the force of gravity, it becomes less crazy. The key lies in the establishment 
of measures and units thereof. Furthermore, we begin to see that if we do grow this 
model and approach, we may find that new software-enabled tools may begin to take 
shape that can help us with this process.
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An Innovation and Quantum Leap Archetype
Figure 6 represents a summary framework for discussing new concepts, their 
formation (the Vision), and the Journey to Fruition. This framework emphasizes 
representing all the elements of an instance of successfully expressed applied 
imagination. In this case, a sphere represents the preexisting reality, and a reticle and 
related new, if not focused, sphere identifies the new reality. The colors of the steps 
represent not only the need for a managed temporal sequence to fruition but also the 
concurrent core-quality factors that should be managed along the way. Importantly, 
this discourse is intentionally limited to the practice of applied imagination toward a 
beneficial or preferred outcome and does not give full consideration to raw “creativity,” 
which can include random ideas with no intention or goal of fruition.
Figure 6. The Vision and Journey to Fruition.
The Narrative Crosscut—Story Matters
Simultaneous with the structured core-qualities framework is the novel insight that 
conceptual leaps are best mapped and planned with a storytelling approach and 
toolset.
The core of this insight comes from observation about what tools and processes 
have resulted in the greatest “leaps” of human conceptual thought. One way to 
envision this is the Hero’s Journey Spiral, illustrated in Figure 7. We adapted it from 
the classic hero’s journey, a common narrative taught in writing classes. The latter 
involves the hero enbarking on a journey—leaving the familiar world behind, learning 
a lesson, applying the lesson to win a victory, and returning home a tranformed 
person. In the Hero’s Journey Spiral, the hero “spirals around” thinking, then comes 
up with an idea that begins to take him out of the spiral, past the familiar or status 
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quo threshhold—indicated with the 
dashed line—onto an innovation 
journey, resulting in a breakthrough—
the star in Figure 7. The hero comes 
back and contemplates again.
Let us journey back in this inquiry 
to the ancient Greeks and their 
invention of the concept of drama as 
a tool and process for inquiry and 
collaborative thought. The Greeks not 
only engaged language and discourse 
but also pioneered a new, deeper 
application of stage and proscenium 
(forestage) for the purpose of examining 
the relational and associative elements 
of the human condition and the nature of existence. We can look to the landscapes 
of Greece and Rome to see how significant this concept became to their society. The 
amphitheater pictured in Figure 8 outside Florence, Italy is a great example. 
Figure 8. Photo of amphitheater outside Florence, Italy.
Theater helped initiate massive leaps forward in concepts of democracy, social 
order, rule of law, property rights, and a civic logic. Story and story arts, therefore, 
formed a key component of the engine and thrust of Western values and successes.
Figure 7.
The Hero's Journey Spiral
-M. Monroe
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As such, this modality of examination and conceptual exploration has come to the 
center of the Quantum Leap Mechanics model. We see there are two broad categories 
of theater: 
• Recreational, Kinetic, Acrobatic, and Visually Mesmerizing Theater
    - Emphasis on Presentational Delight, Daring, and Physical Agility
• Deeper, Relational, and Associative Conceptual Theater/Drama/Opera
    - Consisting of narratives that reflect more profound subjects and themes
    - These deeper models can achieve a transformation of consciousness 
Story, Drama, Theater, and History 
From a historical perspective, storytelling has been a survival factor all the way back 
to the cave paintings. We capture the ancient Greeks and Romans as advancing the 
concepts of theater, then we see Shakespeare and his stunning aptitude for language 
and conveyance in the form of a five-act play. Into the modern age, we see Walt Disney 
discovering the new art of animation, along with television and film; he took story 
into a new dimension with the invention of the theme park. Finally, today, computer 
graphics enable an entirely new engagement with story, and we engage these 
technologies in the Quantum Leap Mechanics toolkit, including in the QLMx Scenario 
Centers and in the Quantum Hologram Workstation (QHW) Development.
Courting the Muse
This framework does not prescribe a thought process or a specific sequence of events 
that will lead to great ideas and fruition because the specifics of process vary greatly 
by application and circumstances. Consequently, the QLMx framework provides a way 
to dislodge an individual’s or a team’s thinking from a rut and shift it to a new angle, 
with core qualities like facets of a finely crafted diamond. It is an audit of sorts, but 
an audit with process implications.
As such, the system outlined in this chapter is conveyed and communicated in 
various “vehicles,” depending on the audience age, culture, and sophistication. For 
young people, the prevailing metaphor is a space shuttle–type rocket ship, with the 
liquid and solid rocket boosters being analogous to skills, reference research, and 
discipline. Distant stars and the orbiter are analogous to dreams and new ideas. For 
adult professionals, the model can be shared using a diamond analogy, with facets 
and precision analogous to the core-qualities refinement model, with implications of 
creating an object or result of enduring value. In some cases, the topic can remain 
more abstract and theoretical, but only when the audience is prepared for such an 
approach. In all cases, the premise is the transition from an existing, or “normal,” 
state to a more preferable elevated, or “energized,” state.
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Application Dimensions
The Quantum Leap Mechanics framework is applicable at multiple levels. Each 
of these operational dimensions contributes to overall innovation and fruition 
performance. 
Talent and Team Elements
Everyone has the capacity to use their imagination. It is the harnessing of this ability 
through literacy and skills development that this fundamental ability is leveraged. While 
some people can be trained for excellence in all areas of the orbital-quality matrix, it is 
often better to build a small team that together covers all the bases of need. This is 
a result of the cognitive and personal uniqueness of human personalities and types, 
which may or may not include personal life experience and context.
Facility and Tools
This new doctrine has strong implications for what kind of environment and tools are 
optimal for accelerated, high-velocity innovation. Innovation and quantum activities 
are messy. They also do not lend themselves to hipster interior environments and 
a constant spotlight of evaluation. Picture a garage. A garage of someone who 
likes to make stuff and try things. Now add advanced manufacturing, an art atelier 
for concepts, a television soundstage, and a feature-film-grade animation and 
postproduction suite. This mix of venues is not typically colocated. But this is a 
concept kitchen. Talent and tools must be quantum and omni-lateral. One process 
map is shown below in Figure 9.
 
Figure 9. Process Framework: From project initiation to fruition (M. Monroe).
As we study this topic in concept, we are also building specialized tools designed 
specifically to use the frameworks and increase the velocity of innovation in 
individuals, teams, enterprises, and metaorganizations. One such tool is MIXONIUM, 
a content-management platform that allows for the rapid mash-up of disparate file 
types into a URL post that can be easily tagged, enriched, and shared. Another tool 
is VibeWyre, which allows one to follow social media sources easily under a channel 
Tremor               Collection Scenario 
Options
Action                  Fruition
Ideation
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topic. This allows for a near real-time monitoring of ideas and insights in a particular 
field or on a particular topic.
Organizational Scale 
Individual/Personal—Q-Self
This technology and related systems lend themselves to personal assessment and 
increased performance. The idea is to explore and optimize the “Quantum Self” 
by taking individual capability to the next level, using the quantum orbitals as a 
framework for assessment and reflection. We are building a personal development 
program at the Magic Canyon Institute that identifies strengths, weaknesses, 
and growth opportunities for civilian and military personnel at all levels. A key 
management factor is realizing that every individual that touches an innovative effort 
has power to substantially enhance, or hinder, optimal outcomes. The core objective is 
actionable literacy. 
Small Team—Q-Cell(s)
At this scale, the system is ideally suited for training and enhancement of existing 
SOF. Not only could the system improve existing specialty teams, but there could 
be a regimen assembled for the creation of an entirely new SOF team—tentatively 
dubbed “Q-Cell”—that is specifically selected and trained in this quantum type of 
problem-solving. 
Enterprise—The Quantum Horizon Laboratory
In situations where an enterprise has an interest for a purpose-built organizational 
element in the service of quantum innovation, we have developed the Quantum 
Horizon Laboratory concept, which includes conceptual, rapid prototyping, field survey, 
intellectual property (IP), and management elements. This approach is not classical 
“R&D” but rather applied development, or “research and deployment,” with a constant 
tether to operational elements of the overall enterprise mission. This allows for 
disruptive concepts as well as ongoing support for existing operations. 
Intra-Enterprise—Quantum Latency Council
At the large scale, we envision a system like the quantum-horizon concept to be 
taken to an even higher level at the Department of Defense (DOD) or Department of 
Energy (DOE) level, or even the intelligence community (IC) level, wherein innovation 
is fostered across enterprises via an information-technology empowered advisory 
hub. This could be an extension of the existing strategic latency concept, leveraging 
existing efforts and reinvigorating some older advisory concepts that have lost 
relevance in the highly dynamic environments faced today by special operators.
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Heuristics—Blue Sky and Reduction to Practice
One key finding about applied creativity is that when high levels of performance are 
required, the best path to improvement is actual practice and kinesthetic involvement. 
An analogy is that one might read for years about playing the violin, but upon picking 
up an instrument, the sound would be less than worthy of Carnegie Hall. Applied 
imagination is a muscle-memory and tools domain.
Yes, we do believe that lightning can strike—an idea can pop to a random person 
and they capture it—but the QLMx process is about fostering literacy and capacity 
from ideation through fruition, which requires more rigor and preparation, and can 
increase the probability of seismic success. As such, training and certifications in this 
field must involve actual problem-solving or creative practice.
An additional element of heuristics is that we firmly believe the model of a new 
science should be tested against reality and evaluated against actual successes and 
failures. Hence, we study many case histories through a growing program of Quantum 
Walkabout guided tours, to see and consider innovations in their environments—
as in Walt Disney World, inside laboratories, and in private-sector environments. 
This includes bloopers—like the steel ball shattering a Tesla truck window (which 
Elon Musk attributed to damage of the window before the test) during a live 
demonstration.5
One internal descriptive term for this audit approach is “omni-lateral” thinking and 
orientation. This framework is not just an area of focus during ideation. It is critical to 
maintain this “worldview” through production and implementation. Hence the strong 
emphasis on real-world engagement.
Science Fiction—Quantum Corps— 
A Glimpse to the Forward Operating Environment
Imagine that we find ourselves in something we might call the Info Stone Age. As 
transformational as digital tools have been in the twenty-first century, we are only 
at the beginning of what they can imply for the publishing, sharing, and access 
to capability and ideas. A simple example would be the area of learning music. 
The access to video as a communication tool has transformed the art form and 
democratized who has access to “inside-baseball” information about the theory, 
practice, and production of world-class music recordings. Kids the world over can find 
out how to make great electric guitar distortion sounds, how to mic a classical guitar, 
and how to stack vocals—techniques reserved for the inner sanctums of recording 
studios just a few years ago. Digital access has altered the landscape of competition 
globally, expanding the field of competent practitioners, and reducing the advantage 
of incumbant experts. This trajectory is at once exciting and vexing for those using 
innovation as a platform for advantage.
Now imagine that the Special Operations Command leadership embraces the 
sweeping change being brought on by digital technologies and information systems, 
and the result is a new kind of specialized tiger team. In order to achieve and sustain 
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innovation superiority, the team would be trained in the optimal applied imagination 
platforms, with skills identified and honed with continuous training, on the order of 
how current teams are trained for marksmanship, communication, or intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). There would be drills. Lots of drills. Quantum 
innovation is like marksmanship or flying an aircraft. It is best done through routine 
practice and updating certifications. One can envision a quantum corps dedicated 
to rapid and agile innovation, scanning the globe for new concepts, integrating them 
into larger systems deployments, crafting agile first-article deliverables, and traveling 
to theaters of operation as needed. This corps would have a patch, a regimen, and a 
coach—or set of coaches—in the same manner that special operations teams have 
strength and cognitive performance coaches. 
As part of this new capability initiative, it is important to continually revisit the 
notion that the focus of a Quantum Leap Mechanics innovation velocity effort is the 
creation of utterly new systems and solutions. This is a shift from drilling on known 
exercises with predicted outcomes. The outcomes in this case are new things, new 
concepts, and new ways of succeeding or meeting mission requirements. It is like a 
form of magic—bringing into existence something that has not existed before. 
In Figure 10, a team coordinates to bring a fictitious “rabbit out of a hat,” using a 
new practice or a new coalition of skills. In the future, this may be an endeavor in the 
traditional kinetic area of combat or operations, but it may also be in the realms of 
soft power, in an emerging world of ubiquitous ISR, or in a real world we have yet to 
discover and inhabit.
Figure 10. Making Magic: A fictitious collaborative endeavor to pull a rabbit out of a hat (M. Monroe).
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Recommendations
Q-Cells, New SOF Corps
There needs to be an aggressive effort to take the existing Quantum Leap Mechanics 
framework and translate it into a curriculum that special operations personnel and 
policy leadership can use in confronting nonstandard national security challenges. 
This type of program could spawn utterly new concepts, and it could be activated to 
help solve new and emerging operational needs for the SOF and the Joint Special 
Operations Command (JSOC). Like air, ground, and cyber superiority, there needs 
to be a new priority placed on “conceptual agility superiority” in the US national 
security enterprise. In its most actualized form, this could be the genesis for a new 
special force, operationally named the Quantum Corps, with specialized training for 
unconventional situational response and planning. The prototype for this could be a 
heightened, elevated, and expanded JSOCx.
Q-Cells Training Camp, Facility, and Program
We believe there should be a physical center and virtual collaboration toolkit to aid in 
the operation of a training and concept-development regimen. Prototypes of this type 
of experiential, location-based programming have been tested at the Magic Canyon 
Institute, Ranch, and Wildlife Park in northern New Mexico, and the proprietary digital 
content management system MIXONIUM has been implemented as a key element of 
creative collaboration operations. Programs can range from low-intensity workshops 
to extreme and intense boot-camp-type immersion, including tangible adversity. We 
also suggest exploring a location-based facility and program in or near the Walt 
Disney World area of central Florida, because of the unprecedented concentration of 
innovative constructs and designs within that roughly 20-mile radius region. One key 
reason for the location-based approach in this digitally connected age is that true 
literacy and skill in this domain requires dialogue and self-confrontation at a level that 
warrants close human contact for support, instruction, and adaptation of principles to 
specific operational requirements. The young generation of today that is buffeted by 
countless false and subversive messages, and credentialed authenticity will be a pillar 
of success for any program like this. 
Quantum Council
We believe while various advisory boards and commissions in the national security 
system for advising on science-and-technology (S&T) areas already exist, there 
should be a new board—perhaps as a replacement for the DOD Jason program—that 
is based on these agile innovation principles. This structure is sourced from the 
rapidly moving private sector, and as globalization and digital networks continue to 
advance, the “velocity” of innovation in the US government will need to keep pace. 
This framework and the organizational implications could assist in this area. As an 
example, we believe an effective approach would be to take the SOCOM strategic 
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latency initiative and expand it with resources and a talent network to fit this goal. 
There should be a specialized university partner construct.
New Digital Tools—Augmented Innovation
As a new and unified field theory of applied imagination and innovation velocity 
continues to take shape, we can actively develop tools to improve the process of 
formulating ideas and concepts, for bringing them to life and fruition. The emerging 
QLMx framework provides a superstructure for tools advancement and at least partial 
automation. At Marshall Monroe MAGIC, this vision is taking shape across a number 
of technology platforms. These include the incubation of MIXONIUM Ultra Media, a 
patented technology for curating and passing packets of rich media that transcends 
file types and represents a new communication form. It is a format ready-made for 
code automation via artificial intelligence, machine learning, and spatial computing. 
These efforts include a comprehensive look at telematics, and how augmented, 
mixed, and virtual reality can be used not only to play games or reproduce the existing 
world but also to play with ideas—to augment the practice of innovation itself. This 
work also includes the invention of a new type of collaborative scenario studio—
leveraging digital tools and rich natural environments to create an optimal setting and 
“space” for the birthing and deployment of new ideas. We will continue to advance the 
concepts, with implications for partners and allies as the demand for transformation 
and the “need for speed” of concept development increases.
Freedom to Innovate
As the pressure from aggressive authoritarian dictatorships and communism 
continues to be felt across the globe and right in our pockets on every smartphone, 
we believe this topic might be an important vehicle for raising awareness and valuing 
the concepts of Western free enterprise and democracy—including the right to the 
pursuit of happiness and of reimagining one’s station in life, rather than a hollow 
promise of guaranteed equal outcomes as prescribed by the state. As such, one 
engagement option would be to open an applied creativity workshop or “boot camp” 
for young and old who wish to engage with this profound topic. This could be an 
expanded “makers fair”–type venue, or something with a more artistic focus, akin to 
a writer’s workshop or music camp. This type of youth and family programming has 
also been tested at the Magic Canyon Institute, Ranch, and Wildlife Park. One extreme 
example of this notion would be to connect an effort like this with the original vision 
for EPCOT—the Experimental Prototype Community of Tomorrow—in Walt Disney 
World. This is a matter of national competitiveness at a consequential scale.
Conclusion
As a student of new ideas and their pathways to fruition, I am honored and consider 
it a privilege to contribute to a volume like the Strategic Latency Unleashed. Unlike 
extraction industries, which consume resources and may be at best “renewable” 
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or “sustainable,” applied imagination is “exponentiable,” in that with each new 
advancement, more becomes possible, and the raw material of capability and capacity 
is not reduced or preserved, but, rather, increases.
Looking ahead with a “2020 Vision” and beyond, we anticipate the current conditions 
of a high-delta national security environment will continue, as artificial intelligence, 
machine learning, global soft-power networks, robots, automated/UAS vehicles, 
metamaterials, big data, mixed-reality systems, spatial computing, digital devices, and 
virtual worlds continue to evolve. Consequently, a new science directly applicable to 
navigating and leveraging new contexts could, and should, be explored further.
Appendix: QLMx Innovation Literacy and Articles Compendium
Component-detail articles by M. Monroe illuminate additional factors and practical 
models for an optimal applied creative process. These insights and approaches are 
original and based on empirical observation and testing. They include the following: 
1. Orders of Innovation: Check Your Passport—Q.CON 0-1-2-3xvi
2. The Oak and the Acorn—Legacy v. Novelty in Managing Innovation Strategy
Concepts of Routine, Habit, Confirmation Bias, and Hidden Algorithm
3. “Heat Vision”—Soft Focus, Nonverbal Communication, and Equestrian Arts
4. Epic Creativity Stories: Glory (Disneyland) and Bloopers (Kodak, Sears)
5. Virus/Host—a Procreation Model for Spawning, Identity, and Ownership
6. How to Brainstorm and Make Meetings Not Suck
7. The History of Creativity: A Humbling View—World Events, USG S&T, VC, USPTO
8. State-Sponsored, Weaponized Innovation—PRC, EU, S. Korea, Airbus
9. Resiliency, Determination, Obstacles and the Quicksilver Quotient
10. Rendering and Movie Poster—The End-State Nirvana Image
11. The Nirvana Scenario—Dream for Ultimate Success and Work Backwards
12. Holodex, MxR.HIVE—Inventory of Industry, Markets, Situation Awareness
13. Blue Sky Project Management—The QLMx Method
14. The Omni-Lateral Team—Casting and Assessing Small Groups for Creative Agility
15. Explaining the Dream—Walt and the Wonderful World of Disney (Disneyland)
16. Reality Radar—Deep Dive Assumption Assessment and Inventory
 Patterns of life, habits, sacred-cow tipping
17. Media Mindfulness—The Potential and Perils of Infinite Digital Content
 Black box algorithms, plausible deniability, and platform bias
 The Power and Risks of Weaponized Peer Pressure, Propaganda, IW
18. Creative Dark Matters—How to Poison the Well and Reduce Creative Output
xvi   This is a work mode for the program analogous to the DEFCON status system, with numeric designations indicating “CONditions” 
for readiness and response. In this case, Q.CON represents the quantum conditions of a situation. For example, Q.CON-0: 
Stasis and Precision Desired—No Need for Innovation (typical military/franchise operations—execution priority); Q.CON-1: 
Orderly, Incremental Improvement Desired (product development, design, or iteration—oak innovation); Q.CON-2: Need for Mild 
Structural Realignment; Adjacent Ideas (venture pivot, core capacity intact, management disruption); Q.CON-3: Radical and 
Revolutionary Ideas Required or Desired—Acorn (seismic shift, values, and survival fear awakened, threatened).
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Anti-creative infections and sabotage strategies; clutter and distraction
19. Phases of Quantum Transformation
Phases of Vision—background scan, prior art inventory, ideation, scenarios
 Phases of the Fruition Journey—rapid prototype, mobilize, test, repair, deploy
20. Divine Intervention—Why Western Cultures Innovate and Discover More
21. Consumer v. Innovator—Transcending Imitation and Conformity with Integrity
22. Teatro Magico—Drama, Story, and Concept Development
 The scenario video; role playing; living laboratories
 New applications of 3D real-time cgi systems—AR/XR/MxR
23. Monroe Muscle Theory of Mind
 Isometric cognitive modalities, fluency and agility; the human figure
24. Boot Camp, Fitness, and the Anatomy of Optimal Creativity
 Exercise, health, dopamine, fatigue, and stimulation
25. Fuel Mixture, Vectored Thrust—Role of the Producer and Production Assistant
A New View on “Management” and Administration
26. Linguistics—Words Matter
 Selective use of words, in a plural world
27. Ownership Topology—Managing the Invisible Physics of Attribution
Virus, host, and the biological strategies for offspring
28. The Diamond Mine—Exercises for Lateral Leap Literacy Aptitude
Including case studies and related rich media
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Russia’s Special Purpose Forces: A Strategic Weapon
Major Jonathan N. Fagins, Michael Nacht, and Glenn Chafetz
Introduction
When Russian president Vladimir Putin authorized military intervention in Syria 
in 2015, the international community turned its attention to Russia’s use of 
unconventional forces, most notably Spetsnaz. Western states, however, remain 
unsure about what Spetsnaz is, what it does, and how it fits in among other 
Russian “unconventional” (or “hybrid”/“special”) forces. The confusion stems 
from nomenclature, the breadth and variety of Spetsnaz itself, and the fact that 
the Russian government has used a variety of different institutions and methods to 
achieve its goals in Syria, Ukraine, and elsewhere.i
This chapter argues primarily that Putin uses the full range of these institutions 
and methods to achieve his two highest strategic priorities without having to 
resort to full-scale war: (1) to weaken and destabilize the West, and (2) to bring 
the countries of the so-called near abroad closer into Russia’s orbit (or at least 
prevent those countries from becoming closer to the West). The chapter begins 
with a discussion of definitions and history. It then places Russia’s use of special 
forces in political-strategic context, that is: to what purposes does Putin put these 
tools? Next, the chapter provides the conceptual context for Russia’s contemporary 
use of these kinds of methods and forces, relying principally on how Chief of 
the General Staff Valery Gerasimov has articulated Russian political and military 
leadership thinking on conflict and the role of unconventional forces. The chapter 
then illustrates how the Russians applied Gerasimov’s ideas in Ukraine and Syria. 
In addition, we clarify which tools the Russians used for which missions and why. 
The chapter concludes with thoughts on the effectiveness of Russian use of special 
forces and the likelihood of success for similar efforts in the future.
What Is Spetsnaz?
The Russians have used the word Spetsnaz to refer to a variety of different units 
attached to intelligence, police, or military institutions and forces. The term itself 
is a portmanteau of the Russian words spetsial’noe and naznacheniya, meaning 
“special designation” or “special purpose.” Spetsnaz units have no common or 
standard institutional home, uniform, insignia, training, or qualifications.1 Forces 
calling themselves Spetsnaz are or have been attached to many military units, the 
Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), its post-Soviet successor institutions—
the Federal Security Service (FSB) and External Intelligence Service (or Foreign 
i   In this chapter, we use Spetsnaz to refer to only the various forces that call themselves by that name. We use “SSO” to refer 
to only that institution. We use “special forces,” “special purpose forces,” “unconventional tools,” or “methods” to refer 
broadly to the full range of institutional means at Putin’s disposal.
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Intelligence Service; SVR)—the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRUii),2 the 
Ministry of Interior (MVD) and other police units, the Russian Airborne Forces, the 
Special Operations Forces (SSO),iii and other institutions.iv 
Beyond the application of the term, another source of confusion is that Spetsnaz 
missions are quite broad and have included raids and sabotage, assassination, 
special reconnaissance, intelligence collection, combating adversary special 
operations forces (SOF), subversion, psychological operations, military assistance, 
support for Russia’s conventional forces, search-and-rescue operations, and peace 
support operations.3 Of greatest interest in this book are the strategic covert 
actions—including those of Spetsnaz—that give the Russian government plausible 
deniability for visible actions for which it wishes to avoid responsibility (and wants to 
attribute to others),v as exemplified by the Russian shadow invasion of Ukraine, which 
included the seizure of Crimea, the attack on the Donetsk Basin (Donbas or Donbass), 
and the various destabilization efforts against the Kiev government.4
History of Spetsnaz
While much of the recent attention has been on Russian Spetsnaz pretending to 
be Ukrainian “self-defense irregulars” (the famous “little green men”) in Crimea 
and the Donbas, these types of covert use of forces for sabotage, assassination, 
misdirection, and reconnaissance are not new.vi The Bolsheviks used concealed or 
misattributed forces during the Russian Civil War. The Soviets employed partisans 
and long-range special-mission teams during World War II and planned to use them 
during any war with NATO.5 Special forces also supported and trained pro-Soviet 
forces against anti-Soviet governments and factions in the Soviet sphere and the 
developing world.6 Other previous uses include the preservation of the Soviet regime 
and support to pro-Soviet forces in North Korea, East Germany, Hungary, Cuba, 
Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan and throughout Africa.7 After the collapse of the 
ii   Although the GRU became the GU in 2010, for purposes of consistency, the authors use the term GRU throughout the 
remainder of the chapter.
iii   For the sake of readability, we have listed translations of institutional names in the text for the following transliterated 
Russian names: Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB), Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB), Sluzhba Vneshney 
Razvedki (SVR), Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie (GRU), and Sil Spetsialnykh Operatsiy (SSO).
iv  For varieties of Spetsnaz and difference between Spetsnaz and other forces, see Fainberg, “Russian Spetsnaz,” 8-9; and Atay, 
“Strategic Utility of the Russian Spetsnaz,” Naval Postgraduate School, master’s thesis, December 2016, p. 52. Atay relies 
significantly on Mark Galeotti and Johnny Shumate, Spetsnaz: Russia’s Special Forces (Elite). Ed. Martin Windrow. Oxford: 
Osprey, 2015, 206.
v   Note: briefly, “plausible deniability” allows individuals in an organization to deny either responsibility for or knowledge of 
damnable actions based on a lack of evidence that confirms their participation. While covert action has public results but 
obscures the responsible actors, clandestine action like espionage conceals even the fact of the action or result, most notably 
the theft of protected information. See also Bennets, “Putin Rules Deaths of Russian Troops in ‘Special Operations’ a State 
Secret,” 2015.
vi   On the use of assassination in Russian and Soviet history, see Amy Knight, Orders to Kill: The Putin Regime and Political 
Murder. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2017, 11-30. See also Sukhankin, “Russian State’s Use of Irregular Forces,” 2019.
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Soviet Union, and before its involvement in Ukraine, Spetsnaz played roles in the 
First and Second Chechen Wars and in Georgia.8
Political-Strategic Context and Purpose of Russian Special Forces
Because of the varied range of strategic and foreign policy purposes of Russian 
special forces, we focus on Putin’s highest priorities: to bring the former Soviet 
constituent states closer into Moscow’s orbit and to weaken NATO and the United 
States. Putin defines Russian and Western interests as zero sum: that which is 
bad for the West is good for Russia, and vice versa.vii Key to serving that interest is 
weakening ties between the West and Putin’s closest neighbors, such as Ukraine, 
whose legitimacy and independence from Russia Putin has never accepted.viii (It is 
worth noting Putin assigned primacy for “near abroad” special operations to the 
FSB, Russia’s internal security service, and not the SVR, the external intelligence 
service. From this assignment, one could infer how much respect Putin gives to the 
independence and sovereignty of those countries).
Putin openly directs much of his foreign policy toward weakening ties between the 
near abroad and the West and preventing former Soviet constituents from moving 
closer to the West, a goal he has pursued most vigorously in Ukraine, Belarus, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. In short, Putin believes that if 
the former Soviet states cannot be returned to Moscow’s control, then, at least, they 
will be denied the independence and capability to choose to align with or cooperate 
meaningfully with the United States. As of yet, Putin has not decided to pursue that 
policy through full-scale conventional warfare (although the war with Ukraine is open, 
partly conventional and undeniably Russian, if not a full-scale war). Instead, Putin 
has relied on limited war, subversion, deception, local proxies, information warfare, 
misdirection, and distraction. 
Conceptual Foundations: General Valery Gerasimov’s Views of Modern Conflict
Valery Gerasimov, Russia’s chief of the General Staff and deputy minister of defense, 
has provided the modern intellectual framework undergirding the current Russian 
approach to conflict. Some controversy exists as to whether the model Gerasimov 
described and advocated rises to the specificity and coherence of doctrine. Gerasimov 
did not reveal anything particularly new in his concepts, except perhaps the inclusion 
of the latest technologies and institutions. The blurred distinctions between war and 
peace, the use of deception, and the preference to achieve a political goal without 
vii   See US ambassador Michael McFaul’s report of his conversation with Russian first deputy prime minister in fall 2013 
regarding Ukraine. McFaul, From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin’s Russia. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt, 2018, 395. There is a domestic political component to this policy; Putin needs an external threat to justify his 
dictatorship.
viii   A useful discussion of Putin’s views about Ukraine can be found in Myers, The New Tsar, 462-480. See also Gerard Toal, Near 
Abroad: Putin, the West, and the Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, 237-273 
and Steven Lee Myers and Ellen Barry, “Putin Reclaims Crimea for Russia and Bitterly Denounces the West,” New York Times, 
March 19, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/world/europe/ukrainehtml.
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fighting existed in Sun Tzu’s time. Still, Gerasimov articulated a set of preferences 
for the use of some tools and techniques over others, and his position as chief of 
the General Staff makes his preferences worthy of attention. His views also merit 
consideration because Russian actions in Ukraine, Syria, and elsewhere have hewed 
closely to what he described. Furthermore, both Gerasimov’s articulation and recent 
Russian action have implications for other countries in the near abroad where Putin 
feels a sense of grievance, insecurity, and threat.
Gerasimov has spoken and written widely, but no one message garnered as much 
attention as a 2013 article published in the Voyenno-Promyshlenniy Kuryer (Military-
Industrial Courier).9 The article is short and general but, in retrospect, seems to 
explain what the Kremlin executed in Ukraine the following year. Gerasimov’s main 
points follow:
• There is no clear distinction between states of war and peace.
• War cannot be regarded as solely military.
• Success will depend on the deployment of mixed, asymmetrical forces 
operating in a single information and intelligence space.
• This method of war will erase existing differences among tactical, operational, 
and strategic forces; toward that end, one focus should be neutralizing the 
enemy using special operations forces and internal opposition “to establish  
a permanent front throughout the opposing state.”
• Many of the measures employed will be hidden; “The open use of force is 
often limited . . . under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis resolution only  
at some stage, mainly to achieve ultimate success in the conflict.”
• Many of the measures will rely on the “protest potential of the [local] 
population.”
• Russia will apply the lesson from its experiences in Georgia, Afghanistan,  
and World War II. 
How exactly all this would unfold in an actual conflict depends on a number of 
factors. The following sequence from Gerasimov’s concept of hybrid warfare10 largely 
resembles what happened in Ukraine, and can be used to judge the extent to which 
Russian political-strategic theory is reflected by its praxis:
• Covert origins: The initial phase in which political opposition and resistance in 
the form of political parties and other groups are formed against the opposing 
regime. This phase includes a comprehensive information warfare campaign 
to shape the environment toward a Russian purpose, with employment of 
strategic deterrence. Potential for miltary activity emerges in this phase.
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• Escalation: In this second phase, political and military leaders become 
aware of the developing conflict. Russia exerts political and economic 
pressure on the targeted regime, including economic sanctions and the 
suspension of diplomatic relations.
• Start of conflict: The third phase starts with hostile acts such as 
demonstrations, sabotage, assassinations, and paramilitary engagements. 
Russia then begins deployment of its forces toward the region.
• Crisis: Russia commences military operations alongside a persistent 
information campaign in order to change public opinion in favor of 
Russian intervention. 
• Resolution: This stage focuses on the best paths to resolve the conflict 
with change of leadership in the state or region in which the conflict took 
place. The goal is to reset the political, military, and economic situation to 
return to peace and order.
• Restoration of Peace: The final stage involves Russian attempts to reduce 
tensions and conduct peacekeeping operations. This protracted phase 
includes diplomatic and political measures required to establish a postconflict 
settlement that addresses the original causes of conflict. 
Russian Strategy in Ukraine
Just as Putin denies the legitimacy of an independent Ukraine, he also threatens 
the independence of three NATO member states: Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.ix 
Therefore, the West must understand the thinking underpinning Russian goals and 
methods—as well as their results—in Ukraine. While the conflict in Ukraine has not 
unfolded in exactly the sequence laid out above, Gerasimov’s model helps us to 
understand Russian strategic thinking. 
Ideally, as Gerasimov argued, the tools used in the first stage or stages of a 
conflict could achieve the state’s strategic goals instead of facilitating further 
escalation. The events in Ukraine in the run-up to February 27, 2014x illustrate what 
these first stages look like in a practical sense. In 2013-2014 in Ukraine, Russia’s 
nearest-term goal was to prevent Ukraine from signing a European Union Association 
Agreement. By that point, Russia had already employed a variety of covert and overt 
means—including information warfare, political and economic sanctions, and likely 
attempted assassination—to keep Ukraine in the fold. However, once the Maidan 
protests started on November 21, 2013, subsequently forcing the pro-Russian 
ix   On Putin’s views of Ukraine and the Baltics, see Myers, 466-467. See also R. D. Hooker Jr., “How to Defend the Baltic 
States,” Jamestown Foundation, October 17, 2019, https://jamestown.org/product/how-to-defend-the-baltic-states. Putin 
and his lieutenants have been quoted repeatedly claiming a right to defend Russians anywhere, most frequently mentioning 
Ukraine and the Baltics.
x   Officials dispute precisely when Russian forces arrived, but most reports list this date.
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Ukrainian prime minister Viktor Yanukovych from power, Putin decided he had to 
resort to military use, though covertly at first. Had Yanukovych managed to stay 
in power, Russia could have achieved its goal without ever resorting to additional 
military measures.
Putin famously described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest tragedy 
of the twentieth century. He first made that comment in 2005, and in 2018 added he 
would reverse the collapse of the Soviet Union if he could.xi Ukraine was the second 
largest constituent Soviet republic at the time of the collapse, and had been the jewel 
in the crown of the Russian empire. Putin found intolerable the possibility that Ukraine 
would align itself with the United States, NATO, and the European Union.11 In the 
Russian view, the overthrow of Yanukovych and election of a pro-Western government 
required some kind of countervailing action. However, for both domestic and foreign 
policy reasons, Putin was not willing to risk a wider war. He wanted to achieve his 
goals for the least amount of blood and treasure. Moreover, a narrative in which the 
Ukrainians themselves opposed a strategic realignment and chose Russia over the 
West served Putin’s domestic and foreign policy goals (in part because of Putin’s 
claims the Russians and Ukrainians are one people).
On February 27, 2014, several hundred members of the 45th Spetsnaz regiment 
helped establish what Russia media called a “popular uprising.” The Spetsnaz forces 
seized key road intersections and facilitated a larger Russian military intervention.12 
Russia used enough deception to cause confusion and provide some degree of 
plausible deniability, at least initially. While most observers strongly suspected the 
Russian hand, the Kremlin made an effort to attribute the action to local Russian-
speaking Ukrainians, who constituted the majority in Crimea and Donbas. The Russian 
troops wore no insignias and claimed to be local self-defense forces. However, the 
assertion these “little green men” were local could not withstand scrutiny. The forces 
were armed with new, modern 7.62 mm PKP machine guns and wore new camouflage 
combat uniforms, tactical vests, and composite helmets. Not even regular Ukrainian 
military units, let alone local militia, carried such up-to-date weapons and equipment. 
Many of the Spetsnaz also spoke Russian in nonlocal accents and were obviously 
not Ukrainian. Despite these inconsistencies, Putin and other senior Russian officials 
denied the presence of Russian forces in Crimea until mid-April 2014, almost two 
months after the first deployments.
The fighting in Donbas that began in March 2014 followed a similar pattern of 
deception, denial, and confusion as in Crimea. One Reuters correspondent reported 
seeing dozens of heavily armed men with Russian accents set up a roadblock 10 
kilometers from the Russian border. Wearing white arm bands and no identifying 
insignia, they were referred to in a BBC report as a “Ghost Army.” Spetsnaz led the 
initial armed action, and after establishing control of key junctions and facilities, 
xi   Putin made the first comment in 2005 and the second in 2018. Adam Taylor, “Putin Says He Wishes the Soviet Union Had Not 
Collapsed: Many Russians Agree.” Washington Post, March 3, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/
wp/2018/03/03/putin-says-he-wishes-he-could-change-the-collapse-of-the-soviet-union-many-russians-agree/
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prepared the way for a larger, more conventional force. By the end of 2017, the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observer mission counted 
about 30,000 military personnel crossing from Russia to Donbas at the two border 
checkpoints it was allowed to monitor.13 Again, Russia started with information 
operations and followed with special purpose forces pretending to be locals. In Donbas, 
Russia did not formally annex the territory it controlled and, thus, did not have to 
acknowledge the presence of its forces. Russia continues to insist it has no forces in 
the Donbas, and that all the antigovernment forces in the area are local residents.
Russian Strategy in Syria
While it does not hold the same strategic importance for Russia as Ukraine does, 
Syria has been a long-term, reliable ally, and the port of Tartus is the site of both 
a Russian navy base and Russia’s foremost signals’ collection platform in the 
Mediterranean and Middle East. Furthermore, in Putin’s zero-sum worldview, any 
adversary of the United States is a friend of Russia. Therefore, supporting Bashar al-
Assad was in Russia’s interest. It is unclear when Russia first became involved in the 
Syrian revolution; however, Spetsnaz forces have been training and assisting Syrian 
forces since at least July 2015.14 However, Spetznaz was neither the only or arguably 
most significant Russian actor in Syria. Others included SSO, Zaslon,15 various 
contractors, the air force, and the GRU, FSB, and SVR in their larger capacities.
Direct-action forces (analagous to top-tier US direct-action operators), SSO 
played a particularly key role in Syria. The SSO reports to the Komandovaniye 
Spetsialnykh Operatsiy (KSO; established in 2010), Russia’s special operations 
command, analogous to US JSOC.16 Unlike Spetsnaz forces, which have broad and 
varied training, and distinguished from other forces by their purpose, SSO are all 
highly trained, volunteer troops. (In contrast, Spetsnaz forces sometimes still rely on 
conscripts to fill their ranks.) SSO operatives focus on three main areas of Russia’s 
strategic deterrence: counterterrorism, special operations in martime affairs, and 
special operations abroad.
SSO’s involvement in Syria focused on the “strategy of limited actions”17 to 
employ the full spectrum of military power on behalf of Russian interests. SSO fought 
alongside Syrian troops, ambushing behind lines and attacking critical communication 
facilities. SSO actions were critical in enabling President al-Assad’s military to advance 
in many areas of the country. For example, in March 2016, Russia’s elite forces 
helped liberate Palmyra from the Islamic State after weeks of Russian airstrikes and 
close-quarter fighting.18 Because of Palmyra’s strategic location in central Syria, the 
battle represented a decisive victory for the Syrian government.
Different Tools for Different Missions
In Crimea, Donbas, and Syria, events unfolded in ways Gerasimov described. In 
each case, the Kremlin relied on a variety of different tools matched to the different 
strategic requirements and conditions. Because Russia intended from the beginning 
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to annex Crimea—an open and formal act—it needed to employ misattribution only 
until it could move sufficient forces into Crimea to seize control of key transportation, 
communication, military, and political facilities. Just as Gerasimov described, in 
the first stages of the conflict, covert methods and forces enabled subsquent overt 
conventional forces.
Russia had a different goal in Donbas, which required diffent methods and, 
therefore, different tools. In Donbas, Russia sought to weaken the legitimacy of the 
anti-Russian, pro-Western government in Kiev by showing how the Ukrainian people 
did not support their own government. Achieving the goal required an actual invasion 
by large numbers of regular Russian troops, but Russia has never given up the fiction 
that the conflict is among Ukrainian factions only. In this case, almost every facet 
and stage of Gerasimov’s model entered into play, from the most covert methods to 
massive employment of conventional forces, including advanced air and antiair power. 
Russian actions in Crimea and Ukraine differed from its actions in Syria, where Russia 
relied less on information operations (which Syrians largely handled) and more on the 
SSO and air power to achieve its goals. 
Russia’s Special Operations Tools and Methods 
The special operations tools and methods Russia has employed have depended 
on particular mission goals and situations. Organizations, missions, and methods 
have overlapped, and Russian leaders often have applied different instruments—
opportunistically, haphazardly, and simultaneously—for the same mission. Let us first 
consider Russia’s three primary intelligence services—GRU, FSB, and SVR—before 
examining other operators Russia has employed.
The GRU is Russia’s military intelligence agency. In the Soviet era, the GRU 
provided intelligence to the military and the government. The GRU reports directly 
to the chief of the General Staff, Gerasimov (who also controls 25,000 Spetsnaz 
forces across all branches of the military19), and plays a critical role in cyber warfare. 
The GRU’s Unit 22951 appears to be the organization responsible for carrying out 
foreign assassinations and assassination attempts, such as that of former Russian 
intelligence officer Sergey Skripal in the United Kingdom in 2018.20 Further, the 
GRU intervened in the 2016 US presidential election. When most people talk about 
Spetsnaz, they refer to units within the GRU. The GRU Spetsnaz formed in 1949, 
disbanded in 2010, and was reconstituted in 2013. 
The GRU’s missions overlap principally with those of the FSB and the SVR. The 
FSB has two primary roles—counteresponiage and counterterrorism21—but also bears 
responsibility for border security (and border troops), the coast guard, and information 
security. Most significantly for the case of Ukraine, President Putin, a former KGB 
officer and former head of the FSB, granted the FSB greater authority to carry out 
operations abroad, particularly in the countries of the former Soviet Union. (Putin, who 
famously served a tour in East Germany before the collapse of the Soviet Union, spent 
the bulk of his KGB career working domestically against internal dissent, an FSB task).
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The SVR inherited the KGB’s foreign intelligence role, collecting mostly civilian 
strategic intelligence. However, SVR missions overlap with the FSB in the areas 
bordering Russia and the GRU, which also collects foreign political, scientific, and 
technical intelligence of interest to the Russian military.22 Each of these institutions 
have Spetsnaz of their own, but each also plays a role in advancing Putin’s 
geopolitical strategy independent of any use of forces called Spetsnaz. 
Other tools include the Internet Research Agency (IRA), various contractors,23 even 
soccer hooligans, volunteer associations, businesses, and a pro-Putin motorcycle gang 
known as the Night Wolves. Per the concept Gerasimov outlined, these institutions and 
groups can act in different combinations at different points to achieve Russian ends. 
To support unrest, protests, and influence operations, the Kremlin used 
several proxy forces to advance Putin’s political objectives. The Kremlin has also 
used right-wing training camps,motorcycle gangs, and neo-Nazi soccer hooligans 
to influence operations in Western countries. For example, in Slovakia, retired 
Russian Spetsnaz soldiers trained young men from a right-wing paramilitary group 
to create disturbances.24 Russia also used the Night Wolves gang as a proxy 
group in Slovakia to promote Russian sympathies; the gang drove en masse to a 
Soviet War memorial and laid red carnations in front of the memorial.25 In France, 
authorities detained the leader of the Russian Union of Supporters (a soccer fan 
club) reportedly under FSB guidance to foment disorder at EURO 2016 soccer 
matches.26 As Putin’s intelligence services lure angry young men into their sphere 
of influence and radicalize skinhead nationalists to provoke protests, Moscow 
advances its goals of destablizing Western societies.27
Russia has also employed fake social media accounts and internet trolls to 
motivate political action and stir unrest, most famously, but not exclusively, in 
the 2016 US presidential election. Elements of both the GRU and the Internet 
Research Agency (IRA) were linked to these efforts.28
Putin tries to set Russia apart by defending what he considers “traditional” 
values against Western liberal values.29 He uses this self-appointed role to sow 
internal division among his adversaries, most famously in Ukraine and in the 
United States during the 2016 election, but also throughout the West. The various 
groups and institutions constituting the Kremlin’s strategic information toolbox 
therefore promote anti-immigrant, antifeminist, anti-LGBTQ, and nationalistic 
rhetoric. Russia’s attempts to erode the legitimacy of democratic institutions are 
intended to strengthen Russian claims that Western (i.e., NATO) democracies are 
not morally superior to the Russian or other authoritarian forms of government.30 
Russian intelligence services and other pro-Kremlin groups fuel such culture wars, 
paving the way for the active measures Gerasimov outlines . In this way, Russia 
integrates its multifaceted special forces units (broadly and inclusively defined) 
into a strategy that extends from peacetime influence operations to hybrid war and 
even strategic signaling.
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Implications
Russia has integrated the full range of its covert and special purpose capabilities 
into its overall national security strategy. As General Gerasimov made clear, the 
Russian conception of conflict denies any meaningful distinction between peace and 
war; therefore, Moscow considers itself free to use all its capabilities at any time 
to achieve Russian goals. Putin’s agenda focuses on bringing former Soviet states 
into Moscow’s orbit, or at least denying those countries the opportunities for close 
economic integration and security cooperation with the West.
Russian special purpose forces (including Spetsnaz), one of the tools at Putin’s 
disposal, helped enable Russia to gain control of Crimea and integrate it politically 
into the Russian Federation and to seize large areas of eastern Ukraine and maintain 
a force that destabilizes the rest of Ukraine. Russia’s involvement in Syria served as 
a test case for its influence in the developing world and provided an opportunity to 
weaken the West. It also provided a test case for Russia’s use of contractors, the SSO, 
and air-ground coordination as elements of its strategic political strategy. Furthermore, 
Russian’s experience in Syria demonstrated that relatively small investments could 
yield large dividends: Russian special forces and air power likely kept Bashar al-Assad 
in power. Russia’s continuing special operations information war on the United States, 
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and other NATO allies serves to divide these 
countries both internally and from one another. The aftermath of the 2016 election 
attack in the United States and inteference in the Brexit referendum in the United 
Kingdom illustrate clearly the effectiveness of the Russian effort.31 
As impressive as Russia’s accomplishments have been in Ukraine, Crimea, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom, much of what Russia has achieved depends 
on factors that may not be replicable against targets such as Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania. First, Russian success in Ukraine came against an unprepared, divided, and 
weak adversary. While the Baltic states are no match for Russia militarily, they are 
much more politically developed and united than Ukraine. More significant, they are 
NATO members. Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty commits NATO member to defend 
one another when attacked militarily, a provision that likely would compel Putin to 
think twice before undertaking any attributable hostile act against Estonia, Latvia, or 
Lithuania. Second, Russia’s intervention in Ukraine provided lessons for Baltic states, 
allowing them to prepare appropriately. Third, while each of the three Baltic states 
has significant Russian populations, those populations are both economically stronger 
than their Russian Federation compatriots (which was not true of Ukraine) and more 
geographically dispersed than in Ukraine. (The fact that Ukraine is split regionally into 
a pro-Russian east and pro-Western west aided Russia’s objectives). These conditions 
make the Baltics less susceptible to the kinds of operations Russia carried out 
successfully in Ukraine, though they do immunize them from constant information 
operations, cyberattacks, and other covert attacks.
Russia’s success in Syria also will not be easy to replicate. First, while many 
developing countries deal with conflict and instability, few offer Putin the advantages 
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he had in Syria: a longtime Russian ally, an existing naval base and port, and relatively 
easy lines of transport. Second, Russia might not be financially strong enough to 
engage in multiple adventures in the developing world. Moreover, combat means dead 
soldiers, and Putin has shown himself apprehensive about the domestic political risks 
of the deaths of Russian soldiers.32 
Finally, the West was slow to recognize and react to the threat and damage of 
Russian cyberattacks and information operations, which have proven to be costly 
and stunningly divisive. However, Russia cannot count on a delayed response from 
the West in the future. In short, Russia’s successful efforts against Ukraine, al-
Assad’s opposition in Syria, the United Kingdom’s Brexit debate, and the 2016 US 
presidential election might be short-lived, as Russian adversaries decide to react 
more aggressively and effectively.
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C H A P T E R  7
Sharp Swords of the Future Battlefield: The Chinese Military’s 
Special Forces and Psychological Operations 
Elsa Kania and Peter Wood
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is prioritizing innovation in the theories 
and capabilities for future warfare.i Building upon a long tradition of military science, 
the PLA is currently exploring the challenges and opportunities of what is seen as a 
new Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).ii The PLA has concentrated on developing 
“new-quality” (新质力量) forces for future combat, including those tailored for special 
operations, cyber operations, and electronic countermeasures.1 Meanwhile, the PLA 
continues to implement a reform agenda that may have far-reaching implications 
for its future capabilities. According to “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” 
“new types of combat forces have been enhanced to conduct special operations, 
all-dimensional offense and defense (立体攻防), amphibious operations, far seas 
protection, and strategic projection, aiming to make the force composition complete, 
combined, multifunctional, and flexible.”2 
The PLA seeks to advance its capabilities to undertake “integrated joint 
operations,” characterized by “system of systems confrontation” (体系对抗).3 
The PLA also seeks to contest operational advantage in the course of the 
transformation in the form of warfare from today’s informatized (信息化) warfare 
toward intelligentized (智能化) warfare, in which artificial intelligence, among other 
emerging technologies, will be critical to future operations.4 As the PLA seeks to 
become a world-class military, these developments in its strategic thinking and 
military modernization merit continued analytic attention. In particular, the PLA 
has concentrated on certain emerging technologies that present the possibility of 
strategic latency, including unmanned systems and artificial intelligence that are 
expected to deliver a decisive advantage in future operations.5 
Chinese military leaders appear to believe any new technology will be inevitably 
weaponized. This quotation by Friedrich Engels is routinely referenced: “Once 
technological advancements can be used for military purposes and have been used 
for military purposes, they very immediately and almost necessarily, often violating the 
commander’s will, cause changes or even transformations in the styles of warfare.”6 
The PLA’s transformation will involve a paradigm change in its model of military power. 
Currently, the PLA is “striving to transform from a quantity-and-scale model to that of 
quality and efficiency, as well as from being personnel-intensive to one that is S&T-
intensive,” according to the 2019 defense white paper, “China’s National Defense in 
i   This chapter draws upon Chinese-language resources. Translations are provided by the authors.
ii   The PLA has adopted the concept and terminology of the RMA that became prominent in US debates and discourse.
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the New Era.”7 This transition demands drastic changes to the Chinese military as an 
organization, including its training, force structure, and talent cultivation. 
The PLA continues to be influenced by formative historical legacies, from its early 
experiences with guerrilla warfare to contemporary concerns about how to confront 
a more powerful adversary as a still weaker military. Indeed, the PLA’s thinking on 
conflict has been shaped by Marxist concepts and Maoist antecedents, including 
the continued salience of “people’s warfare” (人民战争) as a concept.8 The PLA has 
concentrated on “military struggle” (军事斗争), involving “the use of military methods 
to advance struggle among nation-states to achieve a definite political or economic 
objective, of which the highest form is warfare.”9 The PLA’s reforms have looked to 
advance the integration of peace and warfare (平战一体) in its force posture, planning, 
and operations.10 The realization of this concept in practice has involved developing 
an command architecture to mobilize rapidly for potential conflict scenarios and to 
operate across that spectrum between peace and warfare.11 PLA strategists often 
argue those boundaries in conflict are blurring as an inherent feature of modern 
conflict.iii12 In the process, the PLA has been studying and intends to leverage lessons 
learned from recent Russian and American operations. Chinese military scholars and 
strategists are exploring concepts of hybrid warfare, proxy warfare, and asymmetric 
operations, intending to adapt these concepts to its own purposes.13 
Historical Experiences and Influences
Certain elements of “hybrid” or unconventional warfare are already well-established 
within the traditions of Chinese military thinking. In fact, as victors of a multidecade 
insurgency, the principles of guerrilla warfare (游击战) arguably constitute integral 
elements of the intellectual DNA of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its armed 
wing, the PLA.14 It is important to be careful in distinguishing the origins of Chinese 
strategy relative to its intended operational employment.iv The PLA’s contemporary 
understanding of “hybrid warfare” builds upon its study of antecedents in American 
and Russian thinking.15 Initially, the Red Army, which was the predecessor to the 
PLA before 1945, had its defining experiences first as a failed urban insurgency that 
then pivoted to contest rural areas. “Our Party united the people and led them in 
embarking on the right revolutionary path, using rural areas to encircle the cities and 
seizing state power with military force,” as that history is described in a contemporary 
recounting.16 The Red Army engaged in insurgency against the Imperial Japanese Army 
and then concentrated on defeating the KMT’s National Revolutionary Army.17 The 
iii   Major General Ye Zheng, a leading PLA thinker on information warfare, has declared, “The strategic game in cyberspace is 
not limited by space and time, does not differentiate between peacetime and wartime, [and] does not have a front line and 
home-front.” See: Kania, “A Force for Cyber Anarchy or Cyber Order? PLA Perspectives on ‘Cyber Rules,’”  
China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, July 6, 2016,  
https://jamestown.org/program/a-force-for-cyber-anarchy-or-cyber-order-pla-perspectives-on-cyber-rules/.
iv   For instance, the example of the “String of Pearls” strategy is illustrative, a label first applied to an emergent pattern of 
activity by American consultants, then translated into Chinese and reinjected to American discourse as if it were a wholly 
Chinese concept.
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Red Army survived numerous encirclement campaigns by the governing Nationalist 
Party (also known as the Kuomintang, KMT), emerging after World War II to engage in 
conventional large-scale battles. 
The PLA’s earliest familiarity with unconventional warfare can be traced back to 
its roots in the Nanchang Uprising of 1927.18 The CCP’s “Long March” is sometimes 
described as having involved the use of special operations undertaken by the 
Red Army.19 However, special forces in the modern sense can more directly be 
traced to the latter stages of the Chinese Civil War. At that time, the Soviet Union 
appears to have provided training to small groups of PLA soldiers, and specialized 
reconnaissance teams later played a role in attacks on KMT forces.20 During the PLA’s 
1949 invasion of Xinjiang, Soviet aid provided significant contributions.21 The PLA later 
targeted KMT-held offshore islands through the use of “frogmen” from its earliest 
amphibious reconnaissance units in the 1950s.22 
China had to remain alert for insertion of KMT special forces throughout the 
1950s and 1960s, while encountering hybrid conflicts involving the US-trained Tibetan 
guerrilla groups and as well as KMT forces operating from border areas of Burma (now 
Myanmar).23 During the Vietnam War, China sent advisors and even entire air defense 
units to North Vietnam.24 In China’s 1979 conflict with Vietnam, certain evidence 
suggests specialized reconnaissance units operated behind enemy lines, continuing 
during the subsequent decade of minor border skirmishes.25 The PLA adapted a hybrid 
approach by combining conventional and unconventional operations, including during 
its operations in Manchuria.26 
The PLA relied heavily on intelligence gathering, first to survive and later in its fight 
with the KMT, throughout its initial operational experience. In the process, political 
and psychological warfare also played important roles in convincing enemy units to 
defect en masse, an incident that has taken on a certain mythology in the decades 
subsequent but has its roots in real historic events. The success of such subversion 
contributed to the creation of the then-nascent PLA Navy and Air Force.27 During the 
Huaihai Campaign, the party and its army also launched a political offensive, seeking 
to mobilize an uprising among KMT forces.28 According to claims in official Chinese 
military media, the success of this “enemy force work” (敌军工作) resulted in a 
total of 1.89 million defecting from the KMT, including 1,400 generals.29 The PLA’s 
continuing concentration on “disintegrating the enemy military” (瓦解敌军) can be 
traced back to lessons learned from these formative experiences.
The modern manifestations of these legacies can be seen in the PLA’s evolving 
approach to special operations and psychological operations. While Chinese military 
thinkers have argued, famously, for “unrestricted warfare,” capturing the imagination 
of American audiences,v the PLA already possesses established mechanisms and 
formal organizations to carry out nonkinetic operations in peacetime and war.30 
v   This book has received attention that is disproportionate to its actual influence or authoritativeness, as the frequency 
of its citation attests. Liang Qiao, and Wang Xiangsui. Unrestricted Warfare. Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing 
House Arts, 1999.
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As Chinese military leaders and strategists look at a future conflict scenario, the 
PLA likely would be prepared to undertake attacks that would be targeted against 
Taiwan and the United States in particular. At the same time, the PRC is unique in 
the extent of its investments in building up its capacity to leverage whole-of-society 
capabilities, including extensive employment of reserves and militias through 
national defense mobilization. 
The Sharpest of Swords 
Chinese special forces have expanded significantly since their first units were 
officially established in the 1990s after the Gulf War. The available estimates 
of their size range from 7,000 to 14,000.31 Chinese strategists have paid close 
attention to other countries’ employment of special forces, particularly to British 
operations in the Falklands War.32 These observations likely helped motivate and 
influenced the PLA’s creation of its initial SOF units. Today, Chinese special forces 
units are expanding across all services, possessing a range of functions, missions, 
and training.33 At least three of China’s military services have brigade-or-larger size 
SOF contingents, and the PLA Rocket Force is believed to have a battalion-level unit. 
The People’s Armed Policy (PAP), a paramilitary organization that is increasingly 
militarized and newly commanded by the Central Military Commission, has also 
established special forces in Xinjiang, the “Mountain Eagle” commandos, which are 
expanding as the PLA’s concern with terrorism intensifies.34 Looking forward, the PLA 
is exploring ways to increase joint special operations.35 
Within the PLA ground forces exist multiple units dedicated to special operations 
across most of the group armies. These units appear to be expanding in their size and 
increasing the rigor and realism of their training. For instance, in 2018, the PLA Army 
organized the “Qingbing” (奇兵) series of “new-type force” competitions that have 
tested their skills in reconnaissance and intelligence, special operations, information 
security/assurance, electronic countermeasures, and army aviation.36 The PLA Army’s 
special operations units have concentrated on counterterrorism operations intended 
to increase actual combat capability, leveraging support from intelligence and 
reconnaissance and employing electronic countermeasures.37 
The PLA Army’s reforms have increased the proportion of new-type combat forces, 
including special operations within its overall force structure. “If long-range fires 
are the army’s elongating fist, then the special forces are the daggers that the army 
inserts into the enemy’s heart,” claims one commentary in state media.38 The PLA 
Army’s special forces have engaged in counterterrorism drills in Xinjiang, which 
involved drones, employed multisource information fusion processing, and detected 
targets based on electronic and optical reconnaissance, as well as radar decection.39 
In 2018, the PLA Army organized the first “Special Warfare 2018” (特战奇兵—2018) 
contest in Guilin, testing their tactical proficiency, involving assault and snipers.40 
The exercise “tested all levels of command,” involving special forces skills and 
command capabilities.41 In 2019, this competition was again convened to focus on 
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the assessment of special warfare capabilities. The increase in the proportion of the 
personnel who were selected randomly marked a shift to “mass troop training and 
preparation” as its focus.42
Since the reforms, the PLA Navy has expanded its marine corps, including the 
PLAN Marines brigade of special operations forces (SOF), which appears to be a 
priority for expansion. The PLA Marines brigade could be involved prominently in 
operations against Taiwan, including seizing offshore islands, while disabling the 
Republic of China (ROC) artillery on Kinmen, Matsu, and other outlying islands.43 
The PLAN Marines recent addition of an aviation brigade will support this special 
operations capability to become more expeditionary.44 The PLAN Marine Corps 
has been expanded dramatically, demonstrating the PLA’s interest and increasing 
capabilities for expeditionary operations. 
Pursuant to these reforms, it appeared there would be at least one brigade per 
fleet, potentially ultimately amounting to seven brigades of over 30,000 personnel 
in total by 2020. Sea Dragon’s elite Jiaolong Assault Team, which is featured in the 
movie Operation Red Sea (2018),45 has trained to conduct airborne, surface, and 
underwater infiltration missions.46 As Chinese overseas interests have expanded 
worldwide, evidently so has the imperative to create the capabilities to defend them.
The PLA Air Force Airborne Corps also includes a SOF brigade, which could serve 
as pathfinders for the main force in a conflict scenario. Potentially, these units would 
undertake a role in fomenting active measures and undertaking the assassination of 
key leaders in a scenario of conflict with Taiwan. PLAAF airborne troops have trained 
to engage in airborne assaults, air assaults, special operations, and supporting 
operations. For instance, the “Central-2019” (中部-2019) joint exercise, involves 
the use of airborne troops, who were integrated into joint operations, starting 
with airdrops.47 This SOF brigade is described as primarily preparing for “special 
penetration operations, including killing key figures of the enemy and destroying the 
enemy’s command, control, reconnaissance and communication facilities.”48 The 
Thor Commandos unit, created in 2011, is described as “the most special of the 
special forces,” capable of “giving the enemy a deadly blow at key junctures and 
critical moments.”49
The PLA Rocket Force has also established its own special operations units. 
The PLARF has leveraged special forces units to guard DF-16 units.50 The PLARF’s 
“Sky Sword” (Tianjian) exercises have introduced new-type blue forces that create 
more demanding conditions on the battlefield, including strikes from special warfare 
forces electronic countermeasures.51 The PLARF’s exercises that involve “red-blue 
confrontation” have involved special forces representing the red (i.e., national) and 
blue (i.e., adversary) forces, engaging in the defense of strategic weapons systems 
and sabotage.52 Potentially, special operations could be employed in reconnaissance 
of the targets of conventional and nuclear ballistic strikes, according to the Science 
of Second Artillery Campaigns, a textbook that is considered relatively authoritative 
on these issues.53
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The People’s Armed Police (PAP), a force that is internally focused but also under 
the command of the Central Military Commission, also includes several special 
forces contingents.54 These units are believed to have a primarily internal security 
focus, though they have been seen as part of embassy protection units. The PAP has 
engaged in extensive antiterrorism exercises. For instance, China and Kyrgyzstan 
engaged in the “Cooperation One 2019 Joint Anti-Terrorism Exercise” in 2019 in 
Urumqi, in which the “Mountain Eagle” (山鹰) commando team from the Xinjiang 
Armed Police Corps, created since the PLA reforms, participated.55 Their commander 
claimed, “On the front lines of antiterrorism, we must always keep the arrow on the 
string and lead to a high-alert state, acting as a ‘ballast stone’ to maintain national 
security and social stability.”56
The PLA has also concentrated on ensuring that special forces are incorporated 
into the system of systems operations and long-range precision strikes.57 “Special 
operations are comparable to the sharp swords of the future battlefield,” declares one 
PLA commentator.58 The PLA has also explored how electronic countermeasures could 
be leveraged in counterterrorism special operations, including for reconnaissance 
and interference against terrorist networks’ command and communications.59 The 
continued development of PLA SOF will leverage the use of unmanned systems in 
order to expand into domains where traditional special forces cannot readily operate. 
Adaptation of Concepts of Hybrid Warfare
The PLA has carefully examined American and Russian concepts of hybrid warfare.60 
PLA strategists have questioned whether recent discussion on hybrid warfare 
involves “old wine in new bottles,” pointing to antecedents dating back to the early 
2000s.61 The PLA has engaged in intense studies of foreign millitary’s theories and 
concepts of special operations, including emphasizing cyber, space, and unmanned 
operations.62 By the PLA’s view, the US military was the first to propose the theory 
of hybrid warfare, but the Russian military has proven most successful in actualizing 
hybrid warfare on the battlefield.63 Summarizing this literature across American and 
Russian thinking, Chinese defense academics believe hybrid warfare is characterized 
by features that include not only militaries but also nonstate actors and even 
individual civilians participating; the mixture of warfare styles such as conventional 
operations, unconventional operations, terrorist attacks, and riots; and the blending 
of political, military, economic, social, and informational means of war.64 The PLA is 
also concerned with techniques for “counter hybrid warfare,” including integrating 
defensive measures across multiple domains, reflecting concerns the US military 
could undertake these tactics against it.
Chinese observers often characterize Russian military intervention in Syria as 
strikingly effective, despite evidence to the contrary. For instance, according to one 
commentator: “The involvement of the Russian military in antiterrorism in Syria 
has broken the blockade of the West, overcome the obstacles on the way forward, 
(re)balanced the balance of power in the Middle East, and even reshaped the 
100   |   D A V I S ,  G A C ,  R A G E R ,  R E I N E R  &  S N O W
Middle East pattern to a considerable extent.”65 In discussing Russian operations 
in Syria, Chinese military strategists have observed, “The unmanned combat 
systems debuted, and their operational effectiveness was remarkable.”66 Looking at 
trends on the Syrian battlefield, Chinese observers have frequently highlighted the 
prominence of “unmanned warfare” (无人化战争) and the successful employment 
of electromagnetic warfare, as well as the use of special operations.67 Chinese 
military academics are also concerned with a trend of great-power intervention that 
leverages local proxies, including pointing to American assistance to anti-Assad 
forces in Syria.68 
Such proxy conflicts and special operations are increasingly extending from 
physical domains into virtual spaces. Fittingly, with China’s all-domain view of cyber 
warfare, the Science of Campaigns had noted “computer ‘hacker’ warfare will also 
become an important means of special operations.” which could involve the PLA’s 
new Strategic Support Force, which is also taking on a more expansive mission 
for information operations, including psychological warfare. The PLA is exploring 
how to increase the integration and utilization of unmanned systems in support of 
special operations, including, for instance, the use of unmanned ground vehicles 
for logistical support.69 The PLA is also interested in pursuing research to enable 
the optimization and potentially enhancement of human capabilities, leveraging 
advancements in precision medicine and improvements in training.70 
Battle of the Minds
The PLA’s approach to future warfighting could include leveraging “three warfares” (
三种战法) throughout the course of operations.71 The three warfares include public 
opinion warfare (舆论战), psychological warfare (心理战), and legal warfare (心理
战). In addition, the Chinese Communist Party maintains specialized departments 
with parallel mandates: the International Liaison Department (中联部), essentially 
a second foreign ministry with responsibility for developing contacts with foreign 
political parties, and, notably, the United Front Work Department (统战部), which has 
wide-ranging responsibility for internal stability maintenance and external liaison 
work.72 This is not to mention China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS), which has 
been characterized as comparable to the Central Intelligence Agency in its missions 
and capabilities, known to carry out a wide range of operations, from human 
intelligence to cyber espionage.73 Significantly, in the course of the PLA’s recent 
reforms, the PLA Strategic Support Force—which is responsible for space, cyber, 
electronic, and psychological warfare—has also incorporated Base 311, also known 
a the “Three Warfares Base,” which would be responsible for political work/warfare 
and psychological operations,74 primarily targeting Taiwan to date.75 These recent 
changes in force structure could enable a more effective combination of capabilities 
for cyber and psychological operations.76 
The PLA believes these “intangible” domains have become integral to modern 
informatized warfare, in which seizing “information dominance” (制信息权) is vital 
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to victory on the battlefield.77 Similarly, Chinese military strategists believe the 
“three warfares” (三种战法) are critical to seizing “discourse power” (话语权), 
in political and military struggles.78 Increasingly, PLA academics and strategists 
are also exploring the opportunities to leverage social media and emerging 
technologies to enhance their capabilities across these various dimensions of 
information operations, leveraging lessons learned from US and Russian activities 
in the process.79 The PLA has explored concepts of “cross/all-domain asymmetric 
operations,” envisioning attacks that could occur across political, economic, 
military, cultural, public opinion, religious, and other activities,80 as well as the 
information, cognitive, and social domains. “When the weaker side is unable to 
effectively kill the opponent through military means, it can also win the war by other 
means by attacking the other party’s psychology,” argues one defense academic.81 
In contemporary confrontation, “cognitive warfare” has taken on particular 
prominence, involving techniques to attack and subvert the mind, cognition, and 
decision-making.82 
The PLA continues its tradition of concentrating on the offensive and defensive 
dimensions of psychological warfare. According to the PLA’s dictionary of official 
terminology, psychological warfare involves “operations using specific information 
and media to influence the target’s psychology and behavior in order to advance the 
achievement of political and military combat objectives, based on strategic intent 
and operational taskings.”83 According to Lectures on the Science of Information 
Operations, an authoritative textbook on the topic, the objectives involve “breaking 
down the enemy psychologically while stabilizing and inspiring one’s own troops.”84 
These “combat measures” are intended to advance the “goal of winning without a 
fight or emerging victorious from a fight.” 
In particular, the conduct of psychological warfare is regarded as a continuum. 
“Because the execution of psychological warfare has no stringent time or space 
limitations, it runs throughout times of war and peace, and it permeates politics, 
economics, culture, religion, science and technology, society, and all other 
domains.”85 In the conduct of information operations, countermeasures that 
integrate these capabilities can be leveraged for purposes of influence, intimidation, 
and psychological subjugation.”86 
Increasingly, such a “battle of wits” has been playing out in real time against 
Taiwan and Hong Kong. In particular, the dynamics of “public opinion warfare” are 
believed to have “already broken through the boundaries of peacetime and wartime,” 
thus becoming a contest of “you die, I live” (你死我活).87 Today, public opinion 
warfare is the “second battlefield,” critical to achieving winning without fighting (不
战而屈人之兵).88 PLA researchers have been exploring lessons learned from recent 
operations in Ukraine, Iraq, and Syria,89 which are believed to demonstrate that 
social media can achieve effects on the battlefield that exceed and transcend those 
achievable through conventional capabilities.90 Consistently, PLA thinking tends to 
emphasize the psychological dimensions of conflict in the information age, even 
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raising the notion of “cognitive dominance” (制脑权) as a critical factors for warfare 
in an age of pervasive information and connectivity.vi 
Conclusion
The PLA’s continued modernization has concentrated on a vast array of conventional 
and unconventional capabilities. While continuing to expand and modernize its 
special forces for high-end conflict scenarios, PRC also currently engages in what 
might be characterized as gray-zone activities, primarily associated with its militia 
and coast guard. As the PRC concentrates on “re-unification” with Taiwan as a 
key element of national rejuvenation, special operations could serve as the tip of 
the spear in future conflict scenarios. Pursuant to that operational imperative, the 
role of maritime special operations is expanding, including propaganda and the 
introduction of swimmer delivery vehicles (SDV).91 While the PLA’s focus remains 
on Taiwan, Japanese defense officials are concerned about the vulnerability of their 
offshore islands, whose air bases could be seized and used to continue forward 
operations against the main Japanese islands. 
Ultimately, special forces represent a critical component of what the PLA is 
working toward, a high-tech, decentralized/dispersed [分散], and highly capable 
force. At the same time, the continued development of psychological operations 
capabilities may have immediate relevance in peacetime competition. In a 
scenario of high-end conflict, the PRC’s expansive architecture for national defense 
mobilization could realize Mao Zedong’s vision of people’s warfare, but leveraging 
new theories and technological capabilities. 
vi   Since these terms have been raised primarily in less authoritative writings to date, it is unclear the extent to which such 
concepts will reflect actual strategic/doctrinal thinking.
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BIOLOGY AND THE BODY POLITIC: 
MESSING WITH MOTHER NATURE
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C H A P T E R  8
What COVID-19 and China’s Grand Strategy May Teach  
about a History of the Future
Capt. L. R. Bremseth and James Giordano
The SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) virus is not a biological weapon. But, certainly, it is an 
agent creating mass disruption—and destructive effects—to human life, health, 
economies, and social stability. Media coverage and political discourse are rife 
with language that speak of “waging war” against the virus—and perhaps rightly 
so in calls for mobilizing resources, goods, services, and personnel in a fight for 
health and survival. However, despite (1) awareness of the United States’ relative 
weaknesses in biosecurity; (2) viability—if not likelihood—of current and future 
biological threats capable of large-scale impact (e.g., inclusive of natural, human-
made, and/or combination of human-induced natural threats); and (3) past modeling 
and gaming exercise to assess both possible trajectories and US readiness of 
such events, COVID-19 has illuminated inadequacies in US preparedness. This 
failure of recognition, in conjunction with a relative collective rigidity in thought and 
institutionalized preparedness and response processes, has enabled our strategic 
competitors to gain advantage over the United States in these irregular and often 
unrestricted engagements. To be sure, the world is watching.
How might such vulnerabilities be mitigated, if not prevented in the future? 
We believe that while the US special operations forces (SOF) have been utilized 
effectively—and in some cases overextended in their prior and current utilization—a 
reevaluation and redirection of key SOF elements and resources could be employed 
in engagements that contribute strongly to surveillance and interdiction of radical 
leveling technologies and emerging risks and identified threats on the global stage. 
But such use of SOF, or any other Title 10 or Title 50 asset(s), is predicated on 
governmental coordination and collaboration in recognizing the extant need for risk/
threat identification and mitigation, coupled with a national ability to rally and coalesce 
in directed efforts to assure security, stability, and sustainability of multicomponential 
efforts and enterprises (i.e., a unified national, state, and local governmental, 
research, and commercial endeavor).
The US population’s visual witnessing of attacks and destruction, such as those 
that occurred at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 and at numerous sites within the 
United States on September 11, 2001, has been shown to evoke rapid public and 
governmental response, often with predictable patriotic fervor. But, thankfully, such 
overt attacks remain few and far between, in part because of the frank bellicosity of 
their intent and the resulting justification of any retaliatory action. Such explicit acts 
of war are not and, we argue, will not be the norm. Rather, engagements to evoke 
disruptive and influentially “down-range” destructive effects on various aspects of US 
infrastructure, socioeconomics, and international position will be increasingly nonkinetic. 
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Scenario Vignette: A History of the Future
China’s Grand Strategy
The year is 2049, and China reigns supreme. Since 2032, China has had the world’s 
largest economy with the yuan as the global reserve currency, and Mandarin has 
been recognized language of business, trade, and commerce. The United States 
barely achieves ranking in the top five global economies, and its international market 
leverage remains prominent only in limited domains (e.g., automotive and commercial 
aircraft production).
During the late 2020s, socialism replaced capitalism in the United States as 
the preferred socioeconomic model. Whereas China had succeeded in becoming a 
global economic power by embracing capitalistic economic principles while retaining 
communist political and social principles, the United States embraced socialist 
economic approaches that decades before had failed to produce Chinese economic 
success. China clandestinely (and in some instances covertly) influenced the 
United States’ move toward this inefficient form of socialism by discretely funding 
US academic programs, media, and public enterprises by employing large-scale 
psychological operations (psyops) to both pulse and affect US culture. Additionally, 
China funded Mexican cartels to smuggle considerable quantities of illegal drugs 
and and an iteratively growing number of illegal immigrants across the US southern 
border to incur sociopolitical discord, disrupt the social fabric, and both tacitly and 
explicitly change US social demographics to establish ideologies and perspectives 
aligned, rather than competing, with those of China.1 It took several decades, but 
these nonkinetic, asymmetric engagements were instrumental in China realizing its 
“grand strategy” of assuming status as the global superpower. The United States 
was reduced to a significantly lesser force in international relations and capabilities. 
China overcame long-standing tensions with the United States for power dominance 
without the need (or burden) of armed conflict. Durable, dogged adherence to the 
philosophy and teachings of Sun Tzu, with specific emphasis on both achieving 
victory prior to or without conventional warfare as well as deception had assured 
China’s success. 
The success of China’s grand strategy to achieve global dominance was the result 
of careful, deliberate planning and successful implementation of successive Five-Year 
Plans. During the 1980s and 1990s, both US and Chinese officials debated current 
and future intentions of US-Chinese relations and relative positions in the evolving 
world order. By the late 1990s, China’s leadership was influenced and directed 
predominantly by military and former military officials (i.e., pro-conflict “hawks” [ying 
pai]) who advised strategic steps to avenge China’s “hundred years of humiliation” 
(1845-1945) and, in the process, replace the United States as the economic, 
military, and political leader of the world by 2049).2 The Chinese accomplished 
the strategic intent to “revise the US-dominated economic and geopolitical world 
order founded at Bretton Woods and San Francisco at the end of World War II”3 by 
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developing and executing the “hundred-year marathon.”i Deception provided the key 
to the ultimate and durable success of this plan, preventing the United States from 
gaining insight and/or access to China’s strategic intentions until it was too late to 
effect any change or mitigation. This plan required decades of effort and patience, 
and it succeeded brilliantly.
China’s Military Dominance
By 2049, Chinese culture has obtained broad-scale global effects as a function of 
the outreach capabilities provided by its vast media and entertainment industries. 
Further, China’s dominance in science and technology (S&T) is uncontested given 
its decades of investment. A consequence of these S&T advancements is China’s 
control of space and the global maritime (surface and subsurface) domain(s), thereby 
ensuring Chinese commercial, as well as military, global access and influence. The 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) can exercise activity wherever and whenever 
desired, as it is the most advanced, largest, and most powerful navy in the world. 
The US Navy (USN), while still a capable military force, has fallen significantly 
behind PLAN, both in number of combatant ships and global influence. Thus, while 
the USN continues to conduct transits to and from the Indo-Pacific theater of 
operations, it remains careful not to antagonize the PLAN or Chinese commercial 
vessels. The USN’s prior role as a guarantor of maritime free passage in both the 
Indo-Pacific region and globally is now assumed and performed by the PLAN. But 
rather than providing and assuring “freedom of the seas” navigation for any and all 
vessels, the PLAN serves as an instrument to advance China’s economic and military 
influence worldwide. 
The comparative impotence of the USN affords China tremendous military 
capability. China eschews conventional land and/or air warfare, instead focusing on 
naval power to assure global military and trade dominance. By reducing the viability 
of the USN, China essentially guaranteed regional anti-access, area denial (A2AD), 
thereby negating US Army and Air Force assets by preventing them from reaching key 
geographic domains of China’s global power. Instead, any form of kinetic warfare is 
relegated to “proxy geographies” (e.g., Africa and South America). Taken together, 
these dynamics fortified China’s political and military sovereignty in and across Asia, 
the Indo-Pacific region, and, ultimately, worldwide. 
China absorbed Taiwan politically in 2034. The United States was unable to mount 
an effective naval military deterrent for fear of losing numerous carrier battle groups 
and other assets to advanced Chinese hypersonic and space-based weapons. US 
military power was essentially “check-mated” and forced to acquiesce to China’s 
demonstrated power and demands. From that point, US military capacity, influence, 
and prestige began a precipitous decline from which it did not recover.
i   In Chinese, the word “marathon” refers to a long-term effort of rejuvenation or restoration.



















Sun Tzu, the Hundred-Year Marathon, and Nonkinetic Engagement
“The highly developed Chinese body of doctrine is particularly relevant 
today because of China’s long-term strategy to expand its influence 
worldwide through a well-integrated mix of diplomacy, propaganda, 
intelligence, technology acquisition and innovation, and commercial 
trade. . . . Deception continues to play an underlying role, increasingly 
augmented by an unprecedented expansion of overt military power, as 
in the establishment of de facto control over disputed waters in the 
South China Sea, in violation of international law.”4
—Arturo Muñoz, 2018
Essential to its success, China adhered strictly and unwaveringly to the teachings of 
Sun Tzu, particularly Sun Tzu’s emphasis that, “All warfare is based on deception.”5 The 
United States failed to appreciate or understand Sun Tzu fully and, consequently, did not 
recognize China’s highly effective employment of deception, especially as implemented 
through its well-established three nonkinetic warfares: media, psyops, and law/lawfare. 
The view by some in the US government that no definitive proof of deception existed failed 
to acknowledge 1) evidence in Chinese and Western sources indicating the historical 
and cultural proclivity of Chinese officials to undertake coordinated activities to mislead 
perceived opponents, whether internal or external, about the country’s intentions or 
capabilities, and 2) the innate susceptibility of people to deception.6
While deception was certainly vital to China’s success, another contributory element 
was China’s continual quantitative measurement of success of the numerous nonkinetic 
engagements it had implemented during preconflict (“left of bang”) conditions. 
These included economic, cyber, precision biological and chemical enterprises, and 
narcoterrorism, in addition to the aforementioned three nonkinetic “warfares” (Figure 1).
































“Victorious warriors win first then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first then seek to win” - Sun Tzu
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Moreover, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 (when the USSR 
possessed the world’s second most powerful military), China changed its system 
of geopolitical power assessment to emphasize economics, foreign investment, 
technological innovation, and ownership of natural resources, while de-emphasizing 
military strength. In these efforts, China’s political, commercial, and military 
institutions adhered strictly to the nine elements of the hundred-year marathon: 
• Induce complacency to avoid alerting your opponent.
• Manipulate your opponent’s advisors.
• Be patient for decades or longer to achieve victory.
• Steal your opponent’s ideas and technology for strategic purposes.
• Recognize that military might is not the critical factor for winning a long-term 
competition.
• Acknolwedge that the extant hegemon will often take extreme, even reckless 
action to retain its dominant position.
• Never lose sight of shi—the guiding knowledge, principle, and/or force that 
establishes “the way” of power.
• Establish and employ metrics for measuring your status relative to other 
potential challengers.
• Always be vigilant to avoid being encircled or deceived by others.7 
Adherence to shi was the most important element contributing to China’s success, 
as it was (and remains) at the heart of Chinese strategy. This concept is somewhat 
difficult for Western societies to understand. Various Chinese translations describe it 
as “the alignment of forces,” “propensity of things to happen,” “to shape a situation,” 
“to build up posture,” “to assess the overall situation,” and “to seek a balance of 
power.”8 Pillsbury has claimed that “only skilled strategists are able to exploit shi for 
ensuring victory over a superior force”, and “only a sophisticated adversary is able to 
recognize how he is vulnerable to the exploitation of shi.”9 The United States and its 
Western allies could (or would) not fully comprehend the concept of shi. Consequently, 
they failed to recognize its role in China’s geopolitical and military plans and activities. 
Arguably, this lack of recognition and understanding facilitated the decline of US and 
Western hegemony in global affairs.10 
China predicated its strategic approach to global competition and power dominance 
primarily on deductive planning. The potential breadth and scope of the objectives that 
the country desired to achieved by 2049 served as the basis for retroactive planning 
to identify the actions necessary for achieving milestones and ecologies essential 
to the strategic end goal. In progressing toward 2049, China iteratively included 
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inductive planning to assure its ongoing efforts would align with established goals and 
milestones, as measured by successive evaluation of multi-domain successes.
The incorporation of long-term, nonkinetic disruptions were pivotal for inducing 
US complacency and keeping the United States from being alerted to China’s 
real intentions. This accorded with the first dictum of the hundred-year marathon: 
induce complacency to avoid alerting your opponent. China achieved global-power 
dominance operationally through an articulate program and networks of cyber-hacking, 
employment of Chinese espionage agents inside and outside the United States,  
and numerous other penetrations of academia, industry, and military infrastructures. 
Philosophically and practically, China considered such theft and diversion of truth 
legitimate components of deception, especially if and when leveraged to attain its 
predominance of global power. 
China’s Efforts to Destabilize US Society
Synergizing these efforts were the implementation of numerous programs of broad-
scale bio-socioeconomic disruption. For example, the importation of drugs (e.g., 
fentanyl and/or its precursors) had devastating impact and consequences on several 
dimensions and domains of US society; incurring hundreds of thousands of deaths, 
weakening the US economy both directly (i.e., in revenues devoted to care, treatment, 
and/or incarceration of the addicted) and indirectly (e.g., via greater than 20 percent 
diminution of the total US prime-age workforce because of drug addiction).11 Further, 
drug addiction affected US military and governmental stability, as addicted individuals 
could not qualify for jobs in these sectors. 
Much less visible but nonetheless effective, China directly (yet often cladestinely) 
funded US academia (and research), selected politicians, and media and 
entertainment industries. By quietly and sometimes secretly funding American 
academia, China gained deepened insight into S&T trajectories and therefore was able 
to invest in emerging sectors. This would prove to be both economically profitable and 
valuable in acquiring intellectual property rights in influential scientific, technological, 
industrial, and military capabilities. Additionally, China influenced social and political 
narratives, constructs, and perceptions of truth through both overt and clandestine 
funding of scholarly resources (i.e., academic/professional journals) and print, visual, 
online, and entertainment media. China’s overall objective was to shape values, 
attitudes, and opinions of the next generations of US citizens and voters. Augmenting 
these efforts, China funneled money to select politicians for the purpose of shaping 
US (and other nations’) political climate and postures.12
China understood and respected the global power and influence that American 
media and entertainment had achieved and enjoyed for decades. Therefore, it 
began developing its own film industry while simultaneously providing funding for the 
production and distribution of American films. Whereas English had historically been 
the default language for much of international media, the movies that China financed 
and/or helped to produce offered a variety of languages from which to select when 
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viewing. While subtle, this effectively informed and influenced audiences’ perceptions 
that English was losing its prominence as the globally-accepted and -used language. 
Further, making Mandarin the accepted language of business and finance contributed 
to worldwide sentiments of China’s multidimensional hegemony, which subsequently 
enabled the the yuan to replace the dollar as the global reserve currency.
China’s stellar execution of its grand strategy and its strict adherence to the 
nine elements of the hundred-year marathon proved vital to its eventual success in 
replacing the United States as the sole global superpower. Focal to each and all these 
efforts was the maxim: Be patient for decades or longer to achieve victory. Although 
these enterprises were determined and perseverant, the United States’ continual 
failure in and across multiple domains facilitated and ultimately guaranteed China’s 
success. China repeatedly indicated its true intentions, goals, and objectives via 
dialogue and actions, but US governmental entities did not heed. Whether through 
hubris, ignorance, greed, or a combination thereof, the United States surrendered 
global hegemonic power despite being provided sufficient warning and ample 
opportunities to prevent such loss. The United States was unprepared for, and 
too slow to recognize and respond to China’s escalating use of means and tools 
for mass disruption and the devastating rippling effects they incurred throughout 
several (and perhaps all) aspects of US society. US political and military leadership 
looked continuously for the proverbial “smoking gun” to reveal China’s sponsorship 
and execution of these clandestine (and sometimes covert) activities. But given the 
intentional ambiguity of nonkinetic engagements, explicit evidence was absent. Thus, 
the motivations for and political and legal justification of US responsive action(s) were 
considered to be lacking. 
US Failures, Chinese Successes
China executed successfully a series of “check and mate” maneuvers to establish and 
enable strategically latent assumption of global power. Changes in federal budgetary 
appropriations and allocations further impacted US ability to counter and/or avoid such 
multidomain “cornering.” These budget cuts and redirections disempowered military 
and intelligence communities as well as key government and public resources vital to 
national security. This iterative loss of capability and effectiveness became evident to 
the US public and professional sectors. Consequently, the social contract Americans 
had historically maintained with their government (and its associated services) began to 
deteriorate quickly, and this decline became unstoppable. The denigration of confidence 
steadily progressed to the point where the majority of Americans lost faith in both 
their government and the ability of the US to sustain a leading role in global politics, 
economics, and balances of power. 
Perhaps first among the United States’ numerous failures was an inability to 
recognize the evolution of warfare. Even during the period of 2020-2030, the United 
States retained belief that it would likely engage China in a conventional (kinetic) 
force-on-force war in the Pacific. Given this focus upon kinetic warfare, the United 
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States continued to commit billions of dollars to fund equipment and technology (e.g., 
ships, aircraft, missiles, bombs, and bullets) for a war that was unlikely and, in fact, 
never occurred. The United States persisted in its dedication to a Clausewitzian (and 
somewhat Napoleonic) approach to war. This dogmatic view was wedded to an errant 
belief that a superior number and extent of technological assets would be the decisive 
factor in determining the outcome of any future conflict. Clearly, the United States had 
little regard for the fifth dictum of the hundred-year marathon: Military might is not the 
critical factor for winning a long-term competition. Such views and beliefs contributed 
to the United States’ failure to recognize that China (1) had gone to war with the 
United States decades earlier, using nonkinetic, low-visibility engagements (pro Sun 
Tzu), and (2) had been winning decisively in this domain. 
While the United States spent enormous sums for military equipment and assets, 
China allocated more of its gross domestic product toward S&T developmental efforts 
and global engagements. China’s extant cultural values, philosophies, and somewhat 
different (and more permissive) ethics (i.e., than the United States and its Western 
allies) enabled a wider scope and accelerated pace of research efforts. China’s rapid 
S&T achievements in artificial intelligence, big data, bioscience, and engineering 
eventually outpaced and surpassed those of the United States and its global allies 
combined. Fundamentally, China was more insightful regarding global conditions and 
vulnerabilities and, consequently, made better long-term strategic investments and 
decisions than the United States, if not “the West” at large. 
In contrast, the United States maintained an antiquated, World War II–era 
perspective of warfare, and adhered to the institutionalized processes and thinking 
that had served it well from the 1940s through the 1970s. However, by the year 2000, 
these processes—especially the collective channelized thinking that accompanied 
them—became increasingly burdensome. In these ways, the United States repeatedly 
could not to respond effectively to being confronted with ever-more rapidly emerging 
threats and associated technologies. In essence, the United States became captive 
to its own bureaucratic rigidity and stagnation. It had lost the infrastructural systems 
and flexibility to promote and provide imagination, innovation, and creativity that in 
decades earlier had enabled it to challenge adversaries quickly and adroitly. Clearly, 
the United States no longer possessed the speed, dexterity, and purpose of action 
that once contributed significantly to its position as the definitive global superpower.
China effectively recognized and exploited vulnerabilities within US institutionalized 
governmental and bureaucratic processes. No US organization or agency was 
authorized to coordinate among and across other government organizations for 
integrated, comprehensive responses to grave national crises. Yet, US governmental 
and bureaucratic systems failed to identify or correct their inherent flaws in structure 
and function. This inchoate arrangement (and relative ineptitude) of organizational 
authorities and responsibilities further enabled China’s success in executing serial 
and escalating campaigns of nonkinetic engagements against the United States. 
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The opioid crisis of circa 2010-2020 provided an example of how badly US 
governmental stovepiping failed the American people. In restrictingly categorizing the 
opioid crisis as a medical issue, rather than correctly identifying it as at least partly a 
nonkinetic chemical engagement or attack by China (via its proxy clients, the Mexican 
cartels), it was not clear which agency was in charge of, and responsible for taking 
action. These failures led to the disruption of multiple facets of US society and the 
ongoing loss of US capabilities. Whereas China had a grand strategy for shaping and 
directing its long-term enterprises to achieve global power, the United States lacked a 
counterpart strategy. Certainly, it had the National Defense Strategy and other, more 
tactically-oriented initiatives that were updated every few years, often with incoming 
presidential administrations, but these were focused primarily on preparations for 
conventional warfare. Thus, in keeping with outdated Western doctrine, the United 
States failed to appreciate or heed Sun Tzu’s admonition that “tactics without strategy 
is the noise before defeat.”13
The United States continued to embrace precepts of conventional force-on-force 
warfare, while China never deviated from strict adherence to the teachings of Sun Tzu 
that emphasized nonkinetic engagement as the most effective and efficient model 
for winning without fighting. But even von Clausewitz advocated the need for flexibility 
in preparing for and maneuvering on the battlefield. Simply put, the United States 
failed to acknowledge that Clausewitzian dictate, and in so doing, had forgotten how 
to change and foster reinvention to keep pace with (or outdistance) an adversary. 
Hence, the United States was doomed to become another second-rate nation, vying 
for position among many others in their dependence upon, and subjugation to, the 
prominent global superpower. 
This vignette prompts the pressing question: Is this scenario inevitable?
Meeting Challenges and Seizing Opportunities
Now, let us turn back the clock: the year is 2020, and the United States is the 
dominant global superpower, but is quickly losing the lead in and across numerous 
domains. As noted in a series of US Army Science and Technology Trend reports, 
this is especially the case in S&T enterprises.14 The United States government and 
polis recognize the need for strategic leadership and planning at the highest levels 
to maintain a position of predominant global power. However, implementing such 
leadership and plans remains uncertain; questions persist about how to effect such 
change, and where and how to begin. Long-established US processes, procedures, 
and policies inhibit (or prevent) the timely coordination of US governmental agencies 
and private-sector resources needed to respond to rapidly accelerating and ever-
expanding emerging threats. 
The extant partisan divide has led to a legislative quagmire that further 
exacerbates the situation. Is the United States prepared to identify, quantify, and 
respond to such risks and threats? We believe it is not. To reiterate, no evidence 
exists to indicate or imply that the COVID-19 crisis resulted from an intentionally 
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developed or deployed (weaponized) biological agent. Nevertheless, the crisis is a 
proverbial “shot across the bows,” bringing into stark relief the inadequacies of US 
infrastructural coordination of biosecurity information, resources, and response. In 
many ways, we believe this bespeaks a larger, undergirding issue and problem. In a 
2019 PRISM interview, General John M. Murray, commanding general Army Futures 
Command, stated: 
[Russia and China’s] concept of layered standoff—which we think is 
fundamental to their theory of victory—beginning below the threshold 
of war, sees constant competition below that threshold. We have seen 
it in Ukraine, the South China Sea, and the Baltics; all attempting to 
achieve strategic objectives below the threshold of war. In Western 
society we tend to see long periods of peace interrupted by short 
periods of war as the norm, while many of our adversaries see the 
world in constant competition—not necessarily always military, but 
through all elements of national power; diplomatic, information, 
economics, as well as military. That’s a different kind of world 
perspective. . . . In a different way, they are achieving many of their 
strategic objectives below the threshold of war.15
General Murray references Russia’s and China’s intent and capabilities to exercise 
power in non-traditionally bellicose ways, so as to avoid conventional kinetic armed 
conflict with the United States, while simultaneously attempting to achieve strategic 
objectives via constant competition in what is known as phase 0. Phase 0 is the 
domain of preconflict in which strategically-oriented efforts incur war disguised as 
peace. As General Murray stated, “as long as they can continue to achieve objectives 
below the threshold of outright war, what is needed is a whole-of-government effort to 
counter it.”16
Arguably, the United States disadvantages itself by not appreciating, and not 
engaging, the ways that nonkinetic enterprises can be used to achieve national 
strategic objectives. Further, by employing all elements of national power, a whole-
of-nation approach can be exercised, which extends (i.e., force multiplies) the 
activities of whole-of-government efforts. Of course, and as the COVID-19 crisis has 
illustrated, whole-of-government coordination and cooperation is essential both to 
initiate and sustain whole-of-nation enterprises of preparedness and response. To be 
sure, the old adage, “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” aptly applies, 
as such coordinated, collaborative preparedness is far more conservative—and 
conservational—of economic and human costs than stalwart, conflictive competition. 
Principles of, and preparedness for, kinetic warfare do not necessarily or 
appropriately apply to addressing, mitigating, or preventing nonkinetic threats, 
especially those that occur in phase 0 preconflict conditions. As we have noted 
previously, nonkinetic engagements are not intended for “destruction” in the classic 
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sense, but can and should be regarded as efforts toward disruption, intended to exert 
rippling effects that destabilize nations, societies, and populations and, in these ways, 
gain purchase to affect economic, sociocultural, political, and power capabilities and 
relative global position and security. 
Therefore, as the COVID-19 crisis has revealed, whether a naturally occurring 
pandemic, a bioengineered contagion, or the leveraging of key bio-psycho-socio-political 
vulnerabilities in infrastructure and function, disruptive effects can evoke devastating 
multi-domain and -dimensional impacts. In sum, COVID-19 has brought to light US 
inadequacies and vulnerabilities in biosecurity and other factions of threat preparedness 
and response that could be exploited via nonkinetic means and engagements. 
Despite such trends, it still may be possible for the United States “right its ship,” 
but the time for such action is quickly expiring. Certain government and military 
sectors recognize that the United States is consistently reactive, instead of proactive, 
in recognizing and responding to emerging threats. Some consensus exists that the 
established processes, procedures, and policies will need to be modified or changed 
completely to enable the speed and breadth of action required to address evolving 
challenges expediently, efficiently, and effectively. The United States possesses the 
organizations required for such efforts, but these resources tend to be operationally 
stovepiped and constrained by their specified authorities and responsibilities. 
Therefore, an existing organization, or new entity, must be empowered with cross-
organizational authority to coordinate the activities of the Department of Defense, 
the intelligence community, the Department of State, the Department of Justice, 
the Department of the Treasury, other governmental agencies, and private-sector 
institutions and resources toward developing and executing enterprises to limit or 
prevent these emerging threats. 
Within this effort should be an accompanying strategic narrative articulating 
the necessity of employing all elements of national power to achieve long-range 
national objectives (as the US principal strategic competitors articulate currently and 
effectively). It would be foolish to presume COVID-19 will be the last pandemic to 
occur. Also, we believe it would be equally unwise, if not remiss, not to expect rivals to 
recognize and attempt to exploit vulnerabilities in US, and international, systems and 
functions for biosecurity and national stability. To prepare for and mitigate, if not deter 
such threats, we propose establishing a Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) along with 
a Program Management Office and/or a Program of Record for executing, supervising, 
and administering a whole-of-nation approach to maximize efforts in national security 
to meet both natural threats and those of intentional origin and deploy. A prudent, 
cost- and resource-efficiernt redirection and deployment of SOF—and its associated 
and derivative organizations—may serve as both “tip of the spear” in key elements 
of surveillance and interdiction (i.e., mitigation and prevention) in the nonkinetic 
domain. Indeed, COVID-19 has fostered a crisis. We opine it is important to take the 
term “crisis” in its literal sense—a time of change—and use this challenge as an 
opportunity for a call to colors.
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C H A P T E R  9
Cyborg Soldier 2050:  
Human-Machine Fusion and Its Implications
Diane DiEuliis and Peter Emanuel
As the worlds of digital machinery and biology continue to intersect, and the 
pace of discovery in biotechnology accelerates, the potential for altering human 
beings is also growing—creating both promise for and concern about the possible 
outcomes. The latent ability to alter physical or behavioral human attributes as they 
pertain to warfighters, particularly special operators, is generating both operational 
opportunities and ethical concerns, at the levels of both the individual warfighter and 
the Department of Defense (DOD). Few guidlines have been conceived for operational 
or ethical decision-making regarding altered human performance, largely because of 
the lack of studies on potential human performance futures and how they should be 
assessed in the context of special and DOD operations. 
This chapter describes the results of a year-long study representing a first 
foray into forecasting and evaluating specific prototype human-machine interface 
capabilities likely to be introduced between 2030 and 2050. To conduct the study, 
a team of 75 scientists, engineers, lawyers, ethicists, and military personnel came 
together to frame the issues, conduct reviews of current and future research, and 
hosted site visits with subject-matter experts across the nation. The study team 
sought to evaluate strategic operational, ethical, legal, and societal implications 
(ELSI) of cyborg technology for the military. The study team used use the term 
“cyborg”1 purposefully, as we predict an acceleration in the convergence of man 
and machine between 2020 and 2050. The cyborg technologies we assessed go 
beyond augmentation—those used to restore function from injury or disease—to 
those capable of enhancing performance (through a range of modifications, from 
the functional to the radically structural) beyond the normal baseline for the human 
population.2 We also assume genetic engineering, synthetic biology, nanotechnology, 
artificial intelligence, or any number of emerging and converging technology fields will 
enable aspects of cyborg capabilities. 
This chapter identifies four potential future military-use cases for cyborg 
technologies and assesses their impact on DOD’s organizational structure, warfighter 
doctrine and tactics, and interoperability with allies and civil society. It offers a 
framework through which any variety of potential performance enhancements can be 
assessed and a set of recommendations for DOD in the short term to prepare for this 
latent future.
Selection and Assessment of Case Studies
Given the broad and exploratory landscape of human-machine interfaces, the study 
team determined it would be more impactful to select case studies relevant for 
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defense considerations. We developed individual case studies based on technologies 
capable of enhancing human performance either now or potentially by 2050. They 
represent both predicted technology and concrete examples to illuminate and discuss 
operational and ELSI concerns. We prioritized individual capabilities of a soldier from 
most to least impactful on a warfighter’s battlefield performance when enhanced 
above baseline performance: 
• Situational awareness
• Strength and speed
• Imaging and sight
• Communication
• Physiology (endurance/sleep/health)
• Virtual (avatar) control
• Attention and memory
• Learning
• Sense of smell 
These priorities informed the development of four vignettes based on emerging 
global trends in human-machine enhancement research. 
Case Study 1: Ocular Enhancement for Imaging,  
Sight, and Situational Awareness
Army analysts project battlefields in 2050 will be dense urban environments or 
subterranean megacities that will challenge target identification and tracking. In these 
scenarios, a warfighter’s vision is enhanced to enable sensory perception beyond 
the normal visible spectrum, which combine with computational capabilities that 
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would allow for target identification, selection, and data sharing with other individuals 
or military systems. Enhanced individuals would have the ability to analyze images 
from various wavelengths atop one another to better discriminate targets and allow 
identification in complex and cluttered environments. 
Ocular enhancement would offer small dismounted teams the ability to acquire 
and share data in real time. Fast-moving expeditionary units could employ enhanced 
individuals as part of teams engaged in a multidomain battle space in which 
communications will likely be contested or denied. The enhanced individual would 
be part of the expeditionary unit and capable of performing functions autonomous 
of external data feeds, thus providing intelligence data drawn from multiple sensory-
fusion inputs. In short, the individual possessing the ocular enhancement would 
provide the squadron with a portable sensory-fusion capability. 
The enhancement technology could manifest itself in one of two ways. In the 
first scenario, an ocular enhancement system could overlay existing ocular tissue, 
retaining use of the retina (similar to ongoing research to treat adults with advanced 
retinitis pigmentosa). Such capabilities will likely be available and mature by 2030, 
given current research efforts.3 A second, more complex scenario, would require 
complete replacement of the eye, with data feeds passing directly into the optical 
nerve bundle. In this enhancement, anticipated to be mature by 2050, the sensory 
input for visualization is completely mechanical or electronic in composition, allowing 
data feeds of all types and across all spectra, including those previously not capable 
of being visualized by humans. 
It is unlikely individuals would willingly undergo removal of healthy tissue in a 
sensitive area, so ocular enhancement would be an attractive medical option for those 
with eye tissue damaged or destroyed by injury or disease. Further, given the critical 
role vision plays in society, warfighters who have lost part, or all of their vision, might 
be motivated to undergo voluntary surgery that could restore or even improve their 
ability to visualize the world beyond their service in the military. 
Case Study 2: Restoration and Programmed Muscular Control  
through Optogenetic Bodysuit Sensor Web
Musculoskeletal injuries represent the second leading cause of lost duty time in 
the US armed forces,4 and warfighters and special operators perform increasingly 
challenging tasks that push them to the limits of their physical capability.
In this scenario, a network of subcutaneous sensors deliver optogenetic 
stimulation through programmed light pulses to enhance muscle control. An 
optogenetic control network could be employed to restore muscle or nerve function 
in the wake of an injury. It could also allow warfighters to interface with external 
systems not permanently adhered to their bodies or control their bodies to perform 
complex tasks for which they are not trained or accustomed. Ongoing efforts to 
develop warfighter exosystems to reduce energy expenditure has revealed that current 
technologies often impede operator performance and increase metabolic costs.5 An 
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optogenetically controlled bodysuit could better sense the human state and provide a 
real-time interface between the human and the exosystem. This human enhancement 
would allow dynamic adaptive coupling of the human body with an external exosystem, 
leading to more stable and agile physical behaviors, and optimize energy expenditure 
in operational environments.
The enhancement is best described as an implanted digital sensing and 
stimulation system coupled with external sensors (e.g., boot inserts and wearables), 
all of which link to a central computational controller. In effect, the human body 
would have an array of small optical sensors implanted beneath the skin in the body 
areas that need to be controlled. This could manifest as thin optical threads placed 
at regular intervals over critical muscle and nerve bundles and linked to a central 
control area designed to stimulate each node only when required to recruit the 
muscles below it. Optical control would occur across the network of optical threads in 
a programmed manner to effect a fluid muscular action in a choreographed “dance.” 
Such a network of implantable muscle sensing, computation, and stimulation 
provides a closed-loop suite that could be used to decrease injury and mortality rates 
for soldiers through automated hazard avoidance, while enhancing their physical 
capabilities on the battlefield. 
Case Study 3: Auditory Enhancement for Communication and Protection 
Battlefield-associated hearing loss resulting from acute or prolonged exposure to high-
intensity sounds such as gunfire, explosions, or military machines is one of the most 
prevalent service-connected disability for US veterans. A 2012 study suggests that 
~10 percent of veterans suffer from tinnitus, while ~6 percent have been diagnosed 
with some level of hearing loss.6 Existing technology such as the Army-sponsored 
Tactical Communications and Protective System affords some protection but does not 
offer enhanced capabilities to the user. 
S T R A T E G I C  L A T E N C Y  U N L E A S H E D    |    125 
In this proposed enhancement scenario, enhancement of auditory capabilities 
would occur by replacing or modifying the middle-ear bones and the cochlea, affording 
a more dynamic hearing range, both to protect from high-intensity noises and to 
increase sensitivity to low-amplitude sounds. As the technology matures, it could 
expand the range of sensory perception to infrasonic and ultrasonic levels, allow for 
positioning and localization from passive sensor transmissions or echolocation, and 
create advanced communication capabilities.
Given this technology requires invasive ear surgery, it would be used only for 
individuals with significant hearing loss. Direct replacement or modification of both 
inner and middle components would be irreversible, and therefore those with healthy 
auditory capabilities would be unlikely to accept this type of enhancement. Advances 
in external processor capabilities and minimally invasive electrode implantation in 
neural networks could make these technologies more accessible to the general 
population by 2050. 
For military personnel, auditory enhancements would afford protection from high-
intensity noises, provide a wider dynamic range of detectable sounds, and afford 
integrated communication capabilities. In the near-term (2020 to 2030), the study 
team anticipates the enhancement will be coupled with networking capabilities and 
used to track human detection of salient objects in an acoustic environment. In 
squads with limited enhanced personnel, the enhanced individual(s) would detect 
salient auditory information in the environment and relay it to other squad members 
using conventional forms of communication. For squads with multiple enhanced 
individuals, acquisition and distribution of auditory cues to spatially separated 
individuals could direct attention across an entire squad to actionable stimuli. 
Later iterations of auditory enhancements would likely target two key areas: 1) 
the capability for communication via imagined or covert speech, and 2) significantly 
less invasive and/or reversible implants. In regard to imagined speech, within this 
extended timeline (2050), significant advances in the understanding of neural 
pathways will enable not merely improvements to an individual’s auditory signal 
transduction but also conversion and transmission of these signals to others across 
distances.7 This capability could lead to increased acceptance and adoption of 
this enhancement in areas outside the military, such as by intelligence officers, 
police forces, and others who would benefit from using imperceptible forms of 
communication. Technologies that allow real-time translation of multiple languages 
would be useful to military operators, as well as civilians. 
Case Study 4: Direct Neural Enhancement of the Human Brain
Remote weapon systems and/or unmanned vehicles have increasing prevalence 
on the modern battlefield. Vehicle and infrastructure-associated remote weapon 
systems allow for operators to control the battlefield while remaining some distance 
away in relative safety. Similarly, unmanned vehicles will play an invaluable role in 
reconnaissance and long-range targeting of enemy infrastructure, equipment, and 
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personnel. Our current state of technology allows remote weapon systems and 
unmanned vehicles to be controlled by work stations that can be either fixed or 
portable. While effective, these current systems are limited by the complexity of user 
interfaces and limited information that can be conveyed to the user.
In this scenario, neural implants for brain-computer interfacing (BCI) would allow for 
seamless interaction between the individual and secondary assets (i.e., machines). 
This control could extend to drones, weapon systems, and other remote systems 
controlled by an enhanced operator. The enhancement would not simply entail user 
control of equipment (brain to machine) but also transmission to operator (machine 
to brain), and human to human (i.e., command-and-control dynamics) to enhance 
situational awareness as drone, computational-analytic, and human information is 
relayed to the operator. Neural enhancement through implantation of modulatory 
electrodes in the brain will allow for rapid interaction between machine and operator 
via a read/write type of mechanism.8 These enhancements will enable the enhanced 
operator to have rapid and integrated control of multiple assets by improving 
battlefield awareness and warfighter lethality. 
As this technology matures, the study team anticipates specialized operators will 
likely be utilizing neural implants for enhanced operation of assets by 2030. These 
operators will include special forces teams, military pilots, UAV/USV-drone operators, 
and intelligence personnel.9 By 2050, scientists will make significant advances in 
the understanding of the neural network and neural implant technology, enabling 
deployment of these technologies to military forces for use-controlled operation of 
weapon systems, network communication and interaction (e.g., corpspeople speaking 
with doctors or specialists in hospitals to aid in field treatments of combat injuries), 
and improved warfighter awareness through machine-to-brain (and machine-enabled 
remote brain-to-brain) communication via the use of distributed sensors, transmitters, 
and reconnaissance drones. 
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For the warfighter, neural implants would have broad battlefield applicability. 
External processors and transmitters would allow for interaction with battlefield 
assets (weapon systems, reconnaissance drones, UAV/UMVs) as well as personnel 
both within proximity and across distances through hierarchical relays with a central 
network. Early deployment of BCI to enhanced individuals would be limited to small-
scale specialized teams where one or more enhanced personnel would offer squad 
support through asset control. The level of invasiveness of early iterations and the 
potential irreversibility of these implants may limit acceptance by military personnel 
and society, although specialized teams (e.g., Navy SEALs, US Army Rangers) may 
be more inclined to accept these technologies if they could provide significant 
improvements in capability, lethality, survivability, and overall battlefield superiority. 
Improvements in neural implant technology could be significant by 2050. 
Anticipated improvements would focus on reducing the level of invasiveness of 
the implant itself. This could be accomplished through location-specific assembly 
of electrodes using biocompatible nanoparticles that can be directed via an 
external force (doped iron-oxide nanoparticles that can be positioned through the 
use of directed magnetic fields) or through improvements to the signal-acquisition 
capabilities of externally placed electrodes and processors. The study team expects 
warfighter needs will influence these technological advancements; however, such 
advances would plausibly lead to revolutionary changes in how society interacts with 
machines on a daily level. Technologies such as personal robots, entertainment 
options, and vehicles would be driven and sustained by commercial entities. 
Case Study Analysis
Societal Perceptions as Either Impediments or Drivers of Cyborg Soldiers
Our study considered whether near-peer competitors/adversaries’ would be willing 
to pursue genetic alterations or invasive human-machine enhancements the United 
States would be more hesitant to conduct, because of differing ethical frameworks, 
regulatory requirements, or social attitudes. For example, in 2017, Chinese 
researchers manipulated myostatin genes in canines to increase their musculature 
several fold, resulting in what many considered a prelude to the potential creation of 
“super soldiers.”10 Another Chinese research team added more fuel to these concerns 
when it announced the germ-line manipulation of human embryos for the stated 
purpose of avoiding HIV infection passed from parents.11 Months later, a Russian 
scientist claimed he intended to implant gene-edited embryos into women.12
Current DOD perceptions about near-peer adversaries’ strategic intent are based 
on such anecdotes. While we know both China’s political and military institutions are 
involved in all aspects of technology research and development13 and China maintain 
explicit differences in cultural values and norms governing the conduct of research,14 
researchers have not assessed systematically global perceptions on the ethics 
of human enhancement. To what extent, if any, are the research-and-development 
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(R&D) activities of different regions of the world constrained by different moral codes 
or swayed by popular regional opinion? What characteristics—such as education, 
religious beliefs, or doctrine—affect willingness to allow advanced technology to 
enhance the human condition, and to what extent do these attitudes among members 
of the public impact the activities of a particular government? 
The Pew Research Center concluded a survey of 4,726 people within the United 
States to understand domestic attitudes toward human-enhancement technologies.15 
They examined public attitudes about three emerging technologies that could 
improve human health, cognitive abilities, or physical capacities. The study revealed 
the majority of Americans greet these technologies more with wariness and worry 
than enthusiasm and hope. For example, a majority of US adults say they would be 
“very” or “somewhat” worried about brain chips (69 percent) and synthetic blood 
(63 percent). Some said they would be both enthusiastic and worried, but, overall, 
concern outpaces excitement. Opinion is closely divided on the fundamental question 
of whether these potential developments are “meddling with nature” and cross a 
line that should not be crossed or are “no different” from other ways that humans 
have tried to better themselves over time. People’s views differ depending on how 
religious they are; on average, more religious Americans are less affirming of these 
enhancements than those considered less religious, who are more inclined to see use 
of these techniques as the continuation of a millenia-old quest by humans to try to 
better themselves.16 
The Pew Research study results suggest an American’s willingness to accept or 
reject a human enhancement technology is associated with their understanding of the 
technology and their degree of religious commitment. Comparable data from other 
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countries is not available, and near-peer adversaries like China exert heavy control 
over information sharing, making data collection challenging. Moreover, the attitudes 
and opinions of the general public do not necessarily represent what government 
authorities or research teams are willing to pursue. Therefore, US leadership has 
little data about what other countries’ societies, scientists, governments, or military 
leaders would support. Value exists in understanding societal awareness and global 
perceptions of human-machine enhancement technologies because it can be used to 
predict where adoption cyborg technologies may be difficult to introduce and where 
adversarial adoption of offset technologies is likely to be more readily accepted.
Interoperability and the Politics of Enhanced Soldiers
Our subject-matter experts expect commercial medical applications will accelerate 
the pace of development of cyborg technologies between 2020 and 2035; thus, 
defense forces around the globe will likely adopt them apace. Adoption of new and 
potentially sensitive technologies will have implications for interoperability of military 
forces. However, interoperability of military units in a tactical sense is not the only 
hurdle that must be overcome when bringing together populations from different 
countries. Countries base their policies on the shared social norms and beliefs of the 
population, which may or may not align on the issue of human-machine enhancement 
technologies.17 The aforementioned Pew Research study suggests allies with strong 
religious demographics may be more reluctant to accept foreign cyborg soldiers 
operating on a shared military base within their borders. Based upon current postures 
of key strategic competitors,18 the global community will likely not establish consistent 
and harmonized approaches to integrating human-machine enhanced warfighters; the 
lack of harmonization will present challenges to the deployment of these assets in the 
years leading up to 2050. A robust multinational dialogue that identifies acceptable 
legal, moral/philosophical, and ethical frameworks for deploying these technologies in 
national defense may prepare the global communities for these eventualities. 
Beyond allied acceptance and military interoperability, international political costs 
exist for fielding cyborg military assets. State and nonstate adversaries will seek to 
undermine DOD by portraying the United States as deploying technology unethically. 
Demographics such as religion and political affiliation are anticipated to be 
a platform used to galvanize these arguments, with entertainment and social 
media reinforcement. Mass media, including film and literature, is a known stage 
for demonizing cyborgs. From Frankenstein to Terminator, popular media often 
depict technology’s integration with the human body as robbing the human spirit of 
compassion and leading to violence and grave unintended consequences. In the name 
of entertainment, popular social and open-source media, literature, and film have 
often distorted or portrayed in dystopian narratives the use of machines to enhance 
the physical condition of the human species.
However, fiction can also reflect positive applications of emerging technologies or 
be a powerful tool for engaging the public in bioethics discussions.19 More accurate 
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depictions of technology and its applications in both fiction and nonfiction media could 
lay the groundwork for a new generation who see opportunity for societal benefits 
in cyborg technologies. As technology increases the possibility for human physical 
enhancements, DOD must help alter distorted cultural narratives. A more realistic, 
balanced (if not more positive) narrative will serve to better educate the public, 
mitigate societal apprehension, and remove barriers to productive adoption of these 
new technologies. Although this is not intrinsically a DOD mission, defense leadership 
should understand that if they intend to field these technologies the public must 
understand and overcome misperceptions.
Legal and Privacy Implications for Cyborg Technologies
As many legal scholars will attest, current legal frameworks that govern the use of 
technology—including cell phones, email, and social media—are inadequate. As the 
pace of technological development accelerates and human-machine enhancements 
achieve reality in the years leading up to 2050, legal frameworks will almost certainly 
continue to be outpaced. In a 2014 study, “Our Cyborg Future: Law and Policy 
Implications.”20 Benjamin Wittes and Jane Chong discuss how the prolific use of cell 
phones and wearable devices brings technology closer to the human race and suggest 
we are, in effect, approaching a state in which we are “juvenile cyborgs” already. They 
suggest a more important and unique legal challenge associated with man-machine 
enhancements is the data generated by the machines: 
The first consideration that must factor into our discussion is that 
cyborgs inherently generate data. Human activity by default does 
not—at least, not beyond footprints and fingerprints and DNA 
traces. We can think and move without leaving meaningful traces; 
we can speak without recording. Digital activity, by contrast, creates 
transactional records. A cyborg’s activity is thus presumptively 
recorded and that data may be stored or transmitted. To record or to 
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transmit data is also to enable collection or interception of that data. 
Unless one specifically engineers the cyborg to resist such collection 
or interception, it will by default facilitate surveillance. And even if 
one does engineer the cyborg to resist surveillance, the data still 
gets created. In other words, a world of cyborgs is a world awash in 
data about individuals, data of enormous sensitivity, and, the further 
cyborgidization progresses, ever-increasing granularity. Thus, the 
most immediate impact of cyborgidization on the law of surveillance 
will likely be to put additional pressure on the so-called third-party 
doctrine, which underlies a great deal of governmental collection on 
transactional data and business records. Under Third Party Doctrine, 
an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with 
respect to information he voluntarily discloses to a third party, like 
a bank or a telecommunications carrier, and the Fourth Amendment 
therefore does not regulate the acquisition of such transactional data 
from those third parties by governmental investigators.21
The authors argue further that the more essential the role machines play in our lives, 
the more integral the data they produce are to our human existences and the more 
inextricably intertwined the devices become with us—socially, physically, and biologically. 
If this is true, what are the implications for the enhanced individual? Further, what are 
the implications of these data when they are generated by warfighters and special 
operators? Who owns such data, and for what purposes can they be used? From a legal 
perspective, an enhanced human will likely find themselves generating huge amounts 
of data that makes them uniquely susceptible to targeting and surveillance, and legal 
frameworks, structured currently, cannot to do anything about it. Further, the data could 
be hacked by adversaries for harmful purposes. 
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Cyborg technology will also collect data from those around the enhanced 
individual. Some of the technology predictions within this study envision human-
machine enhancements in which audio, video, geolocation, and time stamps would 
all be recorded and distributed. From a national security perspective, this enhances 
situational awareness and clearly has military applications. But in a civilian setting, 
like in a coffee shop or the gym, it will have other implications, including impact on 
bystanders. Even if an individual volunteers for enhancement and any corresponding 
collection of their personal data, bystanders are unlikely to have granted the same 
permission. Some likely scenarios to consider include:
• Are an enhanced individual’s capability to monitor, record, and communicate 
conversations and images bound by the same legal frameworks that govern 
wiretapping and privacy laws for cell phones and other recording devices?
• If an enhanced warfighter is caught and captured, do they have the same 
protections under the Geneva Convention, and will their enhanced status 
alter the treatment they are likely to receive?
• Can a person be prevented from having or using an enhancement under 
special circumstances (e.g., entering a bank or sensitive compartmented 
information facility [SCIF], gambling in a casino, taking a test, or negotiating 
a contract)? 
• Can an employer discriminate against hiring an enhanced—or unenhanced—
person? Can a business refuse to serve? If an employer desires the 
enhanced individual, can they be paid more for their services?
• Is the misuse of enhanced technology on the part of an employee grounds 
for deactivation or removal of the technology? 
• Is there a legal precedent for passing laws that restrict or modulate 
technology integral to our bodies?
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• Who is liable for any accidents caused by malfunctioning of the technology?
• Can a person sign away legal authority or control over something inside their 
body (i.e., akin to a delegation of authority/responsibility)?
• Will people be required to disclose the presence of enhancements within 
their bodies? If so, when, why, and to whom?
• Can someone be screened to reveal an enhancement that is not visible 
through the use of a metal detector or body scanner? What is the 
expectation of privacy for both enhanced individuals and people interacting 
with them?
Current legal frameworks are insufficient to predict the myriad challenges to 
privacy and security that will arise from these situations. The DOD should explore the 
development of dynamic legal, security, and ethical frameworks that anticipate these 
questions. Forward-leaning policies, both internal and external to the department, 
should protect privacy, sustain security, and manage personal and organizational 
risk. Because a core DOD mission is the operationalization of technology for national 
security, these frameworks should be agile and responsive to new technologies, 
whether developed in the United States or elsewhere. Moreover, frameworks should 
be adaptable to the entire lifecycle of technological advancement, from early-stage 
research through fielding and operational use.
Safety and National Security 
Cyborg technology might be classified as a threat; it is almost impossible to detect, 
difficult to deter, and challenging to defend against. If the strategic landscape 
advances sooner than expected, or contains ambiguous threats against which we 
lack capabilities to detect and defend, the balance of power, as well as the very 
definition of “asymmetric warfare,” will be altered. The introduction of human-machine 
enhancements into military and civilian populations will create new vulnerabilities that 
will need to be mitigated by security architectures. As noted above, cyborg individuals 
would automatically record images and audio or generate geographic coordinates and 
time stamps; they will, in effect, create “transactional records,22 enabling collection or 
interception of that data. Unless one specifically engineers the cyborg to resist such 
collection or interception, it will facilitate surveillance by default. Relatedly, because 
of their surveillance capabilities, cyborgs could be selectively tracked and targeted 
unless proper shielding is undertaken.
From a national security perspective, adversaries may piggyback surveillance and 
tracking technologies onto implanted cyborg technologies. In the words of one study 
participant, “If I can’t walk into a [SCIF] wearing an iWatch or carrying a cell phone, 
how will security be confident it is safe to allow a cyborg to walk in there?” 
Machines respond to commands, and if command-and-control systems are hacked, 
the human-machine will be compromised. External hackability could generate the fear 
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of control by others. Even if this risk can be mitigated through enhanced encryption 
methods, variable authentication requirements, or other methods, the perception that 
control could be subverted might lead to issues of trust among peers. For example, 
if a hostile actor could override an optogenetic bodysuit or neural implant that 
controls muscle movement, this could not only create a true threat to the individual, 
organization, and mission but also promulgate fears among the ranks of both 
unenhanced and enhanced alike. 
Lastly, these advanced technologies will be able to travel the world outside of 
traditional exploitation-preventative security controls. Technology ownership and 
chain of command of an enhanced soldier is nontraditional (e.g., an enhanced soldier 
plans a vacation to foreign countries, posing diplomatic and security risks). Thus, 
individual user must trust the system will perform reliably and sustainably—i.e., that 
the system has been verified and validated—in and across a range of settings and 
circumstances. In short, an enhanced soldier with a machine interface presents a 
potential multilevel security risk in need of mitigation.
Military Opportunities to Enhance Capability
Human augmentations and enhancements carry with them a number of security and 
privacy concerns at both the national and global societal level. These technologies, 
however, also offer significant advantages to the DOD and other national agencies. In 
addition to enhancing warfighter performance, these technologies have many technical 
applications with the potential to improve warfighters’ survivability significantly, 
allowing them to operate safely and securely in austere environments.23 One could 
argue that failure to invest in the responsible development of these potentially 
lifesaving technologies would be unethical.
With variable combat environments, conditions, and adversaries, military 
technology is advancing rapidly to provide enhanced situational awareness to 
warfighters. DOD forces regularly deploy a wide array of unmanned aerial and/or 
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marine vehicles (UAV/UMV) to collect data and relay it back for assessment. UAV-
gathered intelligence is often collected at a central location and then disseminated 
to forward operators through conventional communication networks, which can prove 
limiting in some situations. As discussed in vignette 4, neural enhancements—
portable independent communication systems both between squads and squad 
members, as well as with computer systems themselves (such as UAVs)—could 
enable warfighters to operate “off of the cloud” or “on the edge.” In a multidomain 
battle space where fast moving expeditionary forces will contest communications and 
movement, these types of portable communications could lead to enhanced targeting, 
tracking, and situational awareness organic to the squad level, thereby enabling rapid 
decision-making and operational flexibility. 
The ability to passively record environmental situations and personal interactions 
and observations without external equipment or devices would also be invaluable to 
clandestine surveillance. In dense urban environments, operators would be able to 
move seamlessly through crowded city streets capturing environmental intelligence, 
targeting conversations, and acquiring other valuable information that would be digitally 
stored for later analysis and interpretation. Additionally, while clandestine operators are 
trained to capture and remember key details, digital (audio and visual) recordings can 
capture minute details that may be missed by even the well-trained eye. 
Safety Concerns and Benefits
For any enhancement or augmentation, safety is a critical issue, and, challengingly, the 
cognitive and physical effects of these technologies cannot be known fully a priori. The 
DOD must support rigorous science in these domains, not only to validate usefulness 
of the technologies but also to identify and prevent short- and long-term harms. Even 
when measures are taken to ensure the highest level of safety for the end user of 
these technologies, each human’s physiology is slightly different, and the technologies 
could result in unforeseen side effects. DOD personnel, especially those at the “tip 
of the spear” (e.g., SOF), are prone to seek an advantage over adversaries even if the 
chosen technology has not been shown to be fully effective or nonhazardous (e.g., 
the use of dietary supplements by SOCOM). Although speculative at this stage of 
development, the early adoption of low technology-readiness-level (TRL) enhancements 
to keep up with enhanced adversaries may prove an area of concern in the future. 
Given DOD’s particular needs and applications, many of these enhancements will 
likely be unique to the DOD; therefore, collection and accrual of data to validate the 
utility, and establish the safety, of these technologies may be more difficult than in 
the civilian sector, where more opportunities exist to collect data or conduct studies 
with sufficient sample size. Also, long-term side effects will likely be unique to each 
augmentation. The remapping of neural networks resulting from an implant will be 
vastly different than muscular stimulation via optogenetic implants. Each implant type, 
location, and mode of action will carry its own safety and regulatory concerns.
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Human enhancement and augmentation could be implemented as a viable 
technology in DOD personnel for the sole purpose of adding a competitive edge to and 
improve survivability of warfighters. Each of the technologies we have discussed have 
the potential to offer improved situational awareness through 1) enhanced sensory 
perception, 2) streamlined interaction with assets such as UAVs and sensors, and 3) 
improved communication between squad members, which would directly translate into 
improved warfighter performance and safety through “left-of-bang” approaches. While 
these examples would provide more tangible and predictable safety enhancements, 
secondary benefits could also be possible based on current understanding of neural 
plasticity and overall brain function. For example, studies of Alzheimer’s dementia 
have shown early and frequent brain stimulation leads to reduced plaque formation 
in aging populations.24 It is possible enhancements that rely on a neural implant 
or other method of brain stimulation may increase overall brain activity, leading to 
slowed aging of neural pathways and long-term benefits to individuals with these 
types of enhancements. Many of these technologies will incorporate some sort of 
biometric log to ensure the stability of the implant. As has been discussed elsewhere, 
these logs could allow for numerous biomarkers to be monitored, which could lead 
to early recognition not only of implant degradation and/or failure but also other 
disease states (or conditions that the recipient may experience or develop during their 
lifetime). By revealing actionable medical information that would not otherwise be 
detected, the enhancement may provide a safety benefit to the individual. 
Long-Term Effects of Human-Machine Fusion
Enhancement technologies may be integrated intimately within the human body 
and enable decades of exchange information with the human nervous system. As 
mentioned, long-term effects on the human body (and cognitive and/or psychological 
functions) cannot currently be wholly foreseen, and will need to be determined 
through rigorous prospective studies. Once short-term safety and efficacy have been 
demostrated, initial deployment would likely be in small specialized teams monitored 
extensively both during and after military service. These specialized teams could 
serve as “probe cohorts” to enable ongoing evaluation of benefits, burdens, and 
potential harms incurred by such interventions. While the targets will be ever-evolving, 
we discuss below some of the questions and concerns that will need to be addressed. 
Many of the enhancements described here and possible by 2050 will require us 
to to deepen our understanding significantly both of the brain and how to engineer 
technologies affecting its structures and functions. Most cyborg technologies will 
likely require a neural component/implantation to allow efficient utilization, which 
will require a massive two-way data feed to/from the brain, as scientists develop 
iterative methods and techniques to “learn” proper placement of implants and to 
accommodate vast types and amounts of data required to sustain these technologies’ 
optimal functioning. We do not know yet how the use of integrated technologies will 
affect existing brain architectures and functions; arguably, we can know this only by 
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implementing the particular intervention(s) in question. Augmentation of individual 
senses may have secondary consequences for multisensory integration and sensory 
motor coordination and will require information displays that can be digested by the 
human brain without causing spatial disorientation, negative impacts on coordination, 
and disequilibrium.25 Furthermore, if these data streams become corrupted, improper 
sensory relays and interpretation could lead to poor or incorrect decision-making by 
the operator. For example, an operator could falsely identify of targets, leading to 
friendly fire. Would this lead to a “my implant made me do it”–type defense where 
technology is blamed for such actions and mistakes?
With age, the tissues, integrity, and functions of the human body change in 
relative capability, plasticity, and sustainability. We do not yet know whether and/
or how implants will change the rate, extent, and effect(s) of aging, or the influence 
and manifestations of the implants over time. In the long-term, the body might lose 
it ability to interact with the implant as neural connections degrade or muscles 
and connective tissues change or atrophy. Will an individual who receives these 
enhancements during their years of service become even more infirm later in life as 
their body and implant ages? Can enhancements be recalibrated as the body ages 
to restore functionality, or at least ensure operability at some basal level? Or, will the 
technology provide some measure of protection against or mitigation of aging effects, 
thereby rendering the enhanced individual with durable capabilities?
Active Military Considerations
Our study team projects the Integration of enhanced troops into warfighter populations 
will increase in frequency as we approach 2050, and these populations will persist 
for extended periods of service. This “new normal” will require changes in the way 
the DOD recruits, trains, deploys, and protects troops and systems under its span of 
control. At present, all soldiers and support personnel constitute a significant DOD 
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investment. This is not just an investment in the equipment and training, but also in 
the in-service and long-term postservice care. The total life-cycle cost in enhanced 
personnel will require a change in the way the various branches of the DOD organize 
and position individuals in their command. 
• Does this create new quid pro quo service criteria? For example, should the 
DOD mandate substantially longer commitments of service for enhanced 
individuals if the DOD is required to maintain these implants in perpetuity? 
• Should all enlistees be eligible for enhancement, or should only select 
groups—e.g., those who are able to meet certain physical and mental 
criteria—be eligible or selected? Can an individual join the military if they 
have a preexisting augmentation? 
• How do enhanced individuals rank compared to unenhanced ones, and 
how does this change current hierarchies and criteria for promotion and 
recognition/awards?  
These questions and others will require serious attention by each branch of the 
service as they adapt to the previously discussed “new normal,” key aspects of which 
we address below. 
Integration of Enhanced Soldiers into Active-Duty Forces
While human-machine enhancements could potentially increase operational 
effectiveness of military units, the technologies and techniques to employ them 
will require study and optimization. These adjustments to current practice will not 
simply be how we handle personnel but also how we organize enhanced personnel 
into existing hierarchies, how we utilize them on the battlefield, and how the rules of 
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warfare may need to be modified to accommodate the use—and to prevent misuse—
of these technologies. 
Classifying military personnel as enhanced or unenhanced would add another level 
of categorization to military status, fitness for duty, and/or rank that will have to be 
considered. Enhancement will effectively change the capabilities and professional 
status of active-duty soldiers and will require policies and procedures that take 
into account how these new capabilities will impact the professional qualifications 
and military occupational specialties assigned. Additionally, in today’s military, 
individuals can take courses or receive additional training to further their career 
and potential for advancement. Is there a future where obtaining an augmentation 
conveys an equivalent benefit to an individual’s career path? In contrast, could an 
enhancement limit this potential? For example, what if the enhancement is so unit- 
or task-specific (i.e., targeting, reconnaissance) or necessary that it constrains or 
restricts an individual being promoted from field service, or from receiving a different 
enhancement that is not compatible?
In the early stages of development and deployment, individuals augmented through 
use of invasive procedures will not likely be prevalent in the general population 
of troops. Deployment of mixed populations will require changes in doctrine, 
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities 
to maximize impact and better achieve the mission. DOD leaders must consider 
that integrating enhanced personnel within military units that contain unenhanced 
soldiers is likely to create an imbalance in capabilities. This will almost certainly incur 
differences in permissions, treatments, or requirements for long-term sustainment. 
Consideration should be given to how this would impact unit cohesion or morale of 
the military unit, and whether and to what extent “super soldier” myths will (positively 
or adversely) affect unit performance. For this reason, the study group recommends 
that DOD fund and conduct related psychosocial research as development of these 
technologies advances.
Finally, current DOD rules of engagement require a human-in-the-loop for lethal 
actions. As technology blurs the line between system and solider, new policies will 
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need to be developed that define permissions for when to engage in lethal actions 
for systems under direct human neural control. Is it sufficient for a single human in 
control of multiple deployed assets to interpret intelligence independently and decide 
upon the best course of action? In addition to considering how these technologies 
will alter our own rules of engagements, decision-makers must develop methods 
of understanding our adversaries’ capabilities, intentions, and permissions in this 
space.26
Reintegration of Enhanced Soldiers Back into the Civilian Population
An enhanced military cohort will eventually return to civilian life, requiring secession 
planning and institution of transition policies that take into account the unique needs 
of service members with long-term enhancements. The obligations for long-term care 
of the individual, the security of the technology, and the capabilities afforded by the 
technology must be considered for each type of augmentation, and policies will have 
to be tailored to address each consideration and concern effectively. While a soldier 
with a prosthetic arm is not expected to return the arm after service, an individual who 
can control a UAV (or other BCI-device or system) with a neural implant may require 
different considerations upon retiring from service. 
Enhancements designed for military applications will likely enable warfighters to 
perform at a level greater than the previous or general norm, whether via enhanced 
hearing, vision, stamina, or cognitive capabilities. As an enhanced individual leaves 
military service, will the military downgrade or deactivate (demilitarize) the capabilities 
of an enhancement technology, and, if so, what will be the (biopsychosocial) impact 
upon the individual? While this could seem obvious for individuals able to interact 
with complex weapon systems or communications capabilities, what are the protocols 
established for people with enhanced auditory, optical, or cognitive capabilities. If the 
brain has developed new neural pathways to interpret and use information from these 
sources, what happens if and when these systems are diminished or deactivated, 
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and would it be ethical to do so? For enhanced physical capabilities such as strength 
or stamina resulting from a boost-limb or exoskeleton, how would an individual be 
psychologically and socially impacted when this physical enhancement is removed? 
We recognize the possibility of a “post-enhancement distress syndrome” (PEDS) of 
feelings of inferiority, withdrawal, or even a form of depression associated with the 
now disenhanced state.27 
However, as previously discussed, we must consider what it will mean for enhanced 
individuals to “return to normal.” An individual reentering civilian life with enhanced 
limbs that allow for increased strength or stamina, an eye that provides infrared and/
or ultraviolet vision, an auditory device that provides ultra- and subsonic hearing, 
and/or a neural device that optimizes cognitive capability would have a defined 
competitive advantage over unenhanced individuals in society. Given the competitive 
edge imparted to the individual, will there be a propensity for bias in favor or against 
those enhanced? Would enhanced individuals be “throttled” back to normal levels? 
Who determines what these levels should be? Will these enhancements be “reverse 
dual-used” in the civilian population for personal performance optimization, or as 
“neurocorrective” measures for certain types of behaviors? Policies and protections 
will need to be established to ensure the sound treatment of both vulnerable 
populations and those who have received enhancing interventions. 
An enhanced individual would need to be monitored for years for the possibility 
of postenhancement mental health disorders; but what about those who are able 
to maintain their implants after service? As previously stated, a prosthetic limb or 
eye would not be removed when an individual leaves the DOD; but what would policy 
dictate for long-term maintenance and care of indwelling enhancements (e.g., auditory, 
visual and/or brain implants)? When would the military’s commitment to taking care 
of the individual be an obligation to sustain the enhancement system itself? How 
would this kind of specialized care and sustainment be coordinated with the Veterans 
Administration? We must also assume technology will continue to advance the type 
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and extent of enhancements that are available and of value. While one might not 
expect that a veteran would receive a postservice “upgrade” that affords improved 
capabilities, what if such an upgrade maintains functionality, prevents degradation, 
and/or provides comfort? Or, what if the original system has become obsolete by 
technological advances? Would technological obsolescence resulting from lack of 
upgrade(s) (and/or occurrence of PEDS) constitute a compensable disability? 
In the cases described, the enhancements all involve a degree of permanence. 
We recommend, where possible, developing enhancement technologies that could 
be donned or doffed easily, although the group acknowledged that, for certain 
enhancements, this may not be feasible in the future. Given this, the possession 
and security of the enhancement technology becomes an issue during and after 
military service. For example, if the individual possesses a technology that is not 
currently available, or if the technology is vastly superior to what is available in 
other nations, could the individual travel abroad without posing a security risk? What 
restrictions could reasonably and ethically be placed on someone who has received 
an enhancement that they cannot doff? To what extent could or should DOD restrict 
the individual’s movements and/or track the device’s location? At present, policies are 
not in place to deal with these questions, issues, and problems. 
Ethical Considerations
At all stages, ethical considerations must be at the forefront of DOD’s approach. 
Landmarks in both the lifecycle of product development, as well as the lifecycle of a 
service member, are touchpoints for a discussion of ELSI issues. For example, the 
R&D stage of a product raises unique considerations and invokes existing ethical 
and regulatory structures for research, including the Belmont principles of autonomy, 
beneficence, and justice, which DOD investments must satisfy. Likewise the needs 
of, and DOD responsibilities to, a service member change throughout the course of 
the individual’s military career and postmilitary life; each stage merits discussion of 
ethical considerations.28 
It should not be taken for granted that principles and frameworks appropriate 
to one lifecycle stage (either of the product or the individual) will necessarily apply 
to another. For instance, DOD-supported research has stringent requirements 
for voluntariness and informed consent. Thus, a service member receiving an 
investigational enhancement as part of a study must be informed of known risks 
and benefits and must agree to participate without undue influence. As technology 
matures and leaves the investigational stage, those interventions that are part of 
clinical care (i.e., used to prevent, treat, or rehabilitate injury) would also be regarded 
under existing codes of clinical ethics. However, for enhancements that go beyond 
clinical care and which are no longer investigational, new frameworks and related 
policies must be established to illuminate and mitigate ELSI concerns in a rigorous 
and systematic fashion. In other words, ethical concepts and tools likely need to be 
modified or created to more precisely address and resolve emerging dilemmas.
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Among the most significant ethical considerations that the study group posited 
is the issue of voluntariness: under what circumstances, if any, could a service 
member be compelled to undergo an enhancement that has been fielded (i.e., one 
that is no longer in the R&D stage)? Even if enhancement is voluntary, the extreme 
nature of many such enhancements will incur both physical and mental health effects 
immediately after a procedure, during military careers, and over the long term. Can 
volunteers make an informed decision when these techniques and technologies 
are new, and when mid-to-long-term effects remain unknown?29 If potential burdens 
and risks are to be communicated—and accepted by individuals who receive such 
interventions—is the DOD obligated to provide ongoing research into long-term effects 
as well as care for enhanced individuals? 
Therefore, in the spirit of medical (and governmental) nonabandonment, ongoing 
efforts to develop biotechnological enhancements must be accompanied by continuity 
of research to evaluate prospectively the benefits, burdens, and harms incurred to 
individuals, bystanders, and groups, and clinical care of individuals in whom burdens 
and harms occur. The DOD should support foundational research to validate human-
machine fusion technologies prior to fielding and to track the long-term safety and 
impact on individuals and groups. 
Conclusions
The introduction of augmented, or “cyborg,” human beings into the general population, 
the DOD active-duty population, and those of near-peer competitors will accelerate in 
the years following 2050. Human-machine fusions will provide significant benefits and 
will have positive quality-of-life impacts on humankind by restoring functionality lost as 
a result of illness or injury. Cyborgs will also impact military operations and training 
and create potential challenges for established legal, security, and ethical frameworks. 
Each of these technologies will afford some level of performance improvement to end 
users that widen the performance gap between enhanced and unenhanced individuals 
and teams. As these technologies evolve, the scientific and engineering communities 
must move cautiously to maximize potential with a focus on the safety of our society. 
Commensurate investments in these areas will work to mitigate misuse or unintended 
consequences of these technologies. 
The questions used in these discussions, as exemplified by the case studies, can 
provide a broader framework assessment for many types of latent cyborg technologies 
as they emerge. For our case studies, the following are possible recommendations 
(not in priority order):
• DOD must conduct global assessments of societal awareness and 
perceptions of human-machine enhancement technologies. General 
perception exists that our adversaries are more likely to adopt technologies 
that US populations are reluctant or unwilling to field based on ethical 
concerns; however, adversary attitudes toward these technologies have never 
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been verified. Societal apprehension about new technologies can lead to 
political barriers and slow domestic adoption. By assessing global attitudes, 
we may be able to predict both where sociopolitical barriers may hamper the 
introduction of new technologies and when adversarial adoption of offset 
technologies is likely to be more readily accepted.
• US leadership should use forums (e.g., per requirements with NATO) to 
discuss impacts to interoperability with allied partners as we approach 
the year 2050. This will help develop doctrine, policies, and practices to 
maximize interoperability of military forces. 
• The DOD should invest in the development of dynamic legal, security, 
and ethical frameworks under its control that anticipate emerging cyborg 
technologies; current frameworks are insufficient given the speed at which 
these technologies are developing both in the United States and other 
nations, both allied and adversarial. Forward-leaning policies, both internal 
and external to the DOD, should protect privacy, sustain security, and manage 
personal and organizational risk, while maximizing defined benefits to the 
US and its allies and assets. Because operationalization of technology 
for national security is at the core of the DOD mission, these frameworks 
should be structured to be agile and responsive to new technologies whether 
developed within the United States or elsewhere. 
• DOD and others should try to reverse negative cultural narratives of 
enhancement technologies; popular social and open-source media, literature, 
and film have often cast the use of machines to enhance human physical 
conditions in distorted and dystopian lights. A more realistic and balanced 
(if not more positive) narrative, along with transparency in the government’s 
approach to technology adoption, will serve to better educate the public, 
mitigate societal apprehensions, and remove barriers to productive adoption 
of these new technologies. A more informed public will also help illuminate 
social concerns, such as those surrounding privacy. Although fielding cyborg 
technology is not intrinsically a DOD mission, defense leadership should 
understand that, if it intend to field these technologies, it will need to 
overcome negative public and social perceptions.
• DOD should conduct table-top war games and targeted threat assessments to 
inform doctrine and tactics of allied and adversarial forces. War games are well-
established tools to exercise the impact of asymmetric technologies on tactics, 
techniques, and procedures. Table-top exercises exploring varied scenarios of 
the integration and use of human-machine technologies by the United States 
and/or its adversaries will predict offset advantages, identify NATO and other 
allied organizational interoperability friction points, and inform senior military 
strategists and science-and-technology investors. DOD should support these 
efforts by targeted intelligence assessments on this emerging field. 
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• The US government should support efforts to establish a whole-of-nation 
approach to human-machine enhancement technologies versus a whole-
of-government approach. Federal and commercial investments in these 
areas are uncoordinated and are being outpaced by Chinese R&D, which 
could result in a loss of US dominance in human-machine enhancement 
technologies. Near-peer dominance in the commercial sector will place US 
interests in the defense sector at a disadvantage and could lead to an offset 
disadvantage in the realm of human-machine enhancement by the year 
2050. A national effort to sustain US dominance in cyborg technologies is in 
the best interests of the DOD and the nation. 
• The DOD should support foundational research to validate human-machine 
fusion technologies prior to fielding and to track the long-term safety and 
impact on individuals and groups. The benefits afforded by human-machine 
fusions will be significant and will have positive quality-of-life impacts on 
humankind through the restoration of functionality lost because of illness or 
injury. The military community will also see capability opportunities that will 
impact operations and training. As these technologies evolve, the scientific 
and engineering communities must move cautiously to maximize potential 
with a focus on the safety of our society. Commensurate investments in 
these areas will work to mitigate misuse or unintended consequences of 
these technologies.  
Augmentations and enhancements have the potential to impart significant 
advantages to the individual, we can anticipate costs to national security if DOD fails 
to pursue these advantages for the warfighter. Enhancements will be intended to 
produce a competitive edge to an individual’s physical and/or cognitive performance. 
Partly by design and partly as consequence, the use of enhancements will have 
an impact on individuals and groups other than the enhanced service member. A 
thorough approach to anticipating, considering, and mitigating ELSI concerns must 
involve deliberate assessment of impact on other stakeholders, to include bystanders, 
nonmilitary users, organizations, noncombatants, and other nations. Myriad specific 
themes or ethical parameters must also be examined systematically, to include 
unanticipated military uses, changing ethical standards, philosophical and religious 
beliefs, and opportunity costs.30 DOD and its partners must commit to advancing 
ethical precepts and guidelines that account for different stakeholders and ethical 
parameters, with obligation to care for those in service and who have served at the 
forefront.31
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“The contingency we have not considered seriously looks strange; what 
looks strange is thought improbable; what is improbable need not be 
considered seriously.”
—Thomas Schelling,  
in the forward to Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision1
Introduction
As laid out in both the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Security Strategy, 
the global food system is a complex, active area of operations for great-power 
competition and conflict, influence, and control. The global food system comprises 
an unconventional, poorly understood risk surface subject to both intentional and 
unintentional disruptions. Special operations forces (SOF) are regularly called into 
action where control of provisioning and information about provisioning are linked to 
power and freedom to operate. The SOF core activities relevant to this chapter include 
direct action, special reconnaissance, countering weapons of mass destruction, 
counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, and foreign humanitarian assistance.2
Food Systems in War and Peace
Military control of supply lines and food distribution to civilian populations has always 
had tactical, operational, and strategic significance in wartime. The power that resides 
in the control of “food systems” has been wielded by every human civilization in 
both peace and wartime. Historical evidence underlines the Roman Republic—the 
longest-lasting democratic government to date (509–27 BCE)—understood this power 
explicitly; cura annonae, or “care for the grain supply,” was revered as the goddess 
Annona.3 Outbreaks of civil violence as a result of food shortages in Rome are 
reported to have occurred 19 times, once compelling the emperor to flee for his life 
and, on another occasion, forcing the return of Caesar from Egypt.4 Rome understood 
military control of shipping lanes was essential for both the application of the 
domestic rule of law and the Roman ability to mount expeditionary forces.5
Over the last millennia, when food distribution systems for expeditionary forces 
or civilians were interrupted or otherwise failed, history-shaping consequences often 
followed.6 Domestic food riots generally dismissed in geopolitics may nonetheless 
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have regime-shifting consequences.7 For example, in 2011, the civil unrest known 
as the Arab Spring was sparked by rising global commodity prices and local drought, 
resulting in food riots that led to major shifts of military power in several countries of 
the Middle East.8 Spurred by droughts and fires in the Ukrainian breadbasket, Russia 
exploited the civil instability in the Middle East to establish a renewed sphere of 
influence in the region with long-term, global geopolitical ramifications for warfare and 
global terrorism.
The need to control agriculturally productive lands directly or indirectly has 
determined the boundaries of nearly every nation. Some nations—Argentina, for 
instance9—recognize certain agriculturally significant regions as latent strategic 
national security assets, restricting ownership to citizens. In contrast, the United 
States has no policy basis to monitor the ownership of agricultural or food system 
assets or to systematically monitor essential agricultural goods and services or 
contingencies relevant to national security. Agricultural assets include both direct 
and indirect requirements such as soil and water resources, seed and seed banks, 
fertilizer, and agricultural implements. 
In the Embargo Act of 1807, Thomas Jefferson threatened curtailment of US 
agricultural exports to force Britain and France to change their maritime policies 
toward the United States. During World War II, the US ability to ramp up agricultural 
production and support its allies strategically, while also continuing to feed its own 
population, was critical to victory.10 After the war, the United States built a global 
agricultural hegemony that remained stable for decades and reduced US trade deficits 
and led to enormous economic, political, diplomatic and humanitarian benefits. It 
also resulted in soft-power influence, with unparalleled agricultural abundance, as 
seen in the green revolution, fueling steep population increases around the world. 
The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 authorized the 
secretary of agriculture to accept up to $700 million in foreign currency for repayment 
for commodities shipped to friendly nations.11 In the 1960s, the John F. Kennedy 
administration used its Food for Peace program to counter communism in Asia while 
opening export markets to American farmers.
While the idea of food influence has been crucial in building US alliances, 
especially in Asia and Latin America, the United States does not aggressively protect 
strategic use of agricultural exports for foreign policy or security agendas today. 
Most Americans are unaware that during the past several decades, foreign states or 
private companies have acquired US agricultural resources and companies. This is 
occurring as US farmers are in their worst economic position since the early 1980s 
as a result of sustained low commodity prices, extreme weather, and a prolonged 
trade war followed by a global pandemic. Farm exits in some states were at all-time 
highs in 2019. Financial stress and credit policies are resulting in fewer, further 
consolidated, and larger operations. In 2019, a polar vortex caused widespread 
heavy rains, early freezes, delayed harvest, spoiled crops, propane shortages as 
a result of grain drying, stalled shipping, and full bins. US farmers have suicide 
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rates five times the US average (2017), although statistics are likely skewed to 
underestimate the actual rates.12 Some US counties are depleting their aquifers—
strategic groundwater reserves—as a result of poor water-management practices and 
agricultural and trade policies that encourage the export of US fossil water in the 
form of agricultural commodities.13 
Moreover, China, Saudi Arabia, and other foreign interests are purchasing US 
agricultural lands and water rights, often in the absence of legally required notice or 
complete record keeping, despite the 1978 Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure 
Act. In 2017, ChemChina acquired Syngenta—one of the three primary US seed and 
chemical input suppliers—the largest Chinese acquisition of a US-owned company 
to that date, while German multinational Bayer purchased Monsanto. Sufficient 
seed supplies take years of planning, and these genetic resources are unique and 
invaluable. If, for any reason, these companies either refused or were unable to serve 
US markets, there would not be enough seed to plant, with no effective recourse or 
alternative in place. In short, previous assumptions about the resilience, stability, 
and productivity of the US food system may not hold, especially under duress, such 
as biological, artificial intelligence (AI), or other attack. Indirect stressors such as 
pandemics, market shocks, long-term power-grid failure, or failure of Global Positioning 
Systems could result in major disruption of the US food system. 
Historically, when great powers have mounted an attack, they have anticipated the 
dynamics of provisioning both their military and civilian populations through either 
acquired influence (e.g., legal ownership, default technological dominion) or physical 
control of supply sources and supply lines. For example, in World War II, motivated in 
part by a vision of agricultural empire, Nazi Germany mounted the blitz through Poland, 
Norway, Belgium, Holland, and France and attacked the Soviet Union in Operation 
Barbarossa to meet the Axis need for food and resources.14 As control of energy 
sources is often a cause of conflict, food as human energy is likewise a necessity 
of war.15 For the modern-day United States, fragility in supply chains, masked by 
peacetime, presents a serious challenge. 
Throughout most of human history, widespread precedent exists for the 
weaponization of food systems against a belligerent or civilian population as a 
means of control or influence. Article 17 of the 1863 US Lieber Code states: “It 
is lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to 
the speedier subjection of the enemy.”16 Control of food systems has always been 
key to winning wars. Extraordinary institutional innovations such as the Combined 
Production and Resource Boards, created by the Allies across national boundaries 
during World War II, were fundamental to victory and saved tens of millions of 
lives.17 These institutions have been entirely dismantled in the years since, with the 
last vestiges of control removed by the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and 
Reform Act (P.L. 104-127). 
Outside US borders, SOF view control of foodstuffs, energy, and other critical 
provisions as tactical in kinetic war, considered systematically in military planning, 
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but are not generally in a position to think about food resources strategically. The 
weaponization of food to subjugate or starve civilian populations is prohibited by 
the Geneva Convention Article 54(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I and Article 
14 of the 1977 Additional Protocol II.18 Unfortunately, this specific prohibition does 
not clearly limit the weaponization of food or food systems in offensive military 
contexts, it also does not address gray-zone attacks in the homeland clearly. US 
actions in this area, therefore, may serve to define and uphold ethical principles of 
engagement in food systems. 
Food Systems as an Area of Operations: Why Think in Systems?
We define “food systems” as the highly complex, complicated, and dynamic critical 
infrastructures that provide every human being with food every day.19 SOF must 
consider unconventional attack surfaces in the homeland, and the potential for both 
offensive and defensive action in the battlespace defined by contemporary US and 
global food systems. Attacks on systems, per se, have been used to perpetrate 
and propagate damage through causal chains of relationship since at least the Gulf 
War.20 Recent research has demonstrated the interconnectedness and fragility of 
the logistical networks supporting US food systems.21 The locations of key railway 
and roadway networks, cargo shipping routes, reservoirs, water-treatment facilities, 
fertilizer plants, meatpacking/food-processing facilities, seed companies, and 
ports are public knowledge and, thus, highly vulnerable to targeting by adversaries. 
US government policy concerning food supply stems largely from the fact that the 
United States has not experienced warfare in the continental homeland for a century 
and a half, during which period, the nation has experienced agricultural abundance 
unparalleled in human history. Beyond stockpiling Meals, Ready-to-Eat (MREs) for 
sudden expeditionary requirements—such as attacks or disasters in the homeland—
US food-system vulnerabilities have not been a strategic focus of the military since 
the end of World War II. It was reasonable to assume mid-twentieth-century US and 
global food systems were extremely stable and could not be easily weaponized. 
However, this stability is being challenged by the current context. 
Since the 1980s, massive shifts in the structure of US food systems have 
occurred, notably consolidation, duopolization, deregulated algorithmic commodities 
trading, exponential increases in energy intensity, the advent of embedded “smart” 
systems and just-in-time delivery. All of these have opened up new attack surfaces 
in the homeland and ill-understood possibilities for both offense and defense. 
Recent exercises have focused on cyberattack, military attack, and pandemics, but 
the implications of these events on national and global food systems have not been 
explored. President George W. Bush issued a Department of Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive to classify the US agricultural system as “critical infrastructure,” 
followed by revised directives in 2003 and 2013. These policies, in general, have 
focused narrowly on intentional contamination of the US food system for economic 
or political terrorism. They fail to address vulnerabilities affected by the trends of 
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consolidation, resource depletion, increases in foreign control, and farm insolvency 
that have occurred since enactment of these policies.22 
The SOF’s lenses must be widened to account for unconventional and potentially 
convergent attack vectors and events. Biological, cyber, and physical threats or mis/
disinformation campaigns could be imposed as unconventional attacks, potentially 
coincident with collateral disruptions to food systems. For example, an unconventional 
attack launched during the acute global shortage of refrigerated shipping containers, 
which resulted when the 30,000 units that China ordinarily unloaded per day was 
abruptly stopped because of the COVID-19 epidemic, could have been especially 
crippling. Cyberattacks on the food supply chain could incapacitate machinery and/
or computer systems involved with agricultural production, harvest, transport, food 
manufacturing, inventory control, or market information. Ransomware attacks have 
increased dramatically in the last few years. The high degree of centralization 
in the US food systems, coupled with low profit margins and complacency, adds 
up to potentially consequential interruption from a relatively straightforward act 
of aggression. Cognitive attacks could result from deepfake proof that food is 
contaminated. Spoofed or scrambled market or supply information may present 
particulary difficult challenges because misinformation is formally impossible to 
disprove. An attack could spur antisocial behavior, such as the 2019 “ice cream 
licking” incidents or deliberate coughing on produce.
Food systems represent an active area of operations for great-power competition 
and conflict, which Department of Defense (DOD) or US government policies and 
military planning do not recognize. Current US military doctrine does not account for 
food systems in the joint planning process, and arguably hand waves this system as 
not a military concern (JP 1-0, JP 5-0).23 A chasm exists between the traditional US 
concept of “food defense.” Food defense explicitly excludes warfare, but contemporary 
subkinetic warfare exploits any vulnerable or important attack surface. This gap in 
US policy opens potential threat space and opportunities for both competitors and 
enemies to take actions with long-term and immediate impacts. China has clearly 
understood that control of many types of assets in the global and US food system is 
critical for its future stability and security. As for other threats, the default approach 
in the United States since the 1990s has been to “harden,” by stockpiling foodstuffs 
and raw materials in the event of an attack or emergency.
There is a comforting but false assumption that the commercial sector has 
unlimited resilience. This view obscures the range of both vulnerabilities and 
innovative opportunities in the contemporary global and US food systems specifically 
pertinent to the DOD as both warfighters and peacekeepers. While US defense 
planners have focused on stockpiles of military foodstuffs (e.g., MRE caches), the 
US military has not paid enough attention to the complex network structures and 
properties (e.g., ownership, physical infrastructure, trade policies, institutions, 
resilience, stability) that govern the US and global food systems. These structures 
and properties affect US national security and/or define unconventional attack 
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surfaces.24 The DOD excels at intelligence, information, and planning. Still, because 
military planners do not focus on these elements, the defense intelligence enterprise 
is not tasked with collecting and analyzing relevant information. Protection of US 
food systems, or aspects of the global food system of particular relevance to US 
vulnerabilities, may fall to the SOF OCONUS and the National Guard in CONUS. For 
this chapter, we further parse out this battlespace and discuss potential implications 
of our current shortfalls in policy and strategy for both SOF and the DOD as a whole.
Strategic Latency in US Military-Force Food Logistics and Supply
The evolution of contemporary military food logistics and supply processes has 
been broadly guided by the post–World War II Hoover Commission, which led to the 
creation of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The subsistence directorate of the 
defense logistics within the DLA oversees the food sourcing for the armed forces.25 
The Defense Supply Center Philadelphia (DSCP) requires each regulated food-chain 
member to implement a food defense plan in compliance with the DSCP Food Defense 
Checklist.26 The Buy American Act and the Berry Amendment require provisions must 
be purchased from US companies whenever possible, although this requirement was 
waived for Middle Eastern operations.27 Perishable items are generally sourced where 
they are consumed.28 Food supply in conflict zones comes from a variety of sources, 
often only lightly secured (if secured at all). The DLA systems require a high inventory 
load but may still struggle to fulfill forecasted food requirements.29 Alternatively, food 
for forward units is often sourced from DLA-maintained agreements with local and 
regional networks and acquired ad hoc from local markets.30 Sourcing may also take 
advantage of the food systems of the host nation’s military.31 Official USDA Food 
Defense suggests hardening food facilities.32 The Army has a framework, used by the 
other branches, that requires a food defense assessment team (FDAT) at each service 
location.33 Improvements have focused on increasing the effectiveness of the DLA 
system of requisitioning food supplies to conflict zones and improving troop nutrition.34 
Various reports analyze the effectiveness of and potential improvements to the 
military food systems. A 2009 National Defense University report, “Defending the 
Military Food Supply Acquisition, Preparation, and Protection of Food at US Military 
Installations,” details food safety and security in DLA processes and military 
policies.35 Consideration of “attack” on the military food system is restricted to 
material attacks on the food itself by way of contamination, poisoning, or intentional 
introduction of a food-borne pathogen; threats are classified as biological, chemical, 
or radioactive. The report concludes it would be “extremely difficult to specifically 
target food destined for the military this early in the supply chain.” It is possible, 
however, that a determined adversary could exploit other types of strikes or 
vulnerabilities, for instance, interfering with cyber systems and energy supplies, using 
even disinformation and influence campaigns, and attacking the soft targets on bases 
where local food service staff come and go daily. 
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What Is “Food Security,” and Why Is It Important?
The term “food security” originated at the 1974 World Food Conference, reflecting 
the prevailing idea that hunger resulted from a physical shortage of foodstuffs. Today, 
food security is a formal economic statistic derived from nationally reported statistics 
on agricultural production, exports, and imports and the number of impoverished 
people, who are subject to political and other contrivances. The concept has come 
into wide use since the 1970s. “Food security” or “food insecurity” are most tightly 
tied to poverty across the development spectrum and, therefore, are not terms that 
specifically apply to national security or the SOF. An exception is in the extreme case 
when the US military is summoned for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In 
such environments, insurgencies regularly divert and exploit control of foodstuffs and 
funds from aid efforts.36
Increased obesity and diabetes among active-duty military and civilian populations 
are symptoms of an out-of-whack US food system. An unfit military has come to be 
a greater threat to US national security than undernutrition. Still, food insecurity 
experienced by some military families on base has been noted as a specific concern 
for readiness. In a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention study of the impact of 
diet-related health on the military, 71 percent of service-eligible young people were 
deemed unfit to serve, partly because overweight and obesity rose 73 percent between 
2011 and 2015 among active-duty personnel; obese active-duty soldiers were 33 
percent more likely to experience musculoskeletal injury. The study further noted the 
DOD spends about $1.5 billion annually on obesity-related healthcare costs.37 
Control and Influence in Global Food Systems and Great-Power Competition
Despite popular usage, the term food security does not describe a military food 
system secured to function during the types of large-scale, compound assaults 
virtually certain to occur in the near future. The term also does not describe a food 
system upon which a civilian population or the economy depends that is resilient 
or protected from assault. Shifts in both structure and function of the highly 
consolidated, highly efficient systems by which food is produced, manufactured, 
traded, distributed, and consumed have opened potential massive attack surfaces.38 
Considerable potential exists for malevolent actors to weaponize contemporary “food 
systems” as an unconventional attack surface, with plausible catastrophic impact.39 
Nodes, or points of control in food systems where direction could be imposed, 
particularly with reference to ability to or preparedness for war, are not defined. 
No government, private, or other entity is responsible for identifying, monitoring, or 
understanding such control points. Current threat taxonomy is incomplete, leading to 
difficulties in detecting and understanding problems as they emerge. Furthermore, 
interlinked critical infrastructures in the homeland and globally, upon which the 
US force depends, are highly vulnerable. Almost every American living room and 
communication device has opened up a channel through which weaponized mis/
disinformation can be delivered. Any aspect of these complex, interlinked networks 
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is vulnerable to cyber or other attacks, whether as an act of aggression in a great-
power kinetic or subkinetic war or an act either to harm US economic, political, civilian 
systems or to influence warfare.40 
One example of a nonkinetic act of aggression could be targeting US water security 
through large-scale saltwater contamination. Ongoing pumping of water into the 
ground in certain US regions prevents widespread contamination of agricultural soils. 
Brackish water can result from either disrupting this pumping or increasing the rate 
of withdrawal, potentially destroying the productivity of that region permanently. For 
special operators outside the United States, MREs may be the answer to short-term 
food supply requirements. But for SOF, it is critical to ensure stable, secure supply 
lines that recognize the gaps in transfer and the softness of expeditionary bases 
with regard to food preparation on base. New technologies for “pop up” water, food, 
and energy sources that can be mainstreamed quickly will improve the stability and 
security of US forces. 
Through its global reach, China is addressing a number of obvious domestic 
imperatives such as stable long-term food sufficiency, the export of labor and 
finance, access to critical resources (such as mining), and military and foreign 
policy objectives. For decades, globalization has driven the development of highly 
efficient and complex supply networks. The number of companies involved directly 
with food systems has notably decreased, while their size and relationships in 
massive conglomerates have increased.41 Meanwhile, through acquisitions, direct 
and proxy purchases, financing arrangements and labor export, Chinese and Russian 
agricultural capacity is increasing.42 Recent Chinese acquisitions include Smithfield 
Foods, the world’s largest pork producer, and Syngenta, mentioned previously, both 
by state-owned conglomerates.43 Collateral effects of globalized consolidation and 
monopolization are increasing global genetic uniformity of crops and livestock and 
often poorly secured digitized operations.44 While China is reportedly outpacing the 
United States in the development of a number of convergent technologies,i the two 
superpowers are deeply intertwined and interdependent and share exposure to 
various existential risks.
Conclusions
In summary, as the United States updates its war plans in light of the NDS—taking 
into consideration the implications of unconventional, complex threats at scale in 
any operating environment—SOF must prepare for new offensive and defensive 
postures in both civilian and military food systems. SOF should consider the control 
and management of food systems in any preparation for operations and war plans. 
In a world where anything can be weaponized almost instantly, including information 
about an essential commodity in the homeland or abroad, almost anything, 
i   AI, genome editing, biometric fintech, the Internet of Things, chips, qubits, rockets, nuclear reactors, surveillance, mass 
detention, and fake islands, to name a few.
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including international stature or influence, can be put into play. The perception 
of agricultural abundance, engineered by President Abraham Lincoln by the suite 
of visionary legislation he developed during the US Civil War, has lulled US policy 
into ideosyncratic, narrow channels of concern. The terms “food defense” or “food 
security” focus too narrowly on local agricultural production and miss global dynamics 
that could be leveraged with great impact on or for the DOD. 
In 2017, DLA organized a summit to create a partnership for all of their supply-
chain stakeholders. Shawn Jones summarized what Army Lt. Col. Abel Young, 
director of DLA Troop Support’s Subsistence supply chain, said during the summit, 
“the partnership has been effective, but like most complex systems, there is room 
for improvement. . . . The supply chain is a combination of multiple supply chains 
with several independent agencies and mutually exclusive contracts which results 
in ‘a breeding ground for stakeholders with potentially different expectations and 
objectives.’” He stated a need to better integrate internal and external stakeholders 
into a streamlined process with a continuous flow of data.45 These data could also be 
purposed for use by AI to build simulation capabilities and identify key control nodes, 
decision menus, warnings, and threshold protocols, as well as standing capability to 
screen in real time for essentially any type of threat or its signature. 
AI-driven representation of food networks will only be as good as the data used 
to train the capabilities, making it important to deliberate on new data gathering and 
curation missions. A DOD-wide standing capability that can identify geospatially events 
of concern related to global food systems, specifically relevant to DOD’s missions 
and roles, could usefully reside at the US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
and in the Joint Staff. SOF thinking must consider outliers and black swan events in 
the realm of food-security disruptions to maintain competitive military advantage and 
possess the moral high ground for national security. It is necessary to strengthen 
decision-making agility in this fast-paced, disruptive, and complex technological 
landscape of competing values and political and national security priorities. SOF’s 
new applied ethics initiative across its operational spectrum will shore up the 
shortcomings of DOD and US government policies and help mitigate risks.46 The 
SOF should ensure every mission considers both vulnerabilities and potential 
consequences of shifts in the function of military and civilian food systems in the 
homeland, in theaters, or on missions as a facet of complex provisioning systems 
whereby power is created, maintained, and exercised.
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As the Helix Turns: How New Biology, Biometrics,  
and DNA Analysis May Forever Prevent Anonymity 
Brian Souza and Brad Hart
Advances in biology are driving innovation and discovery in new directions. These 
advances hold great promise for finding unknown causes of disease and human 
health. However, they also carry unprecedented risks for the protection of personal 
identity and privacy. Compounded with these advances are concomitant leaps in 
technology across multiple domains, such as artificial intelligence (AI), advanced 
chemical analysis, and biometrics, resulting in a revolution in human identification 
and tracking. Can the same algorithms that identify complex networks of genes 
responsible for cancer progression be used to identify people based on their individual 
biology? Can the methods that track disease be used for multiperson tracking 
against complex backgrounds found in large crowds? Can the secrets of the genome 
be unlocked through proteomic analysis? The short answer to these questions is 
“yes,” and when we assess these questions in the framework of the current, real-
time pace of discovery from advanced analytics of big data, we can imagine the next 
“breakthroughs” that challenge the very idea of who we are. 
The amount of data available to scientists is vast and growing; discovering and 
sorting information that accrues at speeds never before imagined requires deep-
learning methods. Our ability to predict biological outcomes without having to perform 
experiments on the bench is changing hypothesis-driven science because new thinking 
generates testable hypotheses that drive the real-time collection of data as it cycles 
back into a real-time model. Methods that identify inheritable genetic mutations, 
genetic damage, or dysregulation (faults in certain cell functions) can be used to 
identify people by examining small differences in their proteins with a power of 
discrimination far greater than what has been observed traditionally for complex DNA 
forensic analysis. These changes represent the beginning of a new era of biology: an 
era of both great promise and risk. 
Commercial at Home Genetic Testing and the Serial Killer in the Family Tree
The advent and surging popularity of direct-to-consumer genetic-testing services 
such as 23andMe and Ancestry.com have had significant consequences for law 
enforcement—effectively increasing the pool of available DNA profiles with which 
to compare forensic evidence.1 For example, to apprehend the Golden State Killer, 
Joseph James DeAngelo—who attacked victims in California from 1974 to 1986 
and was responsible for at least 12 murders and over 50 rapes—investigators used 
an ingenious technique that linked DNA from crime scenes to genetic data from 
DeAngelo’s relatives to identify him as a prime suspect. DNA from the crime scene 
had sat in evidence storage for decades. Its genetic “fingerprint” was absent when 
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searched against existing criminal DNA databases and, therefore, useless because 
it had yet to be linked to anyone. If DNA from the crime scene is not in an existing 
database, then it is essentially orphaned. Frustration with these types of cases is 
nothing new and has been an issue since the advent of DNA forensics.2
What modern forensics lacked, industry developed with home genetic testing and 
the study of family genealogy. In the case of the Golden State Killer, police used a 
free service, GEDmatch, to compare the DNA from the crime scene to a database of 
volunteered genomes in the hopes of finding a match.3 The suspect’s DNA was not in 
the database; however, a relative’s was, and the pool of suspects was reduced to a 
single family tree. Subsequent law enforcement investigation identified DeAngelo, a 
former police officer, as a prime suspect. As investigators continued their surveillance, 
discarded samples containing his DNA were obtained without DeAngelo’s knowledge 
and were a match for DNA recovered from crime scenes decades earlier, resulting in 
arrest and conviction. “Cold-case” task forces continue to find previously unknown 
trends or patterns for unsolved crimes originally thought to be unrelated but that were, 
in fact, the work of a single individual. 
While this case highlights the benefits of “crowdsourced” genetic information 
for identifying criminals, it also presents a dilemma for those who wish to maintain 
some degree of privacy regarding their genetic makeup. Recently, the Department of 
Defense (DOD) urged all military personnel to avoid direct-to-consumer DNA testing.4 
This guidance was made in part to ensure that potentially erroneous results from one 
of the many rapidly growing testing companies would not hamper future opportunities 
for members of the military. For example, false positives for any number of genetic 
diseases could disqualify soldiers from a variety of career tracks, especially those 
requiring particular physical traits. This concern is tied to the fact that members of the 
military, in contrast to the public, are not protected from discrimination by the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA). However, there is an additional underlying, 
but less specific, set of risks articulated in the memo.5
These risks are associated with contributing one’s genetic information to the 
ever-growing pool of data being generated as millions of individuals seek information 
about potential health predispositions and ancestral lineage. The DOD memo warns 
of potential exposure of personal and genetic information that could have “unintended 
security consequences.” While no specific threat or vulnerability is disclosed in the 
memo, the risk of having the genetic information of personnel with sensitive national 
security roles—be they members of the law enforcement, military, or intelligence 
communities—available openly presents several problematic scenarios. While a 
detailed examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this chapter, one can 
imagine how rapid DNA analysis combined with large data sets and AI-enabled 
analysis tools could provide an advantage to an adversary attempting to track, locate, 
or confirm the identity of either an individual or even members of their family. As 
analysis methods advance and more is discovered regarding the predictive capacity 
of genetic information, it will be increasingly possible to isolate and target specific 
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health-related susceptibilities or even the physical appearance of individuals. The 
implications of these trends for national security are only now coming to light. 
Finding Genetic Differences and Finding People 
While DNA is the gold standard for human identification, DNA profiles have real-world 
limitations. The integrity of DNA is limited because it can degrade quickly under 
normal environmental conditions. This can mean that, instead of full DNA profiles, 
typically comprising 18 or more standard markers, limited profiles that are missing 
some number of markers only provide partial information. Given the relatively small 
number of markers in a full profile, missing markers impact the overall power of 
discrimination that can be achieved, reducing the utility of such data significantly. 
Additionally, samples that contain mixtures of DNA from multiple individuals quickly 
become intractable as the number of contributors rises and the overall picture 
becomes less clear. 
These issues combine to limit the utility of samples collected from crime scenes, 
for example, or from items or locations of interest to investigators. However, direct 
analysis of DNA is not the only way to reveal detailed genetic information. Other 
biological methodologies for uncovering identifying details of the genetic code have 
been developed recently. These methods seek to circumvent some of the critical 
limitations of DNA analysis, allowing for the identification and tracking of individuals 
based on their genetic code, even in cases where time and/or environmental 
conditions would have degraded the DNA itself or where multiple individuals contribute 
to a sample such that a traditional DNA analysis would be confounded. 
The most prominent of these approaches involves the application of an area 
of biological analysis called “proteomics.” The rapid advance of instrumentation 
available for chemical and biological analysis of complex samples has enabled a level 
of detail to be extracted from even the most complex samples.6 The combination 
of high-resolution mass spectrometry and advanced data-analysis tools allows for 
even single amino-acid mutations to be identified in a complex sea of proteins from 
a given sample. This has been a key development given that the mechanisms of 
biology dictate the primary structure of proteins, the actual sequence and identity of 
each amino acid, is determined directly by the genetic code. Therefore, a sequence-
level analysis of protein structure becomes simply another way to understand the 
genetic sequence of an individual. The protein becomes a high-fidelity echo of the 
DNA. Importantly, this new source of genetic information is not often subject to the 
same limitations as DNA. Protein degradation over time or under harsh environmental 
conditions is much slower than that for DNA because of the nature of differences 
in their chemical structures, especially for samples such as hair or shed skin cells. 
Additionally, the nature of the analysis means that, in some cases, a single individual 
can be identified from a sample containing many contributors. Thus, harsh conditions 
such as those found on the battlefield or in a crash site would not destroy vital 
evidence of individual identity. 
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Exploiting Predisposition to Disease or Stress Response  
to Better Assess an Opponent
Research efforts are underway to identify the underlying genetic drivers for a host of 
physical and mental diseases. Some studies have found biological markers that map 
to stress pathways during auditory processing of language.7 These data suggest that 
words, and the way they are delivered, can result in epigenetic and immune responses 
in the person receiving a verbal message. In other words, “sticks and stones may 
break your bones, but words may also cause lasting physical damage.” The field of 
human social genomics—as described by work from Steven Cole at the University 
of California, Los Angelesi8—has opened the door to biological-marker analysis for 
stress response and stress repair in individuals affected by trauma as well as for the 
identification of factors that may predispose a person to poorer (or more favorable) 
clinical postevent outcomes. Data that help medical professionals determine risk 
factors, including those related to stress-related traumatic injury, could be used to 
vector personnel away from duty that is associated with severe stress from combat. 
Knowledge of how an adversary uses this information to select individuals either 
resistant to such stress or that recover rapidly may inform readiness and capability 
for that opponent. With enough data, it is conceivable that a bigger picture of an 
adversary fighting force could be formed, highlighting its physical and mental strengths 
and weaknesses. 
Similarly, methods that analyze human DNA for biomarkers related to both 
susceptibility to and repair from stress could be informative during recruitment 
and selection of individuals for high-stress roles such as special operations 
forces. However, the data sets required to make accurate assessments are likely 
to be enormous. Additionally, advance study of the accuracy of these performance 
biomarkers requires testing over a period of time for a group of individuals undergoing 
a selection process to compare both among the group and to a baseline study. 
The Death of Anonymity and Its Impact on the Special Operations  
and Intelligence Communities
Technology convergence across multiple domains has made traditional methods of 
obfuscating identity obsolete. Obtaining significant levels of anonymity has become 
an almost impossible task, and it is going to get even harder. When it comes to 
leveraging technology to maximize authoritarian control, China leads the way. As 
of 2019, China reportedly had over 350 million surveillance cameras. By 2021, 
that number is expected to be close to 600 million.9 Coincident with the rise in the 
number of cameras is the adoption of AI and related technologies, including facial 
recognition, on a massive scale. Moreover, China is not limiting its growing network 
of surveillance to within its borders. For example, in Kampala, the capital of Uganda, 
i   Scientific literature is growing in human social genomics, and analysis of life experiences that influence gene expression have 
identified changes that occur in response to adversity. Increase in the expression of proinflammatory genes combined with 
decreased antiviral responses drive a conserved transcriptional response to adversity (CTRA). (See Cole.)
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Chinese companies have installed thousands of cameras equipped with facial-
recognition technology, established manned monitoring centers, and provided training 
and assistance to the Ugandan government ostensibly to help fight crime.10 The 
proliferation of such capabilities will support authoritarian governments and make 
anonymity in such countries extremely difficult. These trends would be amplified if 
such tracking systems are cross-referenced with genetic databases.
The rapid emergence of applications for AI has been observed across a wide range 
of public and private domains, including autonomous vehicles, personal electronic 
assistants, healthcare diagnostics, smart search algorithms, and targeted marketing. 
The integration of ubiquitous sensing elements—such as positional, movement, audio, 
video, and health sensors—within AI-driven electronics and other products allows 
for the concomitant generation and analysis of massive amounts of information. 
Often these processes are completely opaque to the user. Persistent, ubiquitous 
connectivity of nearly every kind of consumer electronic device means that integrating 
and exploiting this data across enormous population sets is a real and active area 
of exploration for both beneficial and, presumably, nefarious purposes. Societal 
acceptance of the inherent invasiveness of these technologies speaks to a couple of 
issues. The first of these is a basic lack of understanding of such systems and just 
how much of an individual’s life and information is captured and shared by the tools 
themselves. The second is the perception that the benefits of these tools far outweigh 
the potential risks. In the latter case, the risk potential is not applied uniformly across 
the population. For special operations forces (SOF), the Internet of Things is a double-
edged sword that can reveal key insights about an adversary but also broadcast 
valuable data about our own strengths and weaknesses. 
Implications of the Convergence of Advanced Biology and Technology
The effects of the loss of anonymity on society in general notwithstanding, the 
implications for national security professionals and warfighters are dramatic. Simply 
put, it is a challenging time to be a spy. Techniques, tools, and procedures (TTP) that 
have been the mainstay of intelligence and law enforcement tradecraft over the years 
should be expected to lose effectiveness as counterintelligence activities become less 
focused on physical surveillance and more on data fusion, enabled by AI and other 
data-science-based approaches. Identity is now tied less to superficial appearance 
and more to behaviors and physical characteristics that are increasingly difficult to 
mask. When combined with advanced genetic and proteomic analysis methods and a 
deeper understanding of the underlying genetic drivers for key physical, physiological, 
and mental predispositions, significant opportunities exist to develop “personalized” 
approaches to tracking and potentially affecting individuals. Critically, we are entering 
a phase where previously unrelated technologies and sensing modalities can more 
easily be integrated autonomously to create rapidly a new type of identity profile that 
will be nearly impossible to confound.
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Like most instances where technology and security intersect, both pros and cons 
exist regarding the convergence of these technologies. They enable unprecedented 
ability to reconstruct events and allow perpetrators of egregious attacks to be tracked 
and apprehended. As SOF and the intelligence community navigate this brave new 
world, it will be essential to stay on the cutting edge of these techologies both to reap 
their benefits and counter their use against us.
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Additive Adversaries: Enabling and Supporting the Warfighter 
with Additive Manufacturing
Lawrence E. Bronisz and Dominic S. Peterson
Introduction
During the Apollo 13 mission, an oxygen tank in the service module exploded two 
days into the lunar journey.1 This loss of oxygen made the command module cold 
and dark, forcing the crew to take refuge in the lunar excursion module (LEM) as a 
“lifeboat.” Because three crewmembers were in the LEM, instead of two, the carbon-
dioxide scrubbers depleted rapidly. Luckily, the crew had a team in mission control 
working on the problem and devising a solution to fit the scrubbers from the command 
module into the LEM machinery (literally fitting a square peg into a round hole). This 
example demonstrates how a team supporting personnel in the field (or in space) can 
help solve truly intractable problems, including when supplying a solution directly to a 
remote operation is impossible.
Similarly, the warfighter is supported by an increasingly large team of people 
who are not in the field. This assistance allows soldiers to focus on the mission at 
hand and use their support team to work on solutions to problems that might arise. 
Additive manufacturing (AM) will play an important part in supporting the warfighter of 
the future. To begin with, deployed AM resources will bring the supply chain to forward 
operating bases and possibly into the field. The ability to make replacement parts in 
the field will reduce (but not eliminate) the need to bring large stores of spare parts 
with the troops. In addition to regularly used parts, a three-dimensional (3D) printeri 
(or collection of machines) will be able to fabricate the needed spares or unique 
solutions on demand. This development will disrupt the current thinking about both 
how to qualify a part for use on an expensive asset and the protocols for inspection 
and quality assurance required in the field (as opposed to what is required for a major 
military procurement).
Such a scenario is not entirely futuristic; it bears similarity to the highly skilled 
medieval blacksmiths and armor bearers, who were critical components of medieval 
military operations, providing customizations, ergonomic fit, and research and 
development for the warriors they served. In the medieval period blacksmithing (and 
metallurgy) was esteemed and known as metallaria, one of the seven mechanical 
arts.2 Blacksmith shops were the “makerspace”ii of society until the Industrial 
Revolution made them almost obsolete.3
i   3D printing, also called additive manufacturing, is a family of processes that produces objects by adding material in layers that 
 correspond to successive cross sections of a 3D model.
ii   A makerspace is a collaborative workspace inside a school, library, or separate public and/or private facility for making, learning,  
 exploring, and sharing where participants use high-tech to no-tech tools.
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The advent of ubiquitous AM has popularized makerspaces. The digital river of 
high-bandwidth internet has spread AM and clever design practices to the entire 
world extremely quickly.Capability constraints of our adversaries (both nation-states 
and subnational groups) are eroding, putting these groups on a more even technical 
footing with the United States.4 Ubiquity of technology availability has leveled the 
playing field significantly. Geek Youtube channels and a worldwide generation of 
maker kids is a substantial development.We can expect our adversaries to use 
modern technologies to offset our superiority, and we must be prepared to presage 
and counteract them. Using new tools in a distributed network of substantially 
independent makerspaces is a way both to project force and to counter adversarial 
agility. AM is substantially changing the “invention factory versus invention factory” 
arena of modern warfare.
The authors propose that competitive invention factories be promulgated 
throughout the Department of Defense (DOD) to sharpen leadership and creative 
skills and to exploit new technologies effectively. Pitting military or contractor red/blue 
teamsiii against each other at a professional level (above college robot competitions) 
will drive both offensive and defensive advancement. Often innovation is “merely” 
a combination of existing methods or technologies. For example, high-speed arrows 
were a highly disruptive technology and were quickly enhanced by adding fire 
and poison.5 Combining groups of competitors will bring awareness of disparate 
combinable technologies from different personal experiences and knowledge. 
Promoting a competitive invention-factory culture will yield new offensive weapons and 
the defensive means to counter attacks from our adversary’s invention factories. As 
the AM field has evolved, so has the terminology used to describe the technology; 
“rapid prototyping” has been superceded by term additive manufacturing. However, 
rapid prototyping is perhaps the most important term with respect to the speed of 
competitive technology development.
Applying AM successfully to change the status quo will require a substantial 
overhaul of and transition in the design-and-development approach for modern military 
equipment. Starting with the worldwide RepRapiv hobby AM community, makers used 
AM to produce a substantial portion of the components comprising AM machines 
(i.e., machines printing more machines). In the commercial sector, Hewlett Packard’s 
(HP’s) Multi Jet Fusion (MJF) ink-jet-based AM machines have been designed with the 
goal of applying AM intelligently to machine components, resulting in a commercial AM 
machine with a 50 percent AM part content. The change in the design process was 
made possible by reducing part count by printing complex “combined-part geometries,” 
thereby replacing a several-part assembly with fewer, more complex AM parts. Change 
in the supply chain will need to begin by creating designs specifically producible by AM 
at the start of new projects. In wartime, passion is born of necessity and survival. In 
iii   Red teams are used against blue teams in war-gaming and software security to find and mitigate weaknesses.
iv   RepRap is short for “replicating rapid-prototyper.”
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peacetime, passion, when it occurs, comes from other sources, such as a personal 
geek interest, financial gain, and, yes, even patriotism. The challenge leaders and 
makers face is like building and maintaining a fire: sparking, fueling, feeding, and 
sustaining AM passion and creative potential to achieve patriotic disruption.
Beyond rapid prototyping in the development and customization laboratory, mass 
customization and specialization of AM will be of particular value to the soldier of the 
future. The people who know best what is needed to operate a piece of equipment 
more efficiently are those who use it daily. By communicating with the home team, the 
soldier will be able to get a quick turnaround design for a tool to solve their immediate 
problem or even to make their job just a little easier. The robustness of 3D printers is 
improving, and the technology will eventually advance to the point that the end user 
will become an operator, needing only to load part geometry files and change out 
consumables, much like computer numerical control (CNC) machine operators are not 
required to be fully trained machinists. 
“New Path” Vision
AM has existed for only a few decades. Chuck Hull built the first successful AM 
machine in 1983 and a commercial unit was sold in 1987. His stereolithography 
apparatus (SLA) solidified parts layer-by-layer on a stage in a vat filled with ultraviolet 
(UV) curing resin.6 This machine brought awareness to the technology and sparked a 
rapid proliferation of invention. Another method, selective laser sintering (SLS), which 
fuses parts layer-by-layer in a moving powder bed, became commercial in 1989.7 
Excitement drove investment and more invention. 
With a pace similar to the rapid advancement of AM, in the next three decades, 
monumental disruption of offensive and defensive warfighter realms will be driven by 
applying AM technology successfully to military applications. Here are some reasons why:
• Tool development and qualification as well as threat response will happen in 
almost real time.
• AM will upend each aspect of the DOD’s entrenched, serial cycle of 
specification, design, qualification, and modification/requalification 
(headquartered in the world’s largest office building, the Pentagon).
-  An analogy for how AM will affect the military complex is the toy 
industry, which subsists by a rapid, complete product cycle with 
repetition and rapid change to hit holiday sales spikes. Currently, 
much military acquisition “moves” at a glacial pace; fast-track 
leaps are rare and driven by desperation and necessity, once the 
need becomes obvious enough to influence change agents. 
• The wide availability of AM equipment and expertise will enable practitioners 
to develop solutions on a short time cycle in conjunction with broader 
strategic objectives. 
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3D-printed firearms provide an example for how quickly this technology can advance. 
The first 3D-printed gun was produced by Defense Distributed in 2012, mostly to 
show that it could be done.8 Only five years later, the US Army printed almost every 
component for a grenade launcher (the RAMBO).9 In a short time period, the technology 
advanced from demonstration to something designed for US military use. 
Figure 1. Comparison of the first 3D-printed gun (the Liberator, sterolithography [STL] geometry files  
were released to the public in 2013), left, and a US Army Armament Research, Development, and  
Engineering Center (ARDEC) 3D-printed grenade launcher (RAMBO) in 2017, right. 
Despite the previous example, the upending change expected from AM will probably 
not happen rapidly unless a number of “killer app,” game-changing, fielded successes 
can be achieved and communicated as “new path” examples for the future. For 
instance, ubiquitous open and secure high-bandwidth global communications are 
already available to drive a dynamic specification environment allowing (and requiring) 
rapid response to emerging threats and opportunities for asymmetric warfare. These 
technologies will be essential to enabling the warfighter to take full advantage of AM 
technologies. It may be too much to expect frontline soldiers to design parts, but their 
ideas should be listened to and their thoughts, requirements, and desires need to 
be communicated to specialists such as designers. This communication may include 
teleconferencing, photos, or even scans of what is needed and the ability to design 
and deploy the solution in the field rapidly. In his work on terrorist innovation, Adam 
Dolnik observes, “a key determination of innovation success lies in the specificity 
[specifying] of the problem [to be solved], the solution of which would offer significant 
advantages.”10 This also applies to nonterrorist organizations.
Such shifts toward rapid action are not without precedent in the military-industrial 
complex. As World War II loomed, the conceptual design of the Pentagon was 
completed in 4 days, including a weekend (14 days before Congress authorized 
it), under the driving leadership style of General Brehon Somervell.11 With minimal 
documentation, groundbreaking occurred September 11, 1941, only four and a half 
weeks after drawings were started. It was estimated that the design alone would 
take at least one and a half years. Designed in conjunction with its construction, the 
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Pentagon became what is still the world’s largest office building in a mere 16 months. 
The budget was blown by a factor of four to six, but it got done. Somervell’s man on 
the ground was General Leslie Groves. Many rules were bent, broken, or ignored to 
achieve a rapid result.12 In contrast, One World Trade Center took over eight years 
to design and build with only half the square footage.13 Groves learned much from 
Somervell, who stated: 
Successful management depends on five factors. The first factor is a 
precise understanding of the job to be done. The second is qualified 
and capable men in key positions. The third is a workable organization 
properly adapted to the job to be done. The fourth is a simple, direct 
system for carrying on the activities involved in the job. The fifth is a 
positive method for checking on the results. Given any three of these 
five, a business or agency can probably function with fair success. Four 
of them operating together will result in much better than average 
efficiency. However, it requires all five to create the best management 
obtainable.14 
Ironically, the rapidly built Pentagon now houses residents who primarily plod 
toward military modernization in a slow serial approach, with some notable, recent 
exceptions. The entire November-December 2016 issue of Defense Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics magazine, a publication of the Defense Acquisition University, 
detailed many of the pilot programs, studies, and efforts underway to embrace AM. 
Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus is quoted stating: 
Too many new assets are mired in outdated bureaucratic practices 
that were developed for another era. As we enter the age of cyber, 
unmanned systems, and advanced manufacturing, we cannot allow 
these overly complex, form-over-substance, often useless, and too 
often harmful, practices to slow or prevent development of some game 
changers, while simultaneously giving our potential adversaries the 
competitive advantage.15 
As a result, the Joint Advanced Manufacturing Region (JAMR) effort, via an 
integrated project team, produced the prototype TB-100 Expeditionary Manufacturing 
Mobile Testbed (EXMAN) for modular fieldable AM technologies.16
The US Army’s Rapid Equipping Force (REF) was created in 2002 after US 
soldiers realized the need for nonstandard equipment to meet the demands of new 
terrain, warfare tactics, and their assigned missions.17 Since then, the REF has met 
challenges as diverse as enhancing soldier mobility, providing improved surveillance 
in austere locations, equipping operational energy sources, and enhancing 
communications. The REF is the Army’s quick reaction capability for getting urgent 
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matériel solutions into the hands of soldiers. The organization is able to do this both 
through unique authorities and by maintaining a presence near the point of need. 
New AM Technologies
New AM technologies are emerging with key development loci. Practioners focused 
early AM technologies on process technologies that could print 3D parts without 
much concern for structural properties. Developers of the earliest AM technologies 
concerned themselves with form and almost never with function (which is why early 
AM was known as rapid prototyping).In reality, most 3D processes are capable of 
producing “near-net-shaped” parts. The next leap in AM development is to make 
parts with engineering properties similar to those that can be produced via traditional 
manufacturing methodologies. A number of new 3D technologies extend two-
dimensional (2D) lithographic technologies. 
Digital light processing (DLP) technology, which came from optical projection, 
has revolutionized and greatly expanded the original AM technology segment of 
stereolithography. It began with rastering a laser over a vat of UV curing resin. 
DLP optical resolution provides feature detail at increments of tens of micronsv 
in combination with much higher volumetric build rates. These technologies have 
traditionally relied on acrylatevi chemistry, which enables high write speeds but 
produces relatively weak and poorly aging parts. More recently, additional materials 
have been explored, substantially broadening the types of materials that can be 
printed using DLP, including printing ceramics (postprocessed by sintering) and making 
composites by mixing chopped carbon fiber, and even graphene, into the resin. In 
addition, DLP technologies are evolving to enable much more rapid part production. 
The very limits of speed have been explored by Carbon 3D, which can produce a 
full-size part in a matter of a few minutes by controlling the quenching layer of the 
polymerization region.18 The disadvantage of this approach is that it still requires 
extensive postprocessing to complete the cure of the polymer.
HP’s MJF technology has leveraged 2D ink-jet printheads to apply picoliter dropletsvii 
to powdered polymers delivering rapid build rates, which are ten times faster than 
fused deposition modeling (FDM) and SLS (at half the cost of SLS), in tough, useful, 
strong polymers including nylon and polyurethanes and with detailed features.19
In additional developments, the Polyjet UV curable 600 dots-per-inch (dpi) ink-jet 
technology from Objet Geometries of Israel, now merged with Stratasys, has been 
able since 2008 to mix two feedstreams in variable ratios, resulting in graded polymer 
part fabrication.20 New technology from X-Jet with finer 1600 dpi ink-jet-applied 
nanoparticle-loaded polymers has demonstrated production of metal and ceramic 
v   For comparison, a human hair is about 90 microns in diameter.
vi   An acrylate is a compound derived from acrylic acid, a colorless, corrosive liquid that readily forms polymers and used to  
 make plastics, paints, synthetic rubbers, and textiles.
vii   A picoliter is one-trillionth of a liter. It is so small that the eye cannot see it, and a raindrop can hold thousands of picoliters.
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parts with fine detail.21 A similar feedstream mixing will likely be able to produce 
graded and cermet composite materials with unusual and useful material properties. 
Evolve Additive is commercializing electrostatic transfer printing, which first came 
about with the Xerox machine in 1959.22 Evolve Additive Solutions has developed an 
AM system that uses electrostatic transfer printing to build layers of 3D parts in fine 
detail with standard polymers at high volumetric build rates reportedly 50 times faster 
than other technologies.23 Based on preliminary reports, the technology can deposit 
28 micron polymer layers in four seconds, implying a peak volumetric build rate of 
over 600 cubic centimeters per hour (cm3/h) over their large build envelope.24 The 
company debuted the technology publicly at FomNext in Frankfurt, Germany in 2019.
Postprocessing
Postprocessing of AM parts, the lethal “rhinoceros in the cubicle,” is often glossed 
over and perilously ignored. This oversight has stunted or killed many otherwise 
successful AM applications. The novel ability to produce complex geometries rapidly, 
unachievable by conventional subtractive fabrication, often mesmerizes the beholder, 
while the removal of support material and postfinishing are not taken into account. 
Currently, the postprocessing steps for many AM technologies are labor intensive. In 
order to realize the promise of AM, these operations must become fully automated. 
The type of postprocessing required depends on three factors: the material,viii types of 
support structures,ix and surface finish.x
Material Advances: Making Functional Parts Possible
Ultimately, the utility of additive manufacturing to produce parts for soldiers in the field 
will depend on the material. Three basic classes of materials are available for printing: 
metals, polymers, and composites (including ceramics). The greatest improvements in 
AM technology have been made when utilizing robust materials that fulfill engineering 
requirements. Progress will continue along the same lines, but there will likely always 
be some trade-off between the material that can be fabricated by AM and the ideal 
material for an application. For instance, some stainless steels can be printed, but not 
all are readily available in powder form. The AM processes, especially laser sintering, 
cause much more rapid heating and cooling rates than conventional casting, forging, 
and heat-treating processes. These rapid heating rates cause significant vaporization 
of some alloy constituents, while rapid cooling greatly affects grain morphology, 
sometimes resulting in better (but certainly different) material performance.
Printing aluminum parts is possible, but the raw material can be explosively 
hazardous because of its affinity for oxygen. Also, there will likely be some limitations 
to the number of printing materials taken into the field, and the military may need to 
viii  For example, does it require heat treating or a postcure step? What type of excess material needs to be removed?
ix  As well as how they need to be removed.
x  That is, if a machining or polishing step is required.
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decide what subset of materials will be used in forward operating environments. In 
particular, metal printing has the largest hurdles before being deployed closer to the 
end user, partly because the metal powders must be melted to be fused together, 
usually by using a laser or electron beam. Both of these methods are power intensive, 
and the raw material is heavy.xi These limitations mean that metal AM will require 
significant logistical support. Finally, metal AM instruments require fastidious cleaning 
before changing between materials; this fact will likely lead to a subset of materials 
being available in forward operating bases compared to a more complete set available 
to and strategically stockpiled by the home team. 
The second major class of materials available for AM, polymers are perhaps the 
most versatile class of materials and can be produced by every AM technique. Of 
the different AM materials, primary polymer has easily modified chemical properties, 
which opens up a wide range of existing polymers that can be used for AM. The 
synthesis of new polymers is occurring as a result of the “new production step” 
of photocuring. The greatest drawbacks to polymer AM parts is they may not meet 
engineering requirements. Polymers are softer and weaker than metals and are 
often susceptible to aging, especially in oxidative environments or when exposed 
to UV light. However, polymer AM will be the most useful in the field as it can be 
deployed with minimal power and can be used readily with different materials. In 
2016, the utility of polymer AM was demonstrated by the first 3D printer installed 
on the International Space Station, which has since been used to print wrenches, 
sensor covers, and airflow monitor holders.25
In addition to basic metals and polymers currently used for additive manufacturing, 
there is both great interest in and a need for producing composite materials, which 
are made from multiple constituent materials that when combined create a material 
with far superior properties than either material individually.26 The promise of these 
materials lies in their high strength and stiffness coupled with reduced weight. The 
specific materials that could be formed are broad, including ceramics and carbon fiber 
reinforced and infused with nanoparticles (including metals and semiconductors). 
Using these materials will enable technicians to tune the final part to have specific 
material and physical properties and, possibly, multifunctionality designed into them.
A range of researchers across the world are studying composite materials 
intensely. Glass, carbon, and aramidxii fiber reinforcment of injection-molded parts 
has become common in structural applications, and fiber-reinforced polymers have 
been demonstrated in laser-sintered AM components. The pace of filled composite 
materials in fused deposition modeling (FDM) is already demonstrating usefulness. 
Axially disposed long fibers in FDM are allowing directional “layup” for focused 
xi   The density of steels is about 8 grams per cubic centimeter (g/cm3), compared to about 1 g/cm3 for polymers.
xii   Aramid fiber is the generic name of a group of synthetic fibers. Commonly known commercial brands include Kevlar, Twaron,  
 and Nomex.
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strength in FDMxiii parts. In 2019,Desktop Metal Corporation introduced a hybrid flat 
fiber combined with FDM high-temperature thermoplastics (PEEK and PEK).27 This 
brings tape-layup composites into the AM realm. The trick to employing composite 
materials for AM is developing a method to enable printing of the two phases while 
ensuring the loading material can be incorporated in sufficiently high concentrations. 
This can be done by either adjusting the rheological conditions of the material being 
printed or modifying the loading material to ensure it can be cross-linked with the 
polymerization mixture.
Parts designed to be built with different material properties at the voxel-by-voxelxiv 
level are starting to be realized. HP is developing and has demonstrated some 
voxel customization with their MJF technology.28 Tailoring modulus (stiffness) and 
even electrical conductivity are part of this development, which is determined by 
custom ink-jet applied chemistry individually applied to each voxel of a printed part. 
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology has demonstrated a voxel-by-voxel AM 
machine, which switches dynamically between multiple polymer feedstreams to enable 
adjacent voxels in a layer to be different materials.29
One of the most exciting areas in additive manufacturing (and perhaps the most 
difficult to predict) is the ability to make parts with multiple materials, including 
materials with graded structures, which can have significant advantages in designing 
parts with highly tuned functionality.30 In addition, composite materials can be 
produced that behave differently in different environments. The new area of “four-
dimensional (4D) printing” focuses on making materials that will behave differently 
over time depending on the environment. This “programmable matter” produces 
a product that reacts with environmental parameters (e.g., humidity, temperature, 
light). The current results are academically focused and demonstrate behaviors such 
as folding/unfolding depending on the temperature and/or relative humidity.31 This 
nascent technology already has some exciting potential applications, including self-
assembling structures, integrated sensing, and actuating systems for aircraft, soft 
robotics, self-deployable antenna arrays, valves, and active springs. The composite 
structures that will be available by 2050 will provide additional tools and capabilities 
to the warfighter, although printing for this type of technology may not be available in 
forward deployable environments.
The use of additively manufactured parts will require some change in thinking 
about how materials are produced, inspected, qualified, and put into service. The 
current process for putting a new material into service is quite lengthy, especially on 
major assets or parts critical to the operation of a piece of hardware. AM parts have 
initially been used in areas considered less critical, such as certified AM toilet seat 
covers.32 Although the amount of inspection and qualification applied to these parts is 
xiii   FDM AM technology deposits extruded roads of thermoplastic polymer (now with embedded reinforcements) like a  
 hot-glue gun in layers.
xiv   A voxel is a volumetric (three-dimensional) element for visualization, like a pixel is a two-dimensional element for an image.
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still high. As the military community and services become more comfortable with the 
technology, the process for using new AM materials will likely continue to relax, which 
will eventually enable most replacement parts to be created, inspected, and qualified 
as needed in the field. Currently, AM parts are inspected for dimension, surface finish, 
and internal composition, using techniques such as X-ray computed tomography (CT). 
X-ray CT inspection of AM parts will likely be fieldable over the next several decades 
(just as medical-imaging techniques have become mobile).
More than a Change in Technology, a Change in Thinking to Enable Agile Operations
For much of human history, customized equipment has been reserved for the rich and 
powerful (such as officers and royalty). Rank-and-file military personnel have made do 
with mass-produced, standard equipment. Additive manufacturing will enable “mass 
customization” to be rolled out to all military personnel. This will fundamentally 
change how the military can operate to become a more agile organization. Throughout 
the history of armed conflict, significant advantages have belonged to the side 
that can innovate and develop novel solutions, possibly to problems that were not 
identified as ones before the solution. Things like the invention of the stirrup, short 
swords, shields, armor, gunpowder, and rifling have had profound effects on the 
outcome of conflicts.33
Mass customization enabled by additive manufacturing will enable equipment 
users to have customized tools they need to be successful in their mission. This will 
lead them to think further about other useful equipment. Soldiers will need to be 
tied to AM practitioners who can make their visions a reality. These “makerspaces” 
will be staffed with an interdisciplinary group able to take ideas, design a solution, 
identify material needs, and rapidly iterate the idea to produce a high-quality solution. 
However, centralized power and control tends to affect innovation negatively.34 
Therefore, to operate more creatively and to ensure AM is a useful technology for the 
future, these units must be staffed properly. The personnel selected will need to be 
highly collaborative, be able to operate at a high tempo, and understand a wide range 
of AM technologies, limitations, and constraints. Depending on the development of 
these units over the next few decades, they could be staffed with military personnel or 
civilian contractors.
Leadership and Innovation
For AM to fulfill its potential, the right leadership must be in place. Thomas Edison’s 
Menlo Park, Bell Labs, and the Manhattan Project provide examples of leaders 
applying innovative solutions to pressing problems. Consider for a moment a plethora 
of mini-Manhattan projects enabled by AM, but without a blank check and during 
peacetime, and, therefore, a lack of wartime mentality.
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Edison’s Menlo Park
Edison has been described as the greatest US inventor, substantially because of his 
early investment in the infrastructure that enabled routine invention. His Menlo Park 
laboratory became the first institution set up with the specific purpose of producing 
constant technological innovation and improvement. It produced the carbon button 
microphone (making the telephone practical), the phonograph, the incandescent 
light bulb, and power-generation and -distribution components, including generators, 
switches, plugs, and sockets.35 Edison stated purpose for his Menlo Park laboratory was 
to “invent some minor thing every ten days and some big thing every six months.”36
In his biography of Edison, Quincy Shaw gives a synopsis of the Menlo Park 
invention factory:  
What Edison created was not the stereotypical factory of the Industrial 
Revolution, with workers performing repetitive actions designed to 
lower costs and raise efficiency—it was a bustling hub of creativity and 
shared intent. Edison hired proud and skillful craftspeople and opened 
up his lab to them. In return, he expected them to dedicate themselves 
to the projects to which they were assigned. Anyone who did not would 
soon leave, usually of his own volition. 
The atmosphere in the Edison machine shop was open and congenial. 
When a new employee asked about rules, Edison told him, “Hell, there 
ain’t no rules here! We’re trying to accomplish something.” The men 
were given freedom to experiment on their own, testing new ideas, 
materials, and work methods. 
This is not to say that Edison was a pushover or that he spoiled his 
staff. He was a tough and demanding employer. . . .  
When it came to hiring craftsmen, Edison put more stock in their 
manual skills and their perseverance in solving real-life problems 
than he did in their formal education. He had little respect for college 
degrees and even less for the standard curriculum of the time. He 
denounced traditional schooling for “taking up too much time teaching 
things that don’t count. Latin and Greek—what good are they? They say 
they train the mind. But I don’t think they train the mind half as much 
as working out practical problems.” As he told an interviewer late in life, 
“Doing the thing itself is what counts.”37 
He and his men invented many big things to fulfill his original intent by doing what 
counted.
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Bell Labs
If there is a formula to creating technical innovations, Bell Labs had solved it, especially 
in the second half of the twentieth century.38 Bell Labs is a premier industrial research 
laboratory with innovations and contributions in a wide range of fields.39 Indeed, Bell 
Labs invented not only new things but also new ways to invent them.
One of the key leaders of Bell Labs was Mervin Kelly, director of research 
from 1936 to 1944 (during which time Bell contributed to several critical military 
advancements, including radar), executive vice president from 1944 to 1951 (when 
the transistor was invented), and president from 1951 to 1959. The overall research 
structure of Bell Labs under Kelly’s leadership focused efforts in three areas: basic 
research, systems engineering, and the design and development of new devices. 
However, Bell Labs’real innovation was in bringing together a critical mass of talent 
and building a “living organism” structure in which social and professional exchanges 
encouraged back-and-forth discussions in order to refine ideas. One of Bell Lab’s 
official policies was that anyone (even the most junior staff members) could approach 
an expert in the field with questions and the expert was expected to interface with the 
junior staff member.
In addition to the structural interactions enabled by the scientific and engineering 
staff, Bell Labs enabled a parallel subculture of technical assistants, who were the 
keepers of technical secrets and tricks and maintained the lore of how things got done 
at Bell Labs. These personnel may have been less educated than the scientific and 
engineering staff (often having a high school education), but they were highly valued 
for their technical intuition. They were often the types of people who could take apart 
and put back together an engine or watch.40 Bell Labs also had the ability to provide 
resources, the foresight to hire talent (even if there was not a current business need), 
and the culture to enable collaboration and to encourage long-term thinking. 
Bell Labs provides an example of how additive manufacturing can have the highest 
impact for the military; a structure will need to be instituted to enable the highest 
level of performance. This culture must enable designers and engineers to have a 
free-flowing transfer of information and ideas to solve problems, while also enabling 
the print technicians to have a significant role in contributing to how parts are made 
and ensuring the success of the final products. In addition, some resources should 
be provided to explore solutions for more intractable problems that may not have 
immediate payoff.
General Groves
As a final example of the importance of leadership to the proper implemetation of 
AM for SOF, the Manhattan Project relied on extraordinary technical innovation and 
also on equally extraordinary leadership abilities. When the War Department wanted 
a leader for the Manhattan Project, General Somervell pointed to General Groves, 
his subordinate on the War Department general staff, and then left to lead military 
supply for WWII. General Groves was the right leader. Perhaps his strongest skill was 
S T R A T E G I C  L A T E N C Y  U N L E A S H E D    |    179 
detecting and selecting leaders to whom he could reliably delegate critical tasks.41 
Groves superintended over the $2 billion (World War II dollars) Manhattan Project 
and spent an additional $6 billion during the war on other construction projects. The 
only larger World War II procurement line item was $3 billion for the B-29 bomber 
development and production.
Groves had a virtually a blank checkbook but was extremely focused. He mitigated 
risk with parallel paths. He chose Robert Oppenheimer to herd the “crackpots” at Los 
Alamos, who did so with aplomb and ultimate technical success. Examining Groves’s 
leadership style, Oppenheimer commented:
First, General Groves is the biggest S.O.B. I have ever worked for. He 
is most demanding. He is most critical. He is always a driver, never 
a praiser. He is abrasive and sarcastic. He disregards all normal 
organizational channels. He is extremely intelligent. He has the guts to 
make difficult, timely decisions. He is the most egotistical man I know. 
He knows he is right and so sticks by his decision. He abounds with 
energy and expects everyone to work as hard or even harder than he 
does. Although he gave me great responsibility and adequate authority 
to carry out his mission-type orders, he constantly meddled with my 
subordinates. However, to compensate for that he had a small staff, 
which meant that we were not subject to the usual staff-type heckling. 
He ruthlessly protected the overall project from other government 
agency interference, which made my task easier. He seldom accepted 
other agency cooperation and then only on his own terms. During the 
war and since I have had the opportunity to meet many of our most 
outstanding leaders in the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as many of 
our outstanding scientific, engineering, and industrial leaders. And in 
summary, if I had to do my part of the atomic bomb project over again 
and had the privilege of picking my boss I would pick General Groves.42
Conclusions and Vision for the Future
The ultimate goal of any organization is to ignite the passion and drive to deliver 
the best possible solutions to problems. At their essence, the motivations are an 
inner individual drive. As our previous examples show, multiple sources exist for this 
motivation. One is the necessity and the essential nature of the work, as was the 
case with the Apollo 13 mission, building the Pentagon, and executing the Manhattan 
Project. While this type of motivation is strong, it can also be driven by fear of 
negative consequences; therefore, it may not be sustainable over a long period 
of time or with large numbers of people. Another major motivation may be based 
on a particular reward (e.g., pay, promotion, recognition, or overarching personal 
enjoyment). Identifying people who are driven by the love of something and not an 
external reward is difficult, but doing so yields excellent results over the long term. 
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Opportunities to identify and recruit these types of people can include competitions 
or events where people design and implement ideas—such as with robot battles, 
drone racing, or car racing—and are committed, creative, and technically savvy. 
SOFWERX—a platform that helps solve challenging warfighter problems at scale 
through collaboration, ideation, events, and rapid prototyping—represents a 
substantial functioning example of this approach.43
Additive manufacturing will lead to some fundamental shifts in parts procurement. 
AM will facilitate the ability to build parts on an as-needed and just-in-time (JIT) basis, 
which will reduce the need to perform life-of-program buys for critical spare parts and 
rapid turnaround for a small-volume part. Early military applications of AM have already 
been realized. While this could have an adverse effect in some of the procurement 
practices, one could also envision a range of AM shops near major military installations 
to service the major, routine needs for military AM parts. Such a system might enable 
a broad manufacturing base across the country, which would, in turn, enable innovation 
and be available to service other industries. Such a manufacturing base would also tie 
into more robust quality-acceptance and testing requirements. 
Finally, as aforementioned, proper leadership is the key to obtaining the full 
disruptive value of AM. To enable mass customization, to empower front-line units 
to envision what they need, and for makerspaces to produce needed equipment, the 
highest levels of leadership will need to trust lower levels of the organization. This 
may include delegating some the decision-making authority; however, it also includes 
ensuring expectations are clear and all levels understand their responsibilities for 
overall mission success. Quoting George S. Patton, “Never tell people how to do 
things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.”44
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Nanotechnology and SOF: Is Smaller Really Better?
P. Randall Schunk
Introduction—Smaller Is Better!
In Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces (2002), Tom Clancy describes vividly the 
challenges special operations forces (SOF) faced during the Vietnam War, which were 
mostly related to excessive equipment weight and the lack of military intelligence 
in forward operations.1 Numerous challenges Clancy describes had high-technology 
solutions that had not yet been invented in the 1960s. Simply put, SOF needed 
technology that was smaller, lighter, and higher-performing.
Fast forward 50 years: It is remarkable how many of these challenges have been 
surmounted, largely because of high-tech materials and devices that make objects 
small and light, enhance performance, and provide better real-time intelligence. 
Interestingly, the human dimension that dominated SOF operations in Vietnam 
remains paramount to maintaining advantage.2 Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, 
nanotechnology (NT) underpins most human intelligence technologies. NT enables 
artificial intelligence (AI), the Internet of Things (IoT), sensing, radio-frequency and 
infrared (IR) communications, and other technologies that enhance the sense-think-act 
paradigm of “autonomy.” NT can impact warfighter performance and preservation in 
still unimagined ways that present tremendous, but still latent, threat and advantage. 
Take for example the advances in body-armor technology enabled by NT.3 Perhaps Tony 
Stark’s (also known as Iron Man’s) “nanite suit,” in the Avengers: Infinity War (2018), 
will someday soon move beyond science fiction. 
“Where did that come from?” 
Bruce Banner (The Hulk)
“It’s nanotech. Like it?” 
Tony Stark (Iron Man)
Avengers: Infinity War 
This chapter makes plain the current state of NT, its hype and overhype, its latency, 
and even its history, largely as it relates to challenges, needs, and gaps in special 
operations forces. In the field of NT, SOF need to be innovators, not problem solvers.4 
In an environment of battlefield uncertainty, situations often devolve into disorder and 
chaos, weakening human performance; NT can aid in these situations. The benefits 
of NT in the human dimension are not fully realized, and perhaps represent a latency 
that can be used to gain strategic advantage. 
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Nanotechnology Hype: Real or Imaginary?
At lengths small enough to be considered “nanoscale,” which has been widely 
accepted as less than about 100 nanometers (nm), physical phenomena are 
dominated by forces still relatively mysterious to humans. Even though these length 
scales are large compared to atoms or molecules, molecular forces control how 
matter behaves and interacts in a way that dominates material microstructure, 
thermodynamics, and motion. Successful nanotechnologies result when 
macroengineering tools, such as a microscope or laser, tame these forces, resulting 
in macroscale systems that benefit the warfighter. By controlling the chemistry 
of material structures, scientists can create other successful nanotechnologies, 
enabling materials design functionality. Some nanotechnologies are built simply on 
the integration of nanomaterials (particles of <100 nm dimension) into composites 
to enhance thermophysical properties or optical/electromagnetic properties. Though 
rarely a means to an end, NT enables and improves technology. Engineering at the 
nanoscale has created legions of technological possibilities, and society has already 
enjoyed the benefits.5 However, technology developers must overcome challenges at 
the molecular scale to realize all that nanotechnology has to offer. 
Nanotechnology is such a broad category it defies simple definition. NT started with 
wide-scale materials-science advances such as the electron microscrope in the 1960s; 
these advances brought fundamental molecular-scale chemistry and physics to “life” in 
the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, companies touting the “nano” brand began to pop 
up in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 2000, President Bill Clinton championed the 
National Nanotechnology Initiative, providing a $225M budget. Numerous government 
agencies restructured their discretionary research and development (R&D) portfolios 
to include nanoscience and engineering. Nanotechnology exploded in popularity, with 
numerous start-up and multinational companies including NT as a core discipline 
or even a “product.” However, in the early 2000s, many of the surviving start-up 
companies that flaunted their nanotech credentials rebranded themselves as materials 
or semiconductor companies, realzing nanoscience and the fundamental discipline 
known as materials science were synonomous.6 NT enabled broader technologies that 
are realized at the macroscale. In the end, NT never had its “Facebook” moment or 
blockbuster debut in the stock market. 
The chronological history of nanotechnology has been constructed in numerous 
locations.7 Norio Taniguchi coined the term “nanotechnology” in 1974, in reference 
to the explosive growth of the nascent semiconductor industries,8 but some argue 
the word stems from Richard Feynman’s “vision” in 1959 that resulted from the 
advent of electron microscopy (EM) and the ability to “see” atoms and molecules 
for the first time.9 Davis Baird provides a compelling case that the real tools of 
nanotechnology were those based on scanning tunneling microscopy (STM) and its 
relatives (e.g., atomic force microscopy).10 EM was just an imager, but STM enabled 
atomic manipulation. John Randall, et al., assert that “nanotechnology” circa 2018 
has failed to live up to its potential and claim that while nanoscience flourishes and 
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has led to some exciting applications, nanoscale devices with proven reliability are 
still nonexistent beyond prototypes.11 However, nanotechnology products enabled 
by nanomaterials—such as nanocomposites and nanoparticles for medicine—have 
become commonplace and can be credited for many technology improvements 
and breakthroughs. Randall, et al., base their assertion on simple sematics, as NT 
is much broader than he describes. Nonetheless, the assertion is worth further 
consideration, especially from a manufacturing viewpoint. 
George Whitesides and J. Christopher Love were the first to review relatively nascent 
nanofabrication techniques and expose the plethora of possibilities and challenges.12 
They categorized process routes as either bottom-up—building up structures with nano 
building blocks or particles—or stamping, molding, or forming structures from the top 
down. One early conclusion emerged from this work: top-down soft lithography and 
optical lithography, the workhorses of the semiconductor industry, are the only scalable 
routes to nanodevices. Soft-lithogaphy has since achieved commercial scale, even 
though fabricating 3D logic devices like transitors remains challenging.13
The modern semiconductor industry is really a nanotechnology industry. It can 
control fabrication of the building blocks of transitors to scales of less than 20 nm 
using light and interferometric patterning tricks, and has done so while maintaining 
remarkable throughput. It has also created microdevices that provide platforms to 
study phenomena at the nanoscale.14 Optical lithography is at its limit, however, 
and even with numerous tricks, the semiconductor industry is at the “end of silicon 
scaling.”15 Soft lithography will be critical in attempts to overcome this limit.
To build a nanoscale “system,” or an object engineered at the sub-100 nm scale 
to achieve a certain function, one can do so best with the so-called nanoparticle. STM 
and related technologies prove an “atomic assembler” is not as far fetched as some 
have claimed.16 Whether one will ever be practical is another matter. Nonetheless, 
bottom-up fabrication with nanoparticles may be a future and impactful latency. In fact, 
most nanoscale technologies revolve around nanoparticles with specific functionality. 
Readily manufactured carbon nanotubes (CNTs) have unique electronic properties that 
can improve electrochemical sensing and enable molecular-scale transistors.
Scientists can engineer nanoparticles with nearly any extraordinary property; 
examples include photoluminescence/quantum dots, tunable cargo-carrying porous 
particles for drug delivery, core-shell shape for dual functionality, and nanosheets for 
composite strengthening and lightweighting.17 Nanomaterials can also be engineering 
to serve as sensors or taggants for trust technologies, such as tamper indicators 
and system authentication.18 Essentially, nanoparticles can be made with chemical 
elements across the periodic chart, which can become a scientist’s “palette” to 
create custom NT function and form (see Figure 1). The beauty of nanoparticles is 
that, unlike other forms of nanomanufacturing, such as silicon-CMOS, they can be 
dispersed as colloids into inks and processed with solution-deposition schemes and 
related digitally based additive-manufacturing approaches, such as ink-jet printing and 
liquid film coating, at much larger scales. 
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Figure 1 (acknowledgement: T. J. Boyle, A. Cook, N. Bell, Sandia National Laboratories). 
Governments and private industry continue to invest in developing low-cost, 
scalable process technology at the nanoscale to meet consumer demands for 
electronic devices. National Science Foundation–sponsored engineering research 
centers at the University of Texas at Austin (www.nascent-erc.org) and the University 
of Massachusetts Amherst (umass.edu/chm/) provide examples of R&D efforts 
underpinning the integration of nanomaterials such as graphene and nanopatterning 
at scale. Department of Defense (DoD) investments, under the auspices of 
Manufacturing USA hubs,19 in packaging of Si-CMOS in functional-hybrid electronics 
stand to intersect with nanotechnology to meet the needs of IoT. These large-scale 
efforts attest to the plethora of remaining challenges of bringing nanotechnology to 
market. The primary challenge remains achieving practical fabrication for reliable 
devices and materials. 
Nanotechnology and SOCOM/SOF
Nanotechnology is ubiquitous in today’s military technology and impacts nearly 
all enabling technologies in SOCOM’s primary mission. NT is most prevalent in 
mobile electronic devices—smartphones, global positioning system (GPS) units, 
and wearable electronics. Size-weight-and-power (SWaP) improvements, power-
requirement reductions, and integrated sensors (e.g., cameras) all exemplify the 
benefits of NT. These devices serve many needs for SOF, as they can enable person-
to-person and centralized communication, as well as numerous other functions. The 
central processing units of smart devices have transitors as small as 40nm, and 
their nonvolatile and universal memory can hold gigabytes of information because 
of nanoscale magnetic bits. The power source and display of smart devices are high 
density and fidelity because of small pixel sizes and integrated nanomaterials. Figure 
2 illustrates the essential components of a smartphone/device and the underpinning 
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Figure 2. Essential components of a smartphone or other smart device and the underpinning technologies 
nanotechnology enhances.
Note that many of these NT enhancements involve the integration of nanomaterials 
(e.g., graphene, CNTs, nanowires) or pattenerning with printing/imprinting. Until about 
2015, most nanoscience-device R&D efforts relied on slow and inflexible fabrication 
processes such as electron-beam patterning or thermodynamically defective (self-
assembly) processes with limited capability for pattern complexity or high levels of 
process integration. Transformative nanomanufacturing systems and processes that 
enable mass production of economically competitive mobile computing are overcoming 
these challenges.21 
Beyond electronics, many other NT benefits for SOF have already been realized. 
NT has made inroads in biometrics/chem-bio detection/mitigation, lightweight 
nanocomposite materials, and energy and environment technologies; many of 
these can be used for military applications. Extensive reviews exist on how 
nanomaterials have impacted these sectors, as well as other forms of nanotechnology 
and nanomanufacturing.22 The Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology represents an excellent source of topical 
research and technology information.23 For broader DoD-level applications of 
nanotechnology, readers can consult other reports.24 For the warfighter, nontechnology 
benefits have been in play since the early twenty-first century, mostly in the realm of 
clothing, communications, blast protection, and navigation.25 
A few other NTs deserve mention in this piece, as they have not been fully realized 
in the SOF community. Specifically, NT greatly enhances device performance in power 
generation, energy storage, and climate control by harnessing the sun26 as well as in 
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The burgeoning industry of “nanomedicine” benefits from NT, and, of note for the 
purposes of this book, includes gene editing as countermeasures for biological 
attack.28 Human performance monitoring and enhancement with wearable detectors 
and controlled therapeutic delivery are already readily available in lightweight forms, 
and communication for real-time control and chem/bio sensitivity/selectivity are poised 
for ongoing investments. And, how about IR vision with implanted NPs in your eyes? 
It has already been proven to work in mice.29 On the topic of light management, 3M, 
for example, has manufactured an all-polymer (no metal), 98 percent reflective (in 
the visible range) flexible film.30 All these technologies are currently impacting, or will 
impact, the warfighter, enhancing battlefield performance through weight reduction, 
portable power, medical diagnostics and therapuetics, and overall survivability in difficult 
environments. Finally, in the area of lethality, researchers have realized breakthroughs in 
controlled morphology of energetic nanoparticles (explosives such as CL-20).31 
Nanotechnology and Strategic Latency
In terms of strategic latency, four developing nanotechnologies will likely provide 
advantages to SOF. These include 1) fifth generation (5G) wireless communications, 
2) chip-scale atomic clocks (CSAC), 3) sensorizing everything (i.e., IoT) and 4) 
graphene. Note that all, even graphene, amplify human-in-the-loop capabilities (e.g., 
communication, data analytics) and enable problem-solving in chaotic situations. 
5G: Fast and Furious
5G cellular communications technology uses much higher radio frequences and 
enables data transfer at exponentially higher speeds than fourth-generation 
technology (4G). More important, 5G reduces latency, or the delay before data 
transfer begins, drastically. 5G also enables far more devices to be used within the 
same geographic area.32 In short, 5G will enable up to three orders of magnitude 
improvement in data rates, bandwidth, and supported devices.
The impact of 5G on military operations has been covered extensively in the 
context of drone-to-drone unmanned aerial vehicle communication and battlefield 
uses.33 The connectivity from operator to operator in the field, and with command 
and control, would be instaneous because of the high-speed data transfer and low-
latency of a 5G network. Devices that might be networked for autonomous vehicles 
or drones will be able to commuincate in “real-time.” Instantaneous, high-bandwidth 
communication enables the IoT more than any other technology does or can. So 
what role does NT play in maximizing the benefits of 5G? Look no further than 
portable electronic devices. Beyond mobile computing, 5G enhances a plethora of IoT 
devices (e.g., sensors, energy harvestors, central computing) because of the rapid 
communication not possible with 4G. In short, 5G will greatly amplify the benefits of 
any technology that enables SWaP improvements in devices. 
Nonetheless, barriers can thwart any potential technology. For 5G networks, 
barriers include security and power consumption. In 5G, devices are identified in a 
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“flat” internet protocol vulnerable to cyber threats.34 Ironically, the real benefit of 5G to 
SOF will be a reduction in computing-at-the-edge needs, and, hence, electrical power 
consumption. 5G greatly enables networking SOF with a central server for real-time 
decision analytics. Also, wearable devices do not require as much computing power; 
overall power needs decrease, as will the size and weight of devices. 
Atomic Clocks: The Test of Time
Atomic clocks are the most accurate timekeeping devices and serve as reference 
clocks both domestically and globally.35 They use the oscillation of single atoms or 
ions induced by an electromagnetic field as the frequency standard for timekeeping. 
Certainly, atomic clocks epitomize “nanotechnology.” Precision timekeeping, as it 
pertains to global positioning and, hence, battlefield situational awareness in the 
absence of GPS, are indispensable to an SOF operation. As a side benefit, they can 
be used for ultrasensitive electromagnetic field detection (in, for example, hydrology, 
geology, and underground weapons storage). The National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
have invested heavily in atomic-clock technology, and DARPA has funded the CSAC 
program,36 which aims to condense such systems to small units that can be deployed 
easily on a warfighter.37 While atomic clocks are being developed for both CONOPs 
for military operations and commercial production, rapid communication from asset-
to-asset and person-to-person would only amplify the benefits of atomic clocks for 
soldiers. Perhaps the 5G breakthrough is the missing link for battlefield use of CSACs 
because the nanotechnology underpinning lightweight portable devices that thrive on 
rapid communication is already established. 
Internet of Things: Sensorizing Everything
5G antennas and CSACs for eletromagnetic field detection are two forms of sensors. 
Nanotechnology has greatly enabled the “sensing” aspect of the sense-think-act triad 
of autonomy. Ubiquitous sensing enables capturing environmental signatures of any 
type, uploading and processing to determine a course of action to assess current 
states of operations, and gaining adversarial intelligence. Tunable nanomaterials, 
nanowires, and other nanostructures are instrumental in the development of highly 
selective and sensitive sensors for biologicals,38 chemicals and explosives,39 
radiological materials (from scintillators and carbon nanotubes)40 as well as for 
local temperature, biometrics from soldiers, and temperature of hard assets.41 More 
sensors means more data and, therefore, the need for more processing. However, 
anticipatory analytics could be greatly enhanced if coupled with 5G and centralized 
computing. NT sensing devices enable AI and its deployment in real-time battlefield 
situations. NT has made sensors more sensitive, selective, and lower power, which 
amplifies the benefits of IoT.
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Graphene: The Magic Material
The ubiquitous applications of graphene and related “2D” materials, together with 
close nanotube relatives (e.g., CNTs), should be evident in this piece. Graphene 
has extrodinary properties and has been called a “magic” material because it can 
be used for all sorts of technology applications. Basically, graphene is a monolayer 
of carbon atoms arranged in an hexagonal structure that possesses remarkable 
structural integrity. In fact, graphene is the lightest and strongest known material and 
also conducts heat and electricity better than most metals. Moreover, its chemical 
and thermal structures remain stable in extreme environments. Its unique “thinness” 
and structural flexibility mean it can be processed into useful devices and other 
performance-enhancing technologies . As a semiconductor, it can make light-energy 
devices, such as photovoltaics, thinner and more flexible. It can be used as an 
ultrathin antenna or a chemsorption surface to detect chemical and biological species. 
In flake form, it can be integrated into structural composites to strengthen and for 
lightweighting. It can even be used as a highly selective membrane for water purification. 
Despite the challenges of growing graphene and related sheetlike materials 
in chemical vapor deposition (CVD) reactors and transferring them onto polymer 
substrates for integration into devices, many successes have already been realized.42 
Graphene has enabled many breakthrough technologies in electronics—including 
radio-frequency identification tags, low-cost sensors, and large-area, lightweight 
displays—that are difficult or impossible to realize with standard silicon or 
semiconductor integrated circuits. Plastic GHz/THz devices would provide unparalleled 
advantages to SOF, such as unbreakable platforms with arbitrary form factors that 
have favorable SWaP attributes. Graphene‐based photovoltaics show remarkable 
efficiences43 and could lead to an all‐graphene flexible photovoltaic, which would be of 
great use in forward-base operations. In summary, the production and integration of 
graphene to useful devices in SOF are just beginning, so stay tuned. 
Conclusion
Has nanotechnology lived up to the hype it received in the early 2000s? Absolutely. 
However, NT is rarely cited as a core-technology enabler. “NT inside” prevades 
numerous current and future technologies, including those of keen interest to SOF. 
This chapter only highlights a field that stems from centuries of materials-science, 
chemistry, physics, and engineering research and development. 
Any reliable technology pursuit that can reduce size, weight, and power 
consumption, harvest energy, improve communication speed and bandwidth, provide 
data analytics, and improve human performance, endurance, and decision-making 
is paramount to advancing SOCOM’s capabilities. NT has clearly been a key part of 
currrent technology advantage, and will be crucial to maintaining advantage. Some 
combination of all these capabilities culminate in the most important one: human 
performance and decision-making. NT with the human-in-the-loop is a force multiplier. 
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The United States is making significant investments to help accelerate 
nanotechnology, both in the government and private sectors; however, numerous 
challenges remain, most pertaining to manufacturing. The NT patent rates in Asia44 
have surpassed those in the United States, probably because countries in the region 
have increased research expenditures in high technology. Gary Pisano and Willy Shih 
predicted and provided evidence that the erosion of high-tech innovation leadership in 
the United States is a result of a decline in manufacturing.45 
In the 1990s, US companies outsourced manufacturing to Asia and beyond, partly 
for economic reasons and partly to improve their images as innovators. Without a 
trained manufacturing workforce and manufacturing commons in the United States, 
innovation slowly eroded, particular in high-profit-margin high-tech industries, including 
nanotechnology. In recent decades, a number of US industries have lost their lead 
to Asia, and other regions, in manufaturing such products as flat-panel displays, 
advanced batteries, and other electronic and energy technologies. Industry is faced 
with the problem of determining when manufacturing is critical to innovation and 
when it can be safely outsourced to lower costs and reduce capital outlays. Currently, 
companies pursue the production of NT through low-cost processing routes such as 
roll-to-roll and additive manufacturing. Nanotechnology is likely to suffer the same fate 
as other sectors of the high-tech industry have. 
Finally, quantum technologies are conspicuously missing from this piece. 
“Quantum” seems “nano,” but it implies technology that relies on particles much 
smaller than nanometer scales (hence, the lack of attention given to it in this essay). 
Nonetheless, some quantum topics are worthy of discussion in the NT context. 
Atomic clocks represent technology clearly in this category, but what about quantum 
computing? Because of operating systems and software challenges, quantum 
computing will likely not be a game changer for forward operations until 2025 or 
beyond.46 That said, quantum computing will be a key to AI advancement because of 
the power limitations that currently hamper high-performance computing technology. 
This piece also used “quantum” in another context. Breaking and reforming chemical 
bonds in a way that machines can control over large areas or in large volumes will be 
the basis for “nanomachines and nanopattering” at scales far smaller than current 
semiconductor or nanoimprint technologies. Atomic bonds are at the quantized state 
of matter, e.g. the particles that make up the atom. This author believes the new 
devices and form factors created by subnanotechnology, such as controlling bond 
breakage and formation precisely, will be revolutionary.
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C H A P T E R  1 4
The Disruptive Potential of Advanced Energetics
Bryce C. Tappan and Patrick R. Bowden
Introduction to Energetic Materials: Propellants, Explosives, and Pyrotechnics
As we introduce the concepts associated with advanced energetics for special 
operations forces (SOF), it is important to have a brief understanding of energetic 
materials and their historical relevance and advances before exploring related 
emerging technologies and their strategic latency. The “energetic materials” family 
consists of three categories: propellants, explosives, and pyrotechnics. The first two 
categories, propellants and explosives, rely on many of the same basic ingredients 
and design techniques and differ primarily on whether the charge is ignited via 
a thermal ignition to induce deflagration (burning) or a strong shock to initiate 
detonation. Meanwhile, pyrotechnics encompass thermites, intermetallics, fireworks, 
gas generators, and delay compositions, to name a few.
To a large degree, the chemical design of propellants and explosive relies on the 
elements carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen (CHNO), with chlorine present in 
oxidizers that have the perchlorate anion (as with ammonium perchlorate). Metals can 
be added to increase the overall heat of reaction; most often, this metal is aluminum 
(Al) but can also be other elements such as silicon (Si), magnesium, or titanium. On 
the other hand, pyrotechnics utilize a vast number of elements to provide different 
effects, such as heat, color, light, burning rate, or desired metal formation. 
Through the years, research in explosives chemistry has led to advances in 
energetic materials, including materials that have nearly twice the energy density of 
2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT)—such as hexanitrohexaazaisowurtzitane (CL-20)—or have 
greater power than TNT but are extremely insensitive to accidental initiation—such 
as 5-nitro-1,2-dihydro-1,2,4-triazol-3-one (NTO) or 1,3,5-triamino-2,4,6-trinitrobenzene 
(TATB). NTO and TATB find use in insensitive munitions and insensitive high-explosive 
(HE) formulations. However, research continues in the development new HE materials 
that perform as well or better than 1,3,5,7-tetranitro-1,3,5,7-tetrazocine (HMX) but are 
also insensitive to shock, impact, and friction, like TATB. One method to achieve this 
goal has focused on the preparation of high nitrogen heteroaromatics because they 
tend to have high enthalpy of formation values; the higher nitrogen content often leads 
to slightly higher densities, which has led to outlier explosives such as 4,4’-dinitro-
3,3’-diazofuroxan (DAAF), with roughly the power of the explosive Composition B 
(Comp B) but little response to impact, spark, or friction.1 Explosive performance 
depends on density, but, to date, researchers investigating CHNO-type explosives have 
been able to achieve maximum densities of only 2 grams per cubic centimeter (g/cc), 
which is likely the physical limit.2
Adding metals, particularly aluminum, to explosives is a well-known practice, 
dating back to 1899 and 1900 in Germany with the first suggested use of Al as an 
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explosives additive.3 Metals are added simply to realize greater energy densities in 
one of several regimes of the explosive process. Explosive regimes can be divided 
into three basic temporal stages: prompt reaction in the detonation (nanosecond to 
microsecond [ns-µs], i.e., within the Chapman-Jouguet [C-J] chemical reaction zone); 
reaction in the postdetonation early-expansion phase (4-10 µs); and late reaction 
contributing to blast effects (1-100s of milliseconds [ms]).
Work on mixtures of TNT and Al, termed tritonals, began as early as 1914 and was 
extensive by World War II, when the United States and British researchers discovered 
great effects in the third temporal regime of blast without detrimental effects to 
the prompt detonation regime.4 Because of a lack of acceleration in detonation 
wave speed, the energetics community commonly believes no Al participation exists 
at the C-J plane. However, work by Melvin Cook et al. in the 1950s demonstrated 
that replacement of Al with an inert surrogate, like sodium chloride (NaCl), actually 
increased detonation velocity. Therefore, he postulated Al does react in the C-J plane; 
however, it is kinetically limited to endothermic reactions.5 In contrast, later work 
by Gert Bjarnholt et al. did not see as significant a difference in detonation velocity 
when Al was substituted for the inert surrogate lithium fluoride (LiF) in TNT/RDX 
(cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine) admixtures.6 However, this work showed a 55 percent 
increase in cylinder-wall velocity for late-time expansion for Al-added formulations 
versus an inert surrogate, with Al contribution roughly 4 µs after the passage of the 
C-J plane.7 This observation correlated well with the work of Milton Finger et al. as well 
as others, given a small enough particle size of Al.8 
Modern high-performance munitions applications typically contain explosives 
designed to provide short-lived high-pressure pulses for prompt structural damage 
or metal pushing, such as the HMX-based materials PBXN-14 or PBX 9501. Another 
important class of explosives, however, includes those designed for longer-lived blast 
output (enhanced blast) via late-time metal-air or metal-detonation-product reactions. 
An example of an enhanced blast explosive, PBXN-109, contains only 64 weight 
percent (wt%) RDX and includes Al particles as a fuel, bound by 16 wt% rubbery 
polymeric binder. The low wt% RDX results in diminished detonation performance, 
but later-time Al/binder burning produces increased air blast. To the extreme of 
metal reaction-based energetic materials are a separate class of fuel rich energetic 
materials referred to as “thermobaric” explosives, in which the metal loading can 
range from 30 wt% to as high as 90 wt%.9 These explosives are fundamentally 
different from other enhanced-blast HE. As with such high metal loading, they are far 
from stoichiometric in terms of metal oxidation with detonation products; additionally, 
they have considerably lower detonation temperature and pressure, which also affect 
metal oxidation rates.10 Therefore, such materials are well suited for late-time blast 
and thermal effects but not for metal acceleration. 
A rare but fundamentally important class of materials that has only recently 
been exploited, known as “combined-effects” explosives, combine the favorable 
initial work output from the early pressure profile of a detonation wave with late-time 
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burning or blast and rely on specific ratios of metal to explosive as well as metal 
type/morphology and binder type. Preliminary results by the US Army Research, 
Development and Engineering Laboratory at Picatinny demonstrate both high metal-
pushing capability and high blast ability are achieved by combining small size Al 
particles, conventional high-explosive crystals, and reactive polymer binders.11 
Researchers believe this combination is effective because the small particles of Al 
enhance the kinetic rates associated with diffusion-controlled chemistry; additionally, 
the ratio of Al to explosive was found to be of utmost importance. It was determined 
that at levels of ≥ 20 wt% Al, the metal reactions did not contribute to cylinder-wall 
velocity.12 This result is not only counterintuitive but also an indication that for metal-
acceleration applications, the bulk of current military explosives containing Al are far 
from optimal. To fully optimize combined-effects explosive, scientists would have to 
develop a system in which the binder is either all energetic/reactive or completely 
replaced with a high-performance explosive. Furthermore, while a fair amount of 
research has been performed on Al reactions in explosives, little is understood about 
the reaction of Si and boron (B) in postdetonation environments.
The Limits of Chemical Energy
To understand the disruptive potential of advanced energetics we must take a 
realistic approach to understanding what limitations we face from energy storage in 
chemical bonding. Explosive power is derived from three simple concepts held within 
their molecular structure: how much energy is held within the chemical bonds,i how 
much energy can be derived from the oxidization of the fuel molecules carbon and 
hydrogen,ii and how densely packed all of these molecules are.iii
TNT is the benchmark explosive to which we compare others, not because of its 
performance, but because of historical usage, ability to be melt-cast, relative insensitivity, 
and high chemical stability. Those qualities combined with a simple synthesis from cheap 
commodity chemicals enabled TNT to be produced at massive scales and used as a 
single component explosive or as a base in materials such as Comp B (60 wt% TNT + 
40 wt% RDX), pentolite (50 wt% TNT + 50 wt% PETN) or tritonal (80 wt% TNT + 20 wt% 
Al powder), to name a few. Fast-forward 100 years or more after the first use of TNT as 
an explosive, and the most state-of-the-art explosive available is CL-20, which has less 
than 2 times the energy per unit volume as TNT and resides near the limit of practical 
chemical energy for a CHNO molecule. Other examples exist that may be slightly higher in 
energy than CL-20, such as hexanitrobenzene or octanitrocubane (1.999 and 2.35 times 
TNT, respectively), but their difficult and expensive synthesis make them more expensive 
than gold by weight, and their sensitivity and stability would likely limit their utility to 
explosives of only academic interest.
i   Referred to as enthalpy, or heat of formation.
ii   Referred to as the oxygen balance of the molecule.
iii   Referred to as the theoretical maximum density or TMD.
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These facts lead us to a simple thought exercise: if we have HMX that is 1.54 
times TNT, why not just use 25 percent more in a munition to achieve the same 
lethality as CL-20 for a fraction of the cost? This thought exercise has merits in 
many circumstances but is actually flawed in some, which leads us to more in-depth 
consideration of the effects of energetic materials, entire system consideration, and 
the economics of lethality, discussed below. 
In other approaches discussed in this chapter, the addition of reactive metals 
is applied to enhance the energy of explosives. In Figure 1, we see the energetic 
potential of some elements based on their heat of combustion with oxygen.13
Figure 1. From Lindsay-Fajardo: “The Pyromaniac’s Periodic Table,” where the length of a side of each element’s box 
(black) is proportional to the energy of oxidation per unit volume from the element’s standard state. The dashed 
blue boxes indicate the energy of oxidation relative to the “free-atom limit,” or the available energy if no bonding 
existed between individual elements.14
Figure 1 is an excellent visual aid from seminal work by Lindsay and Fajardo,15 for 
indicating how much chemical energy is available for the combustion of elements in 
the first three rows of the periodic table. It also illustrates the “free-atom limit”—
which is the energy tied up in the covalent or metallic bonding of the standard 
material—for oxidizing beryllium, B, and carbon atoms. However, no strategies exist to 
exploit this potential energy because of the physical constraints in chemical bonding. 
In other words, like single people, free atoms do not like to hang around with one 
another without seriously bonding.
Sensitivity Constraints of Energetic Materials
All explosives have geometric constraints on their functionality in detonation. Referred 
to as critical diameter/thickness or failure diameter/thickness, energetic materials 
can only sustain a detonation above a threshold condition. These conditions are 
dictated primarily by energetic functionality sensitivity, but also by structure, chemistry, 
proximity of oxidizer and fuel, and density factor in substantially. As a general rule 
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of thumb, materials that are more sensitive to stimuli—be it shock, impact, or 
friction—tend to have weaker bonds that are more prone to breaking. Thus, molecular 
explosives containing azido or peroxy bonds are most susceptible to initiation, 
followed by nitrate esters, nitramines, and nitroaliphatics.
When a material is “below its critical diameter,” a detonation will fail because the 
size is too small. As a detonation propagates through a cylindrical explosive rate stick, 
curvature of the shock front develops as a result of edge effects (the boundary between 
the explosive and the confiner—for example, air, plastic, metal). The detonation is 
always driven orthogonally to the shock front. Thus, when curvature develops, less 
energy transmits axisymmetrically. As the diameter decreases, curvature becomes more 
pronounced, and eventually, too much energy is “lost” by the shock front being driven 
outward (instead of in the direction of propagation) and the rate stick will fail; hence, 
critical diameter has been reached. Since energy is required to drive the chemical-
decomposition reaction of a detonation, the quicker the bonds break and reform into 
oxidized gaseous products (CO, CO2, H2O, N2), the smaller the critical diameter will be. 
Thus, weaker bonds have smaller activation energies, thus allowing explosives to have 
smaller critical diameters, see Table 1 for additional information.
TABLE 1. BOND DISSOCIATION ENERGIES 
Family Energetic Functionality Activation Energy (kcal/mol)
Nitroaliphatics C-NO2 70
Nitramines N-NO2 47
Nitrate Esters O-NO2 40
Peroxy O-O 35
Azido M-N3 30
High Nitrogen Compounds N-O-N; N-O-N-O 20-50
Energy Release in Energetic Materials
The measure of energy in an explosive is not an absolute quantity that can be used 
to compare all explosives; rather, the type of energy release must be considered. For 
example, simple black powder, the first explosive material formulated by humans, 
is a low explosive and does not detonate. However, it gets used in pipe bombs, 
where it certainly can deliver lethal effect. If one were to try to measure its explosive 
equivalency via a “plate dent” test, which measures the detonation pressure of an 
explosive, it would not dent the plate and therefore register as zero. Thus, other 
tests, such as ballistic pendulum, must be used to obtain a measure of performance 
in which that material can compete. The same goes for fuel-air explosive devices, 
possibly the most powerful explosives available when considering weight of material 
delivered to target. However, unless one measures air blast within or near the 
detonating gas cloud, it would be difficult to quantify explosive energy. So, let us 
consider where the lethal effects of an explosive are experienced.
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Figure 2. Graphical depiction of the basic effects of an explosion, with near-, mid- and far-field damage occurring 
from direct-pressure effects, thermal radiation within the fireball, fragmentation, and blast-wave damage. 
Aerobic-Phase Energetic Materials
A general class of explosives for enhanced energy release can be thought of as 
aerobic, or air-breathing, materials. The conceptual function of these materials is 
that if you utilize ambient air as an oxidizer for the fuel contained within the explosive 
device, then you can carry more energy to the target. Most explosives carry there own 
oxygen to detonate (exceptions are materials like the azides, acetylides, and high-
nitrogen molecules that rely only on highly positive heats of formation to decompose), 
and those with the greatest detonation pressure are able to burn all the the hydrogen 
to water and the carbon to either carbon monoxide or carbon dioxide. To put this in 
perspective, if you had to carry all of the air (23 percent oxygen by weight) to burn a 
gallon of fuel, you would have to carry over 100 pounds in addition to that gallon of 
fuel! Generally speaking, aerobic materials fit into the categories of thermobarics, 
enhanced blast explosives, combined effects explosives and fuel-air explosives.
Thermobaric explosives can be thought of as weakly detonating or even 
nondetonable materials often distributed with a strong, high-explosive center booster. 
Enhanced blast explosives are fuel-rich metal-containing detonable explosives. 
Combined-effect explosives are metallized explosives formulated in such a way that 
metal reaction will not only enhance blast but also accelerate metal. Finally, fuel-air 
explosives consist of a explosively distributed fuel with a second explosive event 
that will initiate a detonation in the mixed fuel-air cloud. Figure 3 illustrates the basic 
philosophy of when and how much blast pressure releases in the general categories 
of explosives. For simplicity, the TBX:EBX and CEX peak pressures are depicted as 
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Figure 3. Idealized graphic on blast function of HE, TBXs, and FAEs, modified from David Frost and Fan Zhang. 
Primarily, HE will always provide a higher peak pressure, while TBX materials and FAEs will each have lower peak 
pressure but longer sustained pressure, leading to higher impulse. Most US and Canadian research, however, has 
indicated that ideal TBX performance is rarely or never achieved. 
Fuel air explosives (FAEs) are a distinct category in which a fuel is distributed with 
an explosive and a secondary explosive charge will initiate a gas-phase detonation 
once fuel is mixed as optimally as possible with air. In terms of actual energy 
delivered per weight of munition, FAEs are the highest-energy explosive system, but 
they have a limited target set because of the type of impulse possible, with low 
peak pressures, as seen in Figure 3. However, they do have certain applications that 
produce devastating effects to large-area soft targets, such as exposed troops and 
unhardened structures, as in the iconic China Lake test seen in Figure 4. While large 
area targets may not be common for SOF, it is worth noting that developing nation-
states may master this technology for use against US SOF. Often, FAEs are referred to 
as the “poor-man’s nuke,” based on the idea that the energy release is between that 
of a conventional HE and a nuclear weapon. While in some respects this may be true, 
in reality, the energy released is astronomically closer to a standard explosive than 
even the smallest tactical nuclear weapon.
Blast Pressure (atm)
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Figure 4. FAE munition testing China Lake, circa 1970
Despite not being widely adopted by the military, FAEs have captured the 
imagination of cinema and state-level propaganda. In Figures 5 and 6, we see the 
examples in the movies Outbreak (1995) and The Incredible Hulk (2003). 
Figure 5. Fictional FAE munition attack for viral outbreak area decontamination, Outbreak (1995).
Perhaps one of the more accurate fictional depictions of a FAE is shown in Figure 6 in 
The Incredible Hulk, which was clearly adapted from the China Lake test shown in Figure 
4. As one would expect, Hulk, representing the hard target, sustains little damage.
Figure 6. Fictional FAE munition attack on the Hulk. Ironically, the frames display the ineffectiveness  
of FAEs against hard targets.
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In 2007, a FAE device used in Russia propaganda straddles fact and fiction (Figure 
7). While it is not impossible that such a device was developed, the comparison of the 
Russia “Father of All Bombs” and the American “Massive Ordnance Air Blast” is not 
accurate, and lethality mechanisms will differ.
Figure 7. Russian Television coverage of FAE munition deemed “Father of All Bombs.”
Reactive Materials and Structural Composites
Efforts to obtain greater energy output from explosives have largely plateaued since the 
1980s with the synthesis of dense nitramine explosives and optimization in metallized 
formulations to provide enhanced metal pushing and blast effects. Therefore, to deliver 
more energy to target, scientists and engineers have turned to replacing normally inert 
components with reactive materials, thus imparting greater blast energy from either 
anaerobic or aerobic reactions.
In fiscal year 2015, Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL) successfully developed and 
tested a new reactive case concept using a 
simple, affordable, and effective design based 
on aluminum foil rolled and bound with either 
an energetic binder or epoxy. Figure 8 shows a 
scanning electron microscopy (SEM) image of a 
case cross section. The authors hypothesized 
the shock from the detonating HE would 
fragment the foil into extra fine Al particulates, 
free of a protective oxide layer (inherent to Al 
that is exposed to air), that would oxidize with air following an observable delay in 
ignition. The high-speed video records collected during testing showed better-than-
expected results, with extremely prompt ignition of Al foil material and no perceivable 
delay. Reactive cases, were produced and filled with a high-energy cast-cure plastic-
bonded explosive developed at LANL, which is based on HMX and micron-sized Al 
Figure 8. Cross section of Al foil epoxy-rolled 
case, showing Al thickness of ~22 µm.
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bound with a glycidyl azide polymer (GAP) binder system. As shown in Figure 9 (right 
image), the combination of reactive case, bound by an inert epoxy, and LANL explosive 
substantially outperformed the baseline steel case, during blast overpressure testing.
Figure 9. Testing of reactive cases: Baseline in steel case (left) and LANL Al-Foil reactive case (right).
Such devices that provide dramatic enhancement in blast can produce a significant 
advantage in targets such as cave structures and bunkers where fragmentation 
devices are ineffective because of the lack of line of sight. This is of particular utility 
in battlefield scenarios that SOF’s may encounter such as cave networks seen in 
Afghanistan, utilized in part by adversaries such as the Taliban. In fact, much of the 
historical development of these and other anerobic munitions has been driven by 
this need, first by the Soviet Union, and later the United States. Because the reactive 
material also displaces structural materials, weight gains can be realized over 
existing munitions. The same philosophy can be applied in reactive fragmentation, as 
discussed in the following section. 
Reactive Fragmentation—Bringing Energy to Target
Reactive fragmentation cases are similar to reactive cases, but unlike the cases 
described above designed for prompt reaction, reactive fragmentation cases are 
designed to create large, fragments that will react upon impact with a target, 
essentially delivering more energy at the site of impact. These materials have 
significant utility against thin-skinned targets such as automobiles, aircraft, or 
missiles. Various Department of Defense (DoD) branches have funded this line 
of research, namely the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Office of Naval 
Research. The reactive chemistry applied is typically the same as that used for 
thermites and intermetallics or fuel-oxidizer mixtures with a highly electropositive 
metal (e.g., Al, Mg, Ti) mixed with a fluorocarbon binder system. While much of this 
technology will find antimissile or anti-aircraft applications, the utility for SOF is in 
enhanced energy delivery to automobiles both in standoff and emplaced munitions. 
The primary challenges of reactive fragmentation are obtaining a fragment 
density that comes close to the steel being replaced as a munition casing, providing 
sufficient strength to survive detonation and fragment launch, and still provide 
reaction upon target impact. This criteria, while difficult to achieve, provides significant 
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advantages when performed correctly. In roughly 2011, Dahlgren Naval Support Facility 
demonstrated that High-Density Reactive Material (HDRM), a material with “the strength 
of aluminum, density of steel, and more than one and a half times the energy of TNT” 
could have dramatic effects for delivery of energy on target, and produce an enabling 
technology (Figure 10).16 Efforts to commericalize such technologies are still ongoing, as 
is the case with companies suchs as MATSYS Inc., as also is illustated in Figure 10.17
Figure 10. Graphical depictions of reactive fragments releasing energy upon impact with thin-skinned targets, photo 
credit ONR Press Release 2011,18 left, and MATSYS Inc., right.19
It is not hard to imagine the advantages this technology could bring SOF, both in 
defense of position and against offensive targets. Like many technologies, if a greater 
effect can be produced from less material, then a lower weight will be required in a 
munition. Thus, a missile can be made to fly farther and give a range advantage over 
an adversary, or, likewise, an operator will have less weight to carry for the same 
delivered effects on target.
Nanomaterials: Enabling New Reaction Pathways
Like in any technical community, new discoveries or advancements will lead to trends 
or temporary excitement and, sometimes, even advancement of the field as a whole. 
The overall excitement in the wider scientific community about nanomaterials that 
gained momentum in the 1990s also made a significant impact in the energetics 
research community. From this, many new discoveries were made, primarily utilizing 
nanoparticulate aluminum metal (nAl), most notably in materials such as nanothermites, 
which enabled reaction rates up to 1000 times faster than conventionally sized 
counterparts.20 However, this does not also equate to higher energy release, a point 
commonly misconstrued. As discussed previously, hard limits exist to energy content 
stored within chemicals, and no changes in physical form will alter that. Despite this, 
no shortage of researchers have made erroneous claims based on either perfidy or 
simple lack of understanding of the basic physical chemistry of the processes at hand. 
Many claims were introduced that because of the small particle size, an enhanced 
surface energy was produced, exceeding that of the available chemical energy. While 
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there is theoretical basis for the hypothesis that surface energy increases as particle 
size decreases, the realization of these claims was quickly debunked. As a general 
approach, without detailed information about particle size and surface energy, the 
surface energy of the bulk material should be considered.21
Advances in energetic materials, like in all technology fields, are perpetual (for 
now). There are always properties to enhance, whether through increased performance 
or insensitivity or optically switchable, optically initiable, melt-castable, more 
environmentally friendly, or higher-energy-per-unit-volume technology. As such, the 
field of energetics, although stagnant in certain realms, continues to thrive in others. 
Additionally, by enabling new reaction pathways, nanoenergetics have the ability to 
allow materials not typically recognized as explosive ingredients to be used, opening 
up use in hybrid and gray-zone conflicts. 
Special Applications of Explosives
When we consider the opportunity to interject an explosive material into an ordinary 
object, we must consider critical diameter of the chosen energetic-material formulation. 
For small items, explosives that have large critical diameters would not be effective. 
Formulations also must be considered for their ability to maintain a small critical 
diameter. Typically, for a formulation to flow and be castable (into a shape), solids 
loading typically maxes out at ~80 wt%; thus, 20 wt% is binder. For any explosive, the 
more diluent (i.e., inert binder) added, the larger the critical diameter becomes. As such, 
emphasis on creating detonable binder systems is of great importance for maintaining 
critical diameters close to those of neat crystalline high explosives.
Common cast-cure explosives can be similar to rocket propellants, utilizing 
hydroxy-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB) as the primary binder component, along with 
isocyanates and plasticizers. Energetic polymers, such as GAP, 3,3-bis(azidomethyl)
Figure 11. Chess pieces cast with explosives.
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oxetane (BAMO), and 3-azidomethyl-1,3,-methyl oxetane (AMMO) have become more 
popular for developing cast-cure formulations (albeit, mostly rocket propellants). 
Typically, these polymers are not detonable on their own, nor are they merely “dead 
weight” to keep an energetic formulation together. However, the substitution of inert 
binders (e.g., HTPB, epoxy), with energetic polymers, such as GAP, can have realized 
effects on critical diameter. As a result, objects with fine, small features can be 
cast or printed (via additive manufacturing) with fidelity such that all material will be 
consumed in a detonation of the object.
Producing cast replicas of everyday objects is easy, as evidenced by Figure 
11. First, the inert article was cast into a relatively rubbery material (e.g., Shore 
Hardness 20, 40, or 60). Once a two-part mold is obtained, the HE/binder system is 
cast into the mold(s) and allowed to cure; curing times depend on the binder: epoxy 
takes minutes, whereas most GAP-based systems requires hours or days. The color 
associated with items can be changed easily; chemists refer to this as “a little bit 
of color goes a long way,” meaning < 0.1 wt% of added coloring agent will cause 
drastic changes in color without altering performance, resulting in an item innocuous 
in appearance but capable of sustaining a detonation if a 
detonator were placed on it. 
Other methods of introducing explosives into items 
include printing the material or spray casting explosives 
onto parts. Recent advances in additive manufacturing have 
resulted in explosive formulations that can be used in either 
direct-ink write (DIW) or fused deposition modeling (FDM) 
printing. Both of these allow internal structure to be printed, 
resulting in control of detonation propagation or reduction of 
part weight, and even printing of open access files, such as 
the Stanford Bunny (Figure 12).22 Spray casting can be used 
to coat structural components, increasing their flammability 
and/or creating a detonable layer. Spray casting requires 
the explosive to be soluble in a given solvent (e.g., PETN 
in acetone) and also the explosive to be detonable in thin 
layers (i.e., critical thickness must be very small). 
Figure 12. An example of 
using open-access print files in 
energetic printing. The Stanford 
Bunny produced from an FDM-
based explosive material.23 
Machine Learning/Artificial Intelligence 
A machine learning/artificial intelligence (ML/AI) system to develop synthetic 
pathways for explosives with all the desired traits would be one of the most powerful 
and disruptive technologies ever developed. In such a system, a supercomputer with 
ML/AI algorithms,24 perhaps coupled with an automated chemical synthesis machine, 
could quickly run through candidate molecules and provide a means to produce them 
quickly and safely. Desired properties might be selected as high-power/high-density, 
high-power/low sensitivity, high-power/cheap, melt-castable TNT replacements, or 
environmentally friendly synthetic pathways, to name a few. To be able to circumvent 
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the need to train chemists and other scientists and technicians, run costly labs with 
huge infrastructure costs, eliminate environmental effects (quickly becoming the 
cost drivers in most countries), and perform long-term research in mere hours would 
enable the country that developed the technology to dominate energetic materials. 
However, thankfully for us explosives scientists still consisting of flesh and blood, the 
input data to produce such ML/AI algorithms simply does not exist yet. Of the world’s 
known explosives, few have been studied at the level of detail needed to populate 
such a system, and much of the literature includes dubious or misleading information, 
which would spoil the ML/AI algorithm. While this may not be something we see in 
the near term, because such a concept does not defy first principles, it will be part of 
humanity’s future, as long as we do not suffer a great social collapse by other means 
first. Future SOF applications of such technologies, along with additive manufacturing, 
could be miniature custom munition factories on forward operating bases or on off 
shore factory ships. 
Concluding Remarks
This chapter, to paraphrase Lindsay-Fajardo, intends to ground expectations in the 
ability for obtaining greater chemical energy storage in energetic materials and 
to provide a realistic lens in which we view possible strategic latency in energetic 
materials. With the advent of molecules such as CL-20 that have densities around 
2 g/cc, and more exotic molecules such as hexanitrobenzene or octanitrocubane, 
we can still only achieve around 2 times TNT equivalence. Exotic means of energy 
storage might include free-radical stabilization, metastable helium, metallic hydrogen, 
polynitrogens, extended molecular solids,25 or even matter-antimatter annihilation. 
However, research efforts in the United States and worldwide have resulted in only 
some validation of theoretical concepts or experiment confirmations at extreme 
financial cost and enormous energy input.
Therefore, strategies for disruptive energetic production have turned to the more 
physically obtainable concepts such as insensitive explosives with power near high-
energy explosives—this would allow more ordnance closer to front lines in major 
conflicts as well as open up trade space in powerful armor penetrating munitions. 
Because they use ambient air, fuel-air explosives/thermobarics have a higher 
theoretical energy to target than standard high explosives; however, work output is 
different and not directly comparable. Reactive cases could provide up to four times 
blast energy over a steel-cased munition of equal size, but no lethal fragments, so 
uses would likely be in caves or structures in which fragments are easily blocked. 
Reactive fragments could provide much greater energy on target and could prove 
effective against soft-skinned targets like missiles, aircraft, and automobiles.
Special applications of explosives is another area that could provide disruptive 
advances in energetics (for SOF), with the ability to produce quickly special shapes or 
configurations of tools or devices that would be able to hide in plain sight, be difficult 
to detect, or utilize energetics where inert plastics otherwise would have been used.
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Finally, machine learning/artificial intelligence is a far-future concept that could 
provide a nation-state with a quantum advancement in energetic-materials chemistry. 
As we look to the future of explosives, propellants, and pyrotechnics, we must not fail 
to observe how they will be coupled with other disruptive technologies in development, 
such as autonomous weapon systems, unmanned aerial systems, and advanced 
guidance systems. As computational power increases and electronics become more 
and more miniaturized, perhaps the danger on the horizon is not how big an explosive 
effect will become but how well we can use a small amount in a specific and targeted 
fashion. The continued development of these smart energetic systems will enable 
the special operations forces of the future to continue to be the fastest, lightest, and 
most lethal known to the world.
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C H A P T E R  1 5
Metamaterials: How Close Are We to a Klingon Cloaking 
Device or Harry Potter Invisibility Cloak?
Michael Valley
Introduction
Life conditions us to believe and react to what we see, hear, and feel; however, 
metamaterials may one day challenge our reliance on senses, as scientists mold 
material behaviors with alchemy-like outcomes to get the edge on nature. Such 
advances inspire dreams of invisibility cloaks, realizing fictional technologies from the 
universes of Harry Potter and Star Trek. Then again, this sleight of hand would require 
us to bend light and energy to our will. Clearly this is not possible—or is it? This 
chapter examines the burgeoning field of metamaterials and implications for special 
operations forces (SOF).
The United States is not alone in its pursuit of metamaterials. Both rapid strides in 
global technology and dynamic adversary posture shifts contribute to future mission 
environment uncertainties. Preserving our national security advantage, deterring 
foreign actions, mitigating countermeasures, and ensuring adversaries share our 
confidence in SOF capabilities dictate we possess disruptive technologies. The 
United States holds unrivaled responsive alternatives, but technological superiority 
is perishable. Metamaterials have the potential to provide asymmetric advantages to 
erode the value of foreign technology advances. We must understand how to use them 
to our advantage and how to diminish their effectiveness when employed against us. 
Metamaterials may drive us to rethink everything about battlespace technologies.
When metamaterials emerged is debatable, since mankind has long worked to 
improve materials, though the term’s use has been prevalent for only a few decades. 
What is clear is the accelerating pace of metamaterial developments and the promise 
they hold. Pioneering work by Victor Veselago and others stirred beliefs about the 
possibility of creating materials to control electromagnetic waves, providing the 
foundation for visions of metamaterial-enabled devices with tailored optical and 
energy-wave control abilities.1 Since the turn of the twenty-first century, progress in 
the ability to study metamaterial behavior down to atomic size scales has contributed 
scientific insights that led to the creation of powerful design tools.
Parallel advances in the synthesis of new materials and advanced manufacturing 
helped material designers translate their concepts into amazing fabricated parts. 
This rapid progress has excited researchers far and wide. Indeed, metamaterials 
is a dynamic, worldwide research topic with over 25,000 publications since 2000. 
Unfortunately, the greatest metamaterial research growth is outside the United States, 
with 80 percent of publications coming from China since 2015. Breakthroughs are 
being incorporated into national security applications. What is already achievable 
is noteworthy but nothing compared to what is on the horizon for this materials 
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revolution. Our fascination with metamaterials has just begun and will grow as their 
use becomes more common. 
Herein, we do not review metamaterial literature, which go back a century. Many 
publications summarize key breakthroughs in topical areas within the metamaterials 
genre. Representative overviews can be found in “The Century of Metamaterials,” 
“Mechanical Metamaterials Associated with Stiffness, Rigidity and Compressibility:  
A Brief Review,” and “3D Metamaterials.”2
Unraveling the Metamaterial Mystery:  
Magical, Mythical, or Simply Marvelous?
Figure 1. Metamaterial versus a natural material.
The definition of what constitutes a metamaterial continues to evolve as creative 
researchers push the boundaries of science and manufacturing, allowing us to 
translate the art of the possible to field what has long seemed impossible. Essentially, 
as shown in figure 1, metamaterials are natural materials fashioned to deliver 
unconventional properties through the integration of small engineered structures—
often called meta-atoms—whose feature size can approach dimensions thousands of 
times smaller than the width of a human hair. The achievable material properties and 
behaviors resulting from the atomic and microstructural additions and rearrangements 
depends on the blend of the constituent materials and the small-scale structural 
arrangement of those materials achieved through precise manufacturing methods. 
The possible combinations are limitless! Today’s metamaterials demonstrate tunable, 
reconfigurable, and spatially variable behaviors that go far beyond the well-recognized 
characteristics of even the most advanced “smart” materials. 
Indeed, progress in design tools and manufacturing sciences enables us to 
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including the ability to adjust individual atoms. Though manipulating atoms can be a 
powerful method for creating some materials, we are not limited to fabricating devices 
with molecular-scale structures. Additive manufacturing can assemble metamaterial 
products with features from grain scales (100-200 nanometer [nm] building-block 
size using a Nanoscribe three-dimensional [3D] printer) to centimeters or larger as 
manufacturing build volumes expand to meter scales. These larger sizes still manifest 
amazing properties, as has been demonstrated in reinforced composites, printed 
lattices, compression pads, optics, and more.
Though the ability to manufacture ultralarge metamaterial structures has been 
elusive, developers will achieve this capability within the foreseeable future. Even 
today, metamaterial-based technologies are making it to the marketplace within the 
defense and national security, telecommunications, consumer electronics, medical, 
environmental, and energy industries (e.g., solar, batteries, energy storage). 
A desirable and well-recognized metamaterial characteristic is their ability to 
be designed to control energy flow—how much energy is reflected, absorbed or 
dampened, transmitted, redirected through steering or focusing, or filtered as a 
function of wavelength or frequency. Energy-flow control is achievable across the 
electromagnetic regime, providing utility in the optical, infrared (IR), microwave, 
radio-frequency (RF), and radar domains. Similarly, energy-flow control is possible 
for mechanical, acoustic, and thermal energy. Imagine if we could capture energy of 
interest and regulate what happens to the undesirable energy. It is this aspect of 
metamaterials that inspires hope for invisibility cloaks. Though large-scale cloaking 
has not yet materialized, the practical value of energy-flow control provides new 
functionalities that govern device behaviors, as well as material signatures and 
observables. The energy manipulation attributes of metamaterials holds the promise 
of delivering capabilities to strengthen SOF technology options in an uncertain and 
rapidly changing global environment.
Metamorphic Manufacturing
 Metamaterial characterization capabilities, combined with state-of-the-art testing 
systems, elucidate relationships between engineered microstructures and their 
resulting material performance, helping design mature modeling software that 
captures the phenomenology that drives material behavior. It is important to 
understand the underlying physics to use these materials confidently. The ability 
to capture small-scale attributes is particularly important, because metamaterial 
properties are governed by their constituents’ fundamental material physical 
properties, inclusions and defects, shape, and the characteristics of integrated 
engineered material substructures. 
Early on, researchers chiefly fabricated metamaterials using particle-beam 
lithography (e.g., electron-beam, focused-ion-beam lithography). Lithography 
remains an important fabrication method as developments overcome its historic 
limitations. Today, there are more than a dozen lithography options, each addressing 
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a specific fabrication need. Unfortunately, the size of what can be made is only a 
few centimeters. This is not to infer lithography is not viable for creating disruptive 
technologies. Consider, for example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) EXTREME project that uses membrane projection lithography to construct 
3D metamaterial structures with the intent of developing compact conformal, 
hyperspectral, and night-vision technologies.3 The utility would be immense for a 
reconfigurable, small, low-power, lightweight device that provides simultaneous 
multispectral, polarimetric, and classical imaging.
Additive manufacturing is poised to fabricate products orders of magnitude larger 
than what lithography can produce. For example, though not using a metamaterial, Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory printed an entire car body in a day. Additive-manufacturing 
systems provide controlled fabrication of 3D structures using polymers, metals, 
ceramics, and multimaterial combinations, as well as metamaterials. These machines 
provide submicron resolution or large build volumes, but typically not both at the 
same time; however, the pace of innovation in additive manufacturing, driven by a 
worldwide market exceeding $20 billion annually, will rapidly advance metamaterial 
manufacturing in the 2020s.4 Forecasted systems will fabricate metamaterials 
measured in meters with improved fabrication tolerances. 
Additive-manufacturing systems fabricate parts not achievable through conventional 
methods. They take advantage of design concepts such as topological optimization5 
to construct components customized for the mission need while increasing strength, 
decreasing size and weight, and providing shape agility for novel packaging and form 
factors. Considerable efforts are underway to expand additive-manufacturing material-
feedstock choices, which will extend technology development options. For example, 
chemists are synthesizing novel additive-manufacturing printer inks to create materials 
with unusual attributes to advance products such as flexible electronics. Further, 
state-of-the-art system controls are improving part quality and reducing the achievable 
feature size, which can be smaller than a micron. Nevertheless, fabricating large parts 
for defense and national security uses is still difficult. 
To overcome metal part size limits, researchers are crafting additive-manufacturing 
concepts that use multiple high-powered lasers to better control heating at increased 
fabrication speeds. Early tests show heating control reduces defect formation and 
controls the metal grain structure to achieve desired properties. Another advance 
is the Fraunhofer Institute for Laser Technology’s hybrid system, which combines 
conventional and additive-manufacturing processes to take advantage of each 
technologies’ best attributes. This system’s fabrication process chain increases 
manufacturing speed and achievable part size while ensuring consistent part quality 
and not compromising control of small features. 
For fabricating flexible electronics, roll-to-roll methods such Metamaterial 
Technologies Inc.’s Rolling Mask Lithography method and MICROGRAVURE printing 
are proving effective. These production-scale printing systems are cost-effective, 
flexible, and avoid chemical-etching issues. Active research in roll-to-roll printing 
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of metasurfaces continues.6 With breakthroughs in self-assembled nanomaterial 
synthesis methods and the invention of printable inks that fully embrace the periodic 
table, the roll-to-roll manufacturing methods will likely become a future workhorse for 
fabricating metamaterial surfaces. 
As demonstrated by the University of Delaware and the US Army Communications-
Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center, roll-to-roll systems can 
insert electromagnetic materials into large structural composites. This ability may 
prove impactful for building microwave devices and radomes with integrated, high-end 
antennas. Alternately, electromagnetic structures, including microwave metamaterials 
that integrate metals and dielectrics, can be fabricated with multimaterial additive-
manufacturing systems. For example, fused deposition modeling 3D printing can now 
generate high-quality gigahertz (GHz) microwave metamaterials, overcoming the need 
for metallization after printing.
Similarly, metamaterials can be spun into fabric textiles using screen printing 
combined with standard composite processing methods. Lightweight metamaterial 
devices (e.g., communications, sensors, self-cooling) woven into uniforms could 
enhance soldier capabilities and reduce carried-gear weight.7
Metamaterials by Design
Until recently, exploiting the promise of metamaterials has challenged engineers and 
designers. Classical design methods require solving complex equations governing 
the multiscale, multiphysics behavior of the devices and materials of interest—a 
daunting task requiring high-powered computers and expertise in corresponding fields 
of science. Fortunately, tremendous progress in solution methods are easing design 
burdens. Technical-skill requirements are partially mitigated by commercial software 
that aids the design process. Examples include the ANSYS High Frequency Structure 
Simulator and COMSOL Multiphysics software, which use finite element methods to 
solve 3D-device design problems; however, some expertise and model iterations are 
needed to optimize device designs with these tools. 
An effective approach applied to lessen computational burdens and problem-
solving complexity in metamaterials design uses reduced-order models that simplify 
approximations to real-life processes while still capturing the core physics of the material 
phenomena being modeled. An example is the perturbative metamaterial method used 
to maximize dynamic metamaterial performance, such as dampening vibrations.8
Other design approaches overcoming metamaterial design challenges come from the 
field of artificial intelligence (AI). For example, a Tel Aviv University team demonstrated 
an AI deep-learning approach to nanophotonic metamaterials design.9 Similarly, a team 
from Pohang University of Science and Technology used a deep-learning-assisted inverse 
design method to improve the efficiency of designing photonic structures.10 These data-
driven artificial neural-network approaches reduce the number of iterations required to 
optimize a design. They are well suited to designs where the metamaterial devices will 
be quasi-static and where data is available to train the neural network.
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Determining how energy will flow in a structure is straightforward if you 
understand the governing equations or use a commercial design code. Regrettably, 
the possible design variations are innumerable, often requiring countless iterations 
to achieve an acceptable design. To overcome this challenge, developers have 
examined a new design paradigm called metamaterials-by-design (MBD).11 MBD 
considers the design process from an application-oriented perspective driven by the 
device’s performance requirements. In other words, MBD methods solve the inverse 
problem, starting with the end in mind and working backward. While this would seem 
logical, it is far from easy. 
Working metamaterial designs backward requires the use of optimization methods 
to find the best solution, given a myriad of design choices. Imagine finding the deepest 
dimple on a rough surface without measuring each one. This search challenge is similar 
to solving an inverse design problem. Many methods such as topological optimization 
tackle this hunt for the best design, though they still require many trials.12 Fortunately, 
a strategy called “modified error in constitutive equations,” together with an adjoint 
optimization solver for sensitivity calculations independent of the number of design 
variables, has proven efficient at finding the best solution without the need for either 
a supercomputer or many iterations.13 This approach has been validated under harsh 
mechanical test conditions. For example, a metamaterial designed with this approach 
and implemented with 3D additive manufacturing demonstrated three to five orders 
of magnitude reduction in shock and vibration wave-energy transmission and tunable 
frequency transmission across a 10 kilohertz (kHz) frequency range.14
The aforementioned approaches, though powerful, require technical expertise for 
proper use. It is well-known that metamaterial properties are tightly associated with 
the size, shape, composition, and internal distribution of the material constituents. 
Change the material’s internal structure slightly, and you are apt to create a 
different material response. This places a burden on the metamaterial’s design and 
manufacturing. To realize the potential of metamaterials requires we have practical, 
easy-to-use design tools, which is the goal of the DARPA Mirage program. As explained 
by Ihab El-Kady, the Mirage project lead:
Mirage is shifting the burden of design from the subject-matter expert to the 
practitioner. Emerging software users design science fiction–like materials with the 
same ease and efficiency that architects use when they draft building plans, speeding 
up metamaterials research and development (R&D). No longer is a large cross-
disciplinary team of experts required—you just need your imagination, and the new 
tool will do the rest. These nascent tools are driving a perspective shift in material 
selection and conventional design approaches.15
This design software achievement is exactly the breakthrough needed to 
accelerate the development and adoption of metamaterial-enabled devices. Currently, 
Mirage software is applied to electromagnetic metamaterial device designs, but 
efforts are underway to extend this software to acoustic and mechanical device 
design applications.
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Anticipating the Surprise and Realizing the Dream
Continued progress coupling material physics into user-friendly design tools and 
fabrication methods for metamaterials is enabling extraordinary control of the flow 
of energy to create lightweight, damage-tolerant, high-performance materials with 
attributes that have long been unreachable. The way creative designers are taking 
advantage of energy control mechanisms is making us reimagine what is possible. 
As illustrated in figure 2, and discussed below, the ways metamaterials can transform 
and augment SOF operations are steadily growing.
Figure 2. Metamaterials for diverse SOF applications.
While the greatest near-term use of metamaterials may be communications and 
radar systems, early signs indicate metamaterials will soon broadly proliferate into 
commercial and military products. For example, metamaterial super lenses may 
someday image details beyond diffraction limits for higher-resolution microscopes to 
study basic material sciences, as well as the physics of metamaterials themselves. 
With these lenses, we may push past manufacturing barriers to fabricate more capable 
microelectronics processors with smaller feature sizes, particularly if matched with 
materials such as phononic metamaterials that control thermal conduction attributes 
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lightweight flat optics for cameras and viewfinders. Researchers have demonstrated 
metamaterial optical resolution above 80 percent of diffraction limits, and products 
are making it to market. For example, firms such as Metalenz Inc., Phoebus 
Optoelectronics LLC, Nano-Meta Technologies, Inc., and Multiwave Technologies are 
incubating optical metamaterial technologies from lab to market at an increasing rate.
For microelectronics and electronic packaging, researchers at the Toyota Research 
Institute are developing thermal composite metamaterials for thermal energy cloaking 
and shielding, printed circuit-board temperature control, energy harvesting, and 
electrothermal power conversion for next-generation electronics, optoelectronics, and 
photonic devices.16 Also for microelectronics, magnetic metamaterials are helping 
developers move past silicon to field a new class of low-power transistors and 
superconductors for next-generation electronics and high-performance computers. 
These same electromagnetic metamaterials could lead to extreme magnetic field 
sensing for ground-penetrating radars, space-based and underwater magnetometers, 
and improved antiship missile-defense radar.
Though we currently cannot upsize metamaterial optical systems to larger scales, 
ongoing work will someday field more capable military reconnaissance systems, 
including agile spectral and polarization filters, and light-weight flat lenses. Possibly, 
designers will soon couple sparse array metamaterials with computational imaging 
software to field larger airborne and space optics. Already, metamaterials show 
promise in adaptive optics, laser-tracking antiglare, and laser protection coatings 
(e.g., Metamaterials Technologies Inc.); it is a matter of time before they expand 
into larger optical systems. 
Research is yielding improved resolution and measurement sensitivity in 
commercially available sensors. Examples including strain sensors, biomedical 
sensors (e.g., MRI, glucose sensors), optical gas sensors, ultrasonic imagers, 
and thermal imagers such as nanoantenna-enabled cameras that can boost the 
signal by up to three times and improve image quality by reducing dark current by 
up to 100 times. Evolv Technology employs metamaterials for imaging and high-
speed walkthrough firearm and explosive detection portals, which might enable 
portable entry control systems for gray-zone urban environments. Firms such as 
TeraView use metamaterials in a terahertz inspection system that is so sensitive 
it can determine paint thickness or find small defects at semiconductor device 
scales, possibly providing a process control or supply-chain trust-assurance tool. 
TeraView’s terahertz and millimeter-wave imaging systems extend from explosives 
detection and vehicle collision avoidance to higher-resolution radar and sonar 
systems. Also, for autonomous vehicle collision avoidance, Lumotive is developing 
solid-state Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) systems with a metamaterial 
beam-steering technology.
Visualize what is possible with responsive sensors attuned to their surroundings. 
Environmentally activated passive sensors can indicate package tampering (e.g., 
food, microelectronics, medical) to improve safety and trust in the international supply 
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chain. This capability could also activate remote devices autonomously when exposed 
to a targeted signal (e.g., heat, humidity, shock, vibration, RF).
Metamaterials can control mechanical energy, which is the energy source for what 
we feel from shocks, vibrations, impacts, and blast waves. Consider a woodpecker’s 
beak that impacts a tree about 20 times per second with a deceleration of 1200 g’s 
(“g” is acceleration due to gravity) without hurting itself.17 Metamaterials seek similar 
protective capabilities. The same principles that allow us to regulate sound can be 
employed to control how we absorb, reflect, focus, or redirect mechanical waves. 
Indeed, mechanical metamaterials have proved effective in rocket flights, isolating 
sensitive parts from dynamic flight loads. These same materials may reduce the 
jostling from a bumpy road by blocking the energy as it passes through tires, allowing 
military vehicles to speed through undeveloped regions safely and comfortably. 
Focusing mechanical energy would enhance shape-charge effectiveness, placing more 
energy on a small spot. Metamaterials for absorbing and redirecting incoming shocks 
or blast waves could improve shielding, be used for safety equipment, cushion falls, 
and improve footgear. Further, we can design intentional failure mechanisms to control 
energy absorption, such as a crumple zone in a car, thereby protecting something 
precious, such as a human life or a delicate instrument. 
Because we can control metamaterial constituents and their distribution in what we 
build, we can design stiffness and load response variations in devices and structures. 
Uses for this include actuators that can be tuned to respond to specific forces, such 
as strain or loads. SOF applications could include better exoskeletons to enhance 
soldier performance and improved prosthetics and artificial muscles needed when 
serious injuries are sustained. 
In the arena of battlefield sound management and aeroacoustics, research is 
underway to develop lightweight tunable metamaterials for acoustics and vibration 
control. One intriguing effort uses resonant metamaterials for aerodynamic flow control 
to delay the onset of turbulent flow transition, thereby reducing skin friction drag and 
reducing power usage.18 Similarly, a research team from the Italian University of Niccolo 
Cusano and the Chinese Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics is studying a porous 
metamaterial, ultrasonically absorptive coating to delay the turbulent flow transition to 
reduce the boundary-layer drag and heat-transfer rates for a hypersonic vehicle.19
One intriguing class of metamaterials is auxetic materials. They exhibit high-energy 
absorption and fracture resistance through the material microstructure, which can 
flex and stretch in phenomenal ways. These materials have a negative Poisson’s 
ratio, which means they expand in all directions when stretched and contract in 
all directions when compressed. Possible uses for auxetic metamaterials include 
materials for engines and thermal protection, stronger ropes, foams and packaging 
materials to protect parts from shocks, and blast-protection applications. For example, 
Auxetix Ltd. demonstrated an auxetic material called Zetic that can survive a car 
bomb. They suggest Zetic could provide superior body armor and protective clothing, 
blast-resilient ultralight ultrastrong stretchable backpacks and military tents, and 
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strong flexible medical sutures compatible with body tissues. Further, a team from 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Self-Assembly Lab demonstrated heat-
activated auxetic materials, adding a new dimension to what is possible. It is likely 
these magic materials will one day find their way into military applications. 
Metamaterial adoption has been greatest in communications, antennas, and radar 
systems, with related RFID applications for tagging, tracking, and locating. The move 
to 5G communications and extraordinary radar capabilities will push developments 
even faster, with commercial sales forecasted to exceed $10 billion annually by 
2030.20 Metamaterials are integral to future high-performance, high-impedance, 
low-profile, conformal, and fractal antennas for communications and radar systems. 
Immense potential exists for game-changing shifts in military communications and 
radar systems through metamaterials. Indeed, as metamaterials become more fully 
integrated into antenna technologies, they will reduce system costs, enable smaller 
devices with reduced power requirements, facilitate novel shapes and form factors, 
and deliver more agile beam forming and shaping capabilities.
It is now feasible to produce dramatically smaller electric and magnetic dipole 
antennas with boosted radiating power and patch antennas with increased 
directivity, enhanced gain, and reduced return loss. This size reduction does not 
mean performance is compromised. For example, tiny metamaterial antennas 
can be tuned across entire communications bands, overcoming narrow operating 
bandwidths to make smaller radios possible. Also possible are remarkable frequency 
and polarization agility and improved multiband operations with reconfigurability for 
microwave devices and custom antennas. 
The push for smaller antenna sizes will continue. With it will come operational 
resilience. For noisy RF environments, metamaterial mobile-communications smart 
antennas can adjust to their environment to strengthen communications of interest 
while mitigating competing signals. Further, Pivotal Commware sells a wireless 
system that reuses the same spectrum bands, possibly providing a means to ensure 
communications are sustained in congested and contested RF environments. 
Many companies already take advantage of the special attributes only 
metamaterials can provide for RF devices. For example, Fractal Antenna Systems, Inc. 
employs metamaterials for RFID tags, smart sensors, novel antennas, and flat-lens 
technologies for microwave applications for telecommunications and surveillance 
systems. Their metamaterials allow for multiband and wide bandwidth fractal 
antennas that can be positioned in nontypical locations. For example, they claim their 
recessed antennas can even be located next to metal without disrupting antenna 
operations. These antennas are small, thin, lightweight, have no electrical connections 
and reduced circuitry, and offer increased gain. 
Another firm, Kymeta, uses metamaterials in thin, lightweight broadband systems 
for vehicle-to-vehicle communications, enabling a new secure-communications 
paradigm for military forces in remote areas. Well known for their satellite 
communications systems for land and sea, Kymeta now produces a thin, lightweight 
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flat-panel satellite antenna. They use electronically activated metamaterials to 
steer their Ku-band communications beam to a satellite. Together with satellite 
constellations under development, such as the DARPA Blackjack program, this could 
support direct satellite-to-soldier communications.21 
Metamaterial advances are also transforming radar systems. For instance, 
Echodyne makes a handheld radar able to track people, cars, and even a small plane 
at a distance of a few miles. Likewise, Metawave has combined artificial intelligence 
with metamaterials to create radar for autonomous driving vehicles, including an ability 
to see around corners, which could be powerful in contested urban environments. 
Metamaterial adeptness in redirecting and sensing energy flow has opened 
an exciting research path, exploring “compute by feel,” to sense an environment 
dynamically, assess conditions, react autonomously, or respond without a human in 
the loop. Such a reflexive ability to enable functions at the speed of battle should 
increase survivability and weapon-system effectiveness dramatically, especially if it 
simplifies multi-input data analysis needed to deliver situational awareness. These 
metamaterials might obviate computer-based feedback loops to reduce power and 
system complexity. Triggering autonomous action, including system reconfiguration, 
could protect systems from damage and soldiers from harm, or improve performance, 
such as communications-link optimization through origami-like structure-change 
methods.22 Autonomous navigation and maneuvering will be achieved when “compute 
by feel” metamaterials prove capable of discerning normal loads from hostile 
conditions. This will create marked advantages in contested environments with mobile 
targets, particularly for unmanned aerial, underwater, and hypersonic vehicles seeking 
to avoid countermeasures or adverse flight conditions. 
The concept of “compute-by-feel” metamaterials operating like a nervous system in 
a cybernetic mode to drive complex actions is not far-fetched. Classic examples exist 
through smart materials, self-assembly fabrication and material synthesis methods, 
and biomimicry, in which we learn from nature. Many have suggested nature produces 
the best materials adapted over time to deliver exquisite attributes. For example, a 
spiderweb is a distributed sensor platform where the web strands capture vibrations 
and interpret and communicate them to the spider using only mechanoreceptors 
on their legs. Such concepts can now be translated to complex metamaterials.23 
Metamaterials may be a key building block that allows us to borrow from nature 
and create functionalities that heretofore have been limited to plants, animals, and 
insects. Imagine if we could replicate chameleon capabilities! 
Metamaterials are also finding a home in advanced computing. For example, 
professor Nader Engheta and his team at the University of Pennsylvania used 
metamaterials to demonstrate an analog computer that could someday result in low-
power computers that operate by light instead of electricity.24 Also, the DARPA Defense 
Sciences Office has sponsored brain-inspired neuromorphic computing research 
that uses metamaterials and will take advantage of the revolutionary breakthroughs 
in machine learning and artificial intelligence. Indeed, as described by the project 
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lead, Francois Leonard, “imagine a window that turns blue if a bear walks by but 
turns red if it’s a giraffe. Even better, this window could learn to respond to different 
stimuli by repeated exposure to a training dataset, much like the human brain.”25 By 
showing metamaterials themselves can extract useful information from optical fields 
without the need to process optical signals with electronics, this project will create 
neuromorphic optical-media building blocks to increase processing speed and reduce 
power requirements. This could also transform optical sensing, image processing, and 
recognition for national security applications.
Metamaterials will someday provide SOF forces with robust, effective, and flexible 
technologies to assure mission success across the full detect-deter-deny-destroy 
mission spectrum. However, cloaking may be the most impactful for irregular warfare—
but what is possible?
Metamaterial Stealth—A Vanishing Advantage
The same class of metamaterials that improves our communications and radar 
systems can absorb energy. Of interest is the ability of these materials to deliver 
low radar cross-section and IR stealth characteristics. Narrow-band, multiband, 
and broadband high-absorption metamaterials have been demonstrated from the 
optical to microwave spectral regions. For example, a team led out of the University 
of Electronic Science and Technology of China has demonstrated a metamaterial 
with 98 percent absorption for discrete wavelengths that can be designed within 
the 600–1500 nm wavelength range. Applications for this capability range from 
improved sensing, spectral filtering, reduced thermal emissions, and night-vision 
goggles.26 Similarly, metamaterials can be designed to control the direction in which 
thermal energy is emitted. Beyond providing metasurfaces for thermal management 
on satellites, such a capability is valuable in tailoring IR signatures for stealth and 
camouflage uses.
As another example, a research team at Zhejiang University published results 
for an optically transparent, broadband radar stealth material with a frequency-
selective microwave-transmission window and low IR emissivity.27 Their test results 
showed strong broadband performance from 1.5 GHz to 9 GHz, with a radar 
transmission window at 3.8 GHz. This radar transparent metasurface simultaneously 
demonstrated low surface IR emissivity, which would make systems fabricated with 
this material hard to detect with radar or IR imagers. Further, emerging research 
in polymeric photonic crystals indicates chameleon-like tunability in the RF range 
may also be achievable. In general, by manipulating a surface’s energy-scattering 
properties using a metasurface, the signal return can be manipulated to alter an 
object’s appearance or make it disappear completely.28 These attributes seem like 
what we might expect from a military digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) system, 
where we seek to obfuscate electromagnetic signatures, but without the need for 
power and software. 
S T R A T E G I C  L A T E N C Y  U N L E A S H E D    |    221 
When considering metamaterial invisibility, discussions frequently focus on 
inanimate objects like tanks, planes, and ships; however, using metamaterial 
invisibility to provide protection for our forces on the ground would be equally 
compelling. The proven capability to weave metamaterials, microelectronics, and 
micropower systems (including solar power) into clothing provides the tools for 
an adjustable camouflage and concealment capability that could be fine-tuned in 
real-time to a soldier’s environment. Combine such a uniform with creams and face 
paints with nanometamaterial additives to reduce visible and IR signatures, and we 
would be one step closer to having a Predator outfit right out of the movies.
Invisibility cloaking drew excitement in the early days of metamaterials research, 
and a similar sound-masking technology is on the horizon. Acoustic metamaterials 
were first demonstrated by Zhengyou Liu and others in 2000, laying the foundation 
for sound attenuation and control through metamaterials.29 Today we find acoustics 
and sound control in consumer audio systems, and signature management is now 
possible, to some extent. Indeed, companies such as Metasonics control sound 
without impeding air flow, and the Acoustic Metamaterials Group creates high-
performance noise-dampening metamaterials. Many research teams worldwide have 
demonstrated an ability to control which acoustic frequencies can penetrate through 
metamaterials, as well as which acoustic signals will be released. Complete noise 
silencing has been demonstrated, offering the hope that one day any vehicle, engine, 
or noise source can be completely silenced, whether operating on the ground, in the 
air, or in marine domains. Also, by manipulating sound we can alter emissions from 
audio to ultrasound and sonar frequencies, potentially creating an ability to replicate 
the noise signatures of anything we choose to emulate. 
Considering proven capabilities to control energy flow into and out of surfaces, 
it is logical to anticipate advanced stealth, camouflage, and signature-management 
technologies will become commonplace in arenas where concealments, deception, 
and subversion may be employed. By bending light and energy with space-age 
metamaterials, we may also be able to further reduce visibility by removing shadows. 
What we do with the incident energy—be it light, heat, mechanical, or electromagnetic—
will be important for enabling stealth. One possibility might be to harvest energy 
intended to harm and reapply it for useful purposes, like storable power.
Stealthy metamaterials may prove to be both a blessing and a curse for 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems as innovations provide 
more capable sensing systems, as well as the ability to reduce signals from what 
we wish to sense. We will be driven to consider a wider range of measurements of 
potential observables to achieve ISR mission goals against the use of metamaterials 
for static signature management. For materials that provide tunable or autonomous 
chameleon adaptations, we will be challenged to develop countermeasures that can 
discriminate signals and targets from background clutter. This may prove to be a 
pivotal technology where the United States must sustain an advantage and be the 
first to field robust capabilities to shape the future battlespace.
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Conclusions—Making a Material Difference in National Security
Today’s global landscape reflects an unprecedented mix of conflicts, stress points, and 
potential threats. Threats are evolving, and US policy has not constrained adversaries. 
The SOF community remains an essential component of our response options to 
protect US and ally interests in these times of growing uncertainty. SOF capabilities, 
training, skills, motivation, and effectiveness remain high; but as strong as they are, 
they must adapt continually to disrupt the actions of adversaries. In fact, US rivals are 
actively researching and developing technologies to nullify the US advantage at a pace 
exceeding US development-to-deployment cycles. In the face of these aggressive foreign 
efforts, the US may need to expand its research, production capabilities, and supplier 
base to meet this national security and domestic economy need. Indeed, metamaterials 
may become a critical base technology and pivotal enabler to engineer capabilities that 
keep SOF on the forefront of international technologies. If so, the United States will 
need to accelerate its cycles of learning and rate of insertion into mission toolkits. 
In the coming years, we will gaze in awe at the incredible revolution made 
possible by the science of metamaterials and abilities to design and shape them into 
asymmetric technology advantages. By 2025 we expect controllable metamaterials 
will contribute to SOF capabilities through advanced radar and communications 
systems, enhanced tagging-tracking-locating and targeting devices with greater 
geolocating accuracy and operating ranges, compact highly capable electronics and 
sensors, “smart uniforms,” and lightweight materials and armored vehicles resilient to 
shocks, blasts, projectiles, lasers, radiation, and electromagnetic attacks. So too can 
we see the day when cloaking and stealth become mainstream capabilities, realized 
through cutting-edge camouflages, concealments, and surface materials that manage 
radar, RF, and IR signatures and observables, as well as noise emanations.
While we must be on guard to avoid the hype, we must also be open to the new 
realm of metamaterial possibilities. Achieving the metamaterial dream requires we 
nurture and advance national capability-based science and engineering foundations. If 
we do so, through remarkable innovations we will deliver more agile and effective tools 
to SOF forces and avoid adversary surprises in future warfare. Our quest to design 
materials that can be fabricated with predictable and controllable qualities remains, 
but design tools like Mirage and additive-manufacturing advances put metamaterials 
within our grasp, adding radical new dimensions to what is possible.30 Indeed, 
metamaterials hold the promise of delivering strengthened SOF technology options in 
an uncertain and rapidly changing battlespace.
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C H A P T E R  1 6
Armor of the Future: Spider Webs,  
Buckyballs, Nanotubes, and Beyond
S. Robert Skaggs and Frank D. Gac
Introduction: Yesterday, Today, and  
Projecting into the Future
Two words, “protection” and “armor,” go hand in hand, as 
do the words “armor” and “threat.” The development of 
armor parallels the advent of new threats, with the 
objective of defeating the new threats. Consequently, 
armor design and performance have come a long way 
in the last 4,000 years, be it for personnel, vehicles 
(including horses), or structures. Three factors seem to 
drive armor design with the goal of achieving maximum 
performance against specific threats: materials availability; weight, particularly weight 
per area covered (areal density); and ease of use. Overshadowing all of this is armor 
system manufactureablility and a “reasonable” cost. 
An early example of how the connection between threats and armor can play out 
is recorded in the Bible in the book of 1 Samuel, when King Saul gives his armor to a 
teenage David to fight the fearsome giant Goliath.1 Note this event occurs at the end 
of the Bronze Age and the beginning of the Iron Age. 
Then Saul clothed David with his armor; he put a helmet of bronze on 
his head, and clothed him with a coat of mail. And David girded his 
sword over his armor, and he tried in vain to go, for he was not used 
to them. Then David said to Saul, “I cannot go with these; for I am not 
used to them.” And David put them off.2 
In David’s case, the state-of-the-art armor—a bronze helmet and coat of bronze 
or iron (likely a low-grade steel) mail—and the weapon—a state-of-the-art “steel” 
sword—were too heavy and cumbersome. David then undertook a “special operation” 
with a sling and some smooth stones from a brook.i
In August and September 2019, the authors conducted telephone interviews with 
existing and former members of US special operations forces (SOF). The common 
refrain of the special operators echoes that of David of 3,000 years earlier, albeit 
in slightly different wording, “the lighter and less cumbersome the armor, the better, 
especially for personnel armor.”3 
i   Incidentally, David’s battle with Goliath is also a great example of strategic latency, in which existing but latent technology, 
coupled with other important circumstances, result in a shift in the balance of power. 
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With materials availability, weight, and ease of use keenly in mind, this chapter 
takes the reader on a journey commencing with an assessment of the threat 
space the special operator faces today and may face in 20-30 years. The latter 
includes directed-energy (DE) weapons, such as high-energy lasers. The paper then 
discusses the physics, chemistry, and engineering principles that can be applied in 
the design of armor to defeat various threats. The journey includes examining some 
successful and unsuccessful armors of today, which will illustrate the remarkable 
advancements in materials, manufacturing and armor designs that have occurred 
since the 1940s. At that point, time travel begins, with the jump into the future, 
in which the special operator’s “dream armor” is presented, accompanied by a 
discussion of how some advanced materials and the concept of “modeling and 
materials by design” might help us get there. 
The Threat Space
As we look out 5, 10, 20, and even 30 years, it is clear that kinetic threats, be they 
bullets (perhaps even “smart” bullets), explosively formed projectiles, shrapnel 
(including screws, nails, and ball bearings), land mines, improvised explosive devices, 
and debris from nearby explosions will be a continuing concern. The Department 
of Defense and the National Institute of Justice have developed rigorous testing 
standards for armor, which include precise definitions of threats. This paper cannot 
present the plethora of available information on these topics. However, we do wish 
to call attention to the National Institute of Justice standard for body armor and a 
National Research Council report as important starting points for examining potential 
armors and advanced materials.4
Those documents show the design basis for body armor has been divided into five 
categories—IIA, II, III, IIIA, and IV—based on ballistic performance against increasingly 
powerful threats. For example, a new type IIA armor must defeat a 9 millimeter full 
metal jacket round nose (FMJ RN) bullet with a specific mass of 8.0 grams (g) [124 
grain (gr)] and a velocity of 373 meters per second (m/s) + 9. 1 m/s (1225 feet per 
second [ft/s] + 30 ft/s). In contrast, a type IV hard or flexible armor must defeat a 
.30 caliber armor-piercing (AP) bullet (US military designation M2 AP) with a specified 
mass of 10.8 g (166 gr) and a velocity of 878 m/s + 9.1 m/s (2880 ft/s + 30 ft/s). 
However, for body armor, stopping the projectile is not the only issue. The armor must 
also not deflect to a level that would result in severe injury to the wearer, termed 
“blunt force trauma.” This is an additional constraint that must be considered. It will 
be revisited later in the chapter, as we review armor-penetrator defeat mechanisms 
and propose new, advanced materials for future armor designs. 
Now, what about directed energy threats? In 1977, George Lucas captivated 
moviegoers and others with the introduction of the Star Wars film saga, which 
continues today. As with most science-fiction films, it was equipped with a suite of 
weapons built around the concept of directed energy. Now for the real-life spoiler 
alert: DE weapons are here! In the October 29, 2019 issue of Air Force Magazine, 
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Kelly Hammett, who runs the Directed Energy Directorate at the Air Force Research 
Laboratory, stated: 
[Directed energy technology] has matured significantly in the last 
five years or so. . . . Directed energy weapons are emerging in the 
battlespace for all three services. You’re going to see them in your 
battlespace, whether you like it or not. They may be aimed at you.”5
This article refers specifically to high-power microwaves (HPMs) and high-energy 
lasers (HELs)ii as counterdrone weapons, but, once in field, they can be applied readily 
to other targets. So, the question becomes, “What is the DE threat to the SOF?” Let’s 
first look at HPMs. They can be used to attack all forms of electronic systems, be they 
weapons, sensors, or communication systems.6 However, a metal wrap (i.e., a Faraday 
shield or cageiii) can limit, if not eliminate, the effects of HPMs. Typical, short dwell-
time HPMs have nonlethal effects on humans. Depending on the electromagnetic 
frequency, the HPM can produce temporary pain by stimulating nerves in the skin but 
causes no permanent damage. Again, a Faraday shield can limit the effect. 
HELs are a different story. Each type of laser emits in a specific wavelength range.7 
In general, the output power of a laser increases with the wavelength, namely as one 
proceeds from ultraviolet (UV) to visible to near infrared (NIR). Diode-pumped solid-
state (DPSS) laser technology is the exception. It can be engineered to emit in all 
three portions of the aforementioned electromagnetic spectrum. Plus, with the advent 
of solid-state laser technology, 50-100 kilowatt (kW) HEL weapons have evolved from 
the railroad boxcar-sized system to something that can be fielded on a small truck-like 
vehicle.8 If we project 20 or 30 years into the future, an HEL system, which basically 
can burn through most objects, may even become portable by humans. The current 
and future HEL threat to the SOF is real and will likely increase. 
Armor-Threat Defeat Mechanisms
We have some idea of both current threats and the bottom-line philosophy that 
armor needs to be lightweight and uncumbersome. However, before we embark on 
discussions of potential advanced materials for armor systems, we need to review the 
basic physics, chemistry, and engineering principles underpinning the ways in which 
armor defeats various threats, which will enlighten our materials selection. 
In his famous Christmas sermon of 1967, Martin Luther King Jr. begins a 
statement with the words, “It really boils down to this” and completes the statement 
ii   HEL weapon systems are different from so-called low-energy blinding laser weapons and low-energy laser systems used as 
rangefinders, target designators, simulations systems, and guidance systems, where the laser itself is not used to inflict harm. 
The 1995 Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, termed Protocol IV, annexed to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons, prohibits “blinding” laser weapons. 
iii   A Faraday shield or cage is an enclosure constructed from a sheet or mesh of conductive material, usually a metal, used to 
block electromagnetic fields. When an external electric field encounters a Faraday cage, the electric charges within the cage’s 
conductive material are redistributed so that they cancel the electric field’s effect within the cage. 
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with “that all life is interrelated.”9 As we talk about armor-threat defeat mechanisms, 
perhaps our next word is not as socially transcendent as King Jr.’s phrase, but it is 
scientifically overarching. It really boils down to this: energy. An incoming projectile 
has kinetic energy. A HEL has thermal energy. A HPM has electromagnetic energy. The 
purpose of armor is to do something with that incoming energy, in a way that mitigates 
damage from weapon effects so that the operator can perform the mission. 
Deflect/Reflect
One possibility is to deflect, or perhaps reflect, the energy. For an incoming 
projectile, this means causing the projectile to bounce off or ricochet from the 
surface being attacked, accomplished by having the first surface impacted at a 
high angle of incidence with respect to the incoming projectile. The glacis or front 
surface of an armored vehicle is typically slanted about 55-75 degrees with respect 
to the line of fire of the incoming projectile. The projectile then gouges into the 
glacis material, usually hard steel, tipping the trajectory of the projectile away from 
penetrating the vehicle hull. Thus, the maximum amount of energy in the projectile 
is carried away into free space. However, a downside exists. A ricochet can result in 
unexpected collateral damage, because one never quite knows where the deflected 
projectile, or piece of projectile, will travel. This is particularly worrisome for body 
armor, and a first-hand, real-life example will be discussed in the next section. 
The equivalent mechanism for an incoming laser beam is to reflect it with a 
mirrored surface. However, the effectiveness depends on the wavelength of the 
laser.10 For an IR beam, up to 96 percent can be reflected. For a UV beam, greater 
than 50 percent gets through. Things get complicated quickly with a 50-100kW HEL 
because the beam deposits an incredible amount of energy in a small spot, and it 
does not take long for the absorption of heat energy to overpower the reflectance 
effect. Nonetheless, this gives us food for thought about materials selection and 
advanced armor design. 
Consume (Absorb, Break and Catch, Conduct)
Another possibility is to “consume” the energy. One way to do this is to put a 
sufficient thickness of steel in the armor to absorb the kinetic energy and bring the 
projectile to a complete stop. For the purposes of this discussion, we will restrict our 
focus to bullets, rather than something more severe, like a long-rod penetrator.iv The 
steel will deform, but the projectile, namely the bullet, will stop. However, steel gets 
heavy quickly, which defeats the objectives of lightweight and uncumbersome armor. 
iv   A long-rod penetrator (LRP), which is also termed a kinetic energy penetrator (KEP) or kinetic energy weapon (KE weapon), is a 
type of ammunition designed to penetrate vehicle armor, such as a tank (body armor does not stand a chance against this type 
of weapon). It maximizes the stress delivered to the target by maximizing the mass, which entails using the densest metals 
practical, like depleted uranium or tungsten alloys, and minimizing the width (diameter) of the projectile to focus the energy, like 
a stiletto high heel impacting a wood floor. 
S T R A T E G I C  L A T E N C Y  U N L E A S H E D    |    229 
A creative alternative is to equip the armor face with a hard material that will “break 
up” or erode the projectile. High-strength, low-weight, ceramic plates serve this purpose 
well. Examples include boron carbide, silicon carbide, and aluminum oxide (listed in 
order of ballistic performance per areal density, with boron carbide being the best). 
However, because of their brittle mode of fracture, the ceramic plates also break up. 
Consequently, the ceramic plate must be backed up with a material that has a high 
strain to failure (i.e., “stretchiness”) to catch the projectile and ceramic debris. This is 
where high-strength, synthetic polymer fibers have come into play. Aramids and the well-
known commercial product Kevlarv represent one such class of materials. Kevlar armor 
basically consists of multiple layers of woven fabric mats or sheets. Another class of 
polymer fibers is ultra-high-molecular-weight polyethylene (UHMWPE).vi This takes the 
form of Spectra fibers, produced by Honeywell, and Dyneema fibers, manufactured by 
DSM. Spectra Shield Armor Panels are not a woven fabric but a thin, flexible ballistic 
composite made from two layers of unidirectional fibers held in place by flexible resins. 
This is a good time to revisit the deflect mechanism as it relates to ceramic 
hard plates. Because ceramics are brittle, they break up and produce debris when 
impacted by the projectile. If the incoming angle of the projectile is oblique (shallow) 
compared to the surface of the armor, some of the debris can be forced “out.” 
Consequently, ceramic hard faces are covered with a ballistic fabric to catch this 
debris and prevent it from spraying onto the soldier. Now let us discuss the first-hand, 
real-life example involving collateral damage, which was alluded to earlier. 
One of the authors was involved in the ballistic evaluation of novel body armor, 
consisting of a fabric cover, then partially overlapping ceramic disks (like fish scales), 
and backed with a polymer fiber composite.11 A severely oblique hit by the penetrator 
caused the partially overlapping ceramic disks to peel up while breaking up, causing 
significant spray (release) of the ceramic and projectile debris. In a real-life scenario, 
the result would be significant collateral damage to the wearer’s neck and face. 
Consequently, this type of armor was removed from inventory. The novel body armor 
had a good basic concept in that it provided flexibility, which other hard-face body 
armor did not. However, upon closer examination, it had a serious flaw. Quoting a 
close friend of one of the authors while discussing the preparation of this book, in 
research “you want to be on the cutting edge, but not the bloody edge.”12 
A variation on the “consume” theme is a mechanism to bring the projectile to a 
slow stop, which has been used routinely in energetic materials research by filling 
a steel containment vessel with glass Christmas ornaments or other lightweight 
v   Kevlar (poly-paraphenylene terephthalamide) was invented in 1964 by Polish American chemist Stephanie Kwolek while working 
for DuPont. It derives its strength from strong bonding between relatively short molecules. 
vi   UHMWPE is made up of extremely long chains of polyethylene, which all align in the same direction. It derives its strength from 
the overlap of these long, molecular chains. 
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materials, such as perlite,vii to absorb and dissipate energy.13 It has also been used 
to capture and study penetrators in an ~23 meter-long (75 feet-long) by ~1 x 1 m (4 
x 4 ft) steel “tube,” also filled with glass Christmas ornaments.14 Finally, application 
of this method has been proposed for catching engine fragments from the failure of 
an aircraft jet engine, by lining the nacelle with a polymer “wool” that will entangle 
the engine fragment prior to potential penetration of the aircraft cabin.15 One more 
class of materials that offers potential for slow stop are aerogels, an extremely light 
structure that has been dubbed “solid air.”viii 
Yet another variation on the “consume” theme involves the shear-thickening 
concept. A shear-thickening fluid is one whose viscosity increases with increased rate 
of shear stress, or, simply put, “faster mixing.” It consists of tiny particles suspended 
in a liquid. In the version jointly developed by the Army Research Laboratory and 
the University of Delaware, it consists of nanoparticles of silica (high purity “sand”) 
suspended in polyethylene glycol (a common lubricant).16 Under normal conditions 
(slow stirring), the particles flow with the liquid. However, under impact (fast stirring), 
the particles become rigid. This technology can work well to protect against a knife or 
spike but any improvement in ballistic performance, for example by adding this shear-
thickening fluid to a Kevlar vest, is offset by the increased weight of the fluid. One 
could have just as easily added more Kevlar to improve the balistic performance. 
Applying the “consume” theme to a HEL threat might consist of constructing 
a layered armor design that absorbs and conducts the heat away from the 
beam spot. The specific heat capacityix of ceramics is 3 to 4 times greater than 
metals.17 However, the thermal conductivity of metals is 2 to 20 times greater than 
ceramics.18 Thus, a plausible HEL armor concept is a high-melting ceramic face, 
to withstand and absorb the heat, backed by an intimately bonded metal sheet, to 
conduct the heat away. Perhaps an even better approach would be to incorporate 
an aerogel layer behind the metal sheet, to insulate the wearer of the HEL vest. 
Incidentally, aerogel is an even better thermal insulator than the fused silica 
(“ceramic”) Space Shuttle tiles, displaying a 70 percent lower thermal conductivity. 
React/Attack
Yet another way to deal with incoming energy is to “attack” it. One way to 
do this is with reactive armor. Reactive armor has taken many forms, with 
confusing terminology and acronyms, including explosive reactive armor (ERA), 
vii   Perlite is a naturally occurring, volcanic glass that has relatively high water content. When sufficiently heated, it expands 
greatly, resulting in a low-density filler for construction applications, such as lightweight plasters, concrete, mortar, 
insulation, and ceiling tiles. 
viii   An aerogel is not a gel but a class of porous, solid materials displaying an extremely low density. Thus, they are ultralight.  
Their name is derived from the fact that they are synthesized from gels. 
ix   The heat capacity of an object is the amount of heat required to raise its temperature by one degree Celsius. The specific heat 
capacity is simply a little refinement; it is the heat required to raise the unit mass of a substance by one degree Celsius. That 
facilitates a more meaningful comparison between materials. 
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nonexplosive reactive armor (NERA), semienergetic reactive armor (SERA),  
and electromagnetic armor. 
Although the Soviets explored the ERA concept in the late 1940s, the first 
successful developer of ERA may have been Manfred Held in the late 1960s and early 
1970s.19 ERA consists of a slab or sheet of explosive sandwiched between two metal 
plates. The trigger for the explosive is the kinetic energy of the projectile concentrated 
at the nose of the projectile, which contacts the first metal plate and subsequent layer 
of explosive. The explosion moves the first plate into the direction of the incoming 
projectile, hence the word, “attack.” The second metal plate moves away from the 
projectile. As the two plates move in opposite directions at a high angle with respect 
to the incoming projectile, they shear the projectile into fragments and drive them off 
the axis of the projectile. The downside to ERA is that anyone in the immediate vicinity 
of the exploding armor package could suffer serious collateral damage. Thus, ERA is 
restricted to vehicle armor for dealing with threats like LRPs. 
Next, NERA refers to both nonexplosive and nonenergetic reactive armor.20 The basic 
concept consists of rubber sandwiched between two metal plates. When a projectile 
impacts the first metal plate, the rubber is compressed (or further compressed if it 
was preloaded), then the compressed energy in the rubber is released, driving the 
plates in opposite directions, similar to the plates in the ERA but with far less energy 
and effectiveness. If Teflon,x which has a very low specific heat capacity, replaces the 
rubber it does not take much time and energy to heat up, as the incoming projectile 
drives into the face plate, causing it to decompose into a gaseous state and, thus, 
produce gas pressure. The gas energy drives apart the metal plates, albeit with far less 
effectiveness than an ERA. A further variation is semienergetic reactive armor (SERA).21 
In this case, an insensitive energetic material, such as a mixture of aluminum powder 
and Teflon, is sandwiched between the two metal plates. Upon mechanical impact of 
the projectile into the faceplate, the aluminum-Teflon mixture ignites and burns fast, 
releasing chemical energy to drive apart the metal plates.
Electromagnetic armor is basically a high-power capacitor, namely two or more 
conductive plates separated by an air gap or electrically insulating material.22 A 
high-voltage power source is used to charge the armor package. When an incoming 
projectile penetrates the plates, it closes the circuit or triggers a switch, dumping 
energy into the projectile, causing it to melt and maybe even vaporize. At a 
minimum, the structural integrity of the projectile is reduced. Potential down sides of 
electromagnetic armor are the required power and the accompanying weight of the 
total system. 
We summarize and illustrate the basic threat defeat mechanisms in Figure 1. 
We could present much more information, but doing so is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. Our objective is to present the essential information for facilitating the next 
x   Teflon is a commercial name for polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE), a synthetic polymer discovered in 1938 by DuPont, consisting 
wholly of carbon and fluorine. It is commonly used as nonstick coating on cookware. 
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level of discussion about advanced materials and potential new armor designs. 
Nonetheless, those interested in additional detail are encouraged to explore short 
courses on subjects such as penetration mechanics and laser lethality science.
Advanced Materials and Armor—What Might Be Possible?
The SOF “dream armor” for the soldier is a shirt and pants that protects the entire 
body from the ballistic or DE threat, eliminates blunt force trauma, manages the 
heat load on the body, and is equipped with flexible electronics that facilitate 
communications, harvest and store power, monitor the health and location of the 
soldier, and administer immediate local medical treatment if needed.23 That is a 
tall order! However, based on the content of the other chapters in Section 3 of this 
book, aspects of the SOF “dream armor” are not beyond the realm of possibilities, 
particularly as one looks out 10 to 30 years. Those other chapters—which deal with 
nanotechnology, flexible electronics, metamaterials (think antennas), advanced power 
sources, additive manufacturing, and novel energetic materials—speak to components 
of the “dream armor.” This chapter addresses only armor needs. Nonetheless, the 
overlap with other chapters will be readily evident.
Figure 1. Summary of basic mechanisms for defeating an incoming projectile or laser beam.
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Advanced Carbon Chemistry Materials
Vibranium is a fictional metal associated with at least two characters featured 
in Marvel Comics.24 The Black Panther wears a flexible suit of vibranium, and 
Captain America has a stiff shield made from vibranium. The fictional material has 
extraordinary abilities to absorb, store, and release incredible amounts of kinetic 
energy. Analogous to a fictional metal, a nonfictional material, carbon, has evolved 
in a manner tht could meet some of these notional qualities. It turns out carbon 
chemistry has come a long way since the accidental synthesis of fullerenes in 1985.xi 
We now have “buckyballs,” carbon nanotubes, and graphene at our disposal. The 
C60 buckminsterfullerene, or buckyball, has a high coefficient of restitution, meaning 
the energy it absorbs when hit by an object compresses the “soccer ball” shape and 
sends it back in the direction from which it entered. Thus, we kind of have a real-life 
version of the fictional vibranium.
Similarly, carbon nanotubes (CNTs) and graphene display remarkable strength. In 
fact, Citizen Armor, founded in 2017, offers a T-shirt-like armor, termed T-Shield, based 
on functionalized CNT technology, whereby the CNTs bond to each other, purportedly 
achieving NIJ-level IIIA body-armor performance.25 Thus, advanced carbon chemistry 
research has brought us a class of materials that did not exist 20 to 30 year ago, 
but the next 20 to 30 years are required to learn how to synthesize the materials in 
quantities and at a cost viable for research study and limited commercial use. 
Speaking of advacements in systhesis, the Los Alamos National Laboratory 
received an R&D 100 Award for “Atomic Armor,” which consists of a single graphene 
layer.26 In reality, the graphene layer is not armor in the traditional sense, but rather 
a corrosion barrier for sensitive electronic devices. However, the synthesis technique, 
which entails chemical vapor depositon of a single graphene layer on a wide variety 
of substrates, including flexible polymer films, offers the potential for manufacturing 
multiple graphene layer sturctures for ballistic armor applications. 
However, CNTs and graphene are not the end-all, even if they do show promise, and 
it is important to make knowledgeable comparisons. For example, the areal density of 
the T-Shield armor is 6.44 kilograms per square meter (kg/m2) [1.32 pounds / square 
foot (psf)], compared to the Safariland Xtreme vest, made with Kevlar fabric and 
Honeywell Goldshield,xii which displays an areal density of 5.61 kg/m2 (1.15 psf), also 
for NIJ level IIIA protection.27 
xi   A fullerene is an allotrope of carbon (an allotrope is a different physical form in which an element can exist; for example, the 
element carbon can exist as graphite, diamond, and fullerenes). The fullerene molecule consists of carbon atoms connected 
by single and double bonds to form a closed or partially closed mesh of fused rings consisting of five to seven atoms. The 
family is named after the buckminsterfullerene (C60), the most famous member, which in turn is named after Buckminster Fuller, 
an American architect who popularized the geodesic dome. The closed fullerenes, especially C60, are also informally called 
buckyballs for their resemblance to a soccer ball. Cylindrical fullerenes are termed carbon nanotubes or “buckytubes.” Graphene 
(isolated layers of graphite), which is a mesh of regular hexagonal rings, can be viewed as an extreme member of the fullerene 
family. 
xii   Gold Shield GV-2018, is a roll product manufactured by Honeywell Specialty Materials, consisting of four layers of unidirectional 
Kevlar fiber; thus, it is not a woven fabric. 
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Advanced “Fibers”
We have already mentioned Kevlar, Spectra, and Dyneema, which are polymer-
based fibers, and we have touched on CNTs and graphene. However, there are also 
continuous macrofibers made from carbon, silicon carbide, aluminum oxide (chief 
chemical ingredient in automotive spark plugs), and a host of other materials. Table 1 
provides a comparison of key properties for some of these reinforcement materials. 
For familiarity, we have also included Nylon 6, E and S glass, piano wire (which is a 
high carbon spring steel), and human hair. 
TABLE 1. PROPERTY COMPARISON OF REINFORCEMENT “FIBERS”











Kevlar 4928 1.44-1.47 3.4-4.1 70.5-112.4 3.6 DuPont
Dyneema SK7629 0.970 3.3-3.9 109-132 3-4 DSM
CNTs30 0.897 8.8 357
Graphene 0.2-1.8,31 2.0 0.14,32 13033 1,00034
IM-6 Carbon35 1.76 4.4 276 1.4 Hexcel (Hercules)
Silicon Carbide 




Nextel 61037 3.9 2.8 370 3M
Nylon 638 0.21 16 2.5-67 DuPont
E Glass39 2.54-2.55 3.1-3.8 76-78
S Glass40 2.48-2.49 4.38-4.59 88-91
Piano Wire ASTM 
A22841 7.86 1.6-2.8 79 12





(protein) 1.25 ~2 ~30 ~30
As one reviews the table, keep these important points in mind: 
• The lower the density, the lighter the weight of the resulting armor.
• Generally, the higher the tensile strength, the better the stopping power 
against a projectile. 
• The higher the Young’s modulus, the stiffer the material, which can be good 
or bad. A stiff armor can be cumbersome. However, a less stiff armor may 
not provide the same level of ballistic protection. 
• Strain to failure, or “stretchiness,” is also a mixed bag. Too high a strain 
to failure can result in severe blunt force trauma to the wearer of the body 
armor. Too low a strain to failure, and the fibers simply break.
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Nylon is a well-known fabric, originally made famous by its use in women’s 
stockings, namely “nylon” hosiery. In World War II, it was widely used by the American 
military for parachutes and flak jackets. Today, nylon is commonly used in motorcycle 
jackets. E glass is the reinforcement in everyday glass fiber-reinforced plastics, such 
as lawn chairs. S glass is stronger and stiffer, and therefore ideal for high-performance 
products, such as fiberglass boats. Piano wire is reasonably strong but heavy and, 
thus, generally not suitable for body-armor applications.
Kevlar and Dyneema (and Spectra) are strong materials with low density, which 
translates to low weight. Plus, they are readily available in commercial quantities 
and at “reasonable” cost. More important, they are improved constantly. Dr. David 
L. Reichert of DuPont recently shared that the next generation Kevlar will make a big 
jump in performance and be 10-20 percent lighter than current state of the art soft 
armor materials.45 A SOCOM spokesperson reported it is field-testing a lightweight 
armor, based on Dyneema/Spectra-like materials, which weighs 25 percent less than 
standard armor gear, covers 44 percent instead of 19 percent of the body and offers 
protection against small-arms fire.46 
As we contemplate other fibers—such as carbon, silicon carbide, and aluminum 
oxide, which display comparable or higher strength and significantly higher stiffness—the 
question becomes, “Why not consider ceramic-fiber reinforced ceramic matrix composite 
(CMC) front faces for armor layups?” Might these offer improved ballistic performance, 
multihit capability, or perhaps lighter weight? Swab and Sandoz-Rosado do a superb 
job summarizing the history and state of the art of CMCs for armor applications as of 
2017.47 The bottom line is CMCs may offer potential for improved ballistic protection.
However, CMCs are certainly not yet comparable to monolithic ceramic armor 
plates. In contrast, fiber-reinforced CMCs are making great strides in the aerospace 
and automotive industries, which require lightweight, high-temperature structural 
components.48 We recommend monitoring advancements in these industries and 
reconsidering CMCs in a few years.
Bio-inspired Materials
The bottom of Table 1 highlights human hair and spider silk, both bio-inspired 
materials. Human hair is a remarkable material. Approximately 95 percent of a 
strand of hair consists of keratin, a helix-shaped protein. As illustrated in Figure 2, 
the structure of a hair is divided into three layers. The medulla is the porous, marrow 
core of the hair. Next is the cortex, the main component, consisting of long chains of 
keratin, in the form of macrofibrils, microfibrils, and protofibrils, which provide strength 
to the hair. Intercellular cement, rich in lipids (fatty acids) and protein, joins the cells 
of the cortex together. The third part is the cuticle, a thin protective outer armor layer, 
also rich in keratin and composed of cells shaped like overlapping scales.49
There are a number of features worth noting from the structure of the human hair, 
which affirm current and will stimulate advanced armor design. First is the existence 
of hair layers. We have already seen the value of layered structures in armor, as 
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shown in the “Consume” portion of Figure 1, which portrays a layered ceramic hard-
face/polymer composite back-face (also multilayered) structure. As we contemplate 
advance armor designs, it begs the question of whether to use even more creative 
layered structures to consume and dissipate the energy of an incoming projectile. This 
leads to the next notable feature, intercellular cement. 
In polymer-based composites, such as Spectra Shield, the polymer is the 
“intercellular cement” between the Spectra fibers. In metal matrix composites (MMCs), 
such as silicon carbide reinforced aluminum, the aluminum matrix is the “intercellular 
cement.” In the 1980s, Ilhan Aksay and his research team pioneered innovative work 
pertaining to the development of boron carbide—aluminum cermet composites for 
lightweight armor applications.50 Aksay and his team found inspiration in the structure 
of nacre, also known as mother-of-pearl, an organic-inorganic composite material 
produced by mollusks (think sea shells). The nacre structure is a laminated and tabular 
nanocomposite held together with protein, reminiscent of a brick-and-mortar structure. 
The man-made result is boron carbide-aluminum monoliths and laminate structures. 
These structures display improved multihit armor capabilities and possibly lower 
manufacturing cost, while achieving 90 percent of the ballistic performance of hot-
pressed, fully dense boron carbide, a premier but costly ceramic armor. 
One more feature worth noting is the fibrils within fibrils, which might argue for 
different-size fibers or even different compositions of fibers within a composite layup 
or weave. The objective would be to utilize materials with complementary properties 
to achieve enhanced performance or perhaps entirely new functions. Namely, in 
addition to ballistic protection, thermal conductivity might be enhanced to keep the 
wearer cooler, or electrical conductivity might be available to achieve a Faraday cage to 
protect embedded electronics.
 Figure 2. Structure of Hair (from reference 49).
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Let us shift attention to spider silk, another truly amazing material. To start, 
a spider is an incredible manufacturing plant that produces a variety of silk 
compositions for different applications. The compositions include the dragline silk, 
which is used for a web’s outer rim, the spokes of the web, and the lifeline as the 
spider transits. Another application is the silk used to secure and wrap a freshly 
captured prey, reported to be even stronger than dragline silk. Yet another application 
is the silk for temporary scaffolding during web construction. The tensile strength of 
spider silk is similar to high-grade steel or roughly 50-60 percent of that of Kevlar and 
Dyneema, but with 10 times the strain to failure and considerably more flexibility than 
Kevlar and Dyneema. It serves the spider well and may offer potential for creative 
armor design, but it has not been produced in commercially useful quantities.
Without significant advancements in synthesis, even man-made spider silk will 
remain in the realm of science fiction or at most a scientific curiosity. However, the 
spider has a characteristic just now being appreciated. We can look to the spider 
as a pioneer of complex additive manufacturing (AM). Advancements in this area 
for polymers, metals, ceramics, and, most recently, continuous fiber composites 
are staggering.51 Plus, the spider illustrates the value of “portable AM,” a theme of 
increasing importance to the defense industry. 
Closing Remarks and Recommendations
We hope this chapter has been educational at the least, but ideally eye-opening and 
inspiring. Again, as stated earlier, advancements in materials, manufacturing, and armor 
systems have been remarkable since the 1940s. However, it should be noted these 
advancements have not been restricted to the United States; they are truly global in nature. 
What are the implications of advances in armor systems for SOF? The SOF 
“armor of the future” is perhaps closer than one might think. Advancements in 
materials and manufacturing will continue, likely at a surprisingly fast pace. Below 
are some things to watch in the future. 
• Advancements in CNTs: this offers some of the greatest opportunity for weight 
reduction and improved flexibility, assuming one can translate the impressive 
stopping power of an individual CNT to a macro system of CNTs. Chemical 
functionalization of the surface of CNTs may be a key to successful utilization. 
The same concept is applicable to interface chemistry in composites writ large, 
to enhance performance. In fact, chemical functualization of surfaces and 
interfaces may also be the approach required to incorporate infection-fighting 
medication or advanced electronics in the SOF’s armor of the future. 
• Advancements in CMCs: this is a key to tougher ceramics, while ideally 
maintaining high strength. This may become even more important in future 
body armor to deal with both ballistic and DE threats. 
• Novel application of AM: for example, to produce unique laminate and 
functionally graded materials (FGMs) or structures. The acronym FGM has a 
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nice ring to it because it suggests one can accomplish multiple phenomena 
as one proceeds through a material or structure. In 2006, McCauley and 
others investigated the FGM concept for titanium-boron-based armor material, 
and it showed potential; but, like CMCs, FGM is not ready for primetime.52 
Perhaps advancements in AM can help advance FGMs. AM may also be 
an interesting approach for incorporating low-density, energy-absorbing 
materials, such as porous micro- or nanospheres. 
• Follow the sports industry: It often leads the charge in incorporating 
advanced materials in commercial products. The authors heard but 
were unable to corroborate that graphene layers are being used in 
high-performance snow skis, to dampen vibration. That was one of the 
advantages of Kevlar-based skis developped in the 1980s. If graphene layers 
can accomplish the same thing, such material could be considerably lighter. 
• Materials by Design: This pertains to a process of designing materials from the 
atomic to the macroscopic scale with the objective of producing a particular 
suite of mechanisms and properties that are required for specific performance 
and applications. It is not about how to design coponents with existing 
materials but rather how to select and design materials for an application. 
The Army Research Laboratory has spearheaded a Materials by Design effort 
focusing on extreme dynamic environments, like armors.53 This merits following, 
and, in fact, independent activity has already shown success. The Atomic 
Armor, mentioned earlier, was based on a Materials by Design approach. 
In closing, consider the following advice: Think “out of the box.” How does one 
do that? Quoting a friend of a friend, “it’s very simple . . . believe in ‘open boxes,’ 
‘open minds,’ and ‘leaving egos at the door.’’’54
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Extra Note by Frank D. Gac
I first met Bob Skaggs in February 1975, shortly after hiring into what was then 
the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. We quickly became friends, and Bob was a 
significant mentor throughout my career, including inspiring and encouraging me to 
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pursue and complete a doctorate. One of my first projects was for Bob. Now, one of 
Bob’s last professional projects was with me. What an honor and exciting journey, as 
we investigated radiation absorbing materials, developed advanced ceramic matrix 
composites, and fielded innovative armor systems! Bob, I will miss you dearly. 
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C H A P T E R  1 7
Emerging Trends in Flexible Electronics: Opportunities and 
Challenges for a Clandestine Community
Brian Holmes and Michael David
Mr. Universe: Can’t stop the signal, Mal. Everything goes somewhere, 
and I go everywhere—Serenity1
Pervasive Electronic Technology in a Clandestine World—Lessons from a Fitbit
In January 2018, Liz Sly from the Washington Post revealed the extent to which 
aggregated heat map signatures, caused from worldwide data collected through 
fitness-device subscribers, could be tracked, revealing the location and activities 
of US military personnel abroad.2 Pentagon leadership had encouraged the use 
of fitness devices such as Fitbit initially, promoting the utility of electronics that 
support a culture of physical exercise and healthy activity. Several months after the 
Washington Post revealed its discovery and subsequent implications to the security 
of the troops, the Pentagon released a memo restricting the use of such devices by 
defense personnel, particularly in sensitive locations around the world.3
This case is important for several reasons. Seemingly harmless, ubiquitous 
electronic devices are being adopted en masse for use by a global population 
hungry for small electronics that incorporate an incredible assortment of features, 
data, and sensors. An innovative product made possible by miniature rechargeable 
batteries, small circuits, and an interconnected data ecosystem manufactured to 
provide continuous feedback to the user through the interface supplants a simple 
watch. The idea that aggregated information from a population’s watches could be 
exploited by foreign state and nonstate actors in a potentially nefarious manner 
might not have been part of the company’s business plan when creating the product. 
Examples like the Fitbit are part of a far more pervasive global trend built around 
a constantly evolving microelectronics industry. The Internet of Things (IoT), of which 
Fitbit plays a small part, is driving a world in which all manner of electronics will 
feature prominently in our daily lives.4 The only way to meet that reality fully is for 
industry, academia, and government laboratories to research and develop a diverse 
spectrum of semiconductor materials that can be incorporated into a variety of new 
devices and substrates. Consumer demand in this domain is growing and insatiable. 
Ultimately, this technological trend poses future opportunities and challenges for 
US special operations forces (SOF), a community dependent on electronics and 
clandestine positioning.
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SOF and Signals Intelligence—Historical Case Study 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the United States Army Security Agency (ASA) secretly 
deployed Radio Research Units (RRU) in Vietnam.5 On April 29, 1961, President 
John F. Kennedy formally approved the deployment of ASA personnel, the US Army’s 
electronic intelligence branch, to support the Army of the Republic of Vietnam 
(ARVN). The deployment was based on Operations Plan (OPLAN) 7-61 (WHITEBIRCH) 
and OPLAN 8-61 (SABERTOOTH). The ASA contingent organized itself as the 400th 
USASA Operations Unit (Provisional) with a cover designation as the 3rd Radio 
Research Unit (RRU). Throughout the Vietnam conflict ASA called its units “Radio 
Research” to shield its presence. According to J. L. Gilbert’s The Most Secret War, 
the 3rd RRU landed at Tan Son Nhut Air Force Base on May 13, 1961.6 In the 
interim, the 3rd RRU created short-range direction finding (SRDF) teams, using AN/
PRD-1s,7 a lightweight mantransportable radio direction finder system. Direction 
finding (DF), or radio direction finding (RDF), measures the direction from which a 
received signal was transmitted. RDF is a key tool of signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
for the military. The ability to locate the position of an enemy transmitter has been 
invaluable since World War I and played a key role in World War II’s Battle of the 
Atlantic (Figure 1).8
The war in Vietnam provides an example of how the wrong type of equipment 
contributed to an early tragedy. Due to equipment limitations, the SRDFs had 
to operate close to the enemy. Given the size and weight of the equipment, it 
necessitated deploying in two jeeps and a three-quarter-ton truck.9 The example 
we use relates to Specialist 4 James T. Davis, an ASA cryptologist, who joined the 
3rd RRU in 1961. On December 22, 1961, Davis was leading an SRDF Vietnamese 
team to an area approximately 12 miles from Tan Son Nhut in an attempt to locate 
a Vietcong guerrilla force operating in the area. They moved by truck to the area, 
set up, and, in concert with another SRDF team, attempted to locate the enemy 
using direction finding techniques. Unfortunately, 10 miles outside the base, the 
truck hit a mine and was attacked. Davis and nine members of his team were killed 
in action.10 
This case highlighted a significant problem the Army encountered during 
the Vietnam era and one that remains, to a lesser extent, today: incorporating 
cumbersome electronic detection equipment unsuited for the terrain and 
environment while maintaining a clandestine posture. On May 24, 2019, the United 
States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) posted a request for information, 
referenced on the website intelligencecommunitynews.com with the title “USSOCOM 
Looking for Next-Gen SIGINT.” The request focused on detection, DF, and geolocation 
of frequency agile radio transmitters. Even though the technology has evolve, the 
requirements remain the same.11
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Figure 1. Radio Direction Finding—From Concept to Practice.12
Emerging Trends in Flexible Electronics—A New Paradigm of Materials Integration
In response to a congressional request, a committee of the National Research Council’s 
Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy (STEP) reviewed programs worldwide 
and their potential to advance the production of flexible electronic technologies. This 
review resulted in a 2014 study titled The Flexible Electronics Opportunity, published 
by the National Academies Press and cofunded by the National Academy of Sciences, 
Department of Energy, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology.13 
According to the report, flexible electronics “refers to technologies that enable 
flexibility in the manufacturing process as well as flexibility as a characteristic of 
the final product” and can be found today in displays, image sensors, photovoltaics, 
and electronic paper. More important, the report noted the global market for flexible 
electronics could reach $250 billion by 2025 based on a significant growth rate.14
Circuits that bend and stretch are expected to have performance characteristics 
that cannot be obtained from rigid equivalents.15 Many of these characteristics, often 
measured by the efficiency, technology, and lifetime of the device, are described 
in detail in the seminal 2010 World Technology Evaluation Center (WTEC) Panel 
Report “European Research and Development in Hybrid Flexible Electronics.”16 When 
these characteristics are combined with the promise of cost reductions predicated 
on printed roll-to-roll processes, they have inherent appeal. According to a 2013 
symposium by the National Research Council, next generation radio frequency 
identification tags and organic light-emitting diode displays have already begun to 
displace some conventional equivalents.17
A 2019 article in Macromolecules evaluates the growing trends in flexible 
electronic materials, the impetus behind the research, and potential markets for 
their applications.18 The article also describe clearly the barriers to progress toward 
more fully integrated systems. While stretchable and elastic electronic-skin–inspired 
polymers are being developed, self-healing, conformal, adhesive, and transient 
materials are still challenging to incorporate functionally without affecting device 
performance parameters. These limitations can be attributed primarily to a lack of 
flexibility in key components. However, research groups are aggressively attempting 
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to reconcile these known deficiencies with innovative solutions. Small wearables, 
the primary market driver, are expected to become more intimate, functional, and 
informational at the millimeter level.19 The range of flexible electronic devices 
developed recently demonstrates the scope of the field, including patches to 
communicate with robots, wearables to detect heartbeats for healthcare, and solar 
cells that can be sewn into clothing.20 According to some, elastic circuity is finally 
coming of age, and the national security community is taking notice.21 
Today’s SOF SIGINT units require light, mobile, and highly functional electronic 
devices.22 In addition to its interest in smaller, more traditional components, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) has a burgeoning interest in flexible electronics. In 2005, 
the Army Research Laboratory actively pursued miniaturized and flexible electronics, 
including flexible displays and faceplates to incorporate into future military systems.23 
The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is also developing flexible and stretchable 
electronics and conformal devices as well as sensors for communication and analysis. 
Next-generation SOF require a new wave of materials whose properties can be 
maintained while exposed to extreme mechanical conditions. AFRL is researching 
new form factors for these electronics to include textile integration of circuitry and 
ultrathin, high-performance materials that impart shock insensitivity and mechanical 
durability. AFRL is also developing integrated and robust sensing paradigms to 
transmit information to and from humans and machines by exploring traditional 
materials in nontraditional form, such as conformal printed antennas and emerging 
technology such as 2D materials that can be used to gather, process, and distribute 
information via electrical, optical, and tactile pathways.24 In 2015, the DOD helped 
create NextFlex, a public-private cooperative “with a shared goal of advancing US 
manufacturing of flexible hybrid electronics (FHE).”25 
So where are these developments taking us? One direction is a concept described 
in a patent issued in 2004 for a body-worn DF system. The system uses body-worn 
antennas that operate in combination with a DF processor to detect the presence of 
electromagnetic radiation involved in communication as well as the direction of the 
source of the electromagnetic radiation.26 If Specialist Davis and his unit had been 
equipped with this type of technology instead of truck-borne systems, they might have 
been able to employ stealthier approach tactics and avoided being ambushed. 
Toward Next Generation Collection Systems—Progress in Wearable Antennas
The first components required for wearable collection systems are wearable 
antennas. An example of this type of functional research appeared in 2012 in an 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) letter on antennas and wireless 
propagation. This research described E-fibers that offer improved mechanical and 
radio frequency (RF) performance when compared to traditionally flat and rigid 
antennas and circuits. The E-fibers comprise high-strength and flexible polymer cores 
that incorporate conductive metallic coatings. They are readily embroidered onto 
regular textiles and can be laminated onto polymer dielectric substrates. Prototype 
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body-worn, multiband/wideband antennas and medical biosensors were constructed 
to demonstrate their efficiency and comparable performance to that of copper. The 
designs were fabricated with high precision and resolution down to 0.5 mm.27 The 
chemistry and fabrication are complex, but the authors elucidate the complexity in 
detail. For our purposes, suffice it to say, RF and sensor designs can be translated 
into embroidery software, followed by digitizing stitches of the assistant yarn.  
Figure 2 outlines the concept and process.
Figure 2. (a) Fabrication process of body-worn antennas, sensors, and RF circuits.  
These E-fiber RF components offer several new functionalities unavailable previously, such as  
inconspicuous weaving into garments, omnidirectional high-strength signals for connecting faraway cell  
towers and even satellites, and excellent conformality for interior body imaging. (b) Fabricated textile  
transmission line and patch antenna after placement onto a polymer substrate.28
(a)
(b)
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L. Zhang and others described the design and fabrication of a textile, triband 
antenna. The multiband antenna was designed using E-fiber fabrication, displayed in 
Figure 3(a). The antenna covers three communication bands, namely the GSM (850 
MHz), PCS (1900 MHz), and WLAN (2450 MHz). The fabricated textile antenna and its 
RF performance are exhibited in Figure 3(b) and (c).
Figure 3. Textile version of the triband antenna: (a) design and fabricated antenna, (b) realized gain,  
and (c) return loss.29
In June 2019, M. El Abassi and K. Kablin reviewed the main technological 
advances and contributions in the field of wearable antennas for wireless body-sensor 
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monitoring vital signs like pulse and blood pressure, and determining general 
network connection, rather than focusing on DF.31 The capabilities described in the 
article reflect considerable improvements in flexibility and overall functionality. Most 
important, they reveal smaller size, lighter weight, and less effect on the human body 
than previous incarnations. The systems are nearly maintenance free, comfortable, 
and meet durability requirements. 
Figure 4. (a) Multiple incident RF sources of wearable rectenna. (b) Harvesting antenna  
electromagnetic (EM) field sources. (c) Tri-band wearable rectenna circuit.32
Figure 4 illustrates the main incident RF sources of wearable antennas, the 
rectifying circuits of each, and their affect on on-body wireless communication. The 
authors concluded the most important considerations for future research include 
the selection of material, critical parameters of antenna performance, conductive 
ground plane dimensions, material conductivity, the use of electromagnetic band 
gap structure, human body effect on antenna performance, and specific acceptable 
absorption rate levels.33
According to researchers at Florida International University, the goal for textile-
based electronics is to enable communications, IoT, and sensing without using 
handheld devices or additional accessories.34 Existing sensor electronics, including 
micro-electromechanical system sensors, remain rigid and bulky.35 Military operators 
carry an incredible amount of weight and gear. In addition to armor and weaponry, 
batteries for electronics account for a significant percentage of the load.36 Stealthy 
activities inherently require less obtrusive equipment. In 2016, researchers at the 
US Army’s Natick Soldier Research, Development, and Engineering Center evaluated 
textile-based supercapacitors (designed to serve as power sources) incorporated 
(a) (b)
(c)
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into military uniforms to enable the autonomy of wearable sensors. Examples of the 
wearable sensor technology include eyewear, smart textiles, tattoos, and jewelry, 
as displayed in Figure 5.37 A significant percentage of the notional military-applied 
technology is predicated on advancements in the flexible electronic material sector. 
Figure 5. Screen-printed Military Textiles for Wearable Energy Storage38
Back to the Future
As noted earlier in the section, Specialist Davis was killed in 1961 while leading 
an SRDF team moving in trucks and jeeps along an open road. In an attempt to 
overcome this type of land-based targeting vulnerability, the Army began to employ 
airborne radio direction finding (ARDF) capabilities. Once again though, there were 
initial weaknesses with the platform. In the case of ARDF, the main challenge was 
selecting the right type of aircraft to employ the system correctly. Early tests using 
a UH-19 “Chickasaw” helicopter failed because of structural vibration problems. 
Subsequently, engineers turned to the U-6A, which was a small, fixed-wing aircraft 
nicknamed the “Beaver.”39 Fortunately, there were numerous U-6 aircraft utilized in 
Vietnam at the time, and, as a result, maintenance support was readily available. 
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The aircraft also provided the pilot good ground visibility and could transport three 
crew members plus a small load of equipment.40 
The 3rd RRU conducted one early effective demonstration of ARDF in an attempt 
to locate, identify, and destroy the Vietcong communications net in 1962. Staging 
from Qui Nhon on the central coast and Da Nang, aircrews flew two U-6s during a 
four-day operation in mountainous regions under hazardous conditions. On May 27, 
the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces responded to the ARDF fixes with air strikes, 
successfully destroying a command post.41 In February 1964, the 400th USASA 
Special Operations Detachments (SOD) deployed a team for a 120-day field test in 
Vietnam. For the next two years, personnel of the 400th shuttled back and forth to 
Vietnam from Okinawa on one-of-a-kind assignments. These missions provided an 
opportunity to test direct support to tactical forces and represented an important 
milestone in shaping ASA’s future assistance to Special Forces (SF). This included 
developing techniques to exploit SIGINT and ARDF to support SOF missions.42
Based in part on the successes of the 400th, 51 soldiers of the 403rd ASASOD 
deployed from Fort Bragg to conduct SIGINT to support the 5th SF Group in September 
1966. The 403rd ASASOD strove to provide communications-intelligence support at 
the lowest tactical level possible while maintaining maximum mobility and flexibility.43 
During its first year in Vietnam, the 403rd focused on targets in the northern II Corps 
area. The 403rd ASASOD—based in Kontum—conducted manned manual Morse 
intercept and ARDF tip-off, deployed DF/voice intercept teams, ran the local DF net, 
and performed second- and third-echelon maintenance. The 403rd could also deploy a 
small intercept team to support mobile operations.44
Today, virtually the same functions are performed by US Army Special Operation 
Team Alpha (SOT-A) units. The mission of a SOT-A is to conduct signals intelligence/
electronic warfare (SIGINT/EW) to support information operations (unilaterally or in 
conjunction with other SOF elements) and to facilitate existing and emerging SOF 
missions worldwide. SOT-As are the direct descendants of the USASASODs.45 The 
major difference is the surrounding operational environment. 
The Future Operational Environment
Special Operations Forces Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (SOF AT&L), a 
critical component of USSOCOM, posted information describing three areas of 
importance to their near and future (2020–2030) mission: small unit dominance, 
mission assured communications, and signature management. Each post conveyed 
several technical requirements contextualized against a reassessment of their 
mission and force posture.46 The significance of advanced materials, manufacturing, 
communications, and concealment of presence were referenced throughout the 
areas, as was the importance of size and weight restrictions for the operators in 
remote and highly contested environments. 
In every area the need for new sensors and electronics incorporated into the 
operator’s toolkit were implied as a high priority. Advancements in embedded flexible 
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electronics, once fully realized, could be used to conduct specialized reconnaissance 
missions and exact human-intelligence-enabled SIGINT, in addition to integrating 
biosensors specifically designed for health monitoring for more effective soldier 
performance. Clandestine operators are often “first in” the fight and forward deployed 
to better determine the position and capabilities of the enemy through information-
gathering techniques, exactly why the USASA secretly deployed RRUs to Vietnam and 
their more recent counterparts to Afghanistan after the events of 9/11.
In 2018, United States Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command 
(MARSOC) published “MARSOF 2030—A Strategic Vision for the Future” to evaluate 
the future operating environment based on their unique vantagepoint. To meet 
their commander’s intent, the author(s) depicted two conceptual vignettes and 
guiding concepts to better prepare the force for “service in a volatile and uncertain 
future.” Both vignettes better delineate the types of scenarios in which the military 
might find itself where technology solutions could enable small units to reach their 
objectives using minimal footprint solutions. Each highlighted or implied SIGINT via 
manned and unmanned platforms and integrated data analysis through a variety of 
different types of sensor interfaces.47
A more daunting challenge might be how to develop and deploy sensors, including 
flexible electronics predicated on low-power systems, that will operate not only in 
jungles, deserts, and mountainous regions but also in dense urban terrain (DUT). 
Even more esoteric would be how to conduct SF cyber operations in DUT.48 Some of 
the key factors affecting the environment include IoT devices, surveillance cameras, 
and “always on” personal assistants like Alexa and Siri. 
Adding further complexity, the United States or allied entities do not make, supply, 
or maintain many IoT devices and surveillance systems. For example, DuerOS, 
Baidu’s answer to Amazon’s Alexa, has reached over 200 million deployed devices. 
This means the DuerOS is built into Baidu-built and third-party related devices.49 
Emerging 5th generation (5G) mobile networks are primarily supplied by the Chinese 
firm Huawei. Chinese tech companies—particularly Huawei, Hikvision, Dahua, and 
ZTE—supply artificial intelligence surveillance technology in 63 countries, according to 
a September report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace think tank.50 
Of those nations, 36 have signed onto China’s massive infrastructure project, the Belt 
and Road Initiative.51 These Chinese-built surveillance systems are likely to be found 
in the megacities around the globe where SOF units may have to operate. What might 
this environment look like? How can we exploit these systems? How can airborne and 
terrestrial autonomous systems, such as drones and robot sensors, be linked to both 
SOT-A units and embedded electronics to provide situational awareness? 
Conclusion
According to the US Army Training and Doctrine Command summary of ES2, “the 
individual soldier is the most capable, sophisticated collector of intelligence in 
today’s Army.”52 Ideally, each soldier acts as a sensor. Not only do SOFs require 
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a spectrum of new electronic materials to develop innovative sensor technology, 
including flexible embedded devices, but they also need to function in an 
electronically networked society. An additional challenge will be developing the 
capability to deploy these devices in the underground scenario described in author 
John Higgins’s article for the Army titled “R2TD: A New Tool for an Ever-Present 
Threat.”53 Tunnels are as effective as any known electronic jammer. 
Regardless the conundrums facing the devlopment and implementation of 
flexible electronics, the military clearly realizes the distinct advantages flexible 
electronics can enable based on historical endeavors, from the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency–led display research to more recent joint ventures, such 
as the 2004 establishment of the Flexible Electronics and Display Center at Arizona 
State University with the US Army.54 Ideally, global advancements in materials and 
manufacturing research can align with commercial market drivers and user input from 
the operators to formalize innovative solutions such as body-worn direction finding 
(DF) systems. History demands an approach Specialist Davis would approve of.
All statements of fact, analysis, or opinion are the author’s and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the National Intelligence University, the Department of 
Defense or any of its components, or the US government.
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C H A P T E R  1 8
Adapting SOCOM to an Electrified World
Karen Swider-Lyons, Joshua Lamb, and Yet-Ming Chiang
Introduction
The United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) envisions its future 
with hyper-enabled operators empowered by “data assets, adaptive and flexible 
sensors, scalable tactical communications, edge computing, embedded algorithms, 
and tailorable human-machine interfaces . . . integrated into architectures that will 
sense, monitor, transport, process, and analyze data to aggregate information.”1 
Many of these technological advances are possible because of the rapid pace of 
microelectronics development, which has famously followed Moore’s law. This extra 
computing power however is increasingly hungry for electrical power.
Underlying the fielding of advanced communication, computing, and sensors 
is the need for adequate electrical power and energy. Vast technological changes 
have occurred since the 1980s in electrochemical power sources, particularly with 
lithium-ion battery technology for mobile devices, automobiles, and energy storage. 
Fuel-cell technology is also being steadily commercialized. The capacity of batteries 
depends on their chemical composition but has been doubling once every ten years 
as new materials are discovered and developers can cram more “energy in the 
can.” Fuel-based systems are progressing slower because the energy content of 
fuels is fixed; however, improvements are made through creating lighter and more 
efficient conversion devices. To accommodate additional energy requirements for 
microelectronics, developers of commercial electronic products simply use more 
space and weight in devices for the power sources, a design luxury that SOCOM 
might not have. 
We assert continued progress in electrochemical energy technologies by 2050 
will affect SOCOM significantly, as electric-powered, unmanned systems become 
more effective, assuming that SOCOM manages the resources appropriately. Power 
requirements will increase for communication in Global Positioning Systems–denied 
areas, as both the distance between receivers and transmitters increases and signals 
must overcome clutter in the environment. Electrical energy is poised to have an 
even broader impact as the Department of Defense (DOD) moves to directed-energy 
weapons and as demands increase for high-quality power at its temporary installations 
for electronics and communications. New technologies are trending toward increased 
electrification of even traditionally nonelectric devices, with the gap for implementation 
often being the lack of a suitable power source.
Maintaining future technological supremacy requires developing and adopting 
power sources capable of powering new advances. The United States might also 
depend on different countries to keep access to the materials needed for new energy 
sources and rely less on oil-producing countries. This chapter attempts to project how 
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the movement to electric power sources, such as batteries and fuel cells, may affect 
SOCOM’s technological and geopolitical outlook by 2030.
Electrochemical Energy Systems
Lithium-Ion Batteries for Energy Storage
In 1991, Sony first commercialized rechargeable lithium-ion batteries (Li-ion) for portable 
electronics in Japan.2 Since then, the energy-storing capacity of Li-ion batteries has 
increased by more than three times, while their cost has decreased by 85 percent since 
2010. Such increases in capacity and decreases in cost are forecast to continue as 
Li-ion batteries have become ubiquitous in everything from tools to automobiles. As 
the manufacturing and safety of these batteries continues to improve, they are being 
applied in on-grid and off-grid energy storage when coupled with wind or solar power. The 
market prospects for Li-ion batteries and related energy storage systems are discussed 
in Future of Batteries: Winner Takes All? Investments in battery-related technologies by 
the private sector were $13.7B in 2016–2017, and such investments continue to grow.3 
Rechargeable Li-ion batteries are electrochemical energy storage devices that 
store energy produced by another source (e.g., natural gas/turbines, diesel/
generators, solar panels). As illustrated in Figure 1, the materials in the cathode 
and anode of the batteries shuttle lithium ions between them upon charge and 
Figure 1. Schematic of battery charging and discharging. The cycle is about 90–95 percent efficient. 
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discharge. During charging, the cathode transition metal oxides (containing typically 
cobalt, nickel, and manganese) release electrons and positively charged lithium 
ions to the carbon/graphite anode of the battery. The reverse process occurs 
on discharge, and the potential energy of the stored electrons is released to an 
external device. Li-ion batteries store more energy than their lead-acid or nickel-
cadmium counterparts, mainly because their chemistry yields a higher voltage 
(nominally 4 volts versus 1.5 volts for lead acid). Power (P) in watts (W) is equivalent 
to the product of voltage (V) and current (I) represented as (P = V x I). Energy (E) is 
power over time, expressed as (E = [V x I] / t).
Li-ion batteries also feature much higher cycle life than other rechargeable 
technologies, with commercially available technologies able to achieve 500 full 
charge-discharge cycles or more before losing energy storage capability.4 The 
materials in Li-ion batteries are also lighter than in their traditional counterparts, 
giving them higher power and energy-per-unit weight and even volume. New materials 
and manufacturing methods have been developed to make batteries lighter and 
denser, so more watts and watt-hours (Wh)i are produced per unit weight or volume 
of the batteries, with projections for more improvements. Further details of Li-ion 
battery materials and technology, plus future prospects, including environmental 
impact and lifecycle costs, can be found in “Science for Environment Policy: Towards 
the Battery of the Future.”5
Li-ion batteries, however, have not broken the relationship between power and 
energy (typically, increasing power capability leads to a reduction in stored energy and 
vice versa), making battery selection highly dependent on the application. A careful 
consideration of power, energy, and operating conditions (particularly temperature) 
must be considered when selecting a battery for an application. Li-ion, for example, 
typically has a narrow operating window of ~5–55°C.4 Selecting the wrong battery for 
an application can lead to a device being unable to complete its mission, or it can 
even present a safety hazard to users. The stored energy in batteries always carries 
an inherent risk, described in greater detail later in this chapter. 
Fuel Cells
Fuel-cell technologies are also poised to change how energy is distributed worldwide. 
As illustrated in Figure 2, like batteries, fuel cells produce electricity directly via 
electrochemical reactions at the cathode and anode; however, the fuel cells are open 
and use air for the oxidizer, and they do not store energy (the energy resides in the 
fuel). The reactions are facilitated by electrocatalysts, typically containing platinum, 
and the electrolyte is a perfluorinated polymer, such as Nafion.ii
i   A watt-hour is a measure of electrical energy equivalent to one watt (1W) of power expended in one hour (1h) of time. 
ii   Nafion is a brand of the Chemours Company.
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Figure 2. Schematic of hydrogen, or PEM, fuel-cell mechanism.
Hydrogen fuel cells—the most advanced type of fuel cell—are being used for 
automobile propulsion, materials handling (forklifts), and backup power. Hydrogen 
fuel cells operate at low temperatures (e.g., less than 100°C) and with approximately 
60 percent efficiency. Hydrogen fuel cells fill some niches well. Because they convert 
the high energy of hydrogen gas to electricity efficiently, they typically have more 
energy than large-scale batteries. They refuel quickly, keeping equipment in use 
longer than those powered by batteries, a key attribute for warehouse forklifts and 
fleet vehicles. The cost of fuel-cell development is mainly in manufacturing rather 
than in raw materials, so experts project their cost to decrease.6 While investment in 
fuel cells is far smaller than into batteries, fuel-cell automobiles are being developed 
worldwide; Japan, South Korea, and China have set ambitious goals to have millions 
of fuel-cell cars on the road by 2030 and are also targeting long-haul trucking.7 
Amazon bought a large stake in Plug Power for its fuel-cell forklift business.8 
Cummins bought a large stake in Hydrogenics for hydrogen fuel cells and hydrogen 
production for backup power.9
Hydrogen fuel is the main detraction for fuel cells, as it must be made by reforming 
natural gas or electrolyzing water by processes that are marginally efficient. The 
hydrogen is typically stored at high pressures, and the infrastructure has been too 
sparse to make it convenient for most consumers. More recent demonstrations have 
shown that hydrogen is an asset, as renewable energy plants are able to make it 
“for free” with excess solar and wind. Excess electricity is provided to electrolyzers 
to produce hydrogen from water. The hydrogen is either fed into natural gas lines or 
compressed and stored as fuel.10 Hydrogen can also be stored indefinitely, with no 
loss of energy (unlike batteries, which will self-discharge).
Other types of fuel cells include direct methanol fuel cells—which are limited 
to small sizes because of thermal restrictions with heat rejection—and solid oxide 
fuel cells, which operate near 800°C typically on natural gas, but have not been as 
Proton Exchange Membrane fuel cell
Perfluorosulfonic acid (Nafion polymer) membrane
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successful on liquid fuels such as JP-8.iii As discussed later, these types of fuel cells 
have some niche markets for the military.
Electric Power for SOCOM Missions
Portable Power
The heavy load of batteries required for the dismounted soldier is a well-known 
problem. US Marines inculde batteries as one of the three B’s needed for survival: 
“Beans, Bullets, and Batteries.” The US government has spent hundreds of millions of 
dollars for new energy systems in the 20–50 watt range, or adequate to power radios 
and communication systems. The Army strives to network all the power loads on 
the soldier so that only one type of battery must be carried. A range of technologies 
has been explored, such as lithium batteries, energy-harvesting devices (e.g., heel 
strikesiv), and direct methanol fuel cells. Researchers also explored solid oxide fuel 
cells and Stirling enginesv because of their promise of operating on JP-8 only.11 While 
this government investment clearly “energized” the interest in small power sources, 
the main technology now in this power range is rechargeable Li-ion batteries. 
The specific energy and energy density of state-of-the art batteries is given in 
Table 1, along with values for some small, commercial fuel cells and the target for 
the next generation of automotive battery systems. The military has adapted Li-
ion batteries to conform to soldiers’ bodies, thus providing better volumetrically 
efficiency. Methanol fuel cells (using liquid or reformed methanol) have had some 
successes, as have propane-fueled, solid oxide fuel cells. However, no energy-
harvesting devices beyond solar blankets have been deployed for the military. Stirling 
engines never received enough investment to get beyond the prototype stage. 
Polymer electrolyte membrane (PEM)vi fuel cells with compressed hydrogen (Figure 2) 
are the most effective for energy-per-unit weight (specific energy), although they are 
not energy dense. Compressed hydrogen is unappealing for a soldier to carry. Using 
solid forms of hydrogen (uncompressed) is also possible. Metal hydride canisters are 
commercially available, but have low hydrogen storage per weight. More hydrogen-rich 
solutions—such as alanevii or hydrogen made from aluminum in water—are available, 
but these systems are less mature, more expensive, and have less energy than 
compressed hydrogen. 
iii   JP-8 stands for Jet Propellant 8. It is a jet fuel specified and widely used by the US military. 
iv   Technology designed to harvest dynamic energy from the heel-strike phase of walking, convert it to electrical energy, and store  
 the electrical energy in a battery. 
v   A Stirling engine is a heat engine vastly different from the combustion engine used in automobiles. It is based on the cyclic  
 compression of a fixed amount of air or other gas (the working fluid) at different temperatures, such that there is a conversion of  
 heat energy to mechanical energy. 
vi   PEM is also known as proton-exchange membrane. 
vii   Alane, also known as alumane, is aluminum hydride, an inorganic compound with the chemical formula AlH3.
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TABLE 1. SPECIFIC ENERGY AND ENERGY DENSITY OF 20–50 WATT BATTERY AND FUEL-CELL 











Lead-acid battery 30–40 60–75 Well-established,  high-power battery
Li-ion—standard for soldier 170 274 Brentronics BB2590
Conformal, wearable,  
rechargeable Li-ion battery 120 184 Palladium CWB-150
US DOE vehicle battery goals 235 500 Target for system-level batteries12
Primary batteries Primary battery—Li-CFx/MnO2 266 325 Eagle Picher— not rechargeable
Portable  
fuel cells
Direct methanol fuel cell 273 126 UltraCell XRT-25
Direct methanol fuel cell 275 181 SFC Energy, Jenny 1200
PEM fuel cell with 5000 psi H2 515 205 Estimated
The development of cost-effective, reliable power sources can cost in the billions of 
dollars once all the materials development, manufacturing, and systems integration 
is taken into account, so the US government will not likely be able to fund a 
technology alone; dual-use technology, with a broad commercial acceptance is ideal. 
A boon is the level of investment in battery technology from both commercially 
and publicly funded research and development. Significant funding for advanced 
battery development is currently in place through the Department of Energy’s Vehicle 
Technology Office and a consortium of US auto manufacturers, the United States 
Advanced Battery Consortium (USABC).13 They have provided performance targets for 
near-term (CY 2023) battery development for electric vehicles (EVs). This represents 
a significant investment by both commercially and publicly funded research and 
development, and it shows what performance targets may be commercially available in 
the near term. Developments made for the EV market represent a significant resource 
if they can be adequately adapted to the needs of the special operations forces (SOF) 
mission.Progress is also being made on managing the electric loads better, and new 
iPower software is being implemented to better match new technologies to existing 
power sources.13 The recommendation still stands that the US SOF community must 
manage its power loads wisely and effectively11 and not expect an advanced power/
energy source to become available.
Backup Power and Remote Sensors
The specific energy and volume of batteries is essentially linear with sizing. Fuel cells 
become more compelling for longer missions because the weight and size of the fuel-
cell power plant stays the same over time, with the requirement only to add more fuel. 
Diesel generators are state-of-the-art and used successfully; however, they are readily 
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heard, and the electric power is noisy or nonuniform and less ideal for electronics. 
Both methanol fuel cells and propane-fueled, solid oxide fuel cells scale favorably 
with size and as the mission endurance increases from 24 to 72 hours, as shown in 
Table 2. The fuel cells are still relatively expensive compared to batteries, and while 
commercial vendors exist, the required propane and methanol fuels are a specialty 
fuel for the DOD, complicating logistics.
TABLE 2. ESTIMATED SPECIFIC ENERGY OF 110- AND 275-W FUEL CELLS VERSUS  
BATTERIES FOR 24- AND 72-H MISSIONS COMPARED TO LITHIUM ION BATTERY.










Solid oxide fuel cell/
propane fuel 275 350 750 Ultraelectronics D300, limited cycle life
Direct methanol  
fuel cell 110 110 900 SFC EFOY 2400
Soldier Li-ion  
battery 100–275 170 170
Brentronics BB2590—Batteries can be 
added in series to increase power
Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Electric power has many advantages over combustion technologies for unmanned 
aircraft systems (UAS), as it is directly compatible with electronics. In addition, it has 
low electric noise, instant starting, decreased maintenance, reduced vibrations, and 
negligible thermal signatures. 
Small toys, robotics, and air vehicles have proliferated with the introduction of 
lithium polymer (LiPo) batteries, which are a form of lithium-ion batteries with a gelled 
interior electrolyte. LiPo’s tend to have less strict manufacturing than cells used for 
cell phones and computers but can be designed in very small sizes and with very high 
power. Drones,viii or quadcopters,ix are one technology that have particularly benefitted 
from LiPo batteries. The precise control of drones is enabled by electric power to the 
electric motors on each propeller, so that they can adapt dynamically with the wind 
and fatigue on the motors and keep the vehicle level.
Small quadcopters (or multicoptersx) are now commonplace as the result of the 
confluence of advanced Li-ion batteries, electric motors, and small electric cameras 
and payloads. Sophisticated mapping can be carried out with drones that can be 
purchased for a few thousand dollars. Most notably, the DJI Phantom and other 
drones are affordable to consumers and are now being used for jobs ranging from 
wedding photography to electric power-line monitoring.14 The batteries on these 
viii   In this case, drone refers to a remote-controlled, pilotless aircraft. 
ix   A quadcopter, also termed a quadrotor, is rotorcraft (e.g., “helicopter”) that is lifted and propelled by four rotors. 
x   A multicopter is simply a rotorcraft with more than two rotors. 
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vehicles last on the order of 20 to 30 minutes,15 making them inadequate for 
complex, over-the-horizon surveillance.
The endurance of commercial drones is expected to increase incrementally as 
new battery technology develops. While commercial drones might be considered 
too simplistic for advanced SOCOM missions, the SOCOM community should expect 
that their adversaries will be equipped with this technology for both surveillance and 
carrying out attacks. Even without longer endurance, the systems can still be made 
more lethal by grouping the systems together in swarms for more complex attacks 
and/or decoys. This threat will only grow by 2050 as the technology continues to 
develop with the shared commercial market.
As shown in Figure 3, hydrogen fuel cells have been demonstrated to increase 
drastically the endurance of small, tier 2 (15–50 pound) unmanned air vehicles with 
a two to eight times increase over Li-ion batteries. The Naval Research Laboratory 
has demonstrated 24-hour flights of 35-pound vehicles with hydrogen fuel cells16 and 
envisions adding endurance with solar panels and autosoaring so that the vehicles 
can stay up for days at a time and serve as communication networks or provide 
persistent surveillance.17
Other countries are also actively pursuing hydrogen fuel cells for long-endurance small 
UAS. Such vehicles are likely to become a threat, as they are more frequently deployed.
Figure 3. Tier 1 to tier 3 battery, fuel cell, and engine-powered UAS: comparison of propulsion/energy source, 
speed, endurance and gross takeoff weight (GTOW).
S T R A T E G I C  L A T E N C Y  U N L E A S H E D    |    261 
Other SOF Missions
Power requirements for exoskeletons, such as the Tactical Assault Light Operator 
Suit (TALOS) were assessed as too demanding for electrochemical power sources.18 
However, new exoskeleton concepts are arising with reduced electronic loads and 
swappable Li-ion batteries.19 As researchers learn to decrease the power needed for 
the loads and battery and/or fuel-cell technology improves, exoskeletons are likely to 
become an aid on the battlefield.
The SOF community also envisions upgrading wet SEAL delivery systems to dry 
systems with longer ranges. The program to develop the Advanced SEAL Delivery 
System (ASDS) ended with a failure of the Li-ion batteries, resulting in fire and 
destruction to the vehicle.20 This sobering accident effectively halted the use of 
advanced Li-ion batteries for the Navy. However, progress is being developed toward 
the adoption of new Li-ion commercial batteries with better safety pedigrees. There 
are also numerous programs to extend the endurance of unmanned undersea vehicles 
with Li-ion batteries.
Risks of Advanced Battery Sources
All stored energy carries an inherent risk, particularly if the stored energy is 
released uncontrollably. Currently, the largest forms of stored energy on the US 
electric grid are in the form of pumped hydroelectric reservoirs, where water is 
cycled between reservoirs at different elevations to store electrical energy. The 
uncontrolled stored energy in this case is potentially catastrophic, particularly for 
those living downstream from the dam. Like any form of stored energy, batteries 
carry this risk, but they also present some particular challenges. Looking at 
batteries in terms of the fire triangle,xi a fully charged battery holds fuel and oxidizer 
in intimate contact with one another. The only other places this is common is in high 
explosives and rocket fuel. While battery failure is certainly less catastrophic than 
the risk presented by an explosive, advanced electrochemical systems present an 
increasingly energy-dense component of many systems. Not only can a failure render 
the device inoperable, a severe enough incident can lead to damage beyond the 
power source and even injury to the user in extreme cases. 
Li-ion cells present a modern case study of this problem. The specific concerns 
of Li-ion cells are well known. They are intolerant of abusive conditions, the active 
materials exhibit energetic breakdown, the inactive components (the electrolytes 
in particular) are flammable, and flammable gasses are often produced as part of 
the decomposition. Much the same could also be said of chemical fuels. Gasoline 
and other fuel fires happen routinely, yet the hazards inherent to the fuel are rarely 
seen as a reason to prohibit its use. The difference ultimately is familiarity with risks 
inherent to the technology. We have 100-plus years of dealing with liquid-fuel fires, 
xi   The fire, or combustion, triangle is a simple model for understanding the necessary ingredients of most fires: heat, fuel, and an  
 oxidizing agent (usually oxygen or air).
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and most organizations feel well equipped to handle liquid fuels safely and respond 
to any emergency situations surrounding them. Li-ion batteries, by comparison, have 
been in common use since their initial commercialization by Sony in 1991, and in 
most of that time have been relegated to single-cell, consumer electronic devices. 
Applications using more than three or four small cells have become common with the 
initial commercial success of electric vehicles, including the Tesla Roadster (2008) 
and the Nissan Leaf (2010). 
The current solution to field high-energy-density batteries is to rely on 
sophisticated engineering of the battery pack, including both active and passive 
controls to mitigate a potential failure. These solutions add significantly to the 
size, weight, and cost of the system, effectively reducing the energy density of the 
underlying technology. Research and development is underway for advanced battery 
reliability, including more sophisticated diagnostics, cell-level improvements for 
better safety, and pack-level improvements. 
While DOD has been slow to adopt new battery technologies because of safety 
concerns, potential adversaries may be less reticent. A higher tolerance for risk 
presents other countries with an opportunity to leapfrog our own technologies by 
adopting new power-source technologies where the safety concerns have not been 
fully addressed. Russia’s stealthy use of Li-ion batteries in the Losharik submarines 
was revealed when a vehicle had a lethal fire at sea, possibly caused by a Li-ion 
battery fire.21 The Japanese, Australians, Chinese, and others continue to develop 
submarines with Li-ion batteries.22 Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft AG has built a 
fuel-cell-based submarine for years for the German, Italian, and other navies.23 The 
adoption of advanced power sources by SOCOM will be critical to maintaining a 
technological advantage. This requires both a better understanding of the potential 
consequences so users can appropriately assess the risks of a technology and 
improved technologies to mitigate risks when they are deemed unacceptable. 
Geopolitical Concerns for Manufacturing,  
Raw Materials, and New Electric Microgrids
Li-ion batteries were first invented in the United States, and the materials were 
discovered in the United States, Europe, and Japan. However, Sony led the first effort 
to commercialize and manufacture the technology.24 The centers of manufacturing 
then moved to South Korea. China now dominates 73 percent of the manufacturing 
market as part of their strategic government efforts to become leaders in new energy 
technologies and electric vehicles, much like the path that China took for solar 
energy.25 Meanwhile, the United States has 12 percent of the world’s manufacturing 
capability for Li-ion batteries today; with no national plan for electrification, its 
worldwide share is forecast to drop.26 
Up to 70 percent of the cost of Li-ion batteries is in their raw materials.26 Lithium 
batteries require lithium for their anodes, plus an assortment of transition metal 
oxides for their cathode. The original cathodes contained cobalt (as lithium cobalt 
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oxide), but these have been replaced by higher-capacity and higher-voltage materials 
containing nickel and manganese. The majority of cobalt (69 percent) is mined 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; however, China holds 62 percent of the 
cobalt chemical supply, as shown in Figure 4. Nickel is mined primarily in Indonesia 
(26 percent) and the Philippines (17 percent),27 where it is also causing significant 
environmental damage.28
 
Figure 4. 2018 Distribution of cobalt as a raw material (top) and chemical (bottom), adapted from  
“Written Testimony of Simon Moores,”Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, February 5 2019. 
Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, a company that tracks markets for Li-ion batteries, 
briefed the US Congress in 2019 to raise concerns about the United States losing its 
manufacturing and technological lead. The number of Li-ion battery “mega” or “giga” 
factories increased from 17 in 2017 to 70 in 2019, 46 of which are based in China, 
with only 5 currently planned for the United States.29
A RAND study raised similar concerns about the United States maintaining a ready 
manufacturing source of batteries for soldier-portable battery supply,30 and the lack 
of supplies produced by the United States would likely impact SOCOM as well. One 
challenge for low-volume manufacturers for soldier-specific or custom batteries is 
having enough clout to affect the purchase of the materials needed for batteries, as 
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the giga-factories dominate purchasing, raising concern that it might not be possible 
to have a surge of battery production for soldiers in war time. The recent proposal 
of the US executive branch to purchase Greenland from Denmark could be seen as 
a means for more reliable access to the raw materials in batteries, fuel cells, and 
electric motors, as the ice shelves melt and allow new mining projects, such as the 
magmatic massive sulfide project for nickel-copper-platinum-cobalt.
SOCOM should also expect the use of batteries and fuel cells in microgrids, in 
combination with renewable energy (solar and wind), will provide power to thousands 
of communities worldwide that were previously without stable sources of power. 
Microgrids are being implemented now in Pacific island communities, where all power 
is generated by imported fuel from generators. As the technology costs continue to 
decrease, stable electric power will likely come to Africa, India, and developing-world 
communities. The availability of stable electric power from hybrid microgrids will 
undoubtedly improve living conditions for hundreds of millions of people worldwide. 
While peace typically follows improvements in living conditions and economic stability, 
in 2050, SOCOM might find some emerging communities with aggressive ambitions. 
Summary
The world is presently experiencing a revolution in electric power sources, as Li-ion 
battery and fuel cells are becoming ubiquitous, reliable, and cost-effective for portable 
electronics, vehicles, tools, and homes. The technologies are expected to proliferate 
with the growing demand for electric vehicles and grids, and will likely affect SOCOM 
missions at both the technical and geopolitical levels. SOCOM must manage the 
deployment of electronic loads around realistic expectations of the capabilities of 
commercial power sources and work to integrate new technologies effectively into 
its missions. Even though battery and fuel-cell energy will not improve at the rate of 
microelectronics, the electrification of unmanned systems will unleash new, small 
technologies that can be used effectively both by and against the United States. New 
economies might emerge around microgrids in developing countries. SOCOM will also 
have to consider relationships with countries that hold the raw materials for batteries, 
fuel cells, and electric motors. 
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S E C T I O N  4
GLOBAL BUSINESS AND THE 
ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
IN NATIONAL SECURITY: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOF
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Cryptocurrency: Will the Digitization of Currency  
Allow Malign Actors to Achieve Strategic Effects?
Sara Dudley
Your money is no good here—“THE” US dollar (USD)—literally. 
As developed nations move deeper into life as cashless communities, the declining 
acceptance and use of fiat currency marks a critical evolution of society from 
physical cash to digital value transfers. What if rogue and revisionist nations could 
unite behind a digital currency that supplanted the USD? Could they establish 
a secondary monetary system that avoids the international sanctions and anti-
money-laundering protocols in the international financial systems to modulate bad 
behavior? Venezuelan, Russian, Iranian, and North Korean pursuits of just this sort of 
cryptocurrency alternatives give credibility to this concept. The potential next major 
world war might not be on a traditional battlefield but between financial systems. 
Corrupt and criminal networks are no longer the only communities finding ways to 
obfuscate their financial flows from the policing bodies protecting the international 
commercial banking system—nation-states have arrived in earnest.
The complement of emerging cryptocurrency technologies is poised to provide a 
backbone strong enough to threaten US security and international stability. As the 
epitome of disruptive technology, cryptocurrency may subvert the USD’s coercive 
economic power, replacing or usurping the USD as the world’s single preferred market 
currency. The actualization of this possibility would represent a revolutionary change 
in US national power. With the increasing viability of secure and pseudo-anonymous 
cryptocurrency blockchain transactions and direct peer-to-peer (P2P) payment systems 
gaining support, substantial global investment incentives are pushing development 
in the fintech market space. Increases in the technology’s ease of use, security, and 
emphasis on enhanced privacy add momentum to surge up the Rogers innovation 
adoption curve.1 
The final question to answer is not if this technology will upset the infrastructure of 
the international financial system dominated by World War II–winning allies, but when? 
Given the nascent nature of this field, this chapter will cover the following thought 
exercises:
• General understanding of the technology and effect on the concept of “money.”
• Current security concerns (enemy focused).
• Adoption potential (strategic latency).
• How special operations forces (SOF) can best capitalize (friendly focused).
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This chapter is a near-term assessment of adversaries’ ability to utilize the 
foundational properties of crytocurrency to function with impunity and strategic 
effects. This technological leap opens gaps and seams and causes regulatory lags, 
the exact gray space in which illicit actors thrive inside the global financial markets. 
In international economic and financial circles, the USD represents the epitome of 
power. Effects born from illicit-actor adaptation of cryptocurrency, intended to alter 
this balance of power, stand to be revolutionary in a manner potentially unimaginable 
to the Western world. As such, temporary disruption should not be a consideration. 
This technological genie will not retreat into the lamp. It warrants a review of the basic 
concepts and dynamics of money, implications to national security, and any conclusions 
and ideas on how best to position SOF in the security posture of the future. 
“Tell Me Again Why I Should Be Concerned About This  
Flash-in-the-Pan ‘Cryptocurrency’ Thing?”
“Everything you don’t know about money combined  
with everything you don’t know about computers.”
—John Oliver2
What is a cryptocurrency? In generalconversations with average Americans and 
most Western populations, mentioning the word cryptocurrency divides a crowd 
instantaneously. Among glazed-over looks; volunteers offering knowledge and throwing 
out tertiarily related buzz words like “volatility,” “criminals,” “blockchain,” and “dark 
web”; and finally some people engaging in a dialogue of interest that most often leads 
to questions on the soundness of cryptocurrency as an investment, a basic knowledge 
has not taken root. No one in the mix mentions the underlying concept being a 
fundamental change in the fabric of societies, that being money, which is a means to 
relay value between individuals in a trusted transaction. 
The term money garners many definitions. Understanding the concepts of money 
and value transfer systems within societies relates to the intrinsic value that SOF 
bring to the broader strategic security picture. SOF forces offer individuals versed 
in international cultural context, linguistic expertise, and direct integration and 
understanding of the societies in which we partner. Considered neutral and the 
most secular force in society, money must be understood in the context of specific 
communities. Economists generally boil down the concept of money to three 
functions: providing a medium of exchange, a unit of accounting, and a store of value.3 
All three of these traditional functions resolve to or are supported internationally 
through banks. Under the current international construct, banks circulate the currency, 
hold the ledgers of account, and store the money. Cryptocurrency technology breaks 
the need for banks to provide the function as trusted brokers. Because banks 
have the centralized power to control the monetary system, governments focus on 
regulating and protecting the financial system at the three critical primary nodes 
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of the overarching system. Of particular note, the US Bank Secrecy Act, Executive 
Order 13224, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Forty recommendations for 
Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terror (2012), and UN 
Resolution 2462 (2019) focus on protecting the international financial system while 
encouraging individual nations to target specific illicit actors criminally. The focus of 
the international cooperation resides in protecting money transfers within the global 
financial system. To accomplish this task, a secondary positive effect results via the 
need to disrupt illicit-actor use. 
How did banks become the primary nodes of all currency in the twenty-first 
century? In the evolution of money, when shells and stones replaced barter, when 
paper replaced precious metals and coins, and, finally, when paper lost the battle 
to plastic, some entity needed to provide the trust between parties. Each of these 
currency manifestations resulted arguably from demands to stretch across increasing 
distances, be it physical (for trade) or technological (to keep pace with the information 
age and the dawn of the internet). These transitions resulted in greater ease of use 
but, subsequently, a more significant trust relationship between the two parties in 
the exchange. Barter items had intrinsic value to both individuals but often not in 
a precise relational scale. Shells and stones translated to some scarcity or labor 
required for possession. Moving from precious metals and coins marked the transition 
from scarcity in materials to scarcity in circulation, given governmental management 
of paper bills. All the while, one certainty remained: record-keeping of these assets 
existed on ledgers. Fiat currency, the USD specifically, after the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods gold standard, gave way to a pure trust of the US government backing 
the USD to support its continued use as the world’s market currency and the basis 
of the petrodollar.4 With the USD as the world market currency, US banks became the 
centralized ledger holders for the world. With such circumstances comes immense 
responsibility and consolidated power in US financial institutions. 
Centralized Power at the Banks
“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely”
—Lord Acton5
In 1999, Paul Krugman, the Nobel Prize–winning economist, stated, “inadequately 
regulated financial institutions, an extensive moral-hazard problem, and euphoric 
market expectation” foreshadowed the return of Depression economics.6 In 2008, 
President George W. Bush signed a $700 billion bailout for the banking industry, which 
held mortgage-backed securities.7 The effects of the subprime mortgage meltdown in 
US banks rippled internationally, generating a global financial crisis. The trusted agent 
ledger holders at the US banks became rightfully vilified and suspect. 
The general public became disillusioned with corporate greed and massive bailouts 
and considered banks guilty of excessive risk and profiteering within the US and 
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world markets. In response, Satoshi Nakamoto introduced the algorithms underlying 
a cryptographic blockchain to support Bitcoin, a P2P decentralized ledger system 
that imbued trust via mathematical computation, not banks. On January 3, 2009, 
the Bitcoin genesis block emerged with a “text” portion that read “The Times 03/
January/2009 Chancellor on brink of second bailout for banks.”8 Understanding 
the context from which cryptocurrency evolved is paramount to seeing the future. 
Removing banks as the trusted ledger holders encapsulate the pure essence of 
origin for the first viable cryptocurrency: Bitcoin. Societies around the world must now 
reconcile this next-generation financial-ledger technology. Perhaps a brief quote from 
Satoshi Nakamoto’s original email to a cryptography mailing list best describes the 
utopian vision and disruptive potential of this technology:
Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System: 
Abstract. A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow 
online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without 
the burdens of going through a financial institution. Digital signatures 
provide part of the solution, but the main benefits are lost if a trusted 
party is still required to prevent double-spending. We propose a solution 
to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer network.9
Are US Adversaries Interested in Cryptocurrency?
“Power over a man’s subsistence is power over his will.”
—Alexander Hamilton10
I’ll take your sanctions and raise you—I don’t need your USD. As noted previously, 
since the end of the Cold War, when nations worldwide began to march to the 
drumbeat of globalization and doubled down on the USD as the world’s market reserve 
currency, the economic and financial infrastructure of the United States surged. 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s definition that “money is a crowbar of power” best describes how 
this situation progressed.11 With power consolidated in the US financial and market 
systems, these USD ledger holders emerged as the main controllers in the system. 
International sanctions, Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) and Blocked Person 
Lists, and Office of Foreign Asset Controls (OFAC) penalties disrupt illicit actors’ ability 
to move money based on monitoring these ledgers. Adversaries benefit by finding a 
way to operate unhindered by US banking-system sanctions and regulations.
Cryptocurrencies allow for a ledger system outside the aforementioned traditional 
international financial markets.Computer algorithms tasked with running code 
to establish and validate the trust relationship between private parties wishing 
to transfer value replace the need for banks as trusted intermediaries. These 
open, decentralized ledgers also generate pseudoanonymity up to the point that 
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correlations can be made between persons and public addresses. Secondarily, 
categorization must occur to determine the strategic risks among differing 
types of cryptocurrency. The three main types range from 1) commonly adopted 
cryptocurrencies operating in open-source solutions with fully transparent public 
blockchains, 2) secrecy focused cryptocurrencies, and 3) most problematically, 
closed blockchain cryptocurrencies at a nation-state level. This array of currency 
types parallels the security population mission sets in which SOF must engage: 
open foreign internal defense partners, countering collective violent extremist and 
insurgent bad actors, and near-peer nation-state actors.
The broad-spectrum adversarial use of cryptocurrency to bypass US economic 
power warrants a brief threat analysis like that within the 2018 US Treasury National 
Terrorist Financing and Proliferation Financing Risk Assessments. These financial 
assessments use the national level FATF risk-assessment framework to outline the 
threat, vulnerability, consequence, and risk. The key to this new technology is to 
amplify the goodness while managing the risks. 
• Threat: Cryptocurrencies have no centralized regulating authority since they 
are set up expressly to establish P2P trusted relationships that negate the 
need for a banking system. All current international efforts toward anti-money 
laundering and countering the financing of terror (AML/CFT) reside in the 
entry and exit points from the international banking system. All adversaries 
named in the US National Defense Strategy, from sanctioned nation-state 
actors to violent extremist organizations (VEOs), benefit from the ability 
to transmit value outside the USD and international regulatory bodies 
safeguarding the financial system.i Rogue states motivated to avoid USD can 
dedicate substantial investment in the advancement of privacy or secrecy 
coins, as well as pursuing their internal cryptocurrency and blockchain. 
• Vulnerability populations: The highest expected cryptocurrency adoption rates 
will be in communities with the following demographics: internet connectivity, 
high remittance populations, corrupt or low governance, and high inflation 
in local currency.12 These characteristics share some overlap with those for 
areas prone to crime, terror, and corrupt network exploitation.ii The increased 
international development of the new crime-terror nexus plagues these at-risk 
populations to an even greater extent when considering the availability of 
crytpocurrencies and technology exposure.13 In the case of crime networks 
connected to developed nations, drug traffickers occupy the territories within 
other countries where the “state” has retreated or been forced out because 
i   Adversaries listed in the National Defense Strategy include China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and terrorist organizations  
(i.e., VEOs).
ii   The fundamentals on the interaction between crime, terror, and corruption networks are drawn from research and documentation 
of Louise Shelley in Dirty Entanglements (2014).
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of poor or lacking governance. Illicit actors penetrating into these areas 
further exacerbate the downward spiral of the monetary situation. Populations 
in these areas have limited access to formal financial systems because of 
bank derisking because of potential exposure to those same sources of 
illicit funding and criminal activities. When people do not have access to 
broader financial markets, criminal and terror networks gain an advantage 
and can offer a “better than what you have” scenario to many populations. 
Criminal and illicit actors’ increased use of cryptocurrency via the dark web 
portends their support of the technology. Given these scenarios, one might 
expect bad actors to teach and train these vulnerable populations to utilize 
cryptocurrency to obfuscate bad-actor financial transfers. 
• Vulnerable adversaries: While concerned parties worry about the anonymity 
cryptocurrency provides to illicit actors, an immutable digital blockchain 
record also provides transparency. If law enforcement, banking, and 
intelligence officials have access to the decentralized ledger, they can trace 
criminal activity. Given that cryptocurrency emerged from a revolution against 
the power of the banks, observers ought to expect a continued libertarian 
basis for the advancement of increased privacy within transactions.14 As 
technology continues to develop more complex ways to meet the anonymity 
demands of communities wishing to retain individual liberty, the ability 
to follow the transparent blockchain pathways to enforce regulation and 
law decreases. However, the potential for “good actors” to crowd out or 
marginalize illicit ones has promise. The legal actors in the cryptocurrency 
space, intent on maximizing the societal and economic benefits, have a 
vested interest to promote increased investment in technologies to help 
map, understand, and regulate the corresponding advancement of the 
anonymity technology of bad actors. 
• Consequence: Potential of dual market systems of “Western vs. outcast” 
economies. The benefits of applying this technology for good must outweigh 
the strategic risk in developing a financial system that diverges from the the 
traditional international financial markets and infrastructure. International 
organizations concerned with the threat-finance space—like the FATF, the 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), or the International 
Monetary Fund—do three things that help secure and stabilize nations. 
First, institutions provide information about what states are doing; such 
transparency helps countries cooperate and build trust among one another. 
Second, the promise of repeated interactions between known parties 
decreases the incentive to cheat or attack one another. Third, institutions 
provide a mechanism to arbitrate, sanction, or punish offender behavior. 
Pairing the US financial system at the center of international commerce with 
the value and role of the USD in the global economy, international financial 
institutions become a significant executor of US economic statecraft. 
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However, the power of global institutions to maintain norms of behavior, and 
of the US ability to employ economic power to influence the behavior of other 
actors, degrades significantly if another financial system operates in parallel 
or replaces the USD as the most influential standard of global currency. 
• Risk: By increasing the potential wealth and reach of illicit-goods markets, 
cryptocurrency value-transfer platforms represent a new borderless and digital 
mechanism for bad actors to manipulate underlying populations. In countries 
where terror and criminal organizations continue to govern better than 
governments, the threats remain to national security within the counter violent 
extremist organizations (C-VEO) realm. SOF forces will be engaged in a never-
ending battle against the “disease,” never able to address the root cause 
of terrorism. As Marshall Billingslea noted in a statement to the UN Security 
Council on Preventing and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, “States 
must also address fundamental contextual issues that create environments 
conducive to terrorism and terrorist financing. Corruption, weak or ineffective 
governance, and lack of respect for the rule of law—these problems can lead 
to regional instability and render economies vulnerable to terrorist financing.”15 
Cryptocurrency technology makes it easier for threat groups to sustain 
financing, which makes it harder for governments to interdict. This entrenches 
the relationship between populations and criminal or terror networks and 
makes it even more difficult for legitimate governments to address the 
sources of instability via foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, or the 
introduction of general security assistance forces.
How Can Cryptocurrency Generate the Ability to Unseat the USD  
as the World’s Market Currency? 
The convergence of early interest from crime, corrupt, and terror networks with 
investment by rogue nation-state actors guarantees the advancement of technologies 
in this field.16 As cryptocurrency becomes easier to both use and scale and internet 
connectivity becomes more widespread, the international economic order must 
adjust. Several new technologies possess the latent potential for bad actors to train 
underlying populations to move from the USD to digital payment systems. Transitional 
or “gateway” digital payment platforms within high-secrecy countries, anonymity-based 
or closed cryptocurrency blockchain development by nation-states, and alternative-
purpose blockchain technologies all represent developmental technologies that stand 
to change USD economic power dynamics internationally.
“Gateway” Platforms within High-Secrecy Countries 
Digital payment platforms display exponential growth and arguably represent a 
transitional mechanism to cryptocurrency use, requiring neither fiat currency nor 
credit cards to relay value at the point of sale. Examples in the United States include 
Venmo, Zelle, and PayPal. Most digital platforms still require linkage to a traditional 
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bank account or credit card to backstop the digital application. However, the secrecy 
level of the banking industry of each country comes into play for researching illicit 
activities or threat financing. 
WeChat Pay and Alibaba Pay applications, which each have over a billion users, 
support over 90 percent of all payments within the largest cities in China.17 Both 
these apps use quick-response (QR) codes to instantly transmit required currency-
transaction information between buyer and seller, reducing costs and eliminating fees 
paid to banks with traditional credit card payments. Both of these applications run 
through the Chinese technology megacompanies, Tencent (Facebook equivalent) and 
Alibaba (Amazon equivalent), not banks. 
Hosted out of Russia, WebMoney (WMZ) is another combined digital and bank 
composite universal-payment platform (utilizing secret keys) that claims to have 
39 million users.18 WebMoney supports an e-wallet with guarantor entities (all 
incorporated in high-secrecy financial safehaven areas) confirming eleven different 
possible purse types. Each purse can hold a different underlying asset: multiple types 
of fiat currencies, property, prepaid cards, gold, and two cryptocurrencies. 
The international economic movement to digitize the transfer of value at the speed 
of the internet rides the wave of revolutions of information technology. Conversion 
to solely electronic or digital payments represents a departure from the stepwise 
improvements of traditional banking. Technological leaps of this nature tax the ability 
of monetary system regulations and legal bureaucracy to keep up. Meanwhile, it 
also conditions underlying populations to use digital solutions that creep away from 
financial institutions where the regulatory stopgaps occur.
Sanctioned Nations and Illicit-Actor Use
Both profit and participation in the world markets drive illicit actors’ pursuit to 
decouple US banks and international sanctions policy, the watershed cryptocurrency 
event by sanctioned actors being the announcement by Venezuela that it would 
release the petro.The petro represents a state cryptocurrency backed theoretically by 
the nation’s underlying oil reserves. In Venezuela, a population motivated to escape 
government controls and a government seeking to evade global sanctions collided to 
unite behind cryptocurrency. While the underlying population still prefers bitcoins to 
the petro, Venezuela records the second-highest P2P cryptocurrency trading volume, 
behind Russia, within the cryptocurrency trade platforms localbitcoin.com.19 Evolving 
international and US regulations that hold formal cryptocurrency marketplaces to the 
same customer due-diligence rules as US financial institutions foment networking P2P 
platforms like localbitcoin and Paxful to support unregulated transactions. 
Iran, Russia, and North Korea have initiated similar cryptocurrency pursuits both 
to avoid US and global sanctions and to allow for trade and international marketplace 
participation. Blockchain technology applied at the state level generates national 
security concerns, given the new pathways to operate entire economies outside the 
USD-dominated financial system. Therefore, these rogue regimes are prioritizing 
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blockchain technology as the keystone of their efforts to counter US financial power. 
While none of these efforts have manifested in a way that would challenge the USD 
yet, the petro should remain on the radar as a first mover.
In addition to individual illicit actors, crime, corrupt, and terror networks open 
additional latency to support criminal profiteering within the high-risk populations 
identified previously.20 At 20 percent, Turkey tops the list of countries with the 
highest cryptocurrency adoption rates.21 Turkey’s proximity to two states rife with 
terror groups and one that functions as a known sponsor of terror illustrates the 
potential intersection of at-risk populations and illicit marketplaces. This Statista 
survey goes on to illuminate that five of the ten top countries with populations that 
have owned or used cryptocurrency are in Latin America (Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, 
Chile, and Mexico.)22 In 2019, protests and outrage emerged in some of the same 
and surrounding Latin American states known historically to have economic malaise, 
corrupt governance, and inflationary issues with national currencies (e.g. Colombia, 
Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Chile.)23 The primary expectation is that populations 
in these nations are adopting cryptocurrency as an alternative to traditional banking 
out of necessity, unlike the speculative investment mindset of adopters in Western 
nations. However, one must also consider potential influences of the underlying drug-
trade challenges in these same regions. 
The pairing of bad-actor incentives and the underlying anonymity of 
cryptocurrencies has supported new capabilities to scramble the transparency 
built into open blockchains. Specific privacy coins along with applications that mix 
transactions together battle against companies developing computer software to map 
out and provide visualization of all blockchain transactions to governing and regulatory 
bodies. The use of “The Onion Router” (Tor) to enter the dark web provides the final 
touch to obfuscating cryptocurrency transaction history. Tor answers the demand 
signal for anonymity coming from both legitimate and illegitimate actors.
Alternative-Purpose Blockchains
As the naming convention implies, cryptocurrency has more potential than simply as 
“currency.” The underlying private-key-public-key blockchain technology supporting 
cryptocurrency as a store of value can support anything requiring a trust/validation 
relationship between exchanging parties. Specialized crypto coins already compete to 
distinguish themselves in the marketplace via uses specific to this revolutionary concept 
of decentralized computer applications (dApps.) Unleashed by cryptographic concepts 
underpining Bitcoin, more open-source, decentralized public ledgers—with networked 
computers incentivized to validate unique algorithmic blockchain—developed. Additional 
currencies, encrypted communications, smart contracts, digital-identity management, 
games, and token exchanges represent just a few primary dApp capabilities. 
The dApps technology negates the need for centralized trust and control 
from banks, marketing agencies, communications companies, and repressive 
governments—all brokers in this regard. As of 2020, the primary blockchains that 
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allow for dApp capability are Ethereum, EOS, and Tron. Moving into the future, these 
cryptocurrency hybrid options offfer the advantage of the speed and scalability of the 
underlying consensus algorithm that participating computers solve. 
SOF Can Provide an Engagement Counterbalance in At-Risk Adoption Populations
“Grand strategy begins and ends with macroeconomics,  
and perhaps the single most important insight from the Cold War  
is that geopolitical success is a function of economic vitality.”
—Hal Brands24
SOF have a long history of rapid adaptation, flexibility, and innovation. The purest 
essence of value that a SOF force brings to the national security apparatus is the 
combination of creative problem-solving, relationship building, and culturally informed 
assessment. SOF forces employing disruptive tactics offer commanders nonkinetic 
solutions and means to affect both the full spectrum of conflict and broad-ranging 
adversaries. Utilizing latent cryptocurrency capabilities in both a defensive and 
offensive way represents a viable disruptive, nonkinetic capability SOF might bring to 
the competitive gray space short of armed conflict. 
“Disruptive” in the definition used by Clayton Christensen, represents an innovation 
that makes products and services both more accessible and more affordable to a 
larger volume of the population.25 The disruptive potential of cryptocurrencies need 
not only manifest in a catastrophic light. The essence of blockchain, digital, and 
cryptocurrency assets represents undeniable positive societal benefits allowing 
the acceleration of access to global markets for billions of currently unbanked 
individuals. The cryptographic potential of this technology can be utilized positively as 
a counterbalance to bad actors. This level of transparency can inoculate populations 
from monetary ramifications of corrupt governance and as a defense against crime, 
corrupt, and terror influences. 
The SOF-value proposition to influence positively a large volume of the population 
in these at-risk areas would manifest via partner-nation training events and long-
standing military-to-military relationships. In place of utilizing Western-centric payment 
mechanisms, often based in USD, SOF forces should engage in preexisting local 
digital payment platforms or cryptocurrency payments or present at-risk populations 
access to a specialized dApp system developed based on answering communal 
needs. Promoted by economist Bernard Lietaer, new cryptocurrency technologies 
offer communities an efficient complementary mechanism in which to retreat 
from the scarcity models generated by national fiat currency systems dictated by 
monetary policy.26 Cities around the world are testing this type of technology to create 
complementary “civic or city” currencies that support local economic development, 
societal cohesion, and active participation in the sustainability of local communities. 
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Following intergovernmental and nongovernmental organization coordination, 
initiation of this sort of economic stabilization dApp could support a community 
or cooperation coin. Distribution would occur via traditional leaflets based on the 
technological infrastructure of the mobile phones in the area. The more developed 
phone coverage areas could incorporate the addition of a “smart chip” on the 
pamphlets. Current testing of these smart chips within US Army SOF utilizes these 
programmable near-field communications (NFC) technology tags to support the 
direction of recipients to real-time information on a website. These small sticker tags 
could support everything from directing populations to websites explaining the use 
and architecture of community-specific coins to containing an encrypted currency. Less 
developed areas not in possession of smartphones with NFC technology could use a 
QR-code-based system to scan and load with coins. 
Using existing digital payment platforms, expanding cryptocurrency in areas of 
adoption, and introducing community cooperation currencies would allow for the 
signature reduction of both our forces and partner forces. By promoting open-source 
cryptocurrency technology, we can generate an offense way to utilize this technology 
and support culturally appropriate funding solutions. SOF forces could use software 
capabilities offered by multiple private companies to map the complete use of 
digital currencies through these open blockchain constructs, following exactly where 
payments ultimately land. Instead of fearing this technology, accepting and embracing 
it provides defense and offense against the those who use the USD to warp local 
markets, generate perverse unsustainable economics, or support corrupt kleptocratic 
governance temptations to abscond with payments. 
At the End of the Day . . . Give Me the “So What”?
“Lack of money is the root of all evil.”
—George Bernard Shaw27
In the hands of adversaries from nation-states to VEOs, does cryptocurrency make 
the United States vulnerable to strategic effects? And if the strategic results are 
legitimate and likely to advance with this technology, what should be done?
US adversaries of varying skill and capacity have indeed employed hybrid, 
disruptive, and catastrophic capabilities to undermine the instruments of US national 
power. These attempts have been mainly to affect the US comparative advantage in 
the financial and economic marketplace. Cryptocurrency in the technological arsenal 
opens unimaginable consequences should adversaries use it successfully to unseat 
the USD as the world’s market currency. Countering the new ways that bad actors 
across the spectrum fund and support their maligned activities must be addressed. 
The juggernaut of the DOD-military hierarchy and organization now hum the tune 
of large-scale combat and multidomain operation, retreating to the familiarity of past 
formations primarily equipped for combat operations with advanced material solutions 
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and deterrence. Joint Publication 1-02 defines irregular warfare as “a violent struggle 
among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant 
populations.”28 The overhauls in modernization for SOF ought to favor these indirect 
and asymmetric approaches to erode the power, will, and influence of this broadening 
scope of adversaries. 
Monitoring the cryptocurrency adoption rates, actively participating in these markets, 
and watching the creative ways that bad actors modify their financing will only become 
more important as the safeguards in the banking systems are averted. In concert 
with the interagency, SOF can drive good-actor behavior. Full support of open-source 
cryptocurrency adoption within at-risk communities would silhouette and crowd out 
bad-actor use. Harnessing this technology to address underlying causes of illicit-actor 
penetration into vulnerable communities might finally allow SOF forces the ability not 
only to fight symptoms of bad acting and terror through direct action but also to employ 
the will of the underlying populations effectively to effect influence on their governance.
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C H A P T E R  2 0
Blockchain and the Battlefield
Girish Sreevatsan Nandakumar and Jon Cederquist
Hybrid warfare is the new norm. Economic competition—a key “gray zone” in hybrid 
warfare—plays a central role in today’s great-power conflicts. Governments are 
increasingly aware of the potential threats posed by decentralized financial systems 
that can change global power dynamics. In the future, such decentralized systems are 
likely play a major role because of the ever-increasing erosion of trust in governments 
and other centralized systems. Countries across the world are striving to cut down 
on their use of cash to have more efficient monetary systems. Such “cashless 
societies”1 of the future, possibly powered by companies such as Facebook (Libra) 
and Alibaba (Alipay), are likely to involve new digital cryptocurrencies, some of which 
will not be issued by nation-states or regulated in the same way central banks and 
governments control monetary systems today. 
Cryptocurrency is a digital or virtual currency that uses electronic cryptography 
for security, which makes it difficult to counterfeit.2 One of the defining features of 
a cryptocurrency is that it is a peer-to-peer system that cuts out the middleperson 
necessary for a transaction. Such “decentralization” is made possible through the 
blockchain technology—a distributed system of secure and immutable online ledgers.3 
Since cryptocurrencies are not issued by any central authority, they are theoretically 
shielded from government interference or manipulation.4 These decentralized, 
denationalized systems have captured the trust of small groups of people across 
the world. For example, Bitcoin rose in prominence during the 2009 financial crisis 
because it was seen as an alternative to the highly centralized systems that had 
failed. Since the introduction of the first cryptocurrency, Bitcoin (BTC), in 2009, several 
decentralized cryptocurrencies have been released.
With the help of blockchain technology, two strangers can safely and directly 
engage in business transactions without the need for any intermediaries, thereby 
making lawyers, bankers, brokers, and governments potentially irrelevant. Blockchain 
is a system that enables trust through its design—the system confirms the identity 
of participants, validates transactions, and ensures that everyone plays by the same 
rules. This means that all types of goods, services, and information can be traded 
through such systems, which opens the doors for a wide range of possibilities and 
problems because anyone can participate in the system.i Blockchain has also become 
a buzzword for several sectors—from diamonds to recycling5—and there has been a 
staggering amount of research and funding for applications of this technology.6
If large decentralized financial systems are widely adopted for both storage of 
value and medium of exchange, the international monetary system, which has been 
i   The statement is true in the case of nonpermissioned blockchains such as Bitcoin but not true in the permissioned blockchains.
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dominated for many decades by national currencies—primarily the US dollar—will 
be disrupted. Such a disruption could unseat the US dollar’s prominence and might 
strengthen a rival. Blockchain-based systems can also provide smartcontracts and 
other services that could create independently operating legal structures parallel to 
existing national bureaucracies.
A deep dive into the history of the international monetary system and the 
evolution of national and territorial currencies would at least give some benefit of 
doubt to the Austrian School of Economics’ perspective. This school posits current 
governmental monopolies on the creation and distribution of money came about 
primarily as a result of politics, not as sound economic practice. However, there 
is no way to prove whether a free-market approach to currencies would be a good 
idea because “the only valid test of the natural monopoly argument is to abolish all 
barriers to entry and to admit free currency competition from private issuers on equal 
terms,”7 which no national government has allowed. In today’s world, where private 
companies are sometimes more powerful than governments,8 private currencies 
owned and operated by nongovernmental entities may gain traction once regulatory 
agencies allow their circulation. Japan, for instance, allows Bitcoin as legal tender.9 
This pattern of domination by denationalized, decentralized systems may apply to 
other areas—such as businesses, marketplaces, and critical infrastructure—currenty 
monopolized by governments and other centralized private entities.
Future blockchain scenarios are both inspiring and terrifying. The battlefield 
could be impacted by some applications of the technology. For instance, once the 
technology matures and is integrated with other complementary technologies such 
as Internet of Things (IoT)—systems of interconnected computing devices, machines, 
and objects such as drones—a completely autonomous drone with the ability to 
identify and destroy a target for a bountyii could pose new, hard-to-detect or -deter 
threats for special operations forces (SOF). On the bright side, even some existing 
applications of the technology might help the warfighter fight SOF missions more 
effectively. Consider the usage of cryptocurrencies as a method of payment for local 
informants behind enemy lines during SOF missions. According to one former SOF 
operator, this may be more efficient than cash. In the future, there are likely to be 
more uses and threats.
This chapter discusses potential future scenarios involving blockchain technology 
and its applications that may occur by 2030. Our scenarios are based on current 
trends and have a central focus on how SOF operations may be impacted. We first 
provide a background on the blockchain technology, followed by potential positive 
and negative future scenarios. We then review more specific implications on the 
battlefield.
ii   Which could be pseudonymously delivered through a blockchain-based smart contract and paid in cryptocurrency.
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A Bit about Blockchainiii 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines a blockchain as 
“tamper-evident and tamper-resistant digital ledgers implemented in a distibuted 
fashion . . . and usually without a central authority.”10 Blockchain technology is 
the backbone of modern cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies have been used as 
speculative investments,11 instruments for money laundering,12 and as a payment 
system to send and receive money in developing countries.13 The technology is 
already being adopted by major corporations14 and institutions15 and is poised to 
have a major impact on global trade16 if it gets adopted by businesses and financial 
institutions on a large scale. Because blockchain provides a distributed digital 
record that does not require trust or coordination between firms, it allows for secure, 
standardized transactions. Other main applications of this technology include digitized 
contracts, known as smart contracts, and records relevant to voting or health. 
Blockchain-based systems can also be used to maintain land records, voting records, 
medical records, and logistics. This will likely affect SOF environments because of the 
difficulties involved in adapting to these changes, as well as the second- and third-
order effects these changes will inevitably bring.
Smart contracts are programmable contracts that carry the terms of the agreement 
between buyer and seller as lines of code on a blockchain network. NIST defines 
smart contracts as “software deployed on the blockchain and executed by computers 
running that blockchain.” Smart contracts often have the advantage of being a part of 
the same network and system that executes payments through cryptocurrencies. In a 
world where denationalized blockchain-based financial systems are ubiquitous, smart 
contracts are likely to be widely adopted. Smart contracts might be able to provide 
insurance and other legal services, making these networks highly valuable.17
The real risk in such a future scenario is that these blockchain systems will not be 
as decentralized as advertised, especially if authoritarian governments are involved. We 
are already seeing some indications of this. China has reportedly tested the application 
of AI18 and blockchain19 in their internet courts. During the 2019 Forum on China 
Intellectual Property Protection, the president of Beijing Internet Court claimed that AI 
and blockchain are used to make legal rulings and have shown impressive results.20 
The Beijing Internet Court is the second of its kind in China and is part of the country’s 
efforts to address internet-related disputes through an online court. In combination with 
China’s social credit system, such applications of blockchain might further strengthen 
Beijing’s authoritarian model by offering a rigid process that does not allow due process. 
Other authoritarian countries that buy hardware and software from China21 will also 
be able to buy blockchain-based financial and legal services. This might give China 
unparalleled access to economic data from these countries. The rest of the chapter 
discusses potential future scenarios and potential implications in the battlefield.
iii   Note: Because of its highly technical nature, we adapted this section heavily from the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology report “Blockchain Technology Overview.” The report is available at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2018/
NIST.IR.8202.pdf.
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What to Expect
According to the 2019 Gartner Hype Cycle, which highlights emerging technologies 
that will have a significant impact on society over the next five to ten years, blockchain 
technology is sliding into the “trough of disillusionment”—a phase where interest 
wanes as experiments and implementations fail to deliver.22 The Hype Cycle notes 
most blockchain technologies are still five to ten years away from transformational 
impact. While stressing the need for a cautious approach to the hype surrounding the 
technology, Gartner analysts encourage businesses to embrace blockchain.
The Institute for the Future, a California-based think tank, suggests that 
blockchain technology will go through three distinct phases over the next decade: (1) 
Cryptocurrencies as an application, (2) distributed computing systems that include 
applications like smart contracts. (The institute posits such broadly decentralized, 
distributed global systems could potentially disrupt the status quo.)23 (3) Objects 
such as the Internet of Things (IoT) are likely to be connected to blockchain networks. 
These interconnected entities may be capable of transferring data over the blockchain 
network autonomously.24 The institute predicts IoT devices would also integrate with 
smart contracts to create crowdsourced infrastructures that could replace existing 
centralized alternatives. In the following sections, we discuss projected developments 
within the next decade in the context of special operations forces (SOF). We discuss 
current trends and potential future scenarios involving personas, businesses and 
services, marketplaces, infrastructure, and systems.
Personas
The internet has already drastically changed the way humans represent themselves. 
In a future where decentralized systems are the norm, identities will no longer be tied 
solely to traditional nation-states. Instead, blockchain-based “virtual nations”25 could 
offer people a higher sense of belonging because these are niche groups formed 
around specific belief systems. These virtual nations are similar to existing social 
networks, but tend to be “permissioned” (i.e., closed and secured) and offer several 
other services, such as cryptocurrency payments and smart contracts. For example, 
“Bitnation,” descibes itself as “the world’s first Decentralised Borderless Voluntary 
Nation”26 that offers to maintain vital records, identity, and other legal events using 
blockchain technology. 
Such virtual nations are in their infancy and do not yet pose a threat to nation-
states,27 yet they might further exacerbate multipolarization in the world by enabling 
smaller groups of people to isolate. A deeply multipolar world could end up having little 
cohesion, making it easy to turn people against each other, especially when savvy bad 
actors make concerted efforts. For instance, consider the 2018 Toronto van attack, 
which was carried out by a member of the “incel” community—a specific, insular, self-
radicalized community with roots in the anti-feminist 4chan culture.28 Though such 
communities of “involuntarily celibate” people have existed for a long time, they are now 
much easier to radicalize online when they organize in echo chambers.29
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During SOF missions, the ability to reach such online microcommunities behind 
enemy lines might enable online influence operations that weaken the enemy. Bitnation-
style microcommunities of disgruntled citizens behind enemy lines might open up new 
sources of information that may enable SOF operations. A deeper understanding of 
such “virtual nations” is necessary in order to tap into such opportunities. 
Businesses and Services
Individuals across the world are also increasingly adopting30 denationalized 
cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. The biggest problem with such 
cryptocurrencies is that financial transactions might not be easily detected by 
law enforcement authorities. Although not all cryptocurrencies are anonymous or 
pseudonymous, almost all cryptocurrencies make it difficult to trace transactions 
when necessary. This will affect the United States’ ability to counter terrorism, 
transnational crimes, and other illegal activities. Another major issue will be the 
inability to impose sanctions on individuals and businesses identified as bad actors. 
Freezing their accounts will no longer be easy because of decentralized control. The 
use of Bitcoin has already provided North Korea opportunities to circumvent Western 
sanctions.31 Information and services can be traded easily and anonymously through 
such blockchain-based networks, making it harder for regulatory agencies to prevent 
such bad actors. 
Some “virtual nations” have been open and positive for the economy.32 For 
instance, take Estonia’s e-residency program that is advertised as “the new digital 
nation.” This program enables digital entrepreneurs to start and manage a European 
Union–based company online, no matter where they live. While such programs might 
be positive for the economy, there are several negative side effects. If there are new 
competing services by other nation-states that are lenient, bad actors could use such 
services to move money and equipment around. On the bright side, the US might 
want to consider offering a similar program that sets the standards for other such 
programs. Such a digital “belt and road” program could be one way to counter China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), while ensuring that the US dollar’s dominance and 
America’s economic strength prevail.33 Such an American “virtual nation” will also help 
recruit support from people across borders for SOF missions by opening new methods 
for gathering intel and as partners in cyber-enabled operations.
Marketplaces 
Marketplaces created by poorly regulated virtual nations have the option to operate 
worldwide, making it difficult for nation-states to manage the aftereffects of such 
changes. It is easy to imagine the plethora of problems that would result from such 
a shift—weapons and other restricted substances being sold more freely, trading 
information and services that affect national security.
In a scenario where it is no longer dependent on the United States for 
economic growth, China might consider creating a supranational system that offers 
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cryptocurrency, smart contracts, and other services in the Eurasian region, similar 
to the euro in Europe. Such a system would be immune to US sanctions and would 
also consolidate economic activity within countries involved in the BRI. China will get 
to influence, if not control, this currency the way Germany dominated the euro for a 
long time. Such a scenario would pose a threat to the US dollar. Russia’s growing 
diplomatic proximity to China makes such scenarios more likely because creating 
a new “Eurasian” bloc has been a goal for Russia.34 In such a case, the new bloc 
that would emerge would be more difficult for US forces to operate in because of 
increased Chinese influence—both economically and militarily. 
Infrastructure
One of the best uses of blockchain technology is in underdeveloped countries that 
do not have advanced systems for banking, land records, and medical records. Such 
countries may have the potential to leapfrog ahead by implementing more advanced 
systems than the rest of the world. While the costs would be enormous, so would the 
returns. China may see value in investing in such digital infrastructure because of the 
leverage it would provide in terms of data, access, and control. Another alternative 
would be for China to use its “debt trap” method to make such underdeveloped 
countries borrow from China. This will create a win-win situation for China: if the 
underdeveloped economies prosper, so will China. If they fail, China will benefit by 
seizing assets, such as strategically located ports, like it did in Sri Lanka in 2018.35 
China has used some of these assets for military activity. In such scenarios, China 
will be able to weaponize interdependence and extend its spheres of influence, 
affecting SOF readiness in those regions because of increased Chinese military 
activity in and around those regions.
Blockchain-based networks can also lead to changes in the way electricity 
is distributed36 by empowering off-the-grid solar panels with blockchain-based 
payment systems, which could make traditional power grids less relevant. Such 
blockchain-based distributed systems might make it more difficult for SOF to 
disrupt power supply on a large scale during operations. Future SOF missions with 
the objective of liberating populations might go beyond digging wells, and could 
use decentralized blockchain systems to create energy independence along with an 
economic system that will promote stability. Such empowered communities can be 
turned into reliable allies. 
Legal, Financial, and Administrative Systems 
Failing economies sometimes adopt the US dollar as the national currency—a 
phenomenon referred to as “dollarization.” However, recently, there have been cases 
of “cryptonization”—the adoption or creation of cryptocurrencies instead of adopting 
the US dollar.37 If this trend grows, the US dollar’s position as the world’s de facto 
reserve and most sought-after currency will be in jeopardy.38 Revisionist powers such 
as Russia and China, who have been trying to “dedollarize” the world economy,39 will 
S T R A T E G I C  L A T E N C Y  U N L E A S H E D    |    289 
be inclined to promote cryptocurrencies across the world. China will be in the best 
position to do this because Chinese companies—heavily influenced by the Chinese 
government—are among the most innovative companies in the blockchain sector.40
In fact, it may be easier for China to promote and enable private cryptocurrencies 
that compete with the US dollar than to compete directly using its national currency. 
Alipay’s parent company, Ant Financial, is a world leader in fintech41 and owns more 
than 10 percent of all blockchain-related patents.42 This is reportedly the highest 
number of blockchain-related patents owned by any company, with IBM placing 
second. Similar to the case of Huawei, the United States invoked national security 
concerns to prevent Alipay from expanding within the United States,43 but other 
countries, including the United Kingdom, have been lenient in controlling their 
infiltration.44 Alipay has a stake or partnership with mobile payment companies 
across the world and can easily consolidate the global market in the future 
when consumers move toward alternative financial systems based on distrust in 
governments and banks.
If blockchain-based financial systems become ubiquitous, companies such as 
Ant Financial and WeChat will have both the technical capability45 and the scale to 
become undisputed world leaders. Although they are private entities, they are heavily 
influenced by the Chinese government. In a scenario where such blockchain-based 
systems are the “operating systems” that provide financial services, smart contracts, 
land records, health records, and other services in several countries, the United States 
may lose its economic superiority and diplomatic reach, creating a power vaccum. SOF 
preparedness will also be affected because these countries will be under the Chinese 
sphere of influence, affecting the way operators use monetary incentives to gather 
intelligence on the ground during missions without being detected.
Potential Future Implications in Hybrid Warfare
Parallel governments
As discussed in the sections above, “virtual nations” that offer competing services to 
citizens may be empowered to create essentially a parallel government within existing 
nation-states. This might lead to weaker governments, which may in turn empower 
bad actors, especially in the more fragile parts of the world. Future SOF missions 
might require an in-depth understanding of how such campaigns will be carried out to 
prevent strategic surprises. 
Virtual Nations
In a future scenario in which numerous virtual nations exist that imitate most of the 
core functions of nation-states—such as securing financial transactions, providing 
legal systems, and keeping records—violent fringe elements could organize more 
sophiticated attacks under the protective cover of cryptography, transferring money 
and sharing information anonymously among their global members. Future SOF 
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missions might require a better understanding of these specific threats in order to 
ensure readiness and success. 
“Killer Apps”
Imagine a blockchain-based system that can transfer money pseudonymously, 
with identity-making efforts that use smart contracts to make the completion of 
the transaction contingent on certain events, such as the death of a particular 
person identified in a photograph. With the help of IoT devices, such as the fictional 
autonomous “slaughterbot,”46—a palm-sized, autonomous drone that uses facial 
recognition technology and onboard explosives to commit untraceable killings—a 
bounty placed anonymously on a blockchain system can theoretically lead to the 
elimination of the target and would be be hard to trace. Such a scenario is not too 
far-fetched, especially in a system that has a surveillance program similar to China’s 
social credit system that uses millions of cameras for accurate face detection.47 
Clandestine SOF missions could become more difficult because of increased 
constraints and risk of exposure in places that implement such technologies.iv On the 
other hand, SOF missions could use such a “killer app” to eliminate terrorists.
Conclusion
A world where decentralized blockchain systems are mainstream might sound too 
radical to ever be true. But, only recently, a world where people would prefer to get 
into strangers’ cars instead of taxis, and stay in strangers’ houses instead of hotels 
were thought of as radical scenarios. Uber and Airbnb, respectively, normalized these 
practices by adapting available technologies and implementing them in the right 
way. While the international monetary system is definitely larger and more complex 
than the market inefficiencies Uber and Airbnb tackled, blockchain technology and 
its subsequent applications may find equilibriums that may not be as radical as the 
scenarios discussed in this chapter. However, even at such equilibriums, the status 
quo will have significantly changed, and this might affect the battlefield if the United 
States does not have the first-mover advantage, like it did with the internet. 
The “hegemonic stability theory,” which posits a strong hegemon is necessary for 
global stability, has been observed to be true in international monetary relations.48 
History suggests a well-functioning monetary system at the international level 
needs strong leadership by a nation or a group of nations that have vested interest 
in maintaining the system. This hegemon must provide a “lender of last resort” 
privilege, carry out economic transactions, and provide liquidity.49 It has always been 
the dominant power of the day and the one with the mightiest economy and military. 
First, it was Great Britain, followed by the United States. Given the rise of China’s and 
other fast-growing economies, it remains to be seen how an increasingly multipolar 
world will affect the international monetary system and how these changes will affect 
iv   For example, Ecuador is one of the countries that uses surveillance systems designed by China.
S T R A T E G I C  L A T E N C Y  U N L E A S H E D    |    291 
the future of decentralized systems and its applications. Gglobalization and increased 
interconnectivity may have set the stage for efficient, private cryptocurrencies and 
smart contracts that operate globally, which might create new spheres of influence 
that overlap national boundaries. In such scenarios, there will be increased 
complications for military planning, especially unconventional SOF missions.
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C H A P T E R  2 1
The Significance of 5G for Special Operations of the Future
Toby Redshaw
“He will observe also that changes in tactics have not only taken place 
after changes in weapons, which is necessarily the case, but that the 
interval between such changes has been unduly long. This doubtless 
arises from the fact that an improvement in weapons is due to one 
or two men, while changes in tactics must overcome the inertia of a 
conservative class; but it is a great evil. It can be remedied only by a 
candid recognition of each change, by a careful study of the powers and 
limitations of the new ship or weapon, and by a consequent adaption of 
the methods and using it to the qualities it possesses, which constitutes 
its tactics. History shows that it is vain to hope that military men 
generally will be at pains to do this, but that the one who does will go 
into battle with a great advantage—a lesson in itself of no mean value.”
—Admiral Alfred Mahan, 
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660-17831
The Story Line
Military history is a key source for learning how to take advantage of technological 
changes. Foundationally, the tech matters and always has, but it must be managed 
intelligently and requires the ability to understand domain and context. To that end, 
this chapter details the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) and why it matters, and the 
part 5G plays in it. I drill into what 5G really is, while demystifying it and discussing its 
pragmatic impacts. The “7Ps”—proactive, predictive, pattern-matched, preventative, 
permissioned, peer-connected, and precise—define the impact. I also discuss how 
to keep up with the increasing pace of technological change in a 5G world, including 
having future-proofing radar. Finally, how does 5G affect special operations? I propose 
some possibilities and prescriptions and outline some cautionary tales.
The Importance of Technology to Military Operations
I have been stealing from the military my entire career. Military history is a 
hundredfold richer domain than the history of business to understand strategy, 
planning, execution, and the value of talent, training, and morale. It is a richer source 
of learning for offense and defense performed both well and not so well. In this 
domain, one can clearly observe both successful and failing technology applications. 
As in business, no amount of talent, great execution, or technology will save you 
from bad strategy. Mighty Motorola fell in the 2000s because it executed a really bad 
strategy really well. However, even great strategy will certainly fail if structure is not 
matched to mission and talent to task. Many companies have failed and battles have 
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been lost because leaders structured and staffed forces based on the last “war” not 
the war to come. 
My point is that technology matters.
About 3,300 years ago the Hittites pushed across modern-day Turkey with a 
technological superiority that granted them an overmatch advantage against their 
enemies. They had some of the the first mobile missile launchers. In actuality, this 
was a chariot corps with two or three soldiers lobbing javelins, but it was still a 
technological superiority that won the day.2
It is commonly accepted belief that numerical force superiority wins wars most 
often. While we revel in David beating Goliath, the back story is Goliath killed a 
hundred Davids and a thousand of David’s less-known, less-skilled cousins (for this 
thought exercise, let’s call them “Reginalds”). History, however, is full of examples of 
Goliaths losing. The CEO of Walmart—the current corporate Goliath—carries a photo 
of a list of the top-ten retailers for each decade since the 1950s as a reminder that 
companies that were on previous lists and seemingly undefeatable have either lost 
their lofty status or disappeared altogether.3
Walmart is in the numerical superiority game, while special operations forces (SOF) 
seek to achieve and maintain relative superiority. Technology matters in both. I would 
suggest it matters more in the world of relative superiority. So how does this tie into 
special operations?
In 2012, I was honored and surprised at my good fortune to be asked to 
participate in a three-day innovation summit with Admiral William McRaven and his 
direct reports at SOCOM, along with a small group of smart, seasoned industry and 
academic minds. My first response was, “why would the most innovative fighting 
force on earth need to spend time with us?” The answer was simple: adversaries 
were becoming increasingly innovative, and Admiral McRaven realized the time to 
improve an organization’s technology and innovation is when it is still in first place, 
not after the organization begins to lose ground. Admiral McRaven knew this truth 
better than most and, early in his career, captured his thoughts on this topic in his 
master’s thesis capstone at the Naval Postgraduate School, in which he wrote about 
special operations and how their “cutting-edge technology, access to national-level 
intelligence, high-quality training, and elite troops” combine to “achieve relative 
superiority.”4 One of the world’s best engineers, Alan Kay, from Xerox Parc, is widely 
credited as saying “context is worth 80 IQ points.” You can’t delegate understanding 
context, understanding those all-important atmospherics, because when you do, you 
lose 80 IQ points. The CEO of Walmart didn’t miss this observation, and neither did 
Admiral McRaven.
Rather than trot out the “answers,” divine specific futures, or be prescriptive, my 
goal in writing this chapter is to explain what is coming now and coming fast in one 
specific sector: 5G and its environment. I hope to give special operations and 5G 
some context so deeper, smarter, more practiced people can leverage this knowledge 
advantageously both at home and overseas. 
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One important point from Carl von Clausewitz before we dive in: In the special-
operations world, maybe more than any other, selection and training are the essential 
first steps to success, well ahead of any whiz-bang technology. Clausewitz called 
these the “moral factors,” which boil down to an essential synchronized mix of 
perseverance, smarts, boldness, and bravery. No technology will supplant those 
attributes. They come from selecting and training the right men and women for 
each mission. Technology definitely can help, and, in this chapter, we’ll see how 5G 
especially can help, but 5G is the tail, not the dog. Having the right people on the right 
mission makes all the difference. 
The Fourth Industrial Revolution
We are at the start of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. This is massively important 
and provides the broader context for all things linked to technology now and for the 
next decade. Yes, context . . . 80 IQ points.
Before we explain 5G, let’s explore 4IR a bit more. This concept comes from a 
2016 book by Professor Klaus Schwab, founder and executive chair of the World 
Economic Forum, who runs the much touted annual confab of big shots, innovators, 
politicians, captains of industry, and luminaries that is Davos. 
What is 4IR? 
It means these things at a minimum:
• It’s a big enough deal to merit being the fourth industrial revolution.  
The last three changed the world.
• Like the last three, it is not a rising tide, and there will be winners and 
losers, participants and spectators.
• Unlike past industrial revolutions, this one is purely technological. 
• Unlike the previous revolutions that took decades to evolve, this one will take 
six years, perhaps a bit more or less.
• It is sometimes referred to as the cyber-physical era, which will intertwine 
and mesh the physical world with the digital world. Everything that can be 
connected will be connected. 
• With connectivity comes intelligence, and with massive connectivity comes 
pervasive intelligence.  
Importantly, just like the last three “revolutions,” some areas adopt new technology 
methods, and do so extremely fast, while others do not and get left behind. Some 700 
(yes, 700) automobile manufacturers have ceased to exist in the United States over 
the last 120 years, many because they did not adopt new technologies. Ever heard of 
Nyborg or Norwalk Underslung? The Waltham-Orient had a good run for a decade then 
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disappeared in 1908. These cars were made in Waltham, Massachusetts, near one 
of Verizon’s current big 5G labs. The Riker Electric Car won the New York horseless 
carriage race in 1896. The cars were built in Elizabeth, New Jersey—just across the 
river from Verizon’s NYC 5G Lab—and the company was dead by 1902. Some of these 
companies were the Goliaths of their time, others were Davids, others were Reginalds, 
and some Davids became Reginalds by missing technology shifts.
Figure 1: Advertisement for the Riker electric car.
Why Are We Entering 4IR Now? What Is Causing a Sea Change of This Scale?
The 4IR story is anchored in four technologies plus one. If we look back over the 
past decade, we have seen four technologies grow tremendously in terms of utility, 
adoption, impact, value, and/or scale. Think back to where cloud computing, artificial 
intelligence (AI) and big data, augmented reality (AR) and virtual reality (VR), and the 
Internet of Things (IoT) were in 2010, and it is easy to see we have come an amazingly 
long way. The original release for containers (the basic Lego of modern cloud 
computing) was only seven years ago. Global cloud annual revenue is now around 
$266 billion, and growth is accelerating.5 There were more than 8 billion IoT devices 
in 2017.6 Gartner projected there would be more than 20 billion in 2020; others had 
predicted more than 50 billion IoT devises by 2020.7 Released in 2016, Pokémon 
GO, an AR game, is of no great impact or importance, does not use amazingly deep 
tech, and is not applicable to business in general and certainly not something special 
operations would look at. But it had 50 million users in its first 19 days.8 That sends 
a noticeably clear signal: Imagine if Pokémon GO was a useful AR platform with real-
world applications and a better tech solution—what is that growth curve?
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Figure 2: Current trending for artificial intelligence/big data, cloud computing, the Internet of Things,  
and augmented/virtual reality.
Now imagine these technologies were tied to a software-defined, cloud-native 
network that was designed for a thousand times more IoT density and ten times 
better battery life. A network that had compute built in at the edge, massive 
bandwidth capability, and super low latency. (Latency is telco talk for how quickly 
an end point can get a desired outcome, which is transmission time plus whatever 
processing is required.) What I just described is 5G. Together with the other four 
technologies mentioned, 5G creates a flywheel effect for accelerated growth and new 
capabilities—“four technologies plus one” driving the 4IR.
This scenario described in the previous chapter is the key premise behind the 
4IR and why those four technologies plus 5G—despite the seemingly steep curve of 
growth since 2010—will experience hockey-stick growth in the 2020s and change 
everything. Here’s a glimpse of the future:























5G creates a flywheel effect
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I have been close to these technologies for a decade, and I am absolutely 
convinced they are at an inflection point in terms of unit cost, economic impact, and 
ease of adoption. Those three factors alone create hockey stick growth. The addition 
of 5G moves all of them into a new dimension around edge computing as they are 
accelerating. The technologies become more pervasive and intelligent and start to 
function in real-time environments, meaning in human dimensions, time intervals 
that are a fraction of a blink of an eye. In turn, these developments fuel many more 
applications as the unit cost to deploy goes down. A ten times improvement in IoT 
battery life with a thousand times improvement on IoT density restrictions clearly open 
up a much bigger total available market (TAM)—that’s simply money. The larger TAM, 
lower unit costs, easier adoption, and high margins drives massive rapid adoption. 
On the AI/big-data side, emerging platforms exist that may be 50 times better than 
previous ones. Meanwhile the “legoization” of AI enables the field to move from the 
domain of data scientists and senior-level experts to second-year computer-science 
students. Those two factors alone are massive accelerators. Meanwhile, the cloud 
growth trends look like there will be a ten times growth during the 2020s. 
So, let’s assume the hockey-stick prediction is right. My favorite question about 
new tech has always been, “So what, who cares?”
It is fine that smart people all agree these changes will have such a large and broad 
impact that it has been defined as its own industrial revolution. But what does that really 
mean? To answer that question, one needs to understand what 5G really is and what 
kinds of new tech we will get when the four plus one combine. Once we understand 
those two things, we can begin to see why 5G matters for special operations.
Demystifying 5G
5G is a network technology massively different from 4G. It is not only a 10 to 1,000 
times improvement in some of the key things we care about but also produces a 
binary leap forward. 4G does not have the latency to support real-time computing 
environments; 5G does. Latency is simply how quickly you go from ask to response 
in a network. On top of that, because 5G is a software-defined cloud network, it has 
compute built in all the way to the edge. This is standard cloud-based, containerized 
compute. A dumb cheap camera can take its pixel input, blast it back to the edge, 
and return intelligence (an impending crash, anomaly, defect, and identification of foe 
or friend) in 30 milliseconds, which includes the compute time and the transmission. 
That is roughly one-tenth the blink of an eye. That is a different world from 4G. 
Networks are basically clever sets of wires and pipes. The electricity in your home 
and the water coming out of your tap are ends of networks. Telecom networks are 
also “pipes.” There are basically two types: “pipes” in the ground or on poles, which 
are cables (mainly optical fiber). “Pipes” in the air are radio waves, and their size and 
features are functions of spectrum and the specifications of the equipment. 5G is a 
globally accepted set of specifications. The spectrum can provide huge capacity to 
very small capacity, depending on the wave. Millimeter waves from about 26 gigahertz 
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and up are massively fat pipes. The problem is, the fatter the pipes through the air, 
the lower the propagation and penetration through structures. This means building 
out a 5G network is about small cells, and lots of them, placed smartly, instead of the 
more familiar 4G towers we have all seen miles apart. 5G antennas send out smart, 
narrow (6-degree) beams targeted to specific receiving points. 5G towers send out 
broad, noisy waves across 120 degrees. 
The diagram below shows what the key attributes of 5G pipes look like through 
the air. Remember, these attributes are all 10 to 1,000 times more than 4G and have 
compute at the edge; with that latency, compute and intelligence move into the real-
time domain. That is a sea change. Most of the world happens in real time. This is 
part of the “so what” that comes with emerging 5G networks.
Figure 4: Some of 5G’s key atrributes include energy efficiency, reliability, and data volume.
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5G’s Pragmatic Impact
To show what 5G can do, I’ll talk briefly about three major and two minor platforms 
this technology will enable. All the platforms are in Verizon’s labs, and some are 
already with early test customers in the field. By 2021, these platforms will move 
toward the mainstream and become broadly available commercially in their early 
forms on 5G. Devices with 5G chips already exist, and the increasing number of 
devices these chips can go into are just around the corner (as are more specialized 
5G-compatible chips).
Figure 5: The three major platforms enabled by 5G. 
Photonic Sensorization
Over 5G, a relatively cheap camera can send rich video feed at lightning-fast speeds, 
to be analyzed for patterns, triggers, intelligence, and anomalies. When coupled 
with AI, it can return a response in a fraction of a blink of an eye. This is all over the 
air. This could be from a drone, a body cam, or a listening post. AI (more precisely, 
machine learning [ML]) can be trained to recognize any elements in a flow of pixels 
relatively easily. Beating the Korean go champion, winning Jeopardy!, or modeling 
cancer molecule behaviors is difficult AI. Recognizing stuff in pictures just isn’t. More 
than that, photons can become sensors. 
Near Real-Time Intelligence
This is simply capturing all data available in a localized environment and being able 
to run it against ML models and get an answer back immediately. Clearly this has 
applications for the factory floor, venues, healthcare facilities, and distribution centers. 
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Having this capability could also make downrange ad hoc sensors, sensor nets, and 
co-opted sensor networks generate intelligence in real time.
Immersive Creation and Consumption
Immersive creation and consumption is the ability to have real-time intelligent AR/
VR elements in any environment on a device or a heads-up display (HUD). It can be 
used to create hyperrealistic interactive immersive environments for training and 
operational preparation. Not too long ago, I did two ten-minute bursts in an immersive 
environment to teach employees the five key things to watch for (pattern match) 
when working the deli counter at a big grocery store. I barely give the exercise any 
thought, but I can recall these items instantly any time I am at a deli counter, much 
to the annoyance of the employees. This type of deeply immersive training is sticky, it 
stays with you, and it makes your team more effective and efficient. Other simulated 
programs allow you to walk through a space station or fly 100 yards above hot lava 
to fight storm troopers in a complex environment. These simulations had such high 
fidelity that the experience felt real. The ability to create realistic digital training 
environments that are between two to five times better for training and at a functional 
cost way below any current alternatives is a massive breakthrough. 
Figure 6: The “7Ps” of 5G.i
i   Whether you are thinking of a consumer experience, a healthcare center, or something more closely tied to the SOF world, 
which do you want: ones that incorporate the 7Ps or those that do not? Credit to Professor Tim Chou (Stanford Computer 
Science) who gave me the 7th “P” (Precise—note his great book on IoT Precision [2020]). Also credit to John Sviokla, a 
former Harvard Business School professor who helped me with two of these “Ps” in a two-day “work session,” including golf 
carts at Pebble Beach with cigars and beer.
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Evolutionary Intelligence and Agility
Now imagine what happens when you combine these three digital platforms. All these 
processes and activities will produce mountains of raw data and metadata in real 
time that can be moved up to the cloud and used to create new models, discover 
new insights and patterns, solve crucial questions, and identify anomalies, risks, and 
opportunities. In turn, all this information allows me to update my processing at the 
edge to take advantage of the new information. I am then existing in an evolutionary 
environment that, when managed appropriately, can create an overmatch advantage 
that puts my team on continually more intelligent footing than an opponent, which is 
what “evolutionary intelligence” is all about.
Minor Platforms
The two minor platforms worth mentioning are volumetric capture, which is taking a 
huge leap forward, and next-generation presence and collaboration. When coupled with 
5G, the end user now has the ability to make hyperrealistic three-dimensional images 
of anything (even objects in motion) and to create simulated training environments 
that make the user feel like s/he is actually there. There are many applications here 
for special operations to consider, such as what these technologies may mean for 
overwatch or for what overwatch may become in the future. 
Special Operations—Possibilities, Prescriptions, Cautionary Tales
In the big picture, 5G is a tech domain that needs proactive engagement, monitoring, 
and a future-proofing radar to see what is coming up next. These steps can take the 
form of a series of effective listening posts to capture new tech related to 5G as it 
emerges and process those signals. The real trick will be to coordinate those listening 
posts and appropriately bin all signals into one of the following groups:
• Not Applicable. No need to pursue or monitor because the technology 
does not apply. For example, we may build some clever tech for combine 
harvesters that may not have any dual use for SOF or the Department of 
Defense.
• Noted. Technologies of interest in stages too early to determine exact 
applications; should be revisited in six months.
• Interested. Items that have potential, which you want to get your hands on 
and learn more about, maybe through a SOFWERX-, Naval X-, AFWERX-, or 
DARPA-like environment. 
• Obvious. This is new technology with immediate opportunity to leverage. The 
Dreyse needle gun is a good historical example for this category (it is also a 
cautionary tale).  
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In business, especially information-technology areas, companies adopt new 
technologies commonly. However, the real challenge comes when dealing with 
removing legacy systems and architecture. That is often more challenging to replace, 
not a critical short-term mission, and tends to lead to horrible cost structure and 
inefficient spaghetti architectures. Complexity is the enemy of successful SOF. 
Technology and innovation should be used to drive out complexity. Down-range 
communications and information flows can be challenges of complexity, and usually 
those challenges are all about the architectures and designs upstream from the 
operator.Figuring out a good path for swapping out the old for the new deserves our 
attention. Clearly, an opportunity exists to impact the planning, preparation, and 
execution areas for special operations. In his book, Admiral McRaven maps out how 
innovation and new technology can be used to simplify plans, eliminate obstacles, and 
improve time to achieve relative superiority, core SOF functions. 
As the world becomes more digitized, moving to real-time information flows could 
improve operational effectiveness and shrink the gaps between common operational 
practice, intelligence, and on-the-ground reality.
Having an over-the-horizon view can help ensure the technology is employed 
properly in the short and medium terms. More importantly, an over-the-horizon view 
can help operators manage out complexity. For SOF, this means really understanding 
the technical information architecture of pervasive technology. 
Constant realistic rehearsals matter. The ability to do exactly that in short order, 
in more detail and with a lower cost structure with immersive real-time technology 
could make a big impact. I believe leaders in all aspects of training, learning, and 
performance improvement will adopt 5G technology because it is better and faster 
and has a better cost structure than 4G.
In my world, we think a lot about security. But, in my nonkinetic world, we 
do not think about it at the level SOF should. We also do not think much about 
countermeasures. Both security and countermeasures are issues that will need 
special attention in a dual-use technology world. 
In special operations speed to relative superiority and speed of execution matter 
more than most environments. As 5G evolves, having cycle times as a guidepost 
and objective will be important. In the business world some of the biggest winners 
have not been the early adopters of technology but operators that looked at the new 
technology and innovated at the business-model level. When telegraphs and railroads 
started to crisscross the United States, companies like Sears and Standard Oil 
invented new business models to account for the nascent technology. Uber represents 
a modern-day example of employing new tech at the model level. The company 
dominated at a model level without really creating either anything difficult or special 
technologically. 
A parallel tale to how 5G will likely impact special operations and society in general 
can be seen in Helmuth von Moltke’s use of the telegraph and railroads to change the 
model of a standing army and deployment during the Franco-Prussian War. Moltke not 
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only made the standing army better and more responsive but also cheaper. Further, 
he adopted the Dreyse needle gun—the first bolt-action rifle—after both the French 
and British turned it down. The gun was relatively flimsy and broke more often, by an 
order of magnitude, than the robust muzzle loaders. From one perspective, the gun 
was not great technology. From another, it was. It fired five times more often than 
other guns. In addition, a soldier did not have to stand up (and become a big target) 
to reload. From a model perspective, even the wobbly first iteration of this tech was a 
breakthrough. The British and French high command who turned this down were not 
stupid. Judging new technology is hard. 
Other areas that will adopt 5G and 4IR technologies and grow and change will 
be autonomous and semiautonomous vehicles such as drones and roboticsthat 
include robotic weapons and munitions. There will also need to be work on 
future enhancements like rapidly deployable private or isolated ad hoc networks, 
countermeasures, and the ideas that will come from the extra 80 IQ points deep 
context delivers.
Conclusion
There are three key things to keep in mind in the discussion about 5G and special 
operations. SOF must apply 5G and the technologies it will enhance across planning, 
preparation, and execution. SOF must also think across short-, medium-, and long-term 
horizons and across broader areas like information architecture to ensure simplicity, 
manageability, and effectiveness. Finally, SOF must have effective technology radar 
and future proofing to stay current and ahead of the game. On top of that, all special 
operations really rests on the selection of the operators and their “moral factors” of 
perseverance, smarts, boldness, bravery, and training, lots of training. Applying 5G to 
training will also matter, it could be a game changer.
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C H A P T E R  2 2
On Being Stretch Armstrong:  
Innovating Successfully inside Bureaucratic Organizations
Tambrein Bates, Brad Chedister, and Lt Col Jennifer J. Snow
“Learning and innovation go hand in hand. The arrogance of success is 
to think that what you did yesterday will be sufficient for tomorrow.”
—William Pollard
One of the toughest challenges facing the US government and the Department of 
Defense (DOD) is how to use innovation effectively to solve problems. If you were to ask 
each of the armed services and each interagency partner what “innovation” means to 
them, the definitions would be as diverse as the organizations they represent. Accurately 
defining what innovation means for a specific organization will determine if that 
organization competes successfully in the future as a national defense asset and if it 
can help its customers stay ahead of technologically savvy adversaries. As an innovator, 
navigating the various obstacles and challenges from within government can be a bit like 
being Stretch Armstrong: you get pulled in a lot of directions. You have to learn how to 
keep it all moving in the right direction to satisfy your customers’ expectations.
Innovation has become the new watchword inside the DOD and the various 
interagency partners that make up the intelligence and federal law enforcement 
communities. Everybody wants it, needs it, spends toward it, but why are only a few 
of these government-founded innovation centers successful? Innovation is not as 
easy as having a big personality champion an idea, holding a few meetings in a flashy 
space, and then suddenly success is achieved. Innovation requires a clear purpose, a 
well-defined strategy, the right expertise, the right processes, and constant customer 
feedback. Further, innovation is a science, a deliberate effort to grant an organization 
an advantageous position over a technologically comparable or advanced adversary. 
Nowhere is this advantage more important than in support of national security. Yet 
despite millions of dollars invested in hundreds of research-and-development (R&D), 
science-and-technology, and innovation hubs, the DOD continues to struggle, at best, 
with incremental change and, more commonly (and dangerously), lags in innovation 
efforts tied to long-term acquisition plans, decentralized manufacturing, and politics 
that increase the gaps between national security, capability, and agility. 
This chapter explores the challenges facing innovators. By highlighting the struggles 
and limitations, a more fruitful path can be identified and implemented independent 
of the current operating constraints. These innovation models and methods can help 
organizations best structure their efforts, help new innovation teams overcome key 
obstacles, and ultimately achieve success from within by leveraging the right solutions, 
metrics, and tools for their mission. It concludes with specific recommendations for 
leaders faced with securing the United States against diverse emergent futures. 
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How to Define Innovation
Words matter. How your customer, leadership, or innovation hub chooses to define 
innovation will impact your work, its structure, and the paths that develop. Getting 
this part right is important. No single definition of innovation exists, so understanding 
your mission priorities is central to understanding what innovation means for a 
specific customer and how to properly address their needs. Some hubs focus on a 
single technology sector, while others are designed for overall organizational process 
improvement and agility. Some innvoation hubs may also be designed to develop 
solutions that combine multiple collaborative areas of focus. Understanding priorities 
and mission needs and aligning them with the hub’s charter is a vital process. 
When addressing innovation, one must understand the definition of the word. 
Often, people confuse innovation with invention. Although the two complement each 
other, they are not the same thing. Merriam-Webster says, “The words innovation and 
invention overlap semantically but are really quite distinct.” In this case, “invention 
can refer to a type of musical composition, a falsehood, a discovery, or any product 
of the imagination. The sense of invention most likely to be confused with innovation 
is ‘a device, contrivance, or process originated after study and experiment,’ usually 
something that has not previously been in existence. . . . Innovation, for its part, can 
refer to something new or to a change made to an existing product, idea, or field. One 
might say the first telephone was an invention, the first cellular telephone either an 
invention or an innovation, and the first smartphone an innovation.”1
We can expand on the telephone analogy to help define the difference between the 
invention and innovation. The first bidirectional, electrically transmitted speech over 
distance was a groundbreaking invention. The method of transmitting speech today 
via cellular-based smartphones simply changes the way in which we achieve the same 
effect. Innovative, but not inventive.
Provided the definitions above, we can further define innovation based on generally 
agreed upon types, or levels, of innovation. Several different innovation models exist, 
including Jürgen Hauschildt’s Four Levels and McKinsey’s Three Horizons. More recent 
thought leadership defines innovative levels as 1) incremental, 2) adjacent, and 3) 
transformational.2
• Incremental: Sometimes called “core” or “Horizon 1,” these typically serve 
existing customers and may involve new, improved or incrementally better 
products and/or services.
• Adjacent: Often referred to as “Horizon 2”; those innovations that leverage 
existing expertise but do so in new or innovative ways, typically expanding 
into adjacent markets or customer segments.
• Transformational: Sometimes called “breakthrough” or “Horizon 3” innovation; 
involves the creation of entirely new businesses to serve new markets and 
customers. This is the most radical type of innovation and, traditionally, the 
hardest to incorporate into existing organizations unless a crises arises to act 
as a catalyst or strong leadership provides the thrust in support.
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The most mature innovation organizations help their customers diversify research 
funding by distributing efforts across these three kinds of innovation in a 40-30-30 
ratio. Forty percent of their time is focused on incremental innovation, and 30 percent 
each on adjacent and transformational innovation. This practice ensures improvement 
to and modernization of current products for existing customers. Organizations also 
use innovation expertise to find and attract new adjacent markets as well as swinging 
for the fence by developing new products and new markets in anticipation of future 
challenges and competition in emerging areas.3
Why Do Some Innovation Efforts Succeed While Others Fail?
Innovations proliferate quickly, but organizations often struggle to sustain their impact 
and value. Many innovation labs become resource sinkholes, with little to show for the 
money spent except a cool space, with geeky furniture and high-tech toys, as evidence 
the organization is “doing” innovation. These labs vary in model, purpose, staff 
and experience, mission, and goals as well as the ways in which they connect and 
serve their customers. Some key questions may be posed: What red flags signal an 
innovation effort may be set to fail? Conversely, what are some indicators the stage is 
set for success?4 
Failing innovation efforts or “innovation theater,” defined as “any innovation work 
[that] is done to show people that innovation is happening, but which doesn’t result in 
a tangible outcome,”5 usually have several of the following characteristics:
• Flashy spaces with high-tech toys and lighting used for VIP “talk-throughs”;
• Lack a clearly defined mission or too broad a mission or scope;
• Staff members unable to clearly articulate priorities, purpose, or overarching 
strategy;
• Center sits behind guards, gates, and guns or behind government firewalls 
that limit collaboration and potential flow of ideas and outside perspectives;
• Staff members not easily accessible, responsive, or open to outside ideas or 
collaboration—“Not Invented Here” syndrome6 permeates the team;
• Innovation success is thought to derive from achieving a critical mass of 
funding or ideas or through company participation in “brainstorming” events;
• Innovation events are hosted with little background or defined requirements 
to guide participants;
• Lack of processes or plans to capture data from collaborative events and 
provide follow through to apply this information to actual problems and 
solutions;
• Innovation center has a low or no transition rate on projects to key 
customers;
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• Innovation center has no tangible metrics to measure either innovation 
efforts or progress to show value or impact;
• Staff cannot articulate clearly their jobs’ necessary functions;
• Staff cannot define clearly the structure, models, processes, and tools they 
use to support innovation requirements;
• The organization does not provide defined steps, plans, phases, processes, 
or tools for how innovation happens;
• Staff does not have a clear idea of who the customer is, with whom they 
need to be engaging and why, or who key stakeholders are;
• Staff does not have the right experience or mix of expertise or relies on part-
time or additional-duty personnel to accomplish mission;
• Large budgets that allow for the “purchase of solutions” or checklist 
mentalities that limit creative approaches or outside perspectives;
• Lack of support from senior-level leadership.7
• Conversely, successful innovation platforms have the following indicators:
• Open messy spaces where people are working and things are happening; 
includes flexible, reconfigurable workspaces, meeting and training spaces, 
prototyping and manufacturing space, demostration space, and digital 
presence space, and is used daily by multiple users from various sectors;
• A clear mission flexible enough to evolve with the customer;
• Strong support and guidance from leadership to drive innovation and 
innovation strategy;
• Right combination of expertise necessary for the innovation platform to 
succeed, which should be a mix of abilities that bring experienced innovators 
into contact with fresh perspectives and government or agency liaisons;
• Readily available and updated tangible metrics to measure results to provide 
a measure of success and value;
• Seek to interact with sister services, interagency partners, industry, 
customers, and nontraditional groups outside the organization to gain fresh 
perspectives, new ideas, and new opportunities and technologies;
• Have a process, plan, tools, and path to transition projects.
• Well-defined, impactful issues that have a risk-to-reward ratio that justifies 
their selection and will result in disruptive innovation that complements or 
advances existing incremental innovation efforts by the sponsor;
• Functions as an additional tool for existing R&D, science and technology 
(S&T), and acquisitions efforts vice a duplicative or competitive effort;
• Encourages collaborative solutions that bring together diverse groups to take 
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on complex cross-cutting problems that a single organization or entity would 
struggle to accomplish;
• Able to proactively, positively, and consistently interact and influence partners 
and customers across spaces and within the primary service or agency 
sponsor;
• “Constraint-based” innovation that pushes innovators to go for disruptive 
instead of incremental and potentially duplicative solutions;
• A culture that emphasizes information sharing, transparency, trust, and 
shared credit where all participants benefit from participating and someone 
always wins;
• Rapid movement of innovation into the field for feedback and testing followed 
by persistent iterations to deploy the solution in support of the customer;
• Act as a friendly front door for innovators to participate and learn how to best 
team with government and military partners;
• Able to showcase multiple transitions and solutions that have been 
facilitated by the center and used by sponsor or customers today.8
These are not all-inclusive lists but can help organizations identify whether their 
innovation hub is geared for success. If an innovation hub is not well aligned with the 
mission it is meant to support, lacks a well-defined strategy or vision, fails to connect 
with real customers, lacks metrics to show how the center produces value, or has an 
unbalanced team staffed too heavily with either service members or entrepreneurs, 
then the probability of failure is high. The primary purpose of establishing an 
innovation center is to provide a safe space with the right mix of talent to drive 
innovation and creativity across the service or organization while providing for the 
strategy, people, and processes described above to enable success. Real change 
does not happen in a vacuum, and innovation hubs can be the nodes that educate, 
inspire, and connect everyone to external resources, technology, and tools that can 
help them solve their biggest problems.9
Modeling Innovation
Partnership Intermediary Agreements, Other Transaction Consortiums,  
and Commercial Solutions Openings 
Several innovation lab models exist. Probably the two most recognized are the Other 
Transaction Consortium (OT Consortium) and the Partnership Intermediary Agreement 
(PIA). Commercial Solutions Openings (CSO) are another popular format, while hybrid 
models may bring together a complementary variety of solutions to meet more complex 
missions. But how can you know which model best supports your organization? How 
much flexibility do you need to innovate? Are you aiming to solve future problems 
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or existing gaps that the S&T department is struggling to address? Determining the 
appropriate model for the service or interagency partner you support is crucial to 
designing an effective hub. The following describes the most common models in use 
today and provides an overview of their purposes and how best to use them.10
OT Consortium–based models are appropriate for services or interagency partners 
that focus on prototypes or demonstrations, testing and evaluation, or technology-
feasibility studies of innovative capabilities related directly to weapons or weapons 
systems, the mission effectiveness of people and platforms, or the improvements 
of platforms or key components. An OT Consortium can help identify and address 
known gaps in mission effectiveness, and an OT Consortium is a cheap, easy, and 
effective process when paired with a plan of phased future tasks to achieve innovative 
improvements. The OT Consortium model works well for mature organizations with 
established community support looking to expand or modernize missions during 
changing technology regimesi and constrained budgets. The model allows customers 
to focus on filling known critical mission gaps and acquiring innovative solutions. 
It primarily will produce incremental innovation solutions and is best set to provide 
operational to strategic-level solutions.11
PIA-based models are appropriate when the service or interagency wants to establish 
a collaborative community for technology exchange or technology transfers among 
government, industry, academia, and nontraditional technology partners. The model 
emphasizes joint collaboration to accelerate delivery of innovative capabilities. A PIA is 
most useful when leveraging multiple partners in collaborative technology exchanges 
around the development of relevant mission-enabling technologies, including the joint 
exploration of innovative solutions to fill key mission gaps (sometimes these may be 
unknown until external partners get involved) and to define new mission possibilities. 
A PIA must provide generous access, space, collaboration, information sharing, and 
transparency to establish the credibility necessary to show both internal and external 
partners the seriousness and potential value of the endeavor.
The PIA model helps the customer discover both current unknown gaps and 
shortfalls and what they need to be effective and at an advantage for future missions. 
The PIA model is appropriate for customers as part of a new, consolidated, or high-
growth organization that may have nascent community support and that has to 
integrate new missions with rapid technology changes across multiple sectors. With 
the insight of the private sector, academia, or nontraditional experts, it can produce 
both disruptive and incremental innovation solutions and is best set up to meet 
critical needs for tactical to operational users.12
i   Defined as “the set of attributes of a technological environment where the innovative activities of firms take place. Technological 
opportunity, appropriability of innovations, cumulativeness of knowledge and capabilities, and closeness of knowledge base to 
basic sciences (versus applied sciences) are attributes of technological regime” (Song, Michael, et al., “How Does Technological 
Regime Affect Performance of Technology Development Projects?” Journal of Product Innovation Management, June 16, 2014 
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpim.12192).
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In both OTA Consortium and PIA models, organizations may use pilots, prototypes, 
or demonstrations to express innovation and prove their relevance. Both models bring 
high value quickly, through innovation and outreach beyond the traditional vendor 
community. A PIA model has more internal flexibility to explore problem sets and to 
conduct neutral facilitation as a non-Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)–based entity, 
which sets a clear boundary to prevent conflict of interest and favoritism. (PIA staff 
do not select or award contracts or funding and can help direct technology to the right 
customers for a variety of competitive events, testing, and validation.)13
While PIA and OT Consortium are both effective models, there are key distinctions. 
First, the participants of each are derived from different sources. OT consortiums 
draw from a pay-to-play reservoir of participants, usually aligned by sectors (e.g., 
manufacturing), and are typically more traditional memberships that routinely seek 
government contracts as part of their business model. PIA models draw from a low-
barrier-to-entry, or free, model that typically broadcasts challenges to a wide audience, 
followed by targeted research and marketing designed to deliberately increase 
nontraditional offerings. 
Second, PIA and OT Consortium models differ in expertise. When sourcing and 
contracting technologies, the lines of effort (LOE) fall into two categories: LOE 1 
and LOE 2. LOE 1 includes the collaboration, prioroitization, and events processes 
that lead to a specific down-selected technology in preparation for a contract award. 
LOE 2 includes the negotiation, contract award, and program-management functions 
that develop and/or purchase the capability for fielding decisions. While the process 
required to field innovative technologies requires both LOEs, PIAs tend to be much 
better at LOE 1, as their open participation approach attracts nontraditional entities. 
However, PIAs do not have the authority to assist with or issue government OT 
awards, so they are not well suited to LOE 2. On the other hand, OT Consortiums are 
specifically designed for LOE 2 because they are chartered to assist with government 
contracting efforts. However, during LOE 1, OT Consortiums do not attract many 
fast-moving nontraditionals or technology sectors because of their consortium 
participation models. In the future, hybrid models that combine these two types will 
reap the benefits of both.
The CSO-based model is appropriate for customers seeking to fulfill specific 
standing requirements, fill known capability gaps, or advance specific technology 
areas. This non-FAR model uses a merit-based approach that evaluates individual 
solutions using a streamlined process requiring only minimal corporate and technical 
information. It seeks to solicit nontraditional government partners under a process 
similar to a Broad Area Announcement (BAA) that allows for the acquisition of 
technologies relevant to a specific program or project. It has embedded processes 
designed to fast-track technology briefings and allow for notifications to be made 
within a 30-day window, encouraging feedback from service and interagency 
customers. The model also potentially allows for follow-on funding and sponsorship to 
move technologies to the next stage. Organizations typically pair CSO-based projects 
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with an OTA or PIA model but may use them alone to augment existing acquisitions 
processes. CSO projects allow for incremental and adjacent innovation.14
Other Innovation Tools and Models 
Cooperative R&D agreements (CRADAs) also facilitate collaboration among the 
private sector, academia, and nontraditional technology partners with government 
agencies to develop technologies with both military and commercial applications. 
The DOD or interagency partners typically use CRADA with one or more of the 
models discussed in this section, allowing for the sharing of either in-kind 
resources or funding to develop specific technologies. Thus, the customer can 
access expertise to shape the technology in ways that best support its specific 
requirements. Commercialization lowers price points for the government and also 
supports industry partners in a manner that enhances the overall DOD mission. 
Technologies developed under a CRADA may lead to breakthrough solutions that 
grant the DOD and its partners technological advantage over adversaries. CRADAs 
also drive competition, ensure high-quality technological development inside the 
United States, and allow the government to team with unique experts. It also allows 
the government to gain access to sectors it previously may not have viewed as 
relevant to national security and expand its organic capabilities by teaming with 
industry, academic, and nontraditional tech partners to pursue technological foreign 
internal defense initiatives (Tech FID).15
In a skunkworks model, the innovation team sits in a separate space from 
the larger organization and pursues highly disruptive technologies and processes 
intended to revolutionize how services or organizations operate either daily or 
during specific wartime or crisis situations. These types of innovation efforts 
focus on long-term strategic-level initiatives and typically have resources and the 
freedom to test new ideas. A skunkworks-type effort’s primary challenge is ensuring 
good communication with the primary sponsor or customer. Without consistent 
communications and feedback, this form of innovation may be viewed as too 
separate from the primary organization or a potential threat to other incumbents. If 
the service leadership does not have a clear understanding of a project’s mission 
and vision, these efforts may be seen as unnecessary or expendable; therfore, a 
skunkworks model requires persistent engagement to promote understanding and 
alignment and may be used with one or more of the above models to promote rapid 
acquisitions of key technologies.16
Toward Innovation with Purpose
“Collaboration is not just technical. It’s the cultural willingness  
to share and win as a team using the right technologies and  
the assumption that everyone can add value.”
—Wayne Kurtzman
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With all of its complexity, putting innovation into practice is challenging. However, 
examining existing tech hubs, talking to their teams, participating in events, and 
digesting their lessons learned can help any service or organization determine the 
right model and tools. The SOFWERX PIA model provides an applicable case study 
for SOF.
Founded in 2015 by then USSOCOM acquisition executive James “Hondo” 
Geurts, SOFWERX provides a non-FAR-based innovation space outside government 
for cross-cutting collaboration and experimentation with less government restriction. 
The SOFWERX vision was to create a platform designed and operated to help solve 
challenging warfighter problems through increased collaboration and innovation. 
It focuses specifically on accelerating the delivery of innovative capabilities to 
USSOCOM customers and refining capability through exploration, experimentation, and 
assessment of promising technology to support agile acquisitions for the warfighter.17 
In order to achieve this, SOFWERX adopted a “big tent” philosophy designed to 
be transparent and inclusive and to encourage collaboration that benefited all 
participants, not just the government. The model rapidly resulted in an extended 
ecosystem of over 40,000 individuals and organizations from across government, 
industry, academia, and bespoke technological “tribes of expertise” that do not 
typically collaborate with the government. 
A simple and expeditious process exists to accomplish SOFWERX’s goals. 
SOFWERX provides neutral facilitation to support USSOCOM SOF Acquisitions and 
Technology (SOF AT&L) and Program Executive Offices (PEOs) missions to accelerate 
their warfighter support, focusing their efforts on acquisitions. SOFWERX provides 
technology, expertise, testing and evaluation, and rapid prototyping, while working 
with the end user to provide constant feedback to guide and shape technology. This 
becomes a force multiplying capability for the end user, saving lives, resources, and 
time while granting a tangible advantage or solving a critical challenge.18
SOFWERX receives project nominations from the individual warfighter, the 
components, SOF AT&L, and HQ USSOCOM JCodes. Additionally, the SOFWERX PIA 
has leeway to explore transformational technologies by tracking technology forecasts, 
highlighting risks, and providing low-risk/high-yield opportunities to the command.19 
The SOFWERX team leverages ten primary activities to assess technologies for the 
end user, including collaborative project orders, rapid prototyping events, hackathons, 
capability assessment events, technology expos, combat evaluations, capability 
collaboration events, prize challenges, expert tech talks, and projects identified by 
USSOCOM stakeholders.20
The final component of the SOFWERX process is capturing the metrics of all 
outcomes. SOFWERX documents every nomination and activity to support these 
metrics. Impact categories include agreements, knowledge transfers, consignments, 
validations, and actual transitions to programs of record. Consignments allow tactical 
customers to leverage low cost, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions to meet 
a critical need in a deployed or crises environment. Validations allow the USSOCOM 
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stakeholder to evaluate whether a technology can meet or solve a need and indicate 
if, not a good fit now, it might work in the future, allowing both successes and failures 
to be seen as positives. Agreements may include CRADAs or other collaborative 
orders that allow the government to access technologies and expertise it otherwise 
could not access, while knowledge transfers encourage the sharing of solutions 
across spaces and partners. Finally, SOFWERX can also assist with transitions to 
programs of record for PEO’s by establishing assessment events that evaluate, 
downselect, and award agreements for promising capabilities. Metrics from these 
types of transitions benefit not only SOF but also the larger joint and conventional 
forces, and congressional and Senate offices frequently seek these metrics to 
evaluate success.21
What Are the Barriers to and Enablers of Innovation? 
Successful innovation requires understanding the barriers to innovation and how to 
most effectively enable innovation. In 2018, the Innovation Leader team surveyed over 
500 chief innovation officers (CIOs), resulting in the “Bench Marking Innovation Impact 
2018” report. Based on CIO feedback, the team found the following factors to be the 
biggest barriers to innovation:
After coordinating with fellow government innovators, beyond this survey, none of 
those teammates within the Department of Defense disagreed with either the barriers 
or their import. Most interesting, we have found that those that do not work in the 
innovation space often assume funding is the most prominent barrier. However, for 
those who do work in the space, funding rarely (if ever) is the barrier to innovative 
ideas or capabilities.22
If barriers exist, then conditions can be established to allow innovation to flourish. 
CIOs and government innovation teammates agreed the following metrics represented 
the enablers necessary for innovation success:
Politics/Turf Wars/No Alignment
Cultural Issues
Inability to act on signals critical to future business
Lack budget
Lack strategy, vision
Not adopting emerging technologies
Lack executive support
Recruitiong?not enough of high demand skillsets
Other
Inability to pick-up on signals critical to future business
Lack CEO support
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A large majority of those polled designated leadership support as the key 
component to successful innovation. Senior leadership can help align innovation 
goals and quickly resolve conflicts that arise from middle management. Leaders 
must ensure adequate alliances and consistent communication exist between the 
innovation team and the customer to continue positive momentum.23
How to Measure Innovation
Most organizations measure themselves through either financial or nonfinancial 
means. The Innovation Leader report indicated roughly 60 percent used “revenue 
generated from innovation products” as a metric, while only 25 percent do not track 
the financial impact of their innovation. Financial data can track tangible quantitative 
metrics, but what if the innovation space is mostly providing nonfinancial qualitative 
impact? According to Innovation Leader, the most mature innovation teams focused on 
customer touch points, insights generated by their center, and progress metrics, while 
the 25 percent of the least mature innovation hubs did not rely on metrics at all.24 The 
following chart compares these metrics for most and least mature innovation teams:
Leadership support
Ability to test, learn, and iterate
Correct team. types of employees
Correct strategy, vision
Correct approach, tactics
Correct level of funding
Organization accepts failure well
Correct technology/infrastructure
Other
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While the DOD continues to fund disparate innovation organizations, many do not 
use innovation metrics or capture the most impactful metrics associated with their 
innovation goals and responsibilities. The MITRE Corporation conducted a holistic 
survey of government innovation organizations and found some interesting aspects of 
innovation efforts by organizational characteristics:25
Of those organizations surveyed, multiple types of innovation structures existed, 
and each type played multiple roles. SOFWERX is a networker, although the team also 
conducts outreach and STEM programs for local schools, facillitates expert panels 
for government customer awareness, and acts as a neutral facilitator for acquisitions, 
helping to speed up the process and streamline acquisition timelines.26
Within each of the various kinds of organizations, MITRE broke out individual 
activities and impacts. The table on the following page assesses additional 
organizational activities, which helps one understand in which ways each kind of 
innovation organization excels. The breakdown of activities helps provide a starting 
point to develop both quantitative and qualitative metrics.27
While metrics can be an important place to start, there is concern about 
the inadequacy of metrics. Specifically, organizations should focus on the goals 
associated with each project. That way, regardless of an organization’s associated 
level of innovation (incremental, adjacent, or transformational), specific goals can 
be quantified and measured objectively. Further, many DOD organizations point to 
“Transitions to Programs of Record” as a leading metric, which does not allow for the 
ideal 40-30-30 split of effort across innovation spaces to ensure the DOD gains a 
competitive advantage against adversaries while also allowing teams to look for and 
apply transformational levels of technology.28
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What Should the DOD Do to Implement Innovative Ideas  
and Principles Effectively?
The biggest innovation challenges for the DOD include:
• US government debt. Redundancy and duplication of effort must be removed 
and lower cost, joint service, and unifying strategies must be implemented. 
• The US private sector innovation base regards the US government as slow, 
onerous, and inflexible, scaring away partners, especially start-ups.
• US government funding, expertise, and requirements are scattered and 
invisible to ~90 percent of the marketplace. 
• DOD technology analysis, acquisition, and implementation is fragmented 
and lags adversary decision/adaptation cycles, resulting in ever increasing 
capability gaps.
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• National-level communities of interest do not have centralized locations for 
purposeful collisions, interagency and joint service collaboration, or positive 
competitive thought.29 
To overcome these challenges effectively, senior governmental leaders should 
apply an immediate, comprehensive solution. The US government already has the 
tools necessary to “go fast.” However, it does not have the organization, priorities, 
or authorization to leverage technology advancements effectively. It must pursue a 
flexible, high-velocity model to identify, assess, and deploy operationally relevant, low-
cost technologies rapidly and at scale. Only then can our SOF forces keep pace with 
their adversaries.
One option for the government to explore would be to establish an accelerated 
synergistic group of business activities around specified technologies and their 
associated communities of interest. By creating five technology-focused hubs, the 
government and DOD will be able to streamline and strengthen the US innovation 
base and create a unified network, increasing both funding visibility while also drawing 
in the best ideas to provide cross-cutting solutions that prevent duplicatious effort for 
the nation. A basic model for this ecosystem might look something like this:30 
The five hubs should combine with 1) a nonprofit intermediary to execute day-to-
day operations, 2) a proven innovation and collaboration processes, 3) a senior leader 
backing the process to ensure it is created holistically and used appropriately by 
the enterprise, and 4) an experienced OT developer that can award and manage the 
follow-on contracts.31
Reducing competition among the services and incentivizing collaboration on cross-
cutting areas of interest for acquisitions and innovation will also help to optimize 
spending and solutions, prevent duplication of effort, and create increased agility. 
Limiting contract lengths is also imperative. Large-scale long-term contracts (10 years 
or longer) do not suit a world in which emerging technologies generate new threats 
perpetually. Shorter, more flexible contracts with early out options will force companies 
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to stay competitive and to remain in tune with technology advances or risk losing their 
place. Short-term contracts will also benefit SOF, as companies are incentivized to 
respond quickly to technology changes to create capabilities to beat adversaries in 
multidomain operations.32
The US government faces many innovation headwinds, but they can be mitigated by 
the five-hub concept, incentivizing armed services to collaborate on shared challenge 
areas and prioritizing acquisition and contract agility. Short of this type of holistic 
approach, the government will continue to waste precious resources by standing up 
more “silos of excellence” that neither communicate effectively nor share resources, 
requirements, goals, and objectives. A change in approach will ensure the full 
potential of the US innovation base is unleashed to best benefit our SOF forces, our 
nation, and US national security.
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Special Operations Forces as a Rapid Prototyping Laboratory
Leo Blanken and Philip Swintek
Introduction
The US military’s once-secure technological lead is slipping away. Peer competitors 
have developed clever strategies to exploit the US lead, while making significant 
progress in their own right.1 Further, the technology landscape is moving away from 
large, centralized research efforts toward small, diffused networks of technological 
innovation. The Department of Defense seems to be finally waking up to the fact that 
it needs to develop novel strategies for navigating the relationship between emerging 
technology and national security.2
We propose one such strategy in this chapter. In brief, we argue the unique nature 
of special operations forces (SOF) offers a rich opportunity to be leveraged as a “rapid 
prototyping laboratory” (RPL). This laboratory could serve the development of SOF-
specific capabilities, as well as more wide-ranging capabilities that may be scaled up 
to the general-purpose forces.3 
In an RPL construct, SOF units and activities could serve as a test bed for new 
technologies, concepts, and practices. These activities could easily be conducted 
by employing the logic of inductive inquiry, natural experimentation, and field 
experimentation to provide structure and rigor to the prototyping activities. The 
proposed innovation challenges for testing could be curated from across the joint 
force. Professional military education (PME) institutions are the perfect locations for 
the curation and refinement of such research questions, as well as for designing and 
executing the RPL processes. 
SOF have many attractive qualities that make them ideal living laboratories for 
the rapid prototyping of innovation challenges. First, SOF forces are continuously 
distributed to the most operationally relevant locales around the globe. No 
matter the topic one is interested in—from peer competitors, nonstate threats, 
partner force operations, or any of a host of irregular challenges—SOF units are 
deployed to such an environment. Second, SOF forces are the most capable of 
weaving research activities into their operations. Through their careful selection 
and training processes and lean organizational design, SOF possess the cognitive 
and operational flexibility to integrate prototyping nimbly and responsibly. Through 
thoughtful planning that leverages a dedicated network of PME-based researchers 
and “customers,” the joint force could fruitfully utilize SOF units as a global 
laboratory for innovation.
In this chapter, we first set the stage by discussing the Department of Defense’s 
legacy system of innovation, and how it fit appropriately with the technological and 
strategic landscape of the Cold War through the example of the “Second Offset.” 
We then sketch the current technological and strategic landscape, showing how the 
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Second Offset legacy innovation system can no longer keep pace with demands. 
Next, we explicate our argument in two steps: explaining the logic of rapid prototyping 
and showing its natural fit to a partnership between SOF and PME entities. Finally, 
we provide some concrete examples that deliver a robust “proof of concept” of 
SOF operators who have—through their own entrepreneurship—already started the 
rapid prototyping endeavor called for above. Our proposal seeks simply to scale up, 
systematize, and hyperenable such entrepreneurship.
Legacy System of the Cold War, and Why It No Longer Works
World War II taught the United States that success in modern warfare is inextricably 
linked to applied science and technological innovation.4 The total nature of the 
conflict made clear that systems needed to be built to access expertise from across 
the entire society to produce the innovation necessary for the nation’s security.5 The 
system designed to generate innovation for US national security reflected the scale 
and centralization of the industrial-age warfare in which it was born6 and proved to be 
a useful tool in offsetting the size advantage enjoyed by Warsaw Pact conventional 
forces throughout the Cold War.7 
The centralized structure of innovation during the Cold War can be likened to a 
lighthouse: a tall vertical structure from which a single beam emanates at the top. 
In such a construct, the leadership at the top of the lighthouse surveys the strategic 
environment to drive innovation requirements. The leadership then, in turn, directs 
the subordinated structure of the lighthouse to provide the needed innovations.
This approach to innovation worked during the Cold War for a number of reasons. 
First, military and political leaders understood their opponent well. The United 
States well understood the force and bureaucratic structures, Warsaw Pact alliance, 
and political goals of the Soviet Union, as they largely mirrored those of the United 
States. This provided a useful framework from which force planning, intelligence, 
and doctrinal needs could be deduced.8 Second, the US national security apparatus 
had a firm grasp of the trajectory and nature of the technologies that would be 
relevant on the battlefield. Nuclear weapons aside, all force structures during the 
Cold War were improved versions of the platforms and doctrine of World War II. 
In fact, the Cold War period maintained the uninterrupted track record of the US 
defense establishment driving the technological landscape, as every single major 
technological advance in the United States to that point had relied on Defense 
dollars for the basic research.9 More specifically, to control technological innovation 
in this period, the Department of Defense funded universities, government 
laboratories, and the relevant units and organizations within the services.10
The crowning achievement of this era of US military innovation, the “Second 
Offset” wedded doctrine and technologies designed to prevent numerically superior 
Warsaw Pact forces from swamping NATO defenses in central Europe.11 Through a 
carefully orchestrated combination of primary research, applied research, and field 
experimentation wedded with coevolved doctrinal concepts, the United States solved 
324   |   D A V I S ,  G A C ,  R A G E R ,  R E I N E R  &  S N O W
this problem. Stealth aircraft, advanced sensors, and precision-guided munitions 
were the technological innovations necessary to enable the AirLand Battle doctrine 
of the 1980s.12 This series of technical achievements constituted an innovative 
solution to a well-understood and highly salient military scenario. In this case, 
the “lighthouse” discerned the strategic problem and effectively generated the 
innovations necessary to answer it.
None of the conditions that enabled the “lighthouse” to work during the Cold War 
holds true anymore. Rather than facing a single, well-understood threat, the United 
States faces a large number of heterogeneous and poorly understood challenges, 
which range from the enduring scourge of violent nonstate actors to emerging 
regional threats and peer competitors determined to contest the United States in 
asymmetric and nontraditional ways.13 Further, the pace of technological change 
vastly outstrips that of the Cold War, and, for the first time in American history, 
basic technologies are being developed outside the control of the Department of 
Defense.14 Finally, while the United States has been focused on its global war on 
terrorism, its chief rivals on the global stage—namely China and Russia—have 
begun to outpace US military innovation and technology.15 
Therefore, the legacy “lighthouse” model of innovation is no longer sufficient. 
Future innovation efforts should look more like a “Christmas tree.” In this metaphor, 
the bright star at the top of the Christmas tree would fulfill the function of the 
original lighthouse beam; it would focus on well-understood and agreed-upon 
requirements. The rest of the tree, however, is also strung with lights. These strings 
of Christmas lights represent innovation efforts diffused throughout the enterprise. 
Rather than innovation being compartmentalized in a reductionist division of labor, 
innovation efforts can be encouraged and enabled throughout the force. Further, 
given the inherent asymmetric and decentralized structure of SOF, these units are 
perfectly suited to the Christmas-tree model of innovation and could constitute the 
first string of lights on the tree. 
What a Rapid Prototyping Laboratory Looks Like
The Secretary of Defense’s advisory Defense Innovation Board (DIB) recommends the 
following changes to foster innovation: 
Test various possibilities of employing different practices to seek out 
empirical evidence, . . . [to be] rapid, iterative, and risk-tolerant. Instead 
of giving processes pride of place . . . focus on outcomes, and how to 
get there most efficiently. These practices should be generalized, and 
not only to products and services, but potentially to strategies and 
operations as well.16
There are a number of such voices calling for fast, iterative feedback loops 
between operational experiences on one hand and providers of material solutions 
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on the other. Such an approach to military innovation can generally be labeled “rapid 
prototyping.”17 Actionable plans to instantiate rapid prototyping, however, remain 
lacking. Some refer to rapid prototyping as a “mindset” or “culture” that needs to 
be inculcated throughout the force.18 Others seek to rely on nascent technologies to 
make the process work: “Immediate feedback will pour into a data lake where the 
latest methods in machine learning and artificial intelligence can improve operational 
effectiveness.”19 We propose a specific set of established methodologies, married to a 
specific set of operationally deployed units to implement rapid prototyping immediately 
and effectively. 
The first task is to concretize “rapid prototyping,” turning it from a buzzword to 
specific and well-established research techniques. We offer three such analytic tools 
that can be implemented readily: field experimentation, natural experimentation, and 
inductive reasoning. 
Experiments are designed to establish control. In other words, experiments 
allow the researcher to isolate the independent effect of various factors upon some 
outcome. Field experimentation refers to conducting such research in “a naturalistic 
setting and manner . . . as a hedge against unforeseen threats to inference that 
arise when drawing generalizations from results obtained in laboratory settings.”20
The common usage of “field experimentation” across the joint force does not 
fit this definition, as it usually refers to the observation of nascent technologies 
being demonstrated in an empty field on some US military base. Often, by the time 
innovations are actually integrated into field exercises for conventional forces, they 
have been acquired and integrated into force structure. Actual field experimentation 
would allow the researcher to contend with all the potential confounding factors 
created by actual encounters with opposing forces in the actual settings in which 
innovations are designed to operate,21 which would require as many aspects of a 
“down range” setting as possible. Globally deployed SOF missions provide a perfect 
locale for such field fermentation.
Natural experiments can be considered a subset of field experiments. In these 
cases, control over potential confounding factors occur naturally in the environment. 
For example, if US forces are operating in two provinces of Afghanistan that are 
strikingly similar across a number of attributes, an innovation may be tested in only 
one of those provinces (rather than multiple iterations of costly tests in multiple 
areas). Such a design would not only be economical but also provide a large degree of 
control, thereby generating stronger inferences regarding the impact of the potential 
innovation under scrutiny. Given restrictions on “random assignment” within military 
operations, sensitivity to naturally occurring experimental opportunities is paramount 
in leveraging this logic.22
Finally, inductive reasoning refers to the process of inferring general laws or 
principles from the observation of particular instances (as opposed to relying on 
preexisting theory to derive conclusions, as is done through deductive reasoning).23 
In other words, inductive reasoning relies on discerning trends or patterns within 
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naturally occurring data. Though this seems the simplest of the three methods 
discussed here—colloquially referred to as “lessons learned”—the US military has 
struggled to learn systematically from things that it has experienced and observed.24 
This is because of the inherently conservative inclinations of military organizations25 
but also their poor understanding of these two modes of reasoning.26
SOF are an attractive force of choice for implementing a model of this sort for 
the same reasons they are often selected for unique and high-risk missions—
their maturity, education levels, and rigorous selection processes.27 SOF units are 
often more comfortable with risk simply based on the nature of SOF missions.28 
Furthermore, SOF are also consistently deployed across the globe, with forces 
spread across each of the six geographic Combatant Commands. Finally, special 
operators conduct a wide array of missions—from near-peer competition, to direct-
action counterterrorism and working closely with partner forces—ergo, they are 
postured to explore an equally wide range of innovation challenges.
Collaborative partners will be necessary to conduct rapid prototyping endeavors. 
While forward deployed SOF offer an ideal environment to conduct rapid prototyping, 
additional labor and expertise will be necessary to execute these activities. PME 
students may prove to be the ideal partners. As military professionals, they would 
understand the organizational, operational, and strategic contexts in which the 
protyping activities are nested. As graduate students, they could employ research 
techniques they are currently learning in the classroom. Finally, they could 
serve to connect the research to the relevant actors (academic, industry, and 
interagency) across the wider innovation ecosystem.29 Through such a partnership, 
the professional development of PME students would be directly tied to the 
transformation of the force through operationally relevant research projects.30
In the following section we show some examples of specific innovations that have 
been prototyped by special operators. These “naturally occurring” innovation efforts 
show the untapped potential that our proposed endeavor seeks to harness.
SOF’s Natural Affinity for Innovation Prototyping
In recent decades, US SOF has already demonstrated itself as an RPL for emerging 
technology, albeit an unintended one. The benefits of pairing SOF with the 
development, testing, and implementation of emerging or untested technology has 
been shown in a number of cases. We briefly survey three here. First is the use of 
Global Positioning Systems (GPS)–based technology and satellite communication 
(Satcom) during the initial invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan during both the Persian 
Gulf War and the war on terrorism, respectively. Second are the ongoing challenges 
around countering unmanned aerial systems (CUAS). Third is the development of the 
Android Tactical Assault Kit (ATAK), an innovation spearheaded by PME students, to 
enable collaboration with partner forces. We offer these three examples to show a 
latent rapid prototyping capability that could easily be systematized and expanded to 
great effect. 
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One of the most influential technological advances for the US military in recent 
memory has been the use of GPS technology across all aspects of the Department 
of Defense. GPS technology is not new. As early as the 1960s, the US military used 
a rudimentary version of the technology to guide both ships and aircraft. In 1978, the 
United States increased its GPS capabilities by launching the first Navstar satellite 
constellation, but the system was largely untested in combat until Operation Desert 
Storm, during which US SOF were vital to testing the system in the laboratory of 
combat.31 Specifically, SOF deployed behind enemy lines used GPS technology to 
navigate across the barren desert, conducting special reconnaissance deep in enemy 
territory.32
Undoubtedly, mistakes were made while using a largely untested technology, but 
these mistakes were used to improve techniques and equipment. For example, after 
the Persian Gulf War, the Army dictated that all armored vehicles would carry GPS 
receivers, and the demand for handheld devices, which were primitive by today’s 
standards, surged across the force.33 This increase in demand and utility was partially 
based on the successful use of GPS technology during the ground and air wars waged 
by US forces during this short, but influential, conflict. With these lessons, among 
others, the implementation of GPS technology and its satellite constellation grew and 
improved, and the improved US GPS infrastructure greatly enabled SOF during the 
subsequent conflicts across Afghanistan and Iraq, paving the way for another RPL for 
GPS and SOF.
As detachments of US SOF waged unconventional warfare in the mountains of 
northern Afghanistan, their mission was to advise and assist the freedom fighters of 
the Northern Alliance struggling to resist the Taliban on their own. A key component 
of their mission was to increase the lethality and survivability of the Northern Alliance 
through combat-multiplying technologies such as GPS. Primarily, GPS served two 
purposes during the initial invasion of Afghanistan in 2001: map the front lines 
and provide guidance to smart bombs. US SOF and operatives from the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) traveled along the scattered northern frontlines and used 
GPS to pinpoint friendly and enemy positions in conjunction with laser-guided bombs 
to mark high-value enemy targets for pilots flying overhead.34 This data provided 
valuable intelligence to senior US officials as they planned the larger campaign 
to ouster the Taliban and defeat al-Qaeda. More important, it also demonstrated 
the combat power provided by a handful of secure portable handheld GPS devices 
to senior military leaders and policy makers. Today, handheld GPS technology 
is ubiquitous across the US military. Once again, SOF, and its partners in the 
interagency, served as an RPL to validate technology in a combat laboratory.
Just over a year later in Iraq, the US military used the same GPS technology during 
Operation Viking Hammer. As soldiers from the Tenth Special Forces Group (Airborne) 
blazed their way through Kurdistan and into northern Iraq, they relied heavily on GPS 
to coordinate their efforts.35 SFOD-As from Tenth Special Forces Group (Airborne) 
were spread across the Iraqi frontier as they led their Kurdish partner forces to defeat 
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Saddam Hussein’s army. This swift campaign required precise knowledge of friendly 
positions. Relying on handheld and vehicle-mounted GPS systems, commanders could 
see the positions of their subordinate units with high accuracy. While GPS technology 
supported a highly precise bombing campaign in Afghanistan, in Iraq, it increased 
the freedom of maneuver for friendly forces by supporting decentralized operations. 
Commanders understood the battlefield with a new level of clarity that supported 
the dispersion of forces across large geographic areas—further validating GPS as a 
combat multiplier via a SOF RPL.
Similar to GPS, SATCOM was not new technology during the invasions of Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Though widely used throughout the military prior to 2001, it 
was largely untested in combat prior to the war on terrorism. During the onset of 
combat operations in Afghanistan in 2001, SATCOM was pervasive as a form of 
communications across the battlefield. The SFOD-As and CIA operatives fighting 
alongside the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan utilized SATCOM to coordinate the 
efforts of their intricate bombing campaign with major ground offensives.36 Using 
man-portable radios on their backs, US forces sent messages via satellites to their 
headquarters located on the other side of the globe. This space-based technology 
was undoubtedly a combat multiplier across the offensive in northern Afghanistan, 
as it directly supported decentralized operations with near-instantaneous global 
connectivity to execute a precision bombing campaign, once again validating 
technology in a combat laboratory via SOF.
In Iraq, the invasion also required constant communications to coordinate 
Operation Viking Hammer. SATCOM allowed US forces to coordinate the efforts of 
an intricate bombing campaign with the unconventional war they were waging on the 
ground.37 SATCOM enabled small and isolated units to coordinate their efforts and 
synchronize combat power. It also allowed for greater geographic dispersion of forces 
across the battlefield, which proved vital as the United States invaded Iraq. During 
the invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq, SATCOM enabled decentralized, lethal, 
and precise operations that minimized friendly casualties and helped define the new 
American way of war. The value of SATCOM and the operations it fostered was evident 
to leaders at the highest level thanks to an accidental RPL, with SOF leading the way.
Today, SOF continue to fill the role of an RPL for emerging technology across the 
globe. This has increasingly become the case as US operations have become more 
decentralized, with SOF often in the lead, facing technologically savvy enemies and 
adversaries, from extremist organizations with drones to near-peer competitors waging 
electronic warfare. SOF’s value in the process of developing, testing, and fielding 
innovative and emerging technology has only increased in recent years.
While drones and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have played a key role in the 
last two decades of conflict across the globe, until recently, they consisted mostly 
of large drones used to drop munitions on remote targets or observe the battlefield. 
However, drone technology has improved, miniaturized, and become more pervasive 
across the globe, as have the threats posed by UAVs. As a result, US adversaries and 
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enemies use commercial off-the-shelf UAVs to disrupt and attack US forces in remote 
corners of the globe. Typically, the forces facing these threats are SOF.
The emerging threat from UAVs has created a demand for counter-UAV (CUAV) 
technology to enable military and law-enforcement personnel to defeat UAV threats. 
Consequently, the market is flooded with CUAV solutions. While the companies 
touting these wares attest to their value and effectiveness, the testing is all limited 
to controlled scenarios often lacking real-world variables (meaning field experiments 
only). However, for the SOF units in Afghanistan, Syria, and elsewhere facing these 
threats, the threat is real and must be defeated. This paradigm has created a 
perfect SOF RPL, with units on the battlefield fielding and testing CUAV equipment, 
attesting to the validity of said equipment, and ordering more of the successful 
systems and avoiding the ineffective or overly expensive technological blunders. 
Meanwhile, large organizations such as Special Operations Command (SOCOM) 
or the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) oversee the procurement of systems and 
programs of record to counter this threat. To conceptualize this with an earlier 
example, SOCOM and AWG are the light on top of the Christmas tree, guiding the 
overall process. The SOF detachments, on the other hand, are the Christmas lights 
strung around the tree, facing the threat and driving innovation toward the correct 
solution—an SOF RPL.
However, the CUAV example is missing an important piece of the model we 
developed. While there is an adequate amount of experimentation in the innovation of 
CUAV solutions, it needs to be tied into PME—into field experimentation shepherded 
by SOF professionals as part of their academic professional development. ATAK 
represents one such example. The ATAK is an Android-based operating system 
installed on tablets, cell phones, and other handheld devices that provides real-time 
awareness on the modern battlefield, fosters communication, leverages SATCOM, and 
uses GPS technology. It has proven to be an invaluable tool for SOF across the globe. 
Interestingly, given the ATAK’s success and value, many SOF officers have looked to 
its further development, testing, and implementation while attending PME. Two such 
examples include supporting the development of remote advise-and-assist ATAKs for 
partner forces separated geographically from their American SOF advisors and ways to 
tie the ATAK better into joint-operations centers.38
Taking it one step further, the same SOF students have since completed PME and 
are now using the devices they helped improve on the battlefield, completing the cycle 
of innovation. The innovation and integration of the ATAK by SOF professionals—both 
on the battlefield and during PME—is an example of a successful SOF RPL that has 
supported combat success directly, from testing to field experimentation and natural 
experimentation.
Conclusions
We can now return to the Defense Innovation Board’s recommendations and highlight 
the specific ways in which our proposed initiative satisfies their key points:
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Test various possibilities of employing different practices to seek out 
empirical evidence, . . . [to be] rapid, iterative, and risk-tolerant. 
Instead of giving processes pride of place . . . focus on outcomes, 
and how to get there most efficiently. These practices should be 
generalized, and not only to products and services, but potentially to 
strategies and operations as well39 (emphasis added).
By using SOF as the laboratory for rapid prototyping, our proposal leverages the 
military community most comfortable with the necessary rapidity, cognitive flexibility, 
and risk tolerance. Marrying the SOF laboratory with PME research teams produces 
gains in efficiency, as well as the required analytic rigor for valid empirical testing. 
Finally, these operators and military graduate students are fully capable of applying 
these techniques to endogenize strategic and operational concepts, not just the 
technological “shiny objects” that take precedent in most discussions around 
innovation.
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Special Operations Forces and Cyber-Enabled  
Influence Operations
Herbert Lin and Trisha E. Wyman 
Introduction
This chapter focuses on opportunities for influence operations in a rapidly changing 
and disruptive information environment, in which both US special operations forces 
(SOF) and enemy forces have increased access to both global populations and 
systems and a variety of cyber tools to facilitate and enhance such operations. SOF 
are the readied forces—adaptable, small, and capable of sensitive operations—
and have a long history of achieving influence in the information environment. 
Historically, SOF have pioneered the successful navigation and operation of the most 
technologically advanced systems and methods, their future should be no different.
In the future, cyber-enabled influence operations (CEIO) will be integral to the 
success of efforts to influence, recruit, and engage people, systems, and forces 
around the world. To do so, they must take advantage of insights from social 
and cognitive psychology, marketing, social media, and the arts of influence and 
persuasion (as commercial and enemy entities have done). They must also employ 
technological capabilities that shape and manipulate hardware and software 
infrastructures to improve US SOF access to denied areas and marginalized 
populations.
A Special Operations Framing for Influence Operations
US SOF operate in a rapidly evolving and contested information environment that 
requires learning from previous experience, adaptation, and an understanding of peer 
nation-state activities, commercial competitors, and opportunities for cyber-enabled 
influence operations. This chapter is concerned with influence operations, and adopts 
a definition of influence operations inspired by that of psychological operations 
contained in several Department of Defense (DOD) publications. DOD regards 
psychological-operations soldiers as its primary influence-focused force.1 Furthermore, 
this chapter presents influence concepts that can and should be considered for use 
by, and could be used against, US SOF operations.
US SOF operate primarily in small teams and in sensitive and hostile 
environments in which signature management and social engineering may be 
required for mission success. Furthermore, although employed throughout all levels 
and phases of conflict and throughout the full range of military operations, US SOF 
are often the first forces employed both to create favorable environmental conditions 
and in crisis operations.2 Influence operations provide US SOF opportunities 
for improving signature management, socially engineering audience and local 
perceptions, and promoting US SOF objectives. 
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The concepts discussed in this chapter are applicable not only for US special 
operations but also to understand the opportunities available for nation-state 
competitors to target US forces and audiences. Peer competitors actively use 
cyber-enabled influence operations to target US SOF, conventional US forces, and 
other US audiences. They spread their influence efforts across varying internet 
platforms, addressing various military exercises and operations, and target groups 
and individuals. Russia, for example, has demonstrated its capability and inclination 
to use entities such as the Internet Research Agency to plan and execute influence 
operations using social media and human networks to encourage activities and 
attitudes favorable to its national goals.3 Russian media has shared falsehoods 
about SOF activities and their real intent. For example, citing an article on a Russian 
website, the New York Times reported on a false Russian claim that the Ukrainian 
government had issued US service members Ukrainian passports, the possession  
of which would allow American forces to infiltrate Russia. The article was shared 
over multiple Russian social media platforms, according to American officials.4  
China views Russia’s robust media effort as a success, which is reflected in the 
increase in China’s development and funding of its media efforts.5 Both countries 
have employed internet influence measures and clickbait to garner attention to  
their content.6 
Influence Operations and SOF Missions 
This chapter regards influence operations as activities designed to convey to a 
target audience (whose size may be as small as a single individual) both information 
and indicators selected for their potential to influence emotions, motives, objective 
reasoning, attitudes, understanding, beliefs, or behavior in ways that advance the 
interests of the operator.i 
Influence operations can be conducted throughout all phases of conflict, from 
the prewar phase to a postwar phase. They may be aimed at friendly, neutral, 
and adversary audiences to publicize the beneficial reforms and programs to be 
implemented after defeat of the adversary; to instill and sustain popular belief 
in and support for US and multinational political systems (including ideology and 
infrastructure) and associated political, social, and economic programs; to explain 
US policies, aims, and objectives; to amplify economic sanctions or other social or 
political action taken against an adversary; to shape foreign public opinion; or to 
increase the psychological impact of US and multinational combat power.
All military activities are ultimately intended to influence adversary behavior. 
However, if such activities are not planned and executed specifically to convey such 
i     This list of desired effects is derived from both the current DOD definition of military support operations (Joint Publication 3-13.2, 
Military Information Support Operations, Washington, D.C. 2014, II-6.) and an earlier DOD definition of psychological operations 
promulgated in 1984 (http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/psyops/OvertPsyOps.pdf) as “planned political, economic, 
military, and ideological activities directed toward foreign countries, organizations, and individuals in order to create emotion, 
attitudes, understanding, beliefs, or behavior favorable to the achievement of US political and military objectives.” JP 3-13.2 
Military Information Support Operations, 2011, page vii; also see JP3-13 Information Operations, 2014, II-9.
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information or indicators to influence the perceptions and the subsequent behavior 
of a target audience, they do not constitute influence operations in the lexicon of 
this chapter.7
Influence operations may be declared truthfully, undeclared, or declared falsely.ii 
Truthfully declared influence operations identify the originator clearly and correctly, 
so that an influence operation publicly associated with Nation A is in fact conducted 
by Nation A. Undeclared influence operations are not publicly associated with any 
actor at all. Nation A may originate an influence operation, but if the operation is 
gray, it does not identify a national actor. Falsely declared influence operations—also 
known as false-flag operations—are associated publicly with a nation or actor other 
than that of the true operator, so that an influence operation appearing to be publicly 
associated with Nation B will in fact have been conducted by Nation A.
Influence operations act as force multipliers that use nonviolent means in often 
violent environments.8 They seek to persuade rather than to compel, using logic, fear, 
desire, or other mental factors to promote specific emotions, attitudes, or behaviors. 
Many influence operations take advantage of local knowledge about political, cultural, 
ethnic, and religious factors at play in target audiences to influence perceptions and 
facilitate desired behavior.9
Target audiences for influence operations may consist of governments, 
organizations, groups, or individuals. The size of the audiences can vary, ranging 
from entire national populations, geographically delimited populations, specific 
demographic groups, audience leaders, or social media influencers. In cases in which 
an audience may view the US government as a suspicious source of information, SOF 
operators may have to rely on (and, thus, must cultivate) trusted local sources to 
deliver the same information, possibly to greater effect.
Influence operations can be used to induce adversaries to take (or fail to take) 
specific actions that will advantage the originator and/or disadvantage the adversary. 
Influence operations may seek to reinforce the adversary’s preconceived (though 
inaccurate or incomplete) beliefs,iii focus the adversary’s attention on unimportant 
activities so that important activities go unnoticed, create the illusion of strength 
where weakness exists, overload the adversary’s information collection and analytical 
capabilities, or reduce the adversary’s situational awareness.
The act of providing truthful and contextually accurate information to inform target 
populations is an influence operation. Influence operations to inform are serious, 
thoughtful, and balanced attempts to change hearts and minds and are not intended 
to be disingenuous. As far as is possible, they are unbiased, unslanted, and not 
misleading. Most important, the intent of an attempt to inform is to enable target 
ii    These definitions correspond roughly to DOD doctrine distinguishing between white, gray, or black operations. See Appendix A, 
FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations, Army Field Manual, 2005, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-30.pdf.
iii   Magruder’s principle states that it is generally easier to induce an enemy to maintain a preexisting belief than to present notional 
evidence to change that belief. Thus, under many circumstances it is more useful to examine how an enemy’s existing beliefs can 
be turned to advantage than to attempt to change his or her beliefs. See FM 90-2 BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION, 1988.
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audiences to reach their own conclusions, as opposed to the conclusions desired by 
another party. (Of course, other parties—for example, adversaries competing for the 
loyalties of the same target population—may view such operations as misleading, 
unbalanced, biased, or slanted.)
The definition provided above for influence operations emphasizes selected 
information and indicators. Such information—which may be mostly false, mostly 
true, or some mix of the two—may be selected for reasons other than its potential 
for contributing to a fair, balanced, or objective presentation in which the audience 
can decide for itself. Thus, a host of other possible purposes for influence operations 
exist, including: 
• Operations to distract, which seek to shift the attention of a target audience 
to another topic, entity, or issue and can be used to bury unfavorable 
information. 
• Operations to overwhelm, which seek to spread the attention of the target 
audience to many focal points; taken together, the disparate foci serve a 
similar purpose to that of jamming operations in electronic warfare that 
increase noise and lower the signalø-to-noise ratio, making detection of real 
targets more difficult. Such operations may make use of multiple, mutually 
inconsistent narratives and ideas. Such inconsistency is not necessarily 
a disadvantage, as different segments of a large target audience may 
gravitate toward one idea or another, potentially generating confusion and 
disorientation in the overall target audience. 
• Operations to mislead, which seek to introduce additional information into 
the environment. Such information may be entirely false, partially misleading 
or slanted, or entirely unfalsifiable (i.e., opinion that seems to be fact, either 
superficially or overtly). Such operations can be used to introduce alternative 
narratives or interpretations that are more favorable for the operator than 
others already in circulation.
• Operations to provoke and outrage, which seek to evoke or amplify 
emotional responses in the target audience to events or conditions. An 
audience in such a state is manipulated to take action they might not 
otherwise consider in their interests.
Often, influence operations use assets and resources indigenous to the operational 
environment,10 including local broadcast and print media, as well as social media and 
other computer-based communications mechanisms. The use of such assets may 
help to facilitate credibility of the indigenous government, allies, and other agencies. 
In a given geographical region, influence operations conducted by SOF may 
focus on a variety of tasks.11 To be optimally effective, these tasks also require 
synchronization and coordination with the activities of joint, interagency, civil, 
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and foreign partners, such as military-civil affairs units, the State Department, 
local nongovernmental organizations, and foreign governments. For friendly or 
neutral audiences in denied areas, influence operations may seek to improve 
access to accurate and timely information about past and present circumstances. 
When successful, such operations build support from the local populace. If such 
audiences are disorganized or isolated physically or psychologically, influence 
operations may be able to provide useful guidance, instructions, or reassurance. 
For example, they may help to sustain or boost the morale of friendly resistance 
fighters. They may also mobilize popular support for US and multinational military 
operations or encourage empathy between friendly host-nation armed forces and the 
civilian populace.
For adversary audiences, influence operations can be used to diminish morale, 
reduce their will to resist, or give them alternatives to continued conflict. For 
ostensibly neutral audiences skeptical of US motives, influence operations may 
seek to reduce tensions by instilling favorable or positive views of the United States 
or its indigenous partner. As part of ongoing military actions against adversary 
forces, influence operations can also support deception or the exploitation of ethnic, 
cultural, religious, or economic differences in ways that cause confusion or hostility 
among rival adversary factions. Influence operations may be conducted to lower the 
morale of or diminish local support for adversary forces, undermine confidence in 
adversary leadership, counter information disseminated by adversaries, or attack 
the legitimacy of adversary political systems.
The Complexities of the Current and Emerging Information Environment
The information environment—which consists of the individuals, organizations, and 
systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information—has evolved 
rapidly over the last few decades providing increased interconnectedness and ease of 
influence.12 This environment has three dimensions:
• Physical: consisting of command-and-control systems and supporting 
infrastructure and roughly corresponding to cyberspace hardware (e.g., 
computers and network technology interconnected through the internet).
• Informational: consisting of where and how information is collected, 
processed, stored, disseminated, and protected and roughly corresponding to 
the information carried and stored within cyberspace.
• Cognitive: encompassing the thinking minds and feeling hearts of those who 
transmit, receive, respond to, and act on information.iv
iv    The DOD definition of “cognitive” dimension does not explicitly account for affect, making reference only to “minds.” But 
because how people feel affects how they receive, respond to, and act on information, we will use “cognitive dimension” to 
include both thought and affect. For simplicity, we will refer to the cognitive dimension while intending to encompass both 
cognition and emotion. 
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Two examples can illustrate how the rapidly changing information environment may 
affect SOF operations. The first example is the increasingly popular Fitbit, a wearable 
device that tracks the physical activity (e.g., running) of a user and can monitor 
the user’s location in real time through the use of GPS. Such information can be 
uploaded to sites and shared with others, allowing for the aggregation of many users 
location profiles. In 2018, a private citizen noticed that a public-facing global map of 
all Fitbit users choosing to share their location information showed the locations of 
Fitbit-using active-duty military personnel on deployment,13 revealing US deployments 
abroad that were not widely known. Some commentators raised concerns that specific 
individuals could be associated with various deployments14 to the obvious detriment 
of operational security.
Second, electronically mediated gaming, an activity with which tens of millions 
of people worldwide engage voluntarily and avidly and which is expected to increase 
in popularity,15 will provide previously unimagined opportunities to engage with 
target audiences. Various technological developments, from the deployments of 5G 
wireless technology to increased visual and audio fidelity and low-latency responses, 
haptic technologies that provide tactile inputs, and AI-driven image and audio 
creation, will increase the realism of the immersive experience. Consider, then, the 
utility of high-fidelity, multisensory gaming as a way to gain the attention of certain 
target audiences, providing channels through which influence of various kinds may 
be exercised.
The nature of cyberspace is also changing rapidly. Nations around the world, and 
nonstate actors in some cases, seek greater degrees of sovereign control over their 
own cyberspace. For example, Russia is endeavoring to build an internet that can 
be disconnected from the global internet at times the Russian government deems 
appropriate.16 China’s “Great Firewall”—and its associated practices of preventing 
certain foreign sources from delivering internet content to China—is well-known 
as an element of China’s assertion of cyber-sovereignty.17 India shuts down the 
internet, at least regionally, with some frequency—in 2019, India experienced at 
least 95 such shutdowns.18 Since the majority of such nations and nonstate actors 
are authoritarian rather than democratic,v there will be growth in the number and 
size of areas that are denied both physically and in cyberspace. Operating effectively 
in such areas will require US SOF to understand the systems and processes in play 
and will demand SOF expertise in penetration and unconventional warfare. 
The cognitive dimension is where human judgment and perception apply 
information and where people process, react to, and make decisions based on 
information. Modern marketing and advertising techniques for shaping audience 
perception go beyond the use of audio and visual selectors and indicators. Indeed, all 
v     Freedom House produces an annual ranking of the world’s nations according to its judgments of “internet freedom,” a composite 
index that account for internet access, freedom of online expression, and privacy issues on the internet. In the 2019 report 
(Freedom House, Freedom on the Net, 2019), this ranking can be found on page 24-25, and a causal perusal will show that 
nations with the lowest internet freedom scores tend to be those with authoritarian governments. 
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sensory perception should be considered as influencing the cognitive domain. Modern-
day advertisers and marketers purposely activate touch, smell, and auditory signals 
to shape audience perception of a situation or product.19 In a real-world example, 
Dunkin’ Donuts used coffee scent on buses in Seoul, South Korea, in concert with 
visual marketing, resulting in a 16 percent increase in attendance at Dunkin’ Donuts 
stores near bus stations and a 29 percent increase in coffee sales.20 
The Psychology of Influence Operations
Highly effective influence operations often take advantage of human psychological 
factors that have remained relatively unchanged for millennia. This section 
discusses three critical factors in understanding the psychology of influence 
operations: social identity, cognitive economy, and dual-system cognition. We then 
apply these factors to the process of narrative and perception development. The 
impact of these factors on societal interaction, discourse, persuasion, and decision-
making have been studied widely.21
Cognitive Economy
Cognitive economy refers to the inherently limited human cognitive-processing 
capability. For example, the number of unrelated items that human beings can 
remember for a short period of time is finite. Thus, when individuals are under time 
pressure to make decisions, they often select the first satisfactory solution rather 
than the optimal (best possible) one.vi People can “use up” the resources needed 
for thoughtful and deliberate decision-making; thus, their capability for such decision-
making in a limited time is restricted.
The finiteness of a person’s cognitive resources has profound implications for 
how people approach decision-making tasks that involve information processing. 
The phrase “cognitive miser” has often been used to describe human beings who 
preferentially operate in accord with a principle that might be called “cognitive 
economy”—the use of thinking strategies that minimize the effort used in performing 
mental tasks so cognitive resources are conserved.22 
Dual-System Cognitive Theory
A preference for low-effort thought does not mean that humans can only engage in 
such thought. Dual-system cognitive theory posits the existence of some thinking 
vi   The tendency to choose satisfactory solutions in favor of optimal ones is known as “satisficing” and was the subject of two 
papers by Herbert Simon (“A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 69 (1955): 99–118; “Rational 
Choice and the Structure of the Environment” Psychological Review (1956) 63: 129–138). The resulting theory of “bounded 
rationality” was the basis for Simon’s 1978 Nobel Prize in Economics. Simon described the contrast between optimizing and 
satisficing as the difference between “looking for the sharpest needle in the haystack” (optimizing) and “looking for a needle 
sharp enough to sew with” (satisficing) (Simon H. A. “Satisficing.” In New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Eatwell J., 
Millgate M., Newman P., eds., Vol. 4: Stockton Press: New York; 243–245, 1987). For an interesting example of decision-making 
under extreme time pressure, see Hannah Oh, et al, “Satisficing in Split-Second Decision-Making Is Characterized by Strategic 
Cue Discounting” (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 42(12):1937-1956, 2016, https://doi-
org.stanford.idm.oclc.org/10.1037/xlm0000284.)
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strategies that operate at low cognitive cost and others that operate at higher cost. 
The low-cost system—often known as System 1—is a fast, intuitive, reflexive, and 
emotionally driven mode of thought. The higher-cost system—often known as System 
2—reflects a slower, more deliberate, analytical mode of thought.23
Known by a variety of names in the psychological literature—spontaneous, heuristic, 
peripheral, reflexive, and intuitive— System 1 thinking is implicit, unconscious, “from 
the gut,” and responsive to visual and other perceptual cues. It is based on principles 
(called heuristics) highly suited for making quick judgments and snap decisions.24 
(An example of such a heuristic is that loud noise signifies immediate danger.) Most 
important, System 1 thinking is the way human beings process information under most 
circumstances, and it is always operative (that is, it is never not functioning).
For most situations that people encounter in everyday life, System 1 thinking 
is mostly adequate to produce outcomes that are good enough for everyday use. 
But it tends to be inadequate when situations call for complex inferences or deep 
understanding of nuance and subtlety. For such situations, System 2 thinking 
is more often useful, even though it is generally effortful, consumes cognitive 
resources, and operates relatively slowly. Known by a number of different terms in 
the psychological literature—central, systematic, deliberate, and analytical—System 
2 thinking involves a variety of thought processes associated with formal logic, 
reasoning and rationality, symbolic abstraction, serial rule-based processing, and 
language and conscious thought. System 2 thinking is slower but tends to be less 
prone to error than System 1.
Reliance on heuristic thinking is not a tendency limited to less educated or less 
intelligent individuals. All people—regardless of level of education, intelligence, 
profession, or political persuasion—rely on such thinking to some degree, to their 
detriment under some circumstances. Consider the profession of intelligence 
analysis, which has been defined as “the process by which the information collected 
about an enemy is used to answer tactical questions about current operations 
or to predict future behavior.”25 Richard Heuer’s now classic 1999 volume on the 
psychology of intelligence analysis26 makes the point forcefully that intelligence 
failures are often not the result of inadequate or incomplete information but rather 
faulty “going-in” assumptions about the situation under review—assumptions 
that can and are often driven by heuristic thinking. Such assumptions frame the 
mental model within which the analyst places various pieces of information and the 
logic with which these pieces relate to each other. Faulty assumptions often yield 
unreliable conclusions.
Social Identity
Human beings are social, and social identity—that is, one’s identity as a member 
of one or more groups—is important to most individuals. People form groups on 
the basis of similarities with others (a phenomenon known as homophily). Such 
similarities may include ethnicity, gender, age, religion, social class, employment 
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status, geography, or political party. They may also include personal beliefs, values, 
attitudes, and aspirations, such as moral values, shared recreational activities, and 
attitudes toward sexual activity. People in groups are highly motivated to establish a 
shared reality to validate their identity and experiences, and that shared reality may 
well include shared attitudes, feelings, and emotions.27 
A person’s sense of group identity can be threatened by information that 
contradicts or casts doubt on any important aspect of that group’s shared reality. 
Such information is likely to activate identity-protective psychological mechanisms. 
Such mechanisms typically involve the rejection of threatening information, by 
ignoring, disbelieving, or discrediting it, or by finding error in it. Most importantly, the 
invocation of these mechanisms is not necessarily (or even often) conscious.
One particularly powerful method for rejecting threatening information has been 
described as motivated reasoning,28 which refers to a person’s desire to reach 
a particular conclusion. When engaged in motivated reasoning, people choose a 
selective set of cognitive processes for strategies for accessing, constructing, and 
evaluating beliefs, and they search their memory for beliefs, rules, and knowledge 
to support their desired conclusions. That is, they are likely to be rationalizing a 
conclusion (via System 2 thinking) that may have emerged from System 1.
Narrative, Framing, and Perception Management
Humans use narratives and stories to understand and explain the actions of 
others in the groups of which they are a part.29 How a narrative is framed strongly 
influences how people perceive events—a person walking on water can be praised 
for her miraculous skills and talent (a positive framing) or criticized for not being 
able to swim (a negative framing). Framing depends on cultural, societal, and 
psychological factors that may vary from audience to audience,30 and the ability 
to frame a narrative in favorable terms is an enormous advantage in shaping the 
perceptions of an adversary.
An example of using psychological biases in framing narratives is the exploitation 
of the “availability heuristic” in social media. The availability heuristic is a cognitive 
shortcut that relies on the ease with which information can be accessed as an indicator 
of the significance or importance of that information.31 Consistent with the use of this 
heuristic, surveys indicate most people read only headlines of online media postings 
prior to sharing the content.32 Accordingly, malign actors often use headlines to induce 
unwitting users to click on, forward, or share misleading information. 
The leaks to the public of emails from John Podesta, director for Hillary Clinton’s 
2016 presidential campaign demonstrate the use of the availability heuristic. Over 
the one-month period of October 2016, Wikileaks released publicly 33 tranches of 
Podesta’s private emails, which had been stolen by the GRU intelligence service of 
the Russian armed forces.33 The periodic release of these tranches enable Russian 
influencers to keep the emails in front of the American public for an extended period 
of time, thus crowding out, or at least competing with, coverage of other election-
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related stories. The release also helped to shape a negatively tinged narrative about 
Clinton’s candidacy.
Cyber Tools for Cyber-Enabled Influence Operations
Cyber-enabled influence operations are those conducted with or supported by cyber 
tools. Such cyber tools fall into two categories: those accessible to the general 
public and that can be used legally (e.g., Facebook or Google; called Category 1 
cyber tools for the purposes of this chapter), and those that the public cannot use 
legally (e.g., hacking tools used to conduct cyberattacks; Category 2) and which 
actors generally use clandestinely. 
Influence Operations Enabled by Category 1 Cyber Tools
The modern information technology (IT) infrastructure—including the internet, the 
availability of virtually all internet applications on mobile devices, and broadband services 
adequately equiped to carry audio and visual traffic—and IT-based applications—
including, but not limited to, social media, search engines, and data mining—can be 
used to extend the reach and effectiveness of influence operations in ways unimaginable 
before the advent of the internet and personalized computing. We labelInfluence 
operations enhanced in such a manner “cyber-enabled influence operations” (CEIOs).
CEIOs take advantage of Category 1 cyber tools in the information environment, 
an environment that is loud and chaotic with large amounts of information being 
transmitted at high speeds. People encounter increasingly more information and have 
less time to process it. Thus, as the principle of cognitive economy would suggest, 
people go into cognitive overload and increase their reliance on intuitive processing. 
Moreover, many internet-based applications and internet business models have 
features and characteristics that can be exploited by those seeking to leverage 
System 1 processing to pursue an influence campaign. For example: 
• Search engines return highly visible results for queries based in large part 
on the popularity of those results and the algorithmically inferred desires of 
the user for specific information rather than their factual relevance to those 
queries,thus playing to confirmation biasvii based in System 1.34
• Search engine optimization (SEO) techniques enable search algorithms to 
be manipulated to enhance the visibility of false, misleading, or worthless 
information. 
• The internet hosts numerous content providers that supply information 
to willing and receptive users. These providers may be single individuals 
or automated bots, government agencies, large media companies, and 
everything in between. As important, these providers are mostly free to 
vii   Confirmation bias: when a person seeks or interprets “evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or  
 a hypothesis in hand” (Nickerson).
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distribute whatever information they wish. Because of the heterogeneous 
nature of these providers, people can find support for virtually any point of 
view or idea, no matter how outlandish or irrational. 
• Affinity groups with substantial public reach can be created easily 
in today’s information environment. Modern cyber tools also allow 
individuals to find others who have similar points of view easily, which 
facilitates the rapid growth of groups of like-minded individuals. 
Therefore, once societally marginalized views can now find expression 
and voice in easily accesible online groups and, by extension, can be 
mainstreamed into society at large. 
• Groups of like-minded individuals often recirculate their views in echo 
chambers. People are more likely to believe information circulating in 
their affinity groups because access to such information is more readily 
available,35 even if the same message comes from (apparently) different 
sources from within the group. This conclusion is worrisome in light of the 
finding that false information tends to come back multiple times after the 
initial publication on social media; true information does not.36 Although this 
study did not focus on repetition on social media as a whole rather than 
within specific groups, it seems reasonable to suggest a greater exposure 
to false information would characterize the information flows within affinity 
groups—and thus that false information is more reinforced. 
• Video imagery is much more emotionally evocative than text, and social 
media such as YouTube and TikTok provide easy access to online video. 
Since anyone can publish a video on these platforms and make them 
accessible to any audience, such media channels provide may opportuntiies 
for emotional manipulation. 
• Tablet devices and smartphones allow for immediate access to the internet, 
and media applications often notify individuals when new content is 
available. Because people are psychologically predisposed to seek novel 
inputs (a characteristic of System 1 thinking), they are likely to respond 
to such notifications. To increase ad revenue, media applications take 
advantage of such notifications to increase user engagement and continue 
the flow of incoming information.
• Tweets of 280-character messages do not allow for much nuance; indeed, 
they are ideally suited for the distribution of simplistic messages. Features 
such as “retweet” and “like” allow recipients to pass along the message (be 
it text or video) or their sentiments to wide audiences rapidly.
Perhaps most important from the perspective of nation-state adversaries, 
the physical borders of nations are highly permeable to information. Compared 
to controlling the entry of people and physical objects through national borders, 
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nations have to work hard to prevent the entry of information from outside. It is 
essentially impossible to be 100 percent successful at such prevention efforts. 
Internet-based companies trafficking in information of various kinds take advantage 
of border permeability to increase market sizes—and, thus, borders are a poor 
differentiator between foreign and domestic actors.
Influence Operations Enabled by Category 2 Cyber Tools
Category 2 cyber tools—that is, hacking tools—are used by adversaries to 
compromise IT-based products and services by taking advantage of vulnerabilities 
in their design, implementation, or configuration. Their use is generally regarded as 
the key element in what DOD describes as offensive cyberspace operations (OCO).37 
Certain kinds of OCOs can support, facilitate, and enhance influence operations 
(whether cyber-enabled or not) and may even be the primary means through which an 
influence operation is conducted.
As one example, NPR reported US Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) conducted 
a variety of offensive cyber operations under the rubric of Operation 
Glowing Symphony intended to degrade and disrupt online ISIS propaganda, 
communications, fundraising, and recruitment efforts.38 According to NPR, much 
of this effort focused on creating an endless series of technology annoyances 
and time-wasting interruptions that degraded and disrupted the workflow of ISIS 
network operators significantly. 
The NPR report referred to these activities as “psychological operations with 
a high-tech twist” because US CYBERCOM intended them to cause high levels of 
emotional frustration for ISIS operators. Indeed, the description of this event aligns 
with the definition of influence operations provided earlier: These operations conveyed 
to ISIS network and cyber operatives malware and other technology disruptions 
selected for their potential to cause frustration and anger, compromising ISIS 
operators’ objective reasoning and reducing their efficiency and effectiveness in ways 
that advanced the interests of the United States. 
Connections between Cyber-Enabled Influence Operations  
and Offensive Cyber Operations
In the wake of Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election, Dick 
Cheney described the activity as an “act of war,” while Hillary Clinton called it a 
“cyber 9/11.”39 But, although Russian actions clearly violated US sovereignty, they 
did not rise to the threshold of armed attack or a use of force against the United 
States. No one died; no property was destroyed. Russian interference did include 
the conduct of certain offensive cyber operations, but in retrospect, it appears that 
a substantial portion, if not the bulk, of Russian activities were influence operations 
aimed at various segments of the US populace.
OCOs target adversary computing and communications capabilities to destroy, 
damage, or disrupt those capabilities or other systems and processes dependent on 
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those capabilities. As such, the success of an OCO depends on the exploitation of 
vulnerabilities in the computer hardware and software and the system configurations 
that undergird those capabilities. Cyber tools that exploit such vulnerabilities are 
Category 2 cyber tools.
Influence operations—even if cyber-enabled—do not conform to this 
understanding, except perhaps incidentally. As noted previously, influence operations 
are designed to convey specific information to target audiences. That is, they target 
human audiences. While Russian hackers did manage to penetrate the private email 
accounts of Democratic National Committee campaign officials in 2016, the damage 
came not from the hacking itself but from the coordinated release and amplification 
of formerly private emails. Both were part of a Russian influence operation using 
cyber tools to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, attitudes, 
understanding, beliefs, or behavior of American citizens.40 Russia used social media 
cyber tools exactly as they were intended to be used to achieve psychological and 
behavioral effects in the targeted population. Where OCOs relate to hacking into 
machines, CEIOs concern the hacking of human minds. CEIOs take advantage of 
Category 1 cyber tools.
However, we do not mean to imply CEIO and OCO have no similarities. They do 
have some high-level similarities akin to the similarities between ground and air 
combat. Just as ground and air combat allow nations to project power in physical 
space, OCOs and CEIOs project power using cyberspace. Both OCOs and CEIOs use 
digital technologies to accomplish their missions. Like all other aspects of foreign 
relations and international conflict, they both rely on good intelligence collection and 
analysis. But their similarities do not continue at lower levels of abstraction.
Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that Category 2 cyber tools and OCOs 
cannot support CEIOs. OCOs can be used to compromise the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of targeted computing resources and the information 
handled with such resources. Thus, they can extract information from or implant 
information in data-storage devices and communications channels; CEIOs can take 
advantage of information obtained in such a manner or use implanted information to 
help achieve their goals.
Importantly, CEIO can be a tool to influence audiences and shape favorable 
societal perceptions and conditions for future OCO. The Russian elections meddling 
proved to be at least partially successful in developing and disseminating a 
narrative via social networks, leading to social unrest, protest, polarization of 
audiences, and distrust in the political system. Although it may be some time before 
experts determine the full impact of Russia’s meddling, an investigation of their 
activities is an opportunity to examine consequences and outcomes for CEIO as a 
long-term progression toward deliberately well-planned OCO. 
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How Cyber-Enabled Influence Operations Can Support SOF Missions
As noted previously, SOF operators often depend on the actions of indigenous parties 
to accomplish their missions. CEIOs can play important roles in persuading these 
other parties to act accordingly. We base the vignettes below on a set of examples 
of military information support operations provided in Joint Publication 3-13.2. Each 
vignette describes how CEIOs could contribute to these activities.
• Influencing the development of adversary strategy and tactics. An 
adversary government may employ tactics that, if widely known, would cause 
foreign or domestic blowback to its public image. CEIOs can be used to draw 
negative international or domestic attention to these tactics in ways that 
could result in condemnation and, thus, pressure the adversary to change its 
tactics. First-person reports of condemnation-worthy events in text and video 
carried over social media may be particularly effective for such purposes.
• Amplifying economic and other nonviolent forms of sanctions against 
an adversary. An adversary government may be propped up by corrupt or 
malicious commercial activities. CEIOs can be used to organize activities that 
damage these activities . For example, group communications enabled by 
social media and other communications applications can be used to organize 
strikes or boycotts against corrupt merchants.
• Undermining confidence in adversary leadership and attacking the 
legitimacy and credibility of adversary political systems. Discrediting a 
rigged election helps to undermine an adversary government, and CEIOs can 
play a role in doing so. For example, spreading rumors over social media 
may sow doubts in the population about its leadership. Social media is also 
well-suited for organizing protests and is better-suited than traditional media 
for maintaining the operational security that may be needed to go from 
organization to execution. Capitalizing on the idea that secret documents 
are often more believable than public documents, hack-and-leak operations 
combine OCO with CEIO, the former to obtain such documents and the latter 
to publicize them.
• Countering hostile information activities. Adversary information operations, 
often using social media networks, may be damaging to US interests. 
Most social media networks have key influencers that play outsize roles 
in determining information flows and content,41 and eliminating or 
compromising those influencers can impact network operations significantly. 
CEIOs can be used to discredit influencers, for example, by exposing 
unsavory histories.
• Mobilizing popular support for US and multinational military operations. 
Generating popular support for US operations usually requires a nuanced 
and subtle understanding of the political and social environment among 
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the relevant population, which may include tracking popular sentiment by 
monitoring important social networks (though not an influence operation, 
strictly speaking). Being tied into such networks also provides entry for 
CEIOs that can counter misleading adversary messages.
• Gaining and sustaining popular belief in and support for US and 
multinational political systems and political, social, and economic 
programs. To accomplish this task, the effectiveness of communications 
rhetorically hostile to the United States must be reduced. The conversational 
center of such groups can sometimes be shifted by determined actors, but 
such shifts are possible only slowly.
• Shifting the loyalty of adversary forces and their supporters to friendly 
(or perhaps neutral) powers. Provoking hostilities between two rival groups 
that are unfriendly to the United States can be one element of such a shift. 
CEIOs—especially falsely attributed ones—offer opportunities for false-flag 
operations delivered to each group implicating the other.
In the context of these vignettes, a few general considerations can be offered. First, 
many of the CEIOs described rely on the availability of trusted influencers. One approach 
to cultivating trusted influencers is for SOF to build personal relationships with them; 
such relationships require in-person presence and take a long time to develop. 
SOF operators themselves can become trusted influencers in online social 
media networks. Such an outcome may be possible because online interaction 
does not require in-person interaction. On the other hand, working oneself into 
such a position requires infiltrating a group and the paitence to integrate oneself 
into the proceedings of that group by building followers and contributing to the 
group dialogue. If SOF operators can build such relationships and establish 
credibility, opportunities could arise for the SOF operators to engage the networks or 
individuals face-to-face.
SOF operators can also assume the identity of a trusted influencer. Such an 
approach would generally rely on OCOs directed at such an outcome, which would 
enable an SOF operator to impersonate the trusted influencer and also to prevent 
the person from recovering his or her online identity. Even if successful, the SOF 
impersonator will have to be wary of arousing suspicion and refrain from saying 
anything that is distinctly out of character.
A second consideration is that the availability of deepfake technology for 
generating realistic-but-false video and text (e.g., emails or tweets) with a look-and-feel 
of authentic text documents is likely to prove particularly useful in sowing confusion 
and breeding doubt in adversaries, especially among media-naive populations.
To undertake these or similar types of CEIOs, several policy issues would have 
to be resolved. Most important, standing DOD policy prohibits activities that are 
“directed at or intended to manipulate audiences, public actions, or opinions in 
the United States.”42 Although, strictly speaking, this prohibition is applicable to 
348   |  D A V I S ,  G A C ,  R A G E R ,  R E I N E R  &  S N O W
activities “directed at” or “intended” for US audiences, it appears to have been 
extended to influence operations directed at foreign audiences, at least from time 
to time, because of the concern that US citizens might somehow be exposed to the 
information content of such operations through news media or the internet.viii 
The online environment presents nontraditional opportunities for conducting 
influence operations. Because of the online environment’s fundamental anonymity, 
distinguishing between humans and automated “bots” can be difficult. Today, bots 
can be used to flood selected information spaces, augment follower counts, and 
amplify content through retransmissions and “likes.” In the future, bots will be 
able to engage in wide-ranging real-time conversations with human beings that will 
be indistinguishable from comparable human-to-human conversations, at least for 
limited content domains. Indeed, bots will likely be able to engage in persuasive 
conversations at least as well as some people,43 providing SOF operators with 
opportunities for extending influence.
Finally, the lack of face-to-face interaction facilitated by the internet means SOF 
operators can engage with a broader range of adversaries. For example, given the 
paucity of Asian Americans in SOF,44 most SOF units would likely find it difficult 
to operate inconspicuously while on the ground in many Asian nations. If an 
SOF operator can engage remotely, his or her ethnicity need not be apparent. An 
additional advantage of remote engagement is the ability to refer to large databases 
quickly to augment gaps in knowledge, which can build credibility and trust.
viii   The origin of these concerns seems to be a combination of two laws. First, Public Law 111-84, passed in 2009, prohibited the 
obligation or expenditure of DOD funds for publicity or propaganda purposes within the United States not otherwise specifically 
authorized by law (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/2241a). Second, the Smith-Mundt Act, passed in 1948 (Public 
Law 80-402) and modified in 2012, prohibited the Department of State (not the DOD) from domestic dissemination of its 
international information materials and products. Nevertheless, most people when queried express a belief that concerns about 
propaganda and the American populace are rooted in the Smith-Mundt Act. (Note to the reader: this present footnote revises a 
version appearing in an earlier edition that failed to take note of Public Law 111-84.)
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Conclusion
The evolution of 5G networks, independently developed internet infrastructures, and 
tactile internet technology will increase the opportunity and improve the ability of US 
SOF to shape perceptions in various populations. However, these same opportunities, 
particularly independent internet infrastructures, will challenge the conventional 
mindset of CEIO and US SOF’s ability to conduct cyber operations. Virtual reality 
and deepfake technology already exist, but will be more readily available and more 
deceptive than today. 
This chapter suggests many possible opportunities for SOF to take advantage 
of influence operations enhanced by cyber tools. DOD appears to assign some 
responsibilities for influence operations to both SOCOM and CYBERCOM. SOCOM 
and CYBERCOM should maintain their existing efforts, but also consider developing a 
concrete joint strategy.45
There has been ongoing discussion within the DOD—specifically the US Army—
about the scope of US Army Cyber Command responsibilities. In 2019, Army Times 
reported that US Army Cyber Command has proposed changing its name to Army 
Information Warfare Command.46 Lt. Gen. Stephen Fogarty, commander of US Army 
Cyber Command, was quoted as saying, “sometimes, the best thing I can do on the 
cyber side is actually to deliver content, deliver a message. . . . Maybe the cyberspace 
operation I’m going to conduct actually creates some type of [information operation]ix 
effect.”47 True enough. But the expertise of US Army Cyber Command, and of 
CYBERCOM, is on the information delivery side of influence operations.
By virtue of long experience in executing influence operations, US SOCOM has 
developed its extensive psychological and cultural expertise on the information 
content side of influence operations. Bringing to bear the respective expertise of each 
command should enhance the synergies possible between cyber-enabled influence 
operations and offensive cyber operations, and it would be most desirable if the two 
commands could partner on, rather than compete over, the cyber-enabled influence 
operations mission.
ix    In context, the term “influence operations” as it is used in this chapter would have been a more proper substitute than 
“information operations.”
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The New COIN of the Realm: 
The Future of Technology and Insurgency 
P.W. Singer
Introduction
Long before the military convoy arrived in the muggy town of Dara Lam, news of 
the meeting between the US Army colonel and the unpopular governor of Kirsham 
province had seeped into social media.1 Angry with both the American presence and 
the governor’s corruption, local citizens organized for a demonstration. Their trending 
hashtag—#justice4all—soon drew the attention of international media and the online 
world. It also drew the eyes of some less interested in justice: the notorious Fariq 
terror network. Using sockpuppet accounts and bots to steer the course of online and 
real-world sentiment, the terrorists fanned the flames, calling for the protesters to 
confront the American occupiers.
But this was not the full extent of Fariq’s plan. Knowing where a massive crowd 
of civilians would soon gather, the terrorists also set an ambush. They planned to 
fire on the US soldiers as they exited the building, and, if the soldiers fired back, the 
demonstrators would be caught in the crossfire. Pre-positioned cameramen stood ready 
to record the bloody outcome: either dead Americans or dead civilians. A network of 
online proxies was prepared to drive the event to virality and use it for future propaganda 
and recruiting. Whatever the physical outcome, the insurgents would win this battle.
Luckily, other eyes were tracking the flurry of activity online: those of a US Army 
brigade’s tactical operations center. The center’s task was to monitor the environment 
in which its soldiers operated, whether the battlespace was dense cities, isolated 
mountain ranges, or, now, clusters of social media influencers. The tactical operations 
center detected the fast-moving online developments and immediately passed them up 
the chain of command. A generation earlier, the officers might have discounted what 
was playing out online as mere internet chatter, but now they understood its importance. 
Receiving word of the protest’s growing strength and fury, the colonel cut his meeting 
short and left discreetly through a back entrance. Fariq’s plan was thwarted.
Try as you might, you won’t find any record of this event in the news—not because 
it takes place in the distant year of 2030, but because Dara Lam is a fake settlement 
in a fake province of a fake country, one that endures a fake war that breaks out every 
few months in the very real state of Louisiana.
The Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk holds a special place in military 
history. It was created as part of the Louisiana Maneuvers, a series of massive 
training exercises held just before the United States entered World War II. When Adolf 
Hitler and his blitzkrieg rolled over Europe, the US Army realized warfare had begun 
operating by a new set of rules. It had to figure out how to transition from a world of 
horses and telegraphs to one of mechanized tanks and trucks, guided by wireless 
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communications. At Fort Polk, American soldiers, including such legendary figures as 
Dwight D. Eisenhower and George S. Patton, learned how to fight in a way that would 
preserve the free world.
Since then, Fort Polk has served as a continuous field laboratory where the 
army trains for tomorrow’s battles. During the Cold War, the army used Fort Polk to 
prepare for feared clashes with the Soviet Red Army and then to acclimatize troops 
to the jungles of Vietnam. After 9/11, the 72,000-acre site was transformed into 
the province of Kirsham, replete with twelve plywood villages, an opposing force of 
simulated insurgents, and scores of full-time actors playing civilians caught in the 
middle: in short, everything the army thought it needed to simulate how war was 
changing. Today, Fort Polk boasts a brand-new innovation for this task: SMEIR.2
Short for Social Media Environment and Internet Replication, SMEIR simulates 
the blogs, news outlets, and social media accounts that intertwine to form a virtual 
battlefield atop the physical one. A team of defense contractors and military officers 
create a version of the internet activity of a small city—rambling posts, innocuous 
tweets, and the occasional bit of viral propaganda—challenging the troops fighting in 
the Kirsham counterinsurgency to navigate the new digital terrain. For the stressed, 
exhausted soldiers dodging enemy improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and bullets, 
safeguarding the local population and fighting the evil insurgents is not enough; they 
must also be mindful of the ebb and flow of online conversation.
The project illustrates just how rapid—and surreal—technology change can be for 
military training and the broader political environment. A generation ago, the internet 
was a niche plaything, one that the US military itself had just walked away from, 
handing off control to a global consortium of volunteers. Only the most farsighted 
futurists at RAND suggested it might one day become a crucial battlefield.3 None 
imagined the future military would have to pay millions of dollars to simulate a 
second, fake internet to train for war on the real one.4
In this way, what played out at Fort Polk serves not just as a training moment but 
also a warning for those wrestling to understand the future of war. Despite hopes 
to the contrary, there will likely be a consistent need to prepare for insurgency, not 
just because of the continuing issues of failed states and collapsed governance, but 
the likelihood that, as in the Cold War, great-power competition could express itself 
through proxy warfare.5 Yet while the essence of insurgency—a rebellion against 
authority that targets the effectiveness and legitimacy of the pillars of society6—
remains the same, advances in science and knowledge can reshape it. Just as 
they can change the society within which insurgency takes place, new technologies 
can also introduce key shifts in everything from tactics used in battle to the overall 
dynamics of the conflict itself. 
The following chapter first explores the technologic changes that loom in the 
years leading toward 2030 and beyond. It then proposes a series of their potential 
implications, most especially for counterinsurgency, a core task for special operations 
forces from their beginning to today to 2030 and beyond.
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The Technology That Matters
When modern US counterinsurgency strategy was first codified in 1962 under the 
idea of “Overseas Internal Defense Policy,”7 it was typed on a machine without digital 
components. Computers were then used only as massive calculators for a small 
number of government agencies and businesses. Personal communications devices 
were little changed versions of the telephone that had been developed by Alexander 
Graham Bell almost a century earlier, still hardwired into your office or home. The 
internet would not even be conceived for another year (in a memo written by J. C. 
R. Licklider and Robert W. Taylor, first describing it as the “Intergalactic Computer 
Network”),8 while the first mobile telephone would not be invented until 1973 (and 
even then, the three-pound Motorola monstrosity did not go on sale for another 
decade, for the modest price, in today’s dollars, of $10,000).9 As we see in the 
fictional training at Dara Lam to ISIS’s all-too-real rise and recruiting through its deft 
use of social media, these technologies have since proven crucial to the story of 
modern insurgency.10 
In weighing the potential impact of technology on insurgency in the future, we 
should similarly seek to identify the technologies that will truly matter, in a manner 
like the computer and its networking did. That is, our focus should not be on mere 
evolutionary improvements, such as a gun that shoots a bit faster or a missile 
that goes slightly farther, but the technologies that change the game. These go by 
various catchphrases. A generation ago in the Pentagon, “revolutionary” was the 
popular term.11 Today, the buzzword is “disruptive.” Ironically, outside the military, 
the descriptor is “killer app.” Whatever the preferred term, the next most important 
technologies are akin to the steam engine in the 1820s, the airplane in the 1920s, or 
the computer in the 1980s–already real and poised to change the world. 
What makes such technologies so revolutionary, however, is not that they will 
somehow magically solve all our problems or lift the fog of war as once claimed 
by acolytes.12 Rather, it is the opposite. What truly defines technologies as game-
changers is they present new questions, to which we do not have the answers. 
Disruptive technologies introduce two types of questions : First, “What is possible, 
that was not possible just a generation before?” Second, “What is proper, that we 
were not wrestling with before?” These questions may have to do with the right and 
wrong way to recruit, organize, train, or equip. Or, they might be related to right and 
wrong, in terms of raising real legal and ethical issues that were recently only the stuff 
of science fiction. 
A few years back, I helped develop a project for the Pentagon called NeXTech,13 
where we conducted research to determine the pending technologies that might have 
the aforementioned effect, that is, those in the position now that the computer was 
in 1980. We interviewed a diverse set of subject-matter experts, ranging from people 
working at government defense labs and university research centers to experts in 
industry, ranging from defense contractors to Silicon Valley firms such as Apple, 
Google, and Facebook. These experts helped us understand the looming change did 
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not center on any one technology but a cluster of new technology areas. From the 
hardware of robotics to the “wetware” of human performance enhancements, these 
technology clusters are poised to change the landscape of what is viewed as possible 
and proper, including for war and insurgency. 
Hardware
In our lifetime, robots, arguably the most celebrated of science fiction technologies, 
have finally become reality. The US military force that entered Afghanistan after the 
2001 attacks used zero robotic systems; as of 2019, the force had over 22,000 in its 
inventory, while civilian drones are used in an ever-growing number of industries, from 
agriculture to real estate.14
Moving forward, we will see even more automation. Increasingly, autonomous 
robotics will come in two primary forms, each of which mimics intelligence in nature. 
In the first type of system, intelligence is centralized. In robotics, these tend to be 
physically large-scale systems that mimic or directly replace human tasks; examples 
include driverless cars and unmanned planes. In the second type of system, the 
intelligence and resulting tasks are decentralized. These systems work via networks, 
akin to insects, allowing the tasks to be disaggregated into parts, often operating via 
“swarms” in mass scale.15
The changes brought on by both types of systems will be incredibly disruptive to 
both war and work. An Oxford University examination of 702 different jobs found that 
47 percent of total US employment risks change, reduction, or even replacement by 
automation within the next two decades.16 The automation of jobs will most affect 
developing world economies, which support often fragile politics. As just one illustration, 
according to International Labour Organization estimates, over 137 million salaried 
workers in five Southeast Asian countries—Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, and Vietnam—are “at high risk of being replaced by machines.”17
These statistics point to an important impact of true technological change: It 
affects society on multiple levels and in multiple issue areas. For instance here we 
can expect that technology that simulates and replaces humans will not just alter the 
various roles that humans play in insurgency but also may spark the kind of anger and 
unrest that can lead to it.18 
Software
Major changes are also taking place in what runs our digital technology and software 
and the networks that connect it. The rise of the “network of networks” has shaped 
insurgency to such a degree that ISIS, for example, is literally a creature of the 
modern internet,19 both recruiting through and operating on it. Yet, the internet itself is 
changing. One change is to its scale. Only half the world is online, meaning half is still 
to join. Importantly, however, this shift will take place in many of the areas considered 
most fragile politically and, thus, susceptible to mass violence. Another change is in 
its form and function. The internet is shifting from a system of communications among 
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human beings to running the systems of our increasingly digital world. As of 2019, 
roughly 10 billion devices were online. By 2026, the number of networked devices is 
estimated by some to reach 64 billion, reflecting over $3 trillion annual spending.20 In 
the new Internet of Things (IoT), most of the new contact points will shift from desktop 
computers and smartphones to “things” such as cars, thermostats, and power plants.
These changes will shift the internet’s impact on and relationship with the world 
beyond it, particularly in the urban environment. Over the last half century, the global 
urban population grew by roughly four billion. Over the next decades, most of the 
global population growth will continue to be in cities; the United Nations projects more 
than two-thirds of population will be urban by 2050.21 
As war is a human endeavor, driven by human causes, this trend projects that 
future wars will see more and more urban operations. It will also shape all the other 
military tasks, from humanitarian disaster relief to counterterrorism, to take place in 
more urban settings, especially given the growing number of megacities that eclipse 
the scale of past urban operations. (Fallujah, for instance, had a population that 
was less than 250,000, which had fled in significant numbers, and no true high-rise 
buildings; imagine the battle in a city two orders of magnitude greater in scale and 
filled with high-rises and skyscrapers.) 
These cities will be wired in a way they were not before by IoT, changing not just 
operations in this space, but what is known in them. All of the new “things” coming 
online carry “sensors,” a system for gathering information about the world beyond the 
computer, technologies lacking from the computers used by the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) and even the one with which Mark Zuckerberg 
created Facebook. Some sensors are self-evident, such as a smartphone or a 
traffic-light camera. Others hide in the background, like the magnometer and Global 
Positioning Systems (GPS) that provide information about direction and location. 
Further, any information online comes with “metadata,” akin to digital stamps that 
provide underlying details about the point of origin and movement of the data. These 
billions of internet-enabled devices, each carrying multiple sensors, are on pace 
to create a world of almost a trillion sensors. So, whether the setting is a dazzling 
“smart city” or the sprawling slums of a megacity, there will be mass connection and 
collection, making surveillance nearly omnipresent. Indeed, the best parallel for the 
emerging urban space may be the industrial revolution concept of a “panopticon,” 
where someone or, now, something potentially monitors your every move.22 
This massive growth will not only empower the internet economy and gather 
information on scale but also allow the internet to become more of a threat vector 
than it already is. The IoT will not just merely grow the attack surface, the potential 
points of vulnerability that cyber threats will go after. Unfortunately, the construction 
of the IoT is replicating all the original cybersecurity mistakes, baking in insecurity. 
With no clear security responsibilities and almost no regulation or even basic 
liability, these devices often lack basic security features, while customers are largely 
unaware of what they can and should do. Up to 70 percent of IoT devices have 
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known vulnerabilities,23 and compromised devices have already become a key part  
of botnets.24 
The shift to the internet connecting and running things will play out 
simultaneously with another core shift, the use of distributed ledger technologies 
(DLT), using blockchain and other related technologies, to share files, records, and 
knowledge of how the system works. Already, the impact of DLT has been felt in 
areas such as finance, where bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have created a 
new form of money and method for transferring value. Yet, the model of peer-to-peer 
distribution may lead to even greater change as it is applied across fields and into 
recordkeeping. It may even lead to a fundamental reordering of the web, as Chris 
Meserole and Alina Polyakova put it in Foreign Policy magazine, “outside the control 
of major corporations and states.”25 Such a decentralized model would empower 
weaker and nonstate actors. Or, like in other spaces of the web, it may prove to 
be another means for authoritarian states to exert control, such as China’s recent 
efforts targeting blockchain developers.26 The fact that both scenarios represent 
potential futures of which we do not yet know the outcome illustrates the scale of 
shift at hand.
The shift in the internet itself, though, might be minuscule in impact compared 
to that of the coming intelligence of software. The Chinese military describes the 
significance as the move in societies, as well as their wars, from the industrialization 
of the twentieth century to the informatization of the turn of this century to a looming 
“intelligentization.”27
The field of artificial intelligence (AI) encompasses work on everything from 
machine learning to neural networks. Arguably, no other technology area has as 
much political and economic anticipation and financial investment. Governments 
around the world, ranging from the US to the Russian, Singaporean, and Israeli, 
are engaging in an AI “arms race.” This arms race, though, is unlike those in the 
past; the participants do not include only competing nations. All the world’s major 
technology companies and even most traditional business corporations have also 
focused on AI, spending roughly $153 billion in this space, “with an estimated 
annual creative disruption impact of $14-33 Trillion.”28 Google and Microsoft, for 
example, each fund robotics and AI research to an amount of roughly $10 billion a 
year. General Electric, the company founded by Thomas Edison in 1892, has begun 
repositioning itself for a robotics and AI market,29 while John Deere, known for its 
tractors, bought one of the most promising AI firms in the world.30 The majority of 
new entrants to the marketplace also focus on AI. As the founder of Wired magazine 
describes, “AI is already here, it’s real, it’s quickening. . . . I think the formula for the 
next 10,000 start-ups is to take something that already exists and add AI to it.”31
Thought leaders and business luminaries wrestling with the importance of AI 
seemingly cannot overstate its significance. Masayoshi Son, the founder of the 
megaconglomerate Softbank, says:
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Every industry that mankind created will be redefined. The medical 
industry, automobile industry, the information industry, of course. . . . 
Even agriculture will be redefined. Because the tools that we created 
were inferior to mankind’s brain in the past. Now the tools become 
smarter than mankind ourselves. The definition of whatever the industry 
will be redefined.32
Baratunde Thurston, a director’s fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology’s Media Lab, goes further, “Every area of life will be affected. Every. Single. 
One.”33 Insurgency falls within this categorization. 
Wetware
Another historic change is afoot in technology in terms of its relationship to humans 
themselves. “Wetware,” or, more technically, “human performance modification,” is 
about using technology to change us. Think of this as combining the science fiction 
of Iron Man and Captain America and the Russian Olympic athlete program. 
We are seeing revolutions in fields from medicine to synthetic biology, a new 
discipline encompassing everything from genome-editing tools such as CRISPR to 
biologic computers.34 In this space, discoveries and breakthroughs are outpacing 
“Moore’s Law,” the IT field standard for changes in processing speed. These 
are rewriting what is possible for the human species, altering everything from 
susceptibility to disease to bodily endurance to the workings of the brain.35 
In turn, new technologies in brain-machine interface will rewrite the entire history 
of how humans have connected to their technology. From the first stone tools to 
the drone and iPhone, we have used our monkey fingers. This is being challenged 
by technologies that have allowed test subjects to control mentally advanced 
technologies like aircraft36 and “telepathy tech,” conducting database queries and 
process product orders without ever writing or vocalizing them.37
Synergy
A variety of other technology areas could be as disruptive as the three above. 
For instance, new forms of both energy generation and storage are either coming 
online or being distributed in new ways, which could shift the nature of geopolitics, 
battlefield logistics, and other realms of interest to special operations forces. 
Such technologies could redefine the roles and purposes of already revolutionary 
systems. For instance, an autonomous drone is game-changing enough as a plane; 
an autonomous drone that mixes solar and hydrogen energy to stay in the air for 
12 months38 perhaps ought to be understood as something else, as it would have 
attributes more akin to a space satellite than a plane.
Indeed, that these new technologies cross with and shape one another may 
be their most exciting and game-changing aspect. For example, direct digital 
manufacturing, popularly known as “3D printing,” turns a bit, a computer design, 
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into an atom, a created substance. 3D printing is thus a story of both hardware and 
software revolutions. As such, it holds the potential promise of altering fundamental 
business models, doing for defense firms what the iPod did to the music industry, 
changing not just profit margins but also the path to profit itself, as anyone would be 
able make their own systems and spare parts. In turn, it yields new threats. Indeed, 
in Great Britain, a country that effectively bans gun sales, police have had to deal with 
3D printed guns,39 while ISIS used fairly advanced injection molding techniques to 
make its own drones.40
What Will These Tech Trends Mean for Counterinsurgency? 
With so much change, it is too early to know all that will shake out from these new 
technologies. But we can identify a few key meaningful trends for war and beyond and 
resulting questions with which future counterinsurgents will likely have to wrestle.
The End of Nonproliferation
Common among these diverse technology areas is that they are neither inherently 
military nor civilian. Government and civilian organizations will both research and 
develop these technologies and buy and use them. Organizations and individuals will 
apply them to conflict but also to business and family life. Also, these technologies 
will not require the deployment of massive logistics systems, and, as machine 
intelligence increases, they will be relatively easy to learn and use, not requiring 
large training or acquisitions programs. Therefore, insurgent groups will be able to 
make more rapid gains in technology and capability than previously possible. 
In short, the game-changing technologies of tomorrow are most likely to have 
incredibly low barriers to entry, which means they will proliferate. In addition, some 
technologies, such as 3D printing, will complicate nonproliferation approaches such 
as arms embargos and blockades. Weapons interdiction will be altered drastically by 
the widespread ability to manufacture components and even overall systems onsite.
This issue is not one merely of hardware, but also the spread of ideas. As vexing 
as the extent of terrorist ideology and “how-tos” have been in a world of social 
media, Twitter, Facebook, and others still control their platforms. However, the move 
toward decentralized applications reduces companies’ power to censor for legal or 
public-relations reasons.41 This problem is beyond a YouTube clip showing how to 
build an IED or a cleric inspiring someone who watches a linked video to become a 
suicide bomber. Decentralization, crossed with crowd- and open-sourcing, empowers 
anyone on the network to new scales. For example, Tensorflow,42 an existing open-
source project, allows any actor to tap into AI resources that were science fiction 
just a decade ago. 
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Key Resulting Questions
• How will US and allied forces prepare for insurgent adversaries that have 
access to many of the same technologies and capabilities? 
• Will lower barriers to entry make it easier for insurgencies to gain the 
capability needed to rise? 
• Will ease of manufacture and proliferation make it more difficult to defeat 
insurgencies, if they can rapidly re-create capability?
Multi-Domain Insurgencies
A century ago, Marines battling the rebel forces in Haiti pioneered the earliest of close 
air-support missions. Today, Marines battling the Taliban, enjoy that same crucial 
advantage of counterinsurgents. In enjoying unfettered access to the air, they have 
been able to operate more effectively on the land, not only conducting surveillance 
and strikes that prevented insurgents from effectively massing forces but also moving 
their own forces to almost anywhere they wanted. 
The monopolization of power may not be the case in the future. Indeed, ISIS, 
without any state sponsor, has already been able to utilize the air domain (via a self-
made air force of drones) to conduct both ISR of US and allied forces and several 
hundred air strikes.43 Its “air force” may be ad hoc but still has achieved goals at a 
minimal cost. More important, ISIS’s use of drones points to a change in the overall 
story of air power and insurgency. Now, the insurgents can fly and fight back.44 
This ability to cross domains is not limited to air power but also is applicable to 
other new domains that technology is opening up to battle. Insurgencies will be able 
to tap into the global network of satellites that have given US forces such advantage 
in ISR and communications, or even potentially be able to launch and operate cheap 
microsatellites, either via proxy aid or on their own. (If college students can do it 
already,45 why not insurgents?). 
More important, the “cyber war” side of insurgency will likely move well past 
what has been experienced so far.46 The proliferation of capability through both dark 
markets and increasing automation, combined with the change in the internet’s form 
to more and more “things” operating online, points to insurgents being able to target 
command-and-control networks and even use Stuxnet-style digital weapons causing 
physical damage.47 
The ability to operate across domains also means insurgents will be able to 
overcome the “tyranny of distance.” Insurgents will be able to observe, target, and 
reach once-secure bases, and even a force’s distant homeland, through malware or 
unmanned aerial systems. This dynamic has to alter how we think of intervention in 
conflicts previously characterized as “small wars.” More than 75 nations have cruise 
missiles and over two dozen nations have armed drones; pretty much every nonstate 
actor has cyber capabilities. 
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If small nations and nonstate actors can more easily strike back—be it with 
drones, missiles, or cyberspace hacks—the lure of easy wars fought from afar without 
consequence is even more of a false notion than it was in the past. Perhaps the most 
graphic recent illustration of this is the Saudi-United Arab Emirates (UAE) intervention 
into the Yemeni civil war. When these states launched “Operation Decisive Storm” 
in 2015, it had an expectation of an easy, airpower-driven win that would “shock and 
awe” the Houthis into capitulation. Four years and 70,000 casualties later, the Saudi-
UAE coalition found itself not just stuck in a grinding ground war but also the victim 
of a series of drone and missile attacks on sites inside their own countries that, at 
one point, took half of Saudi oil production off line.48 If the other side can more easily 
hit back, be it at a base or the homefront, one must rethink intervention. A future 
insurgency may not see a Tet-style offensive attack in Hue, but rather in Houston. 
Key Resulting Questions
• Is the United States prepared for multidomain warfare, against not only peer 
states but also insurgents? 
• What capabilities utilized in counterinsurgency today might not be available 
to forces in 2030? 
• Just as US forces have used capability in one domain to win battles in 
another, how might insurgents do so? 
• Does the lower barrier to entry for new war technologies demand a higher 
barrier to entry for joining one? 
UnderMatch 
In the final battles of World War II’s European theater, US forces had to contend with 
an adversary that brought better technology to the fight. Fortunately for the Allies, 
the German “wonder weapons,” which ranged from rockets and jets to assault rifles, 
entered the war too little and too late. For the last 75 years, US defense planning has 
focused on making sure this experience was not repeated to ensure it stayed ahead 
of its foes technologically. Having a qualitative edge to “overmatch” our adversaries 
became baked into everything from our overall defense strategy to small-unit tactics. 
This edge allowed the US military to deter the Red Army in the Cold War, despite 
having a much smaller military, and to invade Iraq with a force one-third the size of 
Saddam Hussein’s (inverting the mantra that the attacker’s force should be three 
times the size of the defender’s).49
While this tech overmatch did not always deliver easy victories in painful 
insurgencies, such as in Vietnam and the post-9/11 wars, it still shaped both 
tactics, docrine, force size, and even the worldview of the combatants. A Marine 
officer once told me that if 100 Taliban soldiers attacked his unit of 30 men, he 
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would have no fear that his unit might lose; indeed, he described how it would 
almost be a relief to face the foe in a stand-up fight, as opposed to the fruitless 
hunts, hidden ambushes, and roadside bombs of insurgency. The reason for his 
confidence was not just his force’s training, but that in any battle, his side alone 
could call down systems of technology that the insurgency could not dream of 
having, from pinpoint targeting of unmanned aerial systems controlled via satellite 
to hundreds of GPS-guided bombs dropped by high-speed jet aircraft able to operate 
with impunity. 
Yet US forces cannot count on that overmatch in the future, and not only because 
of the mass proliferation discussed above, driven by the lower barriers to entry and 
availability of key tech in the marketplace. Our future counterinsurgency thinking 
must also recognize geopolitics have changed, with effect on the availaibility 
of systems. As challenging as the Taliban and ISIS have been, they were not 
supported by a comparable peer-state power, both developing its own game-changing 
technology and supplying it to the world. 
Mass campaigns of state-linked intellectual property theft means we pay much of 
the research-and-development costs of China’s weapons development. At the same 
time, China has begun to invest massively in becoming a world leader in revolutionary 
technologies.50 For instance, China has a dedicated national strategy to become the 
world leader in AI by the year 2030,51 with an array of planning and activity to achieve 
that goal, while it has displayed novel weapons programs in areas that range from 
space systems to armed robotics.52
Such trends matter not just in the space of great-power conflict, but also in 
how great powers often contend with each other through much of their rivalry 
period, such as through proxy warfare, an arena that frequently connects to special 
operations. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union repeatedly 
supported and countered insurgents, supplying rebels and governments alike with 
arms, training, advice, and combat support. It is not unreasonable to expect some 
repeat of this as the US-Chinese rivalry goes global. Additionally, just as in the 
Cold War, an arms-trade component of this competition has emerged, with China 
supplanting Russia as the alternative supplier of choice to the United States.
Therefore, in a future deployment, be it great-state conflict or small-scale 
insurgency, whether from purchases off the global market or proxy warfare supplies, 
the United States might not have its expected edge. Indeed, American soldiers could 
even face the same kind of shock that Soviet helicopter pilots had in Afghanistan in 
the mid 1980s, when the Stinger missile showed up in the hands of the mujahideen. 
A US force could one day find itself fighting a guerrilla force that brings better 
technology to the fight.
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Key Resulting Questions
• What tactical changes are needed for counterinsurgents when they do not 
enjoy technology “over-match?”
• How does the growing geopolitical environment shift counterinsurgency? Are 
US tactics and doctrine ready for great-power–supported insurgents?  
Information Underload and LikeWars
“It is like sipping from a fire hose.” 
This is how a US military officer described a core problem in their job to me at 
the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Force Base, where US forces 
coordinated the massive scale of operations in support of counterinsurgencies in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. They felt most challenged by the amount of data coming at them, 
from full-motion video to chatroom posts, sent by people ranging from soldiers in the 
midst of a firefight to intelligence analysts back in the United States. The officer not 
only had trouble keeping up with the flow, but also, in constantly servicing their inbox, 
thinking and acting strategically. 
Some believe that mastering the problem of “too much information” actually holds 
the solution to ending insurgency as a phenomenon. In a world of mass surveillance, 
goes the thinking, if we can sift through the information rapidly enough, insurgents 
will not be able to operate effectively. AI algorithms will not just identify insurgents 
instantly via facial recognition53 or gait detection analysis,54 but even move to predict 
their activities. Indeed, various projects already mine open-source intelligence, such 
as social media posts, to predict the outbreak of violence, riots, and insurgencies.55
We should not be so quick to declare victory against “rebel scum” of the future. 
Like all conflict, insurgency involves a thinking adversary, reacting to each and every 
move and technology. For instance, we are already seeing the rise of tactics to counter 
mass surveillance, such as face paint56 and even stealth clothing.57 The 2019 street 
protests in Hong Kong represented a literal battle lab of this back and forth. In turn, 
the spread of autonomous drones and cars will render whole swaths of current 
counterterrorism/insurgency defenses obsolete. 
The counter tactics may be about more than merely deceiving sensors, but also 
about altering our relationship with information itself. The systems on which we rely 
are only as reliable as the information that goes into them. The connection points 
of this information can be attacked. Communications signals to drones have already 
been blocked and manipulated in tests, while merchant ships in the Black Sea off 
Russia experienced a suspected hack in which their GPS started to tell the ship 
captains they were sailing miles inland.58 In these situations, someone or something 
was cutting off or tampering with the information. But what also bodes is a kind of 
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poison to the overall system, targeting the people behind the networks, in a way that 
blends old lessons of terrorism with new possibilities of social media. 
“Terrorism is theater,” declared RAND Corporation analyst Brian Jenkins in 
a 1974 report that became one of the foundational studies of terrorism and 
insurgency.59 Command enough attention and how weak or strong you were did 
not matter; you could bend populations to your will and cow the most powerful 
adversaries into submission. This simple principle has guided insurgents and 
terrorists for millennia. Whether via assassination in the town squares of ancient 
Judea, marketplace bombings in colonial wars like the one in Algeria, or ISIS’s 
carefully edited beheadings in Syria, the goal has always been the same: control 
what people think (and fear).
Already, we have seen the power of online networks to shape news and narrative, 
perhaps most illustratively with the ISIS invasion of Mosul, where an insurgent force 
did not hide from but, instead, embraced surveillance. Indeed, ISIS even branded its 
2014 offensive with the hashtag #AllEyesOnISIS, to ensure the world was watching. 
Increasingly, we can use technology to disseminate false information that 
overwhelms not only our political systems but also our human senses. Bots, 
algorithms that perform automated tasks, such as acting like humans online, 
represent one eaxmple of how we can be overwhelmed by false information. The early 
versions of social media bots could drive what people thought, knew, and even argued 
about during some of the most influential elections of the last few decades. Bots 
drove one-third of online conversation on Brexit. In the final six weeks before the 2016 
US election, approximately half the American population was unknowlingly exposed 
to Russian propaganda via Facebook, while Twitter concluded that bots helped drive 
Russian-generated propaganda to users 454.7 million times.60 Subsequently, the 
similar use of artificial accounts appeared not only in elections in places ranging from 
Mexico to Brazil and Italy but also in attacks on corporate brands and stock share 
prices and in campaigns to boost the spread of antivaccine conspiracy theories.61
Artificial intelligence, available to all actors, will compound this problem 
exponentially with the creation of “deepfakes.” Artificial neural networks mimic how 
the human brain works, using individual nodes that activate (or not) to a single point 
of information and carry out incredibly complex tasks by layering the connections 
together. Through this, machines can study a database of images, words, and sounds 
to learn to mimic a human speaker’s face and voice almost perfectly. An early example 
of the potential political impact of this came in the creation of an eerily accurate, 
entirely fake conversation between Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Donald 
Trump.62 Drawing only from the data of two-dimensional photographs, these systems 
can build photorealistic, three-dimensional models of someone’s face. In one example, 
AI transformed a single photograph of the late boxing legend Muhammad Ali into 
“photorealistic facial texture inference,” essentially able to rewrite what he actually 
did and said when he was alive, at least in our online records of him (which will be the 
source of “truth” to the vast majority).63
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Neural networks can also be used to create deepfakes that are not copies 
at all. Rather than study images to learn the names of different objects, these 
networks learn how to produce new, never-seen- before versions of the objects 
in question, called “generative networks.”64 As an example, computer scientists 
unveiled a generative network that could create photorealistic synthetic images 
on demand, all with only a keyword. Ask for “volcano,” and you got fiery eruptions, 
as well as serene, dormant mountains—wholly familiar landscapes that had no 
earthly counterparts. Another system created faces of people who did not exist but 
whom real humans would most likely mistake as Hollywood movie stars.65 Such 
networks can do the same thing with video to create new moments in time that 
never happened.66 These networks have produced eerie, looping clips of a “beach,” 
a “baby,” or even “golf.” They have also learned how to take a static image (a man 
on a field; a train in the station) and generate a short video of a predictive future 
(the man walking away; the train departing). In this way, events that never took place 
may be presented online as real occurrences, documented with compelling video 
evidence.
Finally, there are neural-network–trained chatbots—also known as machine-
driven communications tools, or MADCOMs.67 This technology—an AI essentially 
indistinguishable from a human operator—is being built to help companies replace 
their help desks and sell products online. As in every technology, deepfakes also 
could be misused terribly and weaponized. Versions have already been used in 
“revenge porn” that places victims into acts they never committed, while hackers 
have already used the faked voice of a CEO, hyperaccurate down to the subtle accent 
of his German background, to trick his subordinate into the fraudulent transfer of 
$243,000.68 
Today, savvy internet users can still distinguish “real” people from automated 
botnets and even many sockpuppets (the combination of Russophied English and a 
love for red #MAGA hats often gives them away). Soon enough, even this uncertain 
state of affairs may be recalled fondly as the “good old days”—the last time it was 
possible to have some confidence that another social media user was a flesh-and-
blood human instead of a manipulative machine. 
Combine all these pernicious neural-networks applications—mimicked voices, 
stolen faces, real-time audiovisual editing, artificial image and video generation, and 
MADCOM manipulation—and it is tough to shake the conclusion the long-feared 
“cyberwar” of hacking networks will prove less important than what one might 
conceptualize as the “LikeWar” side of battle: hacking people on networks by driving 
ideas virally through a mix of likes, shares, and lies.69 
As an outcome of these technologies, the insurgencies of 2030 will be fought by 
not only people but also highly intelligent, often inscrutable algorithms that will speak 
convincingly of things that never happened, producing “proof” that does not really 
exist. They will seed falsehoods across the social media landscape with an intensity 
and volume that will make the current state of affairs look quaint. For instance, 
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as futuristic as the counterinsurgency training on the SMEIR at Fort Polk seems, it 
captures a point in time soon to passed by technology and tactics.
Thwarted by the eagle-eyed US Army tactical-operations officers, terrorists might 
not just fade back into the crowd. They might instead shoot the civilians anyway and 
simply manufacture compelling online evidence of US involvement. Or, maybe they 
never even show up in the first place, manufacturing the massacre using neural 
networks that would produce hyperrealistic imagery, distributed outward by armies of 
AI-infused bots, manipulating the algorithms of the web itself. In turn, the role of the 
tactical-operations officer might be replaced by the only entity able to effectively battle 
back: another artificial intelligence. The result will be algorithms battling over the 
hearts and minds of humans. 
It is easy to downplay the effects of these online battles, but to do so ignores how 
the lessons of counterinsurgency are likely to cross with the new features of LikeWar. 
As the former head of Joint Special Operations Command General Stanley McChrystal 
told a conference of military officers in the Middle East, “For the foreseeable future,” 
the online space of social media will be as crucial a domain to any war as that of the 
air, land, or sea. The reason, he explains, is, “There is a war on reality. . . . Shaping 
the perception of which side is right or which side is winning will be more important 
than actually which side is right or winning.”70
Key Resulting Questions
• What aspects of our relationship to information will change in future 
insurgencies? 
• What will the LikeWar battles between insurgents and counterinsurgents look 
like in the future? Are we prepared to fight and win them? How will we even 
know?
Conclusions
The most powerful evidence that we are in a time of historic change is that these 
technology trends, and their resulting effects on the world, are so diverse they can be 
a bit overwhelming. Their challenge is not merely that they ripple out in many different 
directions, but that we are not yet in a position to answer many of the questions of 
possibility and propriety that they raise, especially for a realm so prone to uncertainty 
as war. This is okay to admit. As Werner Herzog sagely put it, “Sometimes a deep 
question is better than a straight answer.”71 Yet, in all this uncertainty, one key 
takeaway lesson emerges from this survey of technology and its potential effect on 
counterinsurgency in the future: In a time of massive change, those that choose to 
stand still, to ignore the trends and not adjust appropriately, are making a choice 
through their inaction. They are choosing to lose the wars of tomorrow.
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C H A P T E R  2 6
“Cyber FID”: The Role of Cyber in Foreign Internal Defense
Whitney Kassel and Philip Reiner
Approaches to warfare continue to shift dramatically and rapidly in the digital 
information era, as they have in other moments of epochal change. In the past, 
evolutions in warfare have impacted special operations forces (SOF) early, as such 
forces are frequently on the front lines of US engagement abroad, whether in active 
conflict, “preparation of the battlefield,” or clandestine operations. This has not 
been the case, however, for the integration of digital-age capabilities, specifically 
cyberwarfare, into certain aspects of the SOF mission. While already integral to many 
aspects of modern warfare, cyber tools and tactics have yet to be integrated broadly 
into the frequently SOF-led “foreign internal defense” (FID)i and its manifestations in 
counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stability operations, and unconventional warfare. 
The lack of wide SOF integration is true both in the context of ongoing “hot” conflicts 
and with longer-term great-power competition. As adversaries expand their asymmetric 
operations and attack US interests in the cyber domain—often below the threshold of 
armed conflict—SOF will increasingly be called upon to apply their unique capabilities 
and comparative advantages to undertake cyber missions, in some cases “by, with, 
and through” partner forces as part of the FID mission. These challenges will require 
new operational concepts, skillsets, and resources, as well as careful consideration of 
risks and second- and third-order effects. 
Cyberwarfareii through partners and proxies to achieve strategic effect is not 
a hypothetical exercise. Russia, China, Iran, the Islamic State (ISIS; Daesh), and 
others execute these types of missions aggressively, building capacity and using 
proxies to conduct information operations (IO) and offensive cyberattacks. There 
are also examples of partnered cyber operations being conducted on behalf of the 
larger US government at the national and strategic level. In fact, the September 
2018 National Cyber Strategy lists “building international partner capacity” as a key 
objective.1 However, in order to successfully counter adversary campaigns, many of 
which occur at the operational and tactical levels, SOF must investigate and pursue 
the systematic integration of defensive, IO, and/or offensive cyber elements into 
the FID tool set, enabling partner nations to protect their networks and exploit cyber 
tools to achieve shared objectives. SOF may achieve this by using existing resources 
or personnel or relying on contracted support and various partnership models within 
i      Joint doctrine defines FID as “participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organization 
in any of the programs or activities taken by a host nation (HN) government to free and protect its society from subversion, 
lawlessness, insurgency, violent extremism, terrorism, and other threats to its security.” Refer to United States Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. Foreign Internal Defense. Joint Publication 3-22. Washington, D.C. August 17, 2018.
ii     For brevity, this chapter deploys the term “cyber” in a broad sense to include operations in other domains that may more readily 
be understood as “cyber-enabled” operations.
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the US government and/or private sector. This is already beginning to take shape 
in real time, in a variety of geographic domains. The cyber domain pervades all 
modes of future combat activity, whether preparatory or in delivering effects, and 
SOF’s proven “by, with, and through” model will need to adapt accordingly. Based on 
extensive interviews with practitioners and policy makers, this chapter provides a 
broad framework for SOF planners to begin conceptualizing the necessary elements of 
“cyber FID.”iii 
Current Environment
Scholars, journalists, government officials, and military organizations have reserved 
great time and attention to the increasing criticality of the cyber domain in modern 
warfare, a fact underscored by frequent reports of the strategic use of cyber tools by 
the US government,2iv its allies,3v and, most important, its adversaries.4vi Only in the 
last case, however, have actors deployed cyber tools and weapons through proxies, 
whether defensive, offensive, or as part of an influence or information operations 
campaign. This gap between US and adversarial employment may seem marginal in 
the current security environment, but over time, the strategic advantage of working 
through proxies in cyberspace will prove significant or even decisive. As Tom Gjelten 
predicted in 2013, “We’re no longer just hurling mass and energy at our opponents 
in warfare; now we’re using information, and the more you have, the less of the older 
kind of weapons you need.”5
The United States is far from lagging in the deployment of cyber capabilities in 
warfare and the operations that both precede and prevent conflict.The intelligence 
community, US military, and Department of State (DOS), among others, have enhanced 
their capabilities in the cyber domain dramatically since the early 2000s. With the 
formation of a unified combatant command, US Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), in 
2009, the Department of Defense (DOD) actively signaled its intent to integrate cyber 
operations into the nation’s defense strategy, including offensive cyber operations 
against its enemies. These operations, along with those of the National Security Agency 
(NSA) and others, have already shifted the character of twenty-first-century conflict. 
Early examples of US government cyber operations can be traced to what can be 
considered “national” assets, organizations operating within the beltway—whether 
NSA, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or, more recently, CYBERCOM—and 
iii   Interviewees for this chapter included representatives from the CIA, Headquarters Department of the Army G-3/5/7, Joint Task 
Force Ares, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, NSA, 
Naval Post Graduate School, New America Foundation, Special Operations Command, Special Operations Command-Central, 
SOCEUR JFHQ-C (MARFORCYBER), SOCPAC JFHQ-C (MARFORCYBER), United States Army Cyber Command, United States 
Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, CYBERCOM, and the US National Security Council Cyber Directorate. 
Interviews were also conducted with representatives from private industry who requested anonymity.
iv    For example, Stuxnet, the ongoing campaign against ISIS, and instances of “persistent engagement.”
v     For example, US cooperation with Estonia.
vi    For example, Russian deployment of malware against Ukrainian forces and the Syrian opposition, Iranian training of Hezbollah in 
use of social media and electronic warfare, and Iranian training of Syrian forces.
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largely above the fray of day-to-day tactical operations. This has changed somewhat 
in recent years, particularly after the August 2018 rescission of the Barack Obama–
era Presidential Policy Directive 20 (PPD-20).6 While it remains unclear what policy 
framework was established in its stead, the Donald Trump administration loosened 
PPD-20 constraints, giving the commander of CYBERCOM the authority to be more 
aggressive in the use of force in cyberspace, with less coordination and oversight 
from civilian authorities in the Pentagon or White House.7
In the same vein, both the US military and intelligence community have pushed 
cyber operations, or at least their effects, “forward” in recent years, conducting 
influence operations and cyber espionage in support of combat operations in Iraq, 
Syria, and elsewhere.8 In 2015, Joint Task Force ARES, an NSA/CYBERCOM joint 
unit, systematically dismantled the ISIS media network through an offensive cyber 
campaign known as Operation Glowing Symphony.9 General Tony Thomas, then 
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) commander, credited the 
classified cyber operation as directly supporting the counter-ISIS offensive on the 
ground.10 In early 2019, US forces also reportedly executed a cyberattack against 
Kata’ib Hezbollah, an Iranian-sponsored militia group.11
While cyber operations have grown in importance among the tools available to 
US forces, at least via the national-level entities that support them, those forces 
have simultaneously become increasingly reliant upon and intertwined with partner-
nation forces on the ground. During his administration, President Obama frequently 
advocated “leading from behind” and working by, with, and through allies to achieve 
US policy objectives.12 The Trump administration has furthered this approach, 
dramatically drawing down conventional troop levels in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, 
while leaving small groups of SOF in place to conduct counterterrorism strikes and 
other operations in partnership with host nation forces.13 USSOCOM’s 2019 strategy 
encapsulates this approach as a core tenet for the Army Special Operations Forces 
(ARSOF): “ARSOF supports joint force and interagency efforts, primarily through 
a partnered approach.”14 While these partnerships may, in some cases, involve 
assistance in the defense of partner-nation telecommunications networks,15 they 
have not generally included cyberwarfare.
In contrast, US adversaries regularly leverage partner forces in their cyber 
operations. For example, the Russians notoriously use proxies to conduct 
cyber operations, though, in most cases, the partners they leverage are private 
organizationsvii working in support of Russian campaigns, as opposed to allied 
governments.16 Iran has similarly used cyber proxies to conduct operations, training 
the Syrian Army and Hezbollah to use online influence tactics and even conduct 
offensive cyber operations against its adversaries.17
vii   Unlike conventional warfare, the preponderance of cyberwarfare skills can be found outside the government, an aspect also 
important in the US context, as we explore in this chapter.
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The History of Foreign Internal Defense
While the US military has not yet conducted a large number of cyber operations by, with, 
and through partner nations, the broader construct of working through host nations 
and indigenous nonstate actors has been an essential special operations doctrine and 
missions since their inception. Even before the formation of SOCOM in 1987, SOF’s 
predecessors in the Office of Strategic Services during World War II worked primarily 
with partner forces behind enemy lines. Today, one of SOF’s five core missions is FID: 
“civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by 
another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society 
from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security.” 
Moreover, FID underlies why SOF was devised in the first place.
The FID mission, specifically the way SOF commonly implements it,viii has evolved 
along with the state of warfare itself, from enabling counterinsurgency and combat 
operations on the part of the Republic of Vietnam armed forces in the 1960s and 1970s 
(when FID was not even a doctrinal construct) to accompanying Iraqi Special Operations 
Forces on capture-kill missions against al-Qaeda in Iraq in the 2000s and ISIS in the 
2010s. The SOF version of FID also incorporates related nonkinetic operations, including 
Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and Civil Affairs Operations (CAO), and is 
often aligned with assistance to civilian government entities on the part of the US DOS, 
US Department of Justice, US Agency for International Development, and others. 
In all these arenas, FID and its corollary, unconventional warfare (by which SOF 
support “resistance movements” to prepare for a potential uprising or overthrow of 
a foreign government), are designed to help the US government work itself out of 
a job, so that eventually host nations can defend their territories and populations 
and conduct operations without the direct support or participation of US entities.18 
Historically, FID has also included using surrogate forces to facilitate preparation of 
the battlefield in advance of anticipated larger-scale conflict—an applicable area of 
effort when considering the potential cyber element of future FID missions.
As the FID mission has evolved and advanced, the technology SOF uses and 
instructs partner forces to deploy on the battlefield has transformed dramatically, from 
mortars to High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARs), Morse code to satellite 
systems, and radio towers to airborne media platforms. While the technology has 
changed, the core aspects of the FID mission have not, and likely will not, even as 
warfare advances from land and sea to multidomain efforts including cyber and space. 
These core aspects include, and will continue to focus on:
• training and equipping partner forces,
• the use of surrogates to advance partner and US strategic objectives,
• “direct action” or combat operations together with partner forces,
• information operations and civil affairs.19 
viii    SOF are far from the only parties that conduct these operations.
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The assemblage of these missions and the details of implementation vary 
dramatically over time, and by country and region. For example, since the invasion 
of Afghanistan in 2001, the United States has conducted a broad range of activities 
that could fall within the construct of FID. These activities vary from training in 
jurisprudence and human rights to a relentless counterterrorism campaign in which 
Afghan Special Forces are frequently brought on capture-kill raids against Taliban and 
al-Qaeda targets. Over the last forty years, operations to support partner forces in El 
Salvador, Honduras,20 Senegal, Liberia,21 Thailand, and the Philippines22 also fall under 
the FID rubric, each with their own unique characteristics. 
Based on dozens of interviews with serving and retired military and civilian 
officials, the integration of cyber operations to support FID remains nascent. From 
an institutional perspective and at an operational level, the closest SOF has come 
to “cyber FID” is communications assistance provided by 18E technology specialists 
as part of Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) Special Forces teams, and similar 
communications personnel on Marine Corps and Navy special operations teams.ix 
These personnel may assist local forces in setting up secure telecommunications 
networks, avoiding insecure communications methods (e.g., cellular phones and land 
lines), and deploying basic cyber hygiene activities to include those protecting online 
web presences and social media activity. However, considerable and uniquely SOF-
specific opportunities exist that may expand cyber activities and operations in support 
of the FID mission set across every region in which SOCOM operates.
Cyber What?
What is considered “cyber” within the US government varies by department, service, 
and personal opinion—we will leave those debates to other venues. In the FID 
context, it is easiest to understand cyber operations in three main categories: 
defensive operations, information operations, and offensive operations. While 
somewhat simplistic, these categories allows us to consider the tools, training, and 
authorities that might be required for the majority of hypothetical cyber operations, 
as well as the potential risks and second- and third-order effects of engaging in these 
activities by, with, and through partner forces in cyberspace. It is also important to 
note the application of these types of cyber assistance will depend largely on the type 
of “partner force” being considered. 
The level of cooperation in which the US government is willing to engage will vary 
dramatically depending on the partner in question. For example, sharing between the 
United States and the United Kingdom will far outpace what might be provided to 
other “Five Eyes” nations. The circles of trust and willingness to share will decrease 
as the US government considers partners with fewer shared objectives and less 
ix    Note, from an institutional perspective, “cyber FID” anecdotal cases have gone further, and there are several examples of 
international cooperation in cyber at national and strategic levels.
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ability to control the proliferation of deployed cyber tools and capabilities. Operational 
urgency may shift the US government’s calculus with regard to willingness to share. 
Defensive Operations
As noted earlier, operations resembling defensive cyber FID are, and have for some 
time been, part of ongoing missions within the US government. These include 
assisting host nations with protecting public and private critical infrastructure from 
cyberattacks or sabotage—as seen in the United Kingdom, Estonia, and Ukraine—
and helping partner forces in Iraq and Afghanistan “harden” their networks against 
espionage and cyberattacks. However, most of these operations are not currently 
being conducted under SOCOM auspices. Per our research, the known examples 
of SOF pursuing these missions, in particular in US Central Command (CENTCOM) 
and US Africa Command (AFRICOM), are anecdotal but seem poised to expand. 
These defensive cyber FID missions involve SOF components within the geographic 
commands supporting the network security of partner forces. Simultaneously, 
conventional forces, the Department of Defense, and other US government agencies 
spearhead the broader protection of host-nation infrastructure in support of national-
level host-government entities.
The potential to expand and institutionalize defensive cyber FID as part of 
SOCOM’s FID mission toolset is vast and would have significant benefits to US and 
partner forces globally. The need is also increasingly acute. In many cases, partner 
forces and their civilian counterparts in allied nations are extremely vulnerable 
to cyberattack, whether those attacks are aimed at debilitating a government or 
society, or at gathering information on those forces’ plans, operations, and Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs). Information on how to exploit vulnerabilities in 
commonly used hardware and software systems is widely available to adversaries, 
who can easily employ the information to gain access to allied networks. Defending 
those networks is far more difficult than accessing them; as in all cyber operations, 
the attacker needs to succeed only once, while those defending their networks must 
succeed every day. Powerful destructive tools remain broadly available to adversaries, 
necessitating key training and assistance to defend against adversaries’ tactics.
Potential also exists to take tactical-level, SOF-driven defensive cyber FID beyond 
ongoing conflicts in places like Ukraine and Iraq and apply it to longer-term great-
power competition by giving allied forces tools to protect their networks from 
adversaries. Adversaries are using supply-chain dominance and the construction of 
telecommunications infrastructure as strategic footholds. These adversary tactics 
present an opportunity for the United States in terms of long-term preparation of 
the environment, intelligence collection, and access to signals intelligence and will 
help prevent the United States from ceding strategic ground that may prove critical 
in coming years. In addition, allies in regions like Africa and South America, where 
China has been building sophisticated and all-but-unavoidable telecommunications 
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infrastructure,23 will likely soon find themselves requiring significant assistance to 
protect their communications from unwanted eyes and ears.
Based on the doctrinal SOF mission set, which includes (but is not limited to) 
FID, we believe forward-deployed SOF teams are best positioned to implement 
defensive cyber FID at the tactical level in the immediate term. SOF missions require 
the placement and access to partner forces. SOF often live and work alongside 
partner forces, building relationships and gaining understanding of cultural context 
and language. SOF also train, equip, and cooperate with allies, the exact skillset 
required to conduct cyber FID. It should be noted that not only SOF can conduct 
these operations. Cases likely arise in which augmentees from other government 
organizations or even the private sector will be required to conduct certain missions, 
particularly extremely technical ones.
A number of models exist on which the defensive cyber FID mission could be 
based. Overall, it is not difficult to imagine how defensive cyber tools could fit into 
the capabilities already provided to allies through SOF and FID missions all over the 
world. SOF already work with partner forces in the fields of intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR); electronic warfare; forensics; radio and satellite 
communication; and, in some cases, nascent cyber operations. Providing SOF teams, 
specifically 18E personnel on ODAs, with mobile “cyber tool kits” that can be brought 
forward easily and given to partner forces, with instructions on how to implement 
basic cyber hygiene, would add cybersecurity to the effects of those existing tools.
 
Information Operations
From Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential elections, the 2017 French 
elections, and the 2019 European Union elections to the use of social media in 
attacks against the United Kingdom, Syria, and Ukraine, little doubt exists the 
manipulation of online information to achieve political and strategic effects is one 
of the most (if not the most) critical domain in which US forces will operate in the 
twenty-first century.24 There is also little doubt US adversaries have quickly surpassed 
our defensive capabilities in the sophistication and widespread use of information 
operations to undermine US interests and promote their own. As the United States 
works to close this gap and build up its own capabilities in the IO domain, it will need 
to both enhance its partners’ capabilities and develop ways to work with its allies to 
achieve desired effects and to dominate the IO landscape.
Of the two IO models mentioned previously—outright training/assistance and 
cooperation—the latter may be the more urgent one to address. This is because 
partner forces’ knowledge and understanding of the IO environment in their own 
country or region and their ability to operate in that space make them extremely 
valuable assets in US-led IO operations. For example, consider the establishment of 
online identities and networks, which could spread a particular narrative in support of 
a US objective in a partner nation. True residents of that nation, and native speakers 
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of its language(s), are far more believable and inherently legitimate than anything even 
a sophisticated US actor could create.x
Thus, it is in the United States’ strong interest to increase the IO capabilities of 
its partner nations, both to support those nations’ security objectives and to enhance 
the base through which US IO campaigns can reach target audiences. There are 
several examples of this at the national and strategic level. Specifically, during the 
2018 US midterm elections, the US partnered with European nations25 to help prevent 
Russian interference similar to that seen in the 2016 presidential elections. Similar 
partnerships with SOF and tactical units could directly support partner operations by 
preparing the battlefield in regions where government support may be low or tentative. 
Moreover, these partnerships could convince civilian populations to leave a dangerous 
area prior to operations or debunk antigovernment messages that could pose a direct 
threat to partner forces.
There is inherent risk in providing sophisticated IO techniques to forces who 
may ultimately use them in ways that either do not align with US objectives or pose 
ethical and/or legal challenges. As we move from defensive to IO and offensive cyber 
FID, these risks increase exponentially. In the case of IO, adverse effects are most 
likely to surface if partner forces campaign to discredit critics or undermine the free 
press or open elections. These are real risks and should be closely considered when 
implementing this type of cyber FID. However, these risks are no more severe than 
the potential risks of providing those same allies with the lethal capabilities the US 
government has long provided. Similarly, the US can and should implement careful 
monitoring of the IO environment in nations where this type of assistance is provided. 
The US should also hold partner forces accountable for the use of these tools, 
potentially through the cessation of this and other assistance, when necessary. 
Offensive Operations
While certainly the most controversial and complex of cyber operations, SOF-enabled 
partner-force offensive cyber operations have the significant potential, and failing 
to explore this domain presents an extremely high risk. As noted previously, US 
adversaries have already enabled their proxies to conduct offensive cyberattacks, with 
devastating effects in Ukraine and elsewhere. Without some level of assistance in this 
domain, US allies will cede a strategic advantage in their own struggles, putting US 
strategic objectives at significant risk. 
As with defensive and IO cyber missions, some level of cooperation in the offensive 
domain exists already between the United States and its close allies. Few details are 
available in the unclassified domain, but operations such as Stuxnet indicate the US 
government is open to sharing offensive cyber tools with certain allies under certain 
circumstances. These types of missions likely make use of highly classified tools 
x     While this chapter specifically addresses FID, in which partner nations are wittingly supported by and operating with US forces, 
FID missions provide additional—while still under Title X—benefits worthy of significant consideration that go beyond the 
nature of this chapter’s remit.
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developed within the US government. Such tools would almost certainly not be shared 
with other allies because of the high risk of exposure, as well as the uncertainty of 
how such tools might be used once they have left the control of the United States and 
select allies.
In the operational and tactical contexts occupied by SOF, particularly through 
efforts under the FID mission set, this level of sophistication and secrecy generally 
would not be required, given the technical proficiency and level of threat faced by 
many SOF allies in places like CENTCOM and AFRICOM. There are a number of widely 
available and relatively easy-to-use offensive or “hacking” tools, from mimikatz26 
to Mirai27 and the tools used in Triton28 or Sandworm29 malware attacks, whose 
exposure poses no significant risk to the United States. While these tools are unlikely 
to have dramatic effects against technologically sophisticated actors like Russia and 
China, they could still prove helpful, if not decisive, in many cases.
These tools are widely available online, but partners with whom SOF conduct FID 
worldwide may not have the technical expertise to understand and exploit such tools 
without US assistance (or that of our adversaries, who may step in if we do not). 
Access to offensive tools could allow partner forces to gather sensitive intelligence 
by infiltrating adversary networks (intelligence to which the United States would most 
likely also gain access), shut down or sabotage adversary operations from a safe 
standoff, avoid direct conflict in which they may lack the upper hand and be defeated, 
or establish a foothold on enemy networks (“leaving a cache,” as one senior expert 
suggested) for use in future operations. 
While the physical access necessary to conduct these types of operations may 
arise only through partnered operations via the FID mission, national-level efforts 
undertaken by other departments and agencies are also necessary. Tactical-level 
operations can supplement these national-level efforts in ways unique to the SOF 
community. In many environments, this capability could prove decisive, particularly as 
adversaries increase their use of cyber tactics not only on the national level but also 
on the battlefield.
Providing offensive cyber tools to allies or even simply teaching them to use the 
tools available in the public domain carries significant risk. In an already incredibly 
complex cyber-threat landscape, the distribution of capabilities across public 
and private industry, as well as regionally, makes effective defense and offensive 
operations challenging in the best of circumstances. Further complicating the picture 
by providing capabilities to additional actors, regardless of the origins or availability 
of the tools, would arguably undermine US interest in some cases, as it attempts to 
keep up with these developments and stay ahead of the threat landscape. In the long 
term, however, the same methods the United States has used to control weapons—
from night vision goggles to F-16s—over many decades of FID and security assistance 
can be applied to offensive cyber weapons.
Dating back several decades, US security assistance has played a critical role in 
the implementation of US foreign policy. However, it has always carried significant risk, 
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such as powerful weapons and capabilities falling into the wrong hands, being used by 
allies in unintended ways, or simply proliferating in unpredictable and dangerous ways. 
The US government has set up a system of controls to try to prevent these outcomes, 
from “Leahy vetting” to end-use monitoring (EUM). While these controls are far from 
perfect, they have, in many cases, reduced the risk that must be weighed against the 
potential benefit of equipping allies with critical tools. This same calculus can and 
should be applied to cyber tools, with the risk of providing certain capabilities being 
weighed carefully against the benefits to US allies and the US strategic objectives 
those alliances and operations serve.
Roles, Responsibilities, Authorities, and Resources
If policy makers choose to pursue cyber FID, then SOCOM and its partners will 
need to consider carefully how to appropriately resource and authorize broad-
scale implementation of cyber and cyber-enabled FID. At this time, the most critical 
issue limiting the implementation of cyber FID, or any additional cyber mission, is 
the availability of resources. The US government possesses limited expertise and 
capability in the cyber domain, skills desperately needed to defend US networks and 
conduct operations on behalf of the US government. Because of these limitations, 
SOCOM and the services may not have the resources to conduct cyber FID with their 
current force structure. Rather, existing personnel will require additional training and 
equipment to implement many of the operations described above. In cases where 
existing SOF personnel do not possess or cannot obtain the requisite skillsets easily, 
outsourcing to forces from the services, reserves, CYBERCOM, or NSA that have been 
trained specifically to operate “forward” and in denied areas, may prove more efficient 
than extensive training of SOF. This is taking shape in real time, with partners around 
the globe. As the “SOF Truths” state: 
Although SOF are highly skilled and extraordinarily trained, to maximize 
effectiveness, they often require non-SOF subject-matter experts and 
capabilities. . . . This truth is also applicable to the Cyber Workforce, 
which is often dependent on Signal, Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, 
Fires, and Information Operations capabilities as well as interagency, 
multinational, and commercial partners.30
Per existing legislation, authorities that could be relied on for both cyber defensive 
and information operations under Title 10 (DOD security cooperation) and Title 22 
(DOS security assistance)xi funds include Section 333, 1206/2282, Section 127E, 
xi    “Title 22 funds are appropriated to the State Department, which often transfers them to DOD, which in turn manages and 
executes most security assistance programs. Title 22 includes Foreign Military Sales programs. Title 22 is less flexible in some 
ways, mainly because Congress authorizes and appropriates these funds on a by-country and by-program basis and requires 
congressional notification and permission to move funds from one effort to another.” Refer to Kelly, Terrence K., et al. Security 
Cooperation Organizations in the Country Team: Options for Success. Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation Arroyo Center, 2010. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR734.html
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and Section 1202.31 However, once operations move past those delineated in Title 
10 and into Title 50,32 different conversations will be required. For example, while the 
authorities to conduct defensive cyber FID operations already exist, the authorities 
required to implement offensive cyber FID, in particular, are not currently available to 
most SOF. These authorities will need to be carefully coordinated with CYBERCOM, the 
intelligence community, and other parts of DOD to ensure legality, strategic alignment, 
and prevention of mission overlap in cyberspace. 
However, if leadership at the White House and DOD determine cyber FID to be a 
priority, exact details regarding its implementation can and will be untangled. At this 
early stage, policy makers must not focus on ownership or bureaucratic positioning 
but on the mission itself and its criticality to defending US interests in the short and 
long terms.33
Conclusion
The current lack of cyber elements in the FID toolset undermines US efforts to 
maintain the advantage in both great-power competition and confined, regional 
missions. Lawmakers, privacy advocates, and others raise valid concerns about how 
the proliferation of cyber tools at the tactical level might impact US interests; however, 
the sands are shifting toward full digitization of warfare, and such concerns will not 
slow the trend or change what is necessary to compete on tomorrow’s battlefield. Our 
adversaries have experimented with and deployed cyber tools through proxies and 
partners in ways that directly undermine US national security, while avoiding kinetic 
engagement. As the United States seeks not only to compete with these efforts in 
the short term but also to maintain its influence in strategic regions and “prepare 
the battlefield” for future conflict—particularly in areas where long-term adversaries 
are making significant investments—we must use existing boots on the ground to 
seed capabilities and partnerships. SOCOM is already deploying these forces as 
part of their FID mission set, working hand in hand with partner forces who need 
cyber capabilities. The United States must use this presence to expand its cyber 
capabilities. As one senior DOD official explained, “demand is going to exceed supply.” 
The time in which that becomes a true statement is coming fast—in some cases, it is 
already upon us.
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C H A P T E R  2 7
Open Minds, Open Societies, and Hybrid Conflict
David Bray and Vint Cerf
Recognizing that predicting the future is fraught with challenges, this chapter strives 
to highlight the still unfinished work of the internet and focuses on the human 
impacts of five categories of technical and social work that are needed. Special 
operations forces (SOF) seeking to win hearts and minds in future conflicts must 
take a people-centered approach or risk winning the metaphorical, short-term battle 
only to lose the long-term war. 
The Internet, Open Minds, and Open Societies 
The internet seems to have become a source of division and frustration in society, 
not succeeding fully in its goal of bringing different groups together. It can bring us 
together—yet it can also contribute to the devolution of social institutions that once 
required us to interact and converse in person to achieve social and cultural unity. 
Never has 50 percent of humanity (i.e., the approximate percentage of people on the 
planet with access to the internet in 2018) had access to so much new information 
per day.1 Yet with that access comes a challenge of our modern age: each of us can 
find information that supports our preferred beliefs.
We each can and do experience “confirmation bias” (where we “plus up” 
information that reinforces our existing views and dismiss information that 
challenges them) and “cognitive easing” (in which, if something is repeated 
enough, we become comfortable with it and believe it to be true, even if it is not). 
Both confirmation bias and cognitive easing have much to do with human biology. 
The time and energy it takes to reexamine every aspect of our beliefs daily is 
overwhelming, so we don’t.
Countering confirmation biases produced by mis- and disinformation delivered 
by the internet or other publicly available sources presents a difficult challenge. 
Additional facts may not be sufficient to overcome someone’s existing confirmation 
bias. Indeed, more facts can result in a backlash in which individuals reject facts and 
reaffirm their existing beliefs. 
Thus, SOF operators wanting to counter misinformation online will need to 
recognize both that everyone has biases and that providing more facts may not 
overcome misinformation. Alternatively, the ability to listen with curiousity to the views 
of others over a prolonged period of time will be necessary to build rapport and make 
shifting beliefs less a short-term battle of facts and more a long-term agreement on 
how to interpret situations in different contexts. In a crisis or short-fused situation 
doing so might be impossible. Fortunately, not every day brings crisis, and even in 
crisis scenarios, the period afterward can provide a time to listen, communicate, and 
attempt to understand different perspectives. By this means we may become better 
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informed should further crises happen. We forecast a future need for more SOF 
operators who engage populations by, 
• Listening with curiosity, seeking to understand;
• Avoiding reducing issues to binary positions;
• Being willing to walk a mile in the shoes of others. 
The more humans seek to understand others’ points of view, the more humans 
will be aware that our own perspectives and views change and shift constantly as new 
experiences impact our way of thinking and seeing the world. 
Subsequent sections of this chapter examine the different ways internet-based 
technologies are shaping societies, the battlefield, geopolitics, and SOF activities, 
and how SOF and external partners can seek to preserve open societies despite the 
increasing threats of hybrid conflicts that polarize free societies.2 
How Are Internet-Based Technologies Shaping Open Societies? 
Through shared narratives, law enforcement, and technologies, people have shaped 
social norms and reshaped the distribution of power (i.e., the capability to compel or 
oblige someone to take a certain course of action). In the twenty-first century, we face 
a big question: “Quo Vadis?” Where do we want communities and human societies 
to go, especially given the rate at which new technologies challenge the distribution 
of power within our societies? There are both huge opportunity for improving our 
communities with people-centered approaches and significant concern that our digital 
future may not be as rosy as we would like it to be.
Humans are tool users, and our tools connect to our use of narratives, laws, and 
technologies to distribute power. Ten thousand years ago, we used fire and stone 
tools to make the transition from a nomadic lifestyle to agrarian settlements.3 Tools 
helped give rise to civilization, including the advances of writing, the development of 
calendars to aid agriculture, and navigation of the seas.
Even before the start of human civilizations, human nature included selfish 
instincts that challenged the formation of larger communities beyond immediate family 
members. While some civilizations generated social order through sheer physical 
force, compelling obedience, others generated social order through a system of laws 
that sought to protect communities from the greed, envy, or other hurtful elements of 
its members. Such societies did not develop laws purely for altruistic reasons. The 
laws also solidified the power of rulers and included different forms of taxation of the 
products of their subjects’ labor.4
For most of human history, people met or knew on the order of 100 different 
other people.5 In terms of human history, only recently did we start living in groups 
that were more than family members. Even more recently could most of us travel 
to and live in a town that was not where we were born. By comparison, most of 
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us encounter 80+ different people in a single day who are not immediate family 
members. When we lived in small agrarian groupings, elders could provide answers 
to just about every question about how to live and thrive: when you should plant 
crops and how to plant, harvest, and defend them from pests; and when to know 
bad weather was approaching. With the internet and other digital technologies, this 
has changed. A science that better understands human-and-computer interactions 
involving groups is essential to enable SOF and its partners to better navigate the 
future. The internet, globalization, and increasing interdependence of the planet has 
created an environment that is cognitively very different from our ancestors’ world.
Laws and legal processes distributed power, and in several cases of early 
civilizations, solidified the power of community members to compel or oblige others 
to perform certain actions. These same mechanisms also enabled larger groups 
of people to coexist more peacefully, at least to the extent that the distribution of 
power did not motivate any part of the community to revert to sheer physical force to 
change this distribution.6
As communities grew, so did their use and development of more advanced tools. 
Metallurgy produced bronze and iron tools and weapons, bows and arrows, and 
later both gunpowder and flintlock firearms. Such technological developments had 
the effect of expanding civilizations and disrupting the distribution of power within 
societies.7 Certain advances, such as the assembly line, required new laws to protect 
individuals from a consequent asymmetric distribution of power associated with these 
technologies, such as long work hours in unsafe working conditions. The ethics of 
societies also shifted, embodied in new laws—such as those against child labor.
Developments such as railroads allowed certain individuals to aggregate power. 
Other developments, such as radios, enabled communications that challenged 
the distribution of power. In some cases these technologies helped highlight 
discrimination against subgroups in societies and provoked the creation of laws 
protecting civil rights. On the other hand, as in the case of Nazi Germany’s use of 
“People’s Radio,” radio was sometimes used to foment mobs and create dangerous 
echo chambers of thought.
How Are Internet-Based Technologies Shaping the Battlefield? 
“The categories of warfare are blurring and no longer fit into neat, tidy 
boxes. One can expect to see more tools and tactics of destruction—
from the sophisticated to the simple—being employed simultaneously 
in hybrid and more complex forms of warfare”8
—Robert Gates
Since the mid-1990s, when home dial-up service and early browsers for surfing the 
World Wide Web (such as Mosaic and Netscape Navigator) accelerated consumer 
adoption of the internet, networked devices have grown in number, producing an 
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ever-increasing amount of data. The uptake of these technologies resulted in part 
from a rapid decrease in their cost and related increase in the global accessibility of 
the internet.
The internet has come a long way since its origins in the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency Network (ARPANET).9 In terms of social outcomes, critical work 
must be done to reinforce transnational public trust in and security of the internet. 
Steps that can be taken include empowering entrepreneurs whose efforts can span 
national boundaries. A concerted effort is needed to build a people-centered internet 
to support “living learning communities,” where knowledge could be found of how to 
thrive, adapt, and coexist in ways that celebrate a plurality of views and insights and 
that link rather than separate people.10 If we recognize our interactions on the internet 
reflect humanity, then the internet ’s future will be tied to how we choose to develop, 
expand, and enhance its features. 
In 2003, one of the coauthors of this chapter (Bray) raised questions in the US 
intelligence community about whether “organizing by geographical borders would 
still be the predominant paradigm for societies” by 2030. He asked this question 
in light of the increasing impact of the internet on our lives. To consider this impact 
it is worth noting that during the 1990s, folks talked about “going online” as if one 
left the activities of the real world to enter a digital “cyberspace.” As the twenty-
first century dawned, it became clear the “real” and “digital” were not two different 
worlds. Internet activities in both “worlds” overlapped and augmented what people 
could achieve. Given that the internet itself obscures where a packet of information 
has come from or is going to geographically, it seems likely that national borders, in 
an internet world, will become more porous and ambiguous with time.
Having similarly responded to severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 
with the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Bray believes infectious 
diseases, public health events, and other biorelated activities do not stop at 
national borders. One cannot forgo the reality that public health events half a world 
away could ultimately impact all of us. The health of the world has long-lasting, 
ripple effects on the economic, social, and political stability of communities. This 
underscores the question of whether organizing by geographical borders will remain 
the predominant paradigm for societies. 
As of 2020, we may be transitioning from the Westfalian concept of nation-
states with sovereignty defined by geography to another system. Determining 
what comes next has become a point of friction within and between societies, and 
online technlogies have been used to increase polarization and division in target 
countries. These tactics may have direct political effects or may be used to distract 
from other ongoing geopolitical conflicts. They may even be used as a precursor to 
a conventional battlefield engagement. Russian attacks against the Ukraine and 
Georgia are good examples.11
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How Might Internet-Based, Hybrid Conflicts Shaping the Geopolitical Environment?
 
“Hybrid conflicts . . . are full spectrum wars with both physical and 
conceptual dimensions: the former, a struggle against an armed enemy 
and the latter, a wider struggle for, control and support of the combat 
zone’s indigenous population, the support of the home fronts of the 
intervening nations, and the support of the international community.”12
—J. McCuen
The internet has become a tool to foster division and frustration in society, despite 
its demonstrated capacity to bring different groups together. Online interactions can 
contribute to the devolution of social institutions that once required us to interact in 
person and have conversations as a way to achieve social unity. 
For each of us, interactions with our friends, coworkers, media, political 
institutions, and social networks can be mediated by the internet in such a way 
that they reinforce our individual worldviews, to the exclusion of other ideas and 
perspectives. Internet dialogues, often faceless, can produce negative emotions and 
result in the “shaming” of an outsider. Individuals of all political persuasions are 
subject to these effects, and the idea of pluralistic societies in which people accept 
different points of view seems to be eroding.
Consequentally, if civilization is defined by its members not automatically killing 
a newcomer or a new idea,  modern society is at risk of becoming less civilized, less 
tolerant of a diversity of perspectives, and more tribal in its behavior because of the 
effects of the internet that seem to be eroding the idea of pluralistic societies. Similar 
scenarios have happened before. For example, media outlets in the United States 
from 1895 to 1898 “emphasized sensationalism over facts,” according to an account 
of yellow journalism practices present at that time.13 Human nature partly accounted 
for this “bump in the road.” We all have biases, including confirmation biases, that 
manifest when we actively seek information that reinforces what we already think to 
be true and dismiss information that challenges our beliefs. 
We also experience cognitive ease where the more something is repeated, the easier 
it becomes for us to think it must be true, even if it isn’t. The journal Science published 
a study in which the researchers classified news, “as true or false using information 
from six independent fact-checking organizations that exhibited 95 to 98 percent 
agreement on the classifications. Falsehood diffused significantly farther, faster, deeper, 
and more broadly than the truth in all categories of information, and the effects were 
more pronounced for false political news than for false news about terrorism, natural 
disasters, science, urban legends, or financial information.”14 The big takeaway: we will 
be naturally motivated to believe fiction when doing so feels better than believing the 
truth. People seek the comfort of certainty, and when conflicting facts make them feel 
uncertain, they will favor fiction if it makes them feel less uncertain. While irrational, 
cognitive ease and confirmation bias are part of human nature. 
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For future geopolitical conflicts, perceptions of reality will be shaped by both 
information and misinformation delivered by the internet. Antagonists will undoubtedly 
see attitudes and beliefs as a “cognitive domain” distinct from the domains of 
air, ground, sea, and cyber. Forces may have military superiority in the latter four 
domains, only to lose legitimacy and support in the cognitive domain through targeted 
misinformation that erodes support. 
How Are Internet-Based, Hybrid Conflicts Shaping the Warfighter,  
including US and Adversarial Forces? 
Hybrid conflicts using the internet extend beyond the cognitive domain; they also 
include misuse and abuse of the cyber-related infrastructure of the internet. These 
issues are now important given the sheer number of network devices on the 
internet. Specifically, in 2015 there were approximately 14 billion network devices 
for 7.3 billion human beings. That’s up from 7 billion network devices two years 
earlier. Cisco and other firms predicted there could be approximately 50 billion or 
more network devices globally, relative to about 8 billion people, by 2020. Cisco 
predicts 500 billion devices will be online by 2030.15
The figurative explosion in the number of network devices increases cybersecurity 
risks and the risks of misinformation on the internet. Warfighters face a future in 
which infrastructure can be used against them, whether to impede their movement 
or actions, to alert adversarial forces of offensive and defensive activities, or to use 
“digital exhaust” from the Internet of Things (IoT) to put combatants at risk. 
The IoT also increases cybersecurity risks for the average consumer. Current 
approaches to cybersecurity, that is, relying on human experts to build and maintain 
“tougher digital locks” and “higher (fire)walls,” will not be sustainable as the IoT 
continues to expand the potential attack surface. Warfighters cannot assume 
they can operate without detection. Their adversaries may also use infrastructure 
sensors and related capabilities to misinform situational awareness to produce bad 
strategic and tactical decisions. 
IoT will make even more visible the flaws present in buggy software and the 
challenges of guaranteeing the security of any IT system. Human societies can 
encourage good “internet hygiene” practices and take preventive measures to reduce 
risk and improve the overall security posture of a system. However, any internet-
connected device or system has inherent risks, especially from unscripted, zero-day 
exploits to which there may be no defense until after an attack has exploited a bug.
Taken together, because of these three concerns, communities might want to 
consider tackling cybersecurity differently.16 One approach might include focusing 
on digital resiliency and a strategy more akin to “internet public health” aimed at 
both preventive measures and rapid detection, containment, and mitigation of digital 
threats, i.e., infectious disease control for the internet. Modeled after public health 
systems, such a method would emphasize teaching internet hygiene to reduce the 
likelihood of outbreaks. These are actions SOF could consider. 
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These activities also would emphasize establishing digital-threat-detection 
procedures focused on signs, symptoms, and behaviors to respond to polymorphic 
digital threats such as malware that changes signatures. In addition, a public health—
like approach to digital resiliency would include mobilizing the equivalent of internet 
epidemiologists with the training necessary to characterize, contain, and remediate 
malware and digital threats as quickly as possible, should ones emerge; collaborative 
actions using trained experts augmented with machine learning may be essential to 
respond to these risks.
Hybrid Conflict and Special Operations Forces
Internet-based hybrid conflicts are shaping the SOF mission, which must accommodate 
the social elements of the internet. SOF must also recognize the increasing use 
of automated programs (bots), algorithms, and artificial intelligence (AI) to shape 
information flows and activities on the internet. AI-mediated and bot activites over the 
internet represent a dimension of hybrid conflict that has only begun to present visible 
signs of disruption to the public, with more disruptions expected for open societies in 
geopolitics, elections, commercial relations, and public perceptions of technology and 
other global trends. Consequentally, SOF must incorporate AI and counter-AI activities 
into future strategies and plans, including recognizing the historical arc of how AI has 
evolved in parallel with the internet. 
In 1957, early AI pioneer Herbert Simon partnered with Allen Newell to develop a 
general problem solver that separated information about a problem from the strategy 
required to solve a problem. Since then, the field of AI has experienced two more 
waves of innovation. Starting in the mid-1960s, the second wave of AI innovation 
included work on rule-based expert systems represented mainly as “if-then” 
statements instead of procedural code. The goal of such systems was to perform 
tasks that expert humans could also do, such as evaluate geological sites or perform 
medical diagnoses.17
In approximately 2015, cumulative advances in the speed, size, and scale of 
microprocessors and computer memory reached a tipping point that triggered a third 
wave of AI innovation. It became possible to execute machine learning with sufficient 
speed and scale to benefit real-world and even real-time applications. Machine 
learning employs large data sets to train multilayer neural networks statistically to 
make accurate categorizations of what something is or is not; for example, training 
a machine to identify accurately images of different objects, places, or entities, or to 
enable natural language translation, among many other innovative applications.
Importantly, machine learning is, at best, only as accurate as the data provided 
to it, a textbook example of the computer-science mantra “garbage in, garbage out,” 
where poor-quality data results in poor-quality machine learning. Moreover, machine-
learning technology can be “brittle” in the sense that it may fail in unexpected ways 
with small input variations. Nowadays with the internet, large data sets potentially 
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exist that could train machine-learning instances; however, human societies must 
address data privacy, brittle functionality, data quality, and biases.
How Can SOF Respond to and Shape Hybrid Conflict Environments? 
To address future internet-based hybrid conflicts, SOF need to renew its focus on 
the importance of monitoring local and global narratives, given the linkage between 
narratives, community norms, and the distribution of power. Humans are innate 
storytellers. This may have to do with consciousness, including our ability to simulate 
events. Stories allow us to simulate fictitious but plausible realities. By simulating 
events in our minds, we can “test potential scenarios” without incurring some near-
fatal or fatal outcome and, thus, increase our survival chances.
Stories can be told that change behaviors. A simple visceral story of “I did X once 
and it caused me to puke my guts out” probably would convince several people who 
have never done X to avoid it.i If stories can be told that change behaviors, repeat 
behaviors over time can become “sticky” habits. Habits inculcate norms. The power 
of narratives lies in their ability to shape and institutionalize norms and power 
distribution in our human communities.
There is also increasing evidence, though, that we have developed communication 
and language to convince others the scenario they faced was similar to what we have 
also faced (i.e., “myside”).18 Some researchers now call confirmation bias “myside 
bias,” which is adaptive.19 If the group can collectively be on the same “myside,” that 
may help coordinate responses to threats or opportunities.
Our world is much broader than the immediate environment we see and experience 
nearby; this has dangerous side effects, such as challenges in reaching consensus or 
agreeing on the relevant facts for a situation.
Our planet is increasingly interconnected in ways that challenge the notion of 
organizing into groups based on geographical boundaries. The question is, what 
takes its place? Affinity groups that divide different groups of humans into “us” vs. 
“them” labels are one possibility; however, “wars” between different affinity groups 
might then occur. If affinity groups alone replace how we organize, political discourse 
would become a winner-take-all game. Without compromise, the fabric of republics 
and representative democracies might well rip apart. Taken to an extreme, affinity 
groups are unwilling to tolerate “newcomers” and will become dictatorial autocracies, 
insisting that to be a member, one must think a certain way. In such a scenario, 
plurality of thought is not appreciated. Differences in opinion are to be ridiculed or 
expelled. If this were to occur, such an outcome would paint a troubling future indeed.
SOF operators need to prepare for a future that could include the following: 
• More “stormy issues” occuring with increasing tempo in open societies and 
challenging the interests of different digitally enabled stakeholder groups.
i   This is where we get into the serious challenges of misinformation online, namely that the best way for something to go viral is 
to make it hateful or fearful; positive narratives do not seem to go viral as readily.
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• The need to address stability and security from “outside of the box” (or 
device, as the case might be) and to be proactive in our design thinking.
• The erosion of the nation-state in open societies, if we do not resolve issues 
across multiple stakeholders.
What Can Be Done to Counter Adversary Narratives  
and Produce Competitive Advantage?
The United States and other open societies, including several parts of Europe, are 
becoming collections of “echo chambers,” and the internet seems to be devolving to 
a degree into affinity groups that homogenize ideas or beliefs about how the world 
works and what we should do for the world ahead. If we become a collection of 
intolerant affinity groups, we risks becoming autocracies of thought.
We need to remember President Lincoln’s quote of “I don’t like that man. I must 
get to know him better.”20
We believe that to counter adversary narratives and produce a competitive 
advantage for open societies, our world needs a plurality of ideas and approaches 
to address the challenging intersection of exponential technologies, issues of 
globalization and global fragmentation, and questions of the future of both work and 
life. Members of open societies still have much work to do to help connect those on 
the planet who want the internet or improved access to it, and to address the digital 
divide even in places where the internet is available. Many of us also want to ensure 
a more open internet for everyone and to find new ways to address the challenges of 
human biases in news and information. 
On December 9, 1968, computer science pioneer Douglas Engelbart gave a 
demonstration that later became known as “the Mother of All Demos,” in which he 
demonstrated a computer with a graphical user interface, a mouse pointer, version 
control for files, user-ability to jump to other documents by clicking on hyperlinks, and 
many more features that we associate with how we interface with computers. For 
1968, his demo of the future was truly groundbreaking.21
When considering the future work of the internet, it is worth remembering that 
Engelbart also had a vision that human intelligence could be augmented through 
computer-based tools. This included the idea that technologies could help humans 
connect, share ideas, and become “living learning communities.”22 Internet access 
began to accelerate in 1988, and commercial service arrived the following year. 
Several of Engelbart’s ideas, realized in the World Wide Web, contributed to periods 
of exponential content and activity growth: hyperlinking web pages, sharing knowledge 
online, and helping humans connect.
Future SOF doctrine must recognize the importance of operating in highly 
networked contexts composed of humans and machines focused on adapting to and 
accomplishing certain tasks. These networked contexts will become increasingly 
important, embodying krewes of humans and machines operating together. Instead of 
assigning a specific person to a role, it may be assigned to a krewe. Krewes may float 
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across organizations, akin to a freelancing team that brings its own organic devices, 
software, and algorithms to bear on challenging topics.
Long-term, human organizations may be replaced by networked krewes bidding on 
work assignments, accomplishing them, and moving on to new assignments; to some 
degree, contractors and contracted work already parallel this concept. In the future, 
automated technologies may be able to help the krewe’s talent and time management 
be smarter when it comes to the SOF mission by: 
• Highlighting issues for different teams to focus on;
• Suggesting the best pairing of different team members;
• Removing some human biases from decision-making;  
Not that software produced by computer scientists is infallible. In fact, we know 
software will have bugs and biases that human programmers may have included.Thus, 
future SOF efforts will need to experiment with ways to evaluate the effectiveness of 
krewes using automated approaches to identify and fix bugs and to pioneer ways to 
better communicate the tasks of algorithm to all human participants so they can spot 
existing bugs or biases in code.
What New Tools and Technologies Would Give US SOF Unique Advantages? 
Over the last 150 years , humans have built interconnecting technologies allowing 
for interactaction or broadcast around the world through telegraph, telephone, 
radio, television, and satellites. Now we have the internet, which lies at the heart 
of many of the challenges modern society faces, including societal and geopolitical 
fragmentation, tribalism, misinformation, and disinformation. We need to recognize the 
lessons of history and of human nature and strive to be brave, bold, and benevolent 
in finding ways to build bridges rather than walls. This will be largely a people-focused 
challenge. Technology will take us only so far. 
We propose SOF consider six steps to address the human-centric, internet-
amplified challenges of misinformation, disinformation, and erosion of trust: 
• Step one: Raise questions, ideas, and possible solutions to “what comes 
next.” Most important, discuss what social and political institutions will allow 
for pluralistic human coexistence and encourage peaceful resolution (and 
forgiveness) of disputes.
• Step two: Focus on being positive. It is important to focus on positivity even 
in the face of hate or darkness—getting angry, sad, or giving in to those 
arguing against coexistence prohibits one’s ability to empathize with others 
and strive to find the common humanity in us all.
• Step three: Reach across groups and ideological divides. If we use the 
internet only to associate with and get to know people we like and find 
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supportive of our worldviews, then we will only reinforce the age-old human 
paradigm of “us vs. them” and will miss the opportunity to find merit in the 
compassion in or insight of people with which we might not agree in principle.
• Step four: Find ways to benefit multiple groups, not just groups with which we 
self-identify (lest we accelerate tribalism) or from which we benefit.
• Step five: Work across communal groups and help build a world in which 
different ideas and people can coexist.
• Step six: Identify which choices we make that disconnect us from others. We 
need better designed online systems to facilitate better outcomes.
Cumulatively, these six steps could frame the work of many organizations for 
the decade ahead, recognizing that such challenges cannot be met by technology 
alone. These steps will vary in degree of difficulty depending on the level of 
transparency in the architectures, algorithms, and attributes of the interfaces that 
mediate human interaction.
What Can Initiatives outside US SOF Do to Help Make Open Societies  
More Resilient against Polarizing Hybrid Conflicts?
A more people-centered, positive online future requires collaboration across sectors 
and national boundaries and, most likely, the creation of new institutions. Such 
institutions must work with civil societies, private-sector companies, and public-sector 
organizations to produce a future with more beneficial choices, options, and freedoms 
for everyone. Public-sector organizations must support inclusive, open, affordable 
internet access to the public, given that the internet has become such a connective 
element in everyday life. Private-sector companies must ensure the services they 
provide offer both informed choices and value to help individuals and communities. 
Such public and private services should encourage productive, nondivisive, and 
nonexploitive uses of the internet. The public must encourage such activities, 
potentially pioneering community projects or start-ups that promote a more people-
centered internet.
Tackling the unfinished work associated with the future of the internet raises many 
questions: how do we to hold true values as individuals, as communities, and as a 
world while also adapting to rapid change? The internet and its successors, whatever 
they may be, will weave together a tapestry of human and computing threads. Just 
what images will be found in this tapestry will depend on the nature of the threads 
and the skill and creativity with which the weaving is accomplished. 
It seems clear from the considerations in this chapter that we must adopt a 
realistic appreciation for the way in which computing in all its generality is applied 
to solving social and economic problems. Our choices of algorithms affect society. 
We must assure that all members have equal access to the potential benefits these 
computing tools offer. 
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After World War II, in part through the Marshall Plan, the United States created 
global institutions modeled after US ideals—with the specific goal that another world 
war should be avoided at all costs. This included US military and national security 
institutions that to this day are unparalleled in their ability to respond to nation-state 
conflicts and prevent escalation of issues to world war.
The modern world is not the world of 1948. Efforts to adjust such institutions to 
meet the challenges of terrorism or cyber-related concerns represent Band-Aid and duct-
tape solutions at best. Trying to apply laws solely by geography is challenging for the 
internet era, especially given the challenge of trying to apply laws to technologies that 
change rapidly and produce social impacts globally. There is clear pressure, however, 
to reinforce a Westfalian, national sovereignty model. This can be seen especially with 
the recent actions of the Chinese government to reinforce its “Great Cyber Wall”23 and 
the Russians to build RU.NET24 and test its ability to operate after total disconnection 
from the rest of the internet. Cumulatively, the era of relative peace may be ending, 
potentially to be replaced with a different period heretofore undefined.
It is our belief that isolationism is a bad idea. Even if the United States tries to 
withdraw from the world stage, the rest of the world will continue to become more 
connected digitally. Threats half a world away will persist and may still be able to 
reach us in either online or offline ways. As we as authors and associates with the 
People-Centered Internet have observed, some cyberthreats have already become 
affordable to small nations and technologically “superempowered” individuals who 
mean to do harm or sow chaos.
Technology solely for its own sake is also a bad idea. Some players have predicted 
social media and internet technology as the future forms of human connectivity. 
Without a people-centered focus, such technologies paradoxically could increase 
unrest, distrust, disengagement, and the spread of misinformation. 
Following the disruptions of 9/11, nations around the world debated what type 
of future to pursue: One focused on individuals freedom or one that emphasizes 
centralized planning in the name of regional stability and that risked impedeing individual 
freedoms? Nowadays, most US institutions and the laws associated with them are 
poorly primed to respond with the agility needed for the global issues of the coming 
decades. These institutions need to modernize, not just their technology and capabilities 
but also their focus and purpose. The debate about the future often gets overshadowed 
by short-term political debates. Inherantly, short-term thinking does not look at either the 
last 70 years since the end of World War II and the potential 70 years ahead. 
Conclusions
In the aftermath of World War II, the United States and its allies shaped significantly the 
political and legal frameworks of the modern world; however, nothing guarantees we will 
shape the remainder of the twenty-first century if we do not recognize that any long-term 
solutions to the challenges of internet-based hybrid conflicts require understanding of 
the social and economic dynamics of an increasingly technology-based world.
396   |   D A V I S ,  G A C ,  R A G E R ,  R E I N E R  &  S N O W
SOF face such a significant challenge when working to assist other open 
societies that face hybrid conflicts. The openness of the discussions and plurality of 
perspectives in such societies puts them at risk of being the target of weaponized 
disinformation. Domestic and external actors use and will continue to leverage open 
internet-based commerce, interactions, and discussions to their advantage. In closed 
societies, data collection about the activities of citizens is a common practice. In open 
societies, it seems we must institute defenses against inappropriate data collection 
to protect citizens from harm. 
Unless implemented with security in mind, IoT devices used for home, health, or 
workplace-related interactions also will be avenues for abuse. The conundrum for 
open societies is to protect citizens from those who exploit internet-enabled devices 
while avoiding the extremes of censorship and other constraints on utility. 
Given these challenges, our recommendation to US SOF is a long-term strategy 
based on three important pillars. The first seeks to shine a light on and share data 
with corporations, the public, the media, and our allies associated with what we 
believe are ongoing, internet-based, hybrid conflicts. This task may prove difficult 
as such suspicions may be speculative. Such speculation may be informed by 
methods and means that cannot be divulged fully because of their compromising 
sources. Even with such challenges, we believe more “sunlight” must be shown to 
all members of open societies on what we as authors sense are ongoing conflicts. 
This transparency is needed to exercise the strength of diversity of open societies. 
In the absence of transparency, the benefits of social, economic, and political 
discourses will diminish. 
The second pillar seeks to better understand human-and-computer interactions, 
especially at large scales involving teams, organizations, and societies. A better 
science of understanding these interactions, informed by neurobiology, psychology, 
and anthropology, is required to forecast social risks and to gauge ways to strengthen 
the resiliency of the society.
The third pillar of our proposed, long-term strategy is to provide nondystopian 
narratives of how open societies around the world can use the internet and other 
technologies to advance positive ends and productive futures for all. Without these 
narratives, the cognitive battlefield will be ceded to those who sow anger, fear, discord, 
confusion, and dismay. This is terra incognita–there is no textbook for where we are 
going, and yet we need to develop narratives that give hope to open societies.
These narratives must offer tangible, visual, and visceral experiences, not merely 
words. Disney’s Experimental Prototype Community of Tomorrow (EPCOT) created a 
plausible future world. The narratives must enable people to understand the diverse, 
multistakeholder practices that can cope with a complex, technology-rich world. This 
may take the form of a Model United Nations class for high schools and colleges. 
Such experiences would show how governments, technologists, civil society, and the 
private sector possess shared and unique responsibilities for resolving issues and 
implementing solutions to problems that arise.
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Cumulatively, the 2020s will require SOF and its partners to adapt its doctrines 
more quickly and flexibly. To cope with the challenges of hybrid conflicts, we must 
do what we can to address the pernicious effects of misinformation, the fragility of 
AI-mediated decisions, and the risks posed by the IoT. We should pursue a strategy 
that aims for Engelbart’s vision of “living learning communities.” SOF’s unique role 
provides both motive and opportunity to introduce important memes in conflicted 
areas that reinforce the principles of open societies and defend against authoritarian 
regimes that seek to undermine and fragment them.
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Artificial Intelligence: Risks and Opportunities for SOF
Paul Scharre
Recent rapid advances are changing the art of the possible in artificial intelligence, 
with significant opportunities for special operations forces (SOF) across the full range 
of SOF missions. This chapter gives a brief overview of current trends in AI and some 
examples of potential AI applications to SOF missions. 
The AI Revolution
Few technologies are advancing as rapidly and dramatically as artificial intelligence. 
Since 2012, the field of AI has seen a renaissance in machine learning, driven by 
advances in data and computer processing power. From 2012 to 2018, the amount of 
computer processing power, or “compute,” applied to cutting-edge machine-learning 
advances increased 300,000-fold. This exponential rate of growth is faster than 
“Moore’s Law,” which has driven advances in computer processing power for the 
past several decades. Instead of doubling every two years, since 2012, compute in 
machine learning has been doubling every 3.4 months, an astonishing trajectory of 
technological development.1 
There are few other areas related to war in which the underlying technology is 
evolving at such a rapid pace. Missiles are not 300,000 times faster than they were 
in 2012. Vehicles are not 300,000 times more fuel-efficient. Armor is certainly not 
300,000 times lighter. While many technologies are improving and have significant 
potential should they come to fruition, AI and machine learning are already being 
applied to a range of industries. The US military should move aggressively to adopt AI 
for SOF applications. 
What Is AI?
Artificial intelligence is the field of study devoted to making machines intelligent.2 
Intelligence measures a system’s ability to determine the best course of action to 
achieve its goals in a wide range of environments.3 The field of AI encompasses a 
range of methods to achieve intelligent behavior in machines.4 
Broadly speaking, AI systems can be grouped into two general categories. The “first 
wave” AI systems are “expert systems” that draw on a set of rules of behavior that 
have been informed by human experts. An example of an expert system is an airplane 
autopilot, which has rules for behavior in different settings, drawing on the experience 
of human pilots. “Second wave” AI systems use machine learning, in which behavior 
is not programmed into the machine but learned from data. There are a variety of 
machine-learning methods, including supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement.5 
In supervised learning, the human tells the algorithm what to look for in the data. In 
unsupervised learning, the human does not tell the algorithm what to look for and the 
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machine groups data according to patterns. In reinforcement learning, the algorithm 
learns by interacting with an environment and optimizes its performance to achieve a 
goal. “Deep learning” is a particularly powerful machine-learning approach that uses 
“deep” neural networks. Neural networks are connections of artificial “neurons,” 
loosely inspired by biological brains, and deep neural networks are those that have 
multiple layers.
Underlying all these machine-learning approaches is a common reliance on data 
and compute. The exponential increases in data and compute over the past decade 
have enabled machine-learning methods that are effective in training machines 
across a range of tasks. Machine learning has yielded algorithms with human-level 
or superhuman performance in object classification, facial recognition, and various 
games, including Atari games, the Chinese strategy game Go, and real-time computer 
strategy games such as Dota 2 and StarCraft. Machine learning is being applied to a 
range of industries, including transportation, finance, and medicine.
General Methods, Task-Specific Machines
Machine-learning methods can be applied to a range of tasks, provided ample data 
exists and the task is sufficiently bound and has clear metrics for better performance. 
The applicability of AI methods to a broad range of tasks makes AI a general-
purpose enabling technology, much like electricity or the internal combustion engine. 
Technology writer Kevin Kelly has argued, “AI will enliven inert objects, much as 
electricity did more than a century ago. Everything that we formerly electrified, we will 
now cognitize.”6 Moreover, a 2017 study conducted by the McKinsey Global Institute 
estimated roughly half of the tasks performed currently in the US economy could be 
automated using existing technology.7 Many technology analysts have argued that AI 
is likely to lead to sweeping economic and social changes in the coming decades, akin 
to another industrial revolution.8 
Just as past industrial revolutions enabled the creation of machines that were 
stronger than humans for specific tasks, the new cognitive revolution is enabling the 
creation of machines that are smarter than humans for specific tasks. However, much 
like physical machines have been, AI systems will be designed as tools to aid humans 
in conducting tasks. While the methods underlying AI can be applied to a broad range 
of problems, once trained, AI systems exhibit “narrow,” or task-specific, intelligence. 
They may be effective at the task for which they are designed but generally have 
no ability to perform other tasks. For example, an AI translation application can 
translate between languages (provided it has been trained on those languages) but 
cannot understand or analyze the text. Other AI systems may be able to engage in 
some modest reading comprehension, and still others can create relatively realistic 
computer-generated text given a prompt on a topic. But all these AI systems can 
perform only one specific task. Useful AI systems often combine a suite of AI tools 
into a broader application that humans use, just as physical machines developed 
during the Industrial Revolution have been used for moving mechanical energy. 
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Forklifts, cars, tractors, trucks, buses, steamrollers, and backhoes are all machines 
designed to perform specific tasks and powered by the same underlying technology: 
the internal combustion engine. Many jobs, such as mining, construction, or road 
paving require using multiple different mechanical machines together. The same 
concept is true of AI systems, which may combine different methods and tools to build 
a useful cognitive system. 
Current Limitations of AI Systems
One important limitation of today’s narrow AI systems is that their performance often 
drops off dramatically when they are used outside the bounds of their systems’ 
design. AI systems lack the reasoning abilities that allows humans to adapt to novel 
circumstances, which can make their performance quite “brittle.” For example, the first 
version of AlphaGo, which reached superhuman performance in Go in 2016, reportedly 
suffered a major drop in performance when the size of the board was changed from 
the 19x19 grid board on which it was trained.9 Similarly, multiple independent studies, 
including by the US government, have shown facial-recognition algorithms decrease 
significantly in performance when used on faces whose demographics (e.g., race, 
gender) are not well represented in the algorithm’s training data.10 AI systems that 
perform well in one setting can fail suddenly and dramatically when subject to slight 
changes in either the environment or their operating conditions. This has already been 
a factor in several deaths resulting from Tesla car autopilots, which have driven cars 
suddenly into parked cars, tractor trailers, or Jersey barriers.11
These incidents demonstrate the criticality of conducting robust testing and 
evaluation in realistic operating environments to better understand the boundaries 
of AI systems’ behavior. However, even with testing, designers and users of AI 
systems should expect some failures, and plan accordingly, when systems are first 
placed in real-world operational environments, especially military ones, given their 
unpredictability. Failures may also occur when systems are first placed in combat 
environments—even if the systems have been used extensively in training—as 
combat environments may differ from training scenarios in critical ways, such as 
environmental conditions, target signatures, or adversary behavior. AI systems often 
excel at repeatable, precise behavior, but they can perform poorly in novel situations, 
a significant challenge for military applications.
AI systems are also vulnerable to manipulation, hacking, and spoofing attacks, 
including novel attack vectors that exploit cognitive vulnerabilities in the systems’ 
thinking processes or learning approaches.12 Data poisoning entails inserting hidden 
malicious data into the training data of a machine-learning system, corrupting its 
learning process and altering its behavior.13 Adversarial data inputs are tailored 
spoofing attacks fed to trained algorithms that exploit weaknesses in how they 
process data in order to trick the algorithm.14 For example, one team of AI researchers 
embedded subtle swirls into the shell of a 3D-printed turtle that caused an AI-based 
image classifier that identifies objects to misidentify the turtle as a rifle.15 These 
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important vulnerabilities, which are common across many machine-learning methods, 
should be taken into account when designing and using AI systems.16
Uses of AI Systems
AI systems can be used to perform a range of functions. These include:
• Classifying data, including identifying objects, faces, or emotions;
• Detecting anomalous behavior inconsistent with historical data patterns, such 
as fraudulent financial transactions, computer malware, or human behavior;
• Predicting future behavior based on past data, such as recommendation 
algorithms for media content or improved weather predictions; and
• Optimizing performance of complex systems, allowing for greater efficiency in 
operations. 
Artificial intelligence can also be used to enable autonomous systems. Autonomy 
is the freedom a person or machine has to perform a task. AI enables increasingly 
intelligent machines, which can, in turn, be granted autonomy to perform increasingly 
complex tasks in a wider range of environments. Autonomy can be embodied in 
physical systems, enabling advanced robots to perform a wider range of missions in 
different environments. For example, it can be used in human-occupied vehicles, in 
applications such as autopilot, intelligent cruise control, or active protection systems 
for ground vehicles. In addition, autonomy can be applied to nonphysical systems, 
such as autonomous cybersecurity applications. 
The degree of autonomy delegated to intelligent machines is a choice made by 
human users, who may desire machines to perform some tasks autonomously in 
some environments, such as automated takeoff and landing for drones or automatic 
braking in automobiles. For other applications, human users may prefer greater 
control over the operation of the system. A range of human-machine command-and-
control relationships exist. In semiautonomous systems, in which a human is “in the 
loop,” the machine waits for human approval before performing a task. In supervised 
autonomy, the human is “on the loop,” meaning the machine performs tasks on its 
own, but the human can intervene, if necessary. In fully autonomous systems, the 
human is “out of the loop” and cannot intervene for a period of time.
In practice, people design machines with a mix of autonomy for different tasks. 
For example, an automobile has some features that are fully autonomous (such 
as automatic seat-belt retractors or antilock brakes), some that involve supervised 
autonomy (such as cruise control), and others that humans direct manually (such as 
controlling the vehicle’s movements or choosing the destination). Using autonomous 
systems effectively requires not only robust testing and evaluation in realistic 
operating environments but also educating users on the systems’ capabilities and 
limitations to achieve trust in the machine’s performance.
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AI, Autonomy, and Special Operations
AI and autonomous systems have many potential applications across the breadth of 
SOF missions and environments.17 Some illustrative examples are given below, but 
these are by no means the full range of potential applications.18 Special operations 
forces will have to experiment with and adapt to new potential uses as AI technology 
continues to mature. 
Intelligence and reconnaissance
Robotic and AI systems will present a number of opportunities for SOF to improve 
reconnaissance, intelligence collection, and analysis. Uninhabited aircraft, or drones, 
have already been a major boon to reconnaissance and intelligence collection 
because of their greater endurance and persistence than aircraft with humans 
onboard. Similarly, more advanced autonomous robotic systems will be able to persist 
on the battlefield for longer periods of time and operate in different shapes, sizes, 
and environments than humans can. Increased autonomy will allow robotic systems 
to penetrate into denied areas and collect intelligence even without a continuous 
link to remote human controllers. Unattended ground sensors will be able to monitor 
areas for traffic, building up patterns of life of ground activity. Small robots will be able 
to navigate into buildings, snake their way into tunnels or buried facilities, monitor 
activity, and then exfiltrate data. Robotic systems may also be vectors for delivering 
payloads such as cyber tools, electronic warfare, or kinetic effects. 
AI will also help to process and synthesize information, allowing analysts to 
integrate multiple data sources and identify anomalies more rapidly. AI image 
classifiers can help process the glut of full-motion video data from uninhabited 
aircraft, and, more broadly, AI-based classifiers of any sort can help process data in 
any number of formats, such as audio or electromagnetic signals. One straightforward 
and easily applicable use for AI is automating many of the steps that humans take 
today in collecting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating information. Automation 
is most useful for routine cognitive and physical labor, and simply automating many of 
the tasks servicemembers perform today in intelligence analysis can help accelerate 
decision cycles and free up humans for other important tasks. AI tools will not be able 
to take on the higher-level cognitive functions that humans perform to understand an 
enemy’s intent or to analyze courses of action, but AI tools can be useful adjuncts for 
human analysts to help them process large amounts of information more quickly and 
effectively. The net effect of AI and automation for analysts should be to accelerate 
the targeting cycle, allowing for more rapid and precise synthesis of information.
Force Protection and Mission Support
AI, robotic, and autonomous systems will also have a number of valuable applications 
to support special operations forces when infiltrating to or on an objective and in 
exfiltration. Robotic systems can be used for immediate reconnaissance ahead of 
forces in order to act as the “point person,” giving teams extended eyes and ears to 
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detect potential threats. Similarly, robotic systems can be used to travel alongside, 
ahead of, and behind small teams, giving them an extended bubble of sensors to 
detect approaching threats. These robotic systems can consist of a mix of air, ground, 
sea-surface, or subsurface systems, depending on the mission environment. As 
robotic systems become increasingly autonomous, the operation of a robotic sensor 
cloud surrounding SOF teams will become practical without overtaxing the attention 
of team members, which would not be the case if robotic systems were controlled 
remotely. Increasingly, autonomous systems will also be able to react automatically to 
potential threats, cuing additional sensors to identify threats, and to prepare kinetic or 
nonkinetic defensive measures for use, if needed. 
Increasing autonomy will allow robotic systems to surround, give early warning 
to, and help protect SOF teams when not only moving through open areas but also 
in Global Positioning Systems (GPS)–denied environments such as inside buildings 
or underground. Visual-aided navigation allows robots to move through GPS-denied 
environments and maintain navigational awareness, allowing swarms of air and 
ground robots to move ahead of SOF teams in buildings or underground to map the 
environment and to identify potential threats. These robotic systems could not only 
help protect special operations forces by giving them advance warning of threats 
but also allow for more rapid mission execution, as they can help map environments 
quickly and vector forces to find key individuals or locations to accomplish the 
mission.
Robotic forces can also be valuable adjuncts to SOF teams by carrying additional 
and resupplying equipment and evacuating casualties. Robotic teammates—using 
legged, wheeled, or tracked modes of locomotion depending on the terrain and 
mission requirements—can move alongside SOF teams, carrying additional gear, 
ammunition, water, or other supplies. Autonomous robotic helicopters can ferry 
resupply equipment to teams, even under fire or in small landing zones not suitable 
for larger helicopters. Autonomous helicopters or ground vehicles may be also be 
used for casualty evacuation to send wounded personnel more rapidly to a higher 
standard of care. Lastly, wearable robotics (such as exoskeletons) can help SOF 
personnel carry additional weight—including weapons, armor, or other mission 
equipment—and/or increase mobility, allowing SOF personnel to move further and 
farther than would otherwise be possible. 
Limitations
Despite their potential ability to assist SOF, robotic systems will continue to have a 
number of limitations, chiefly in power and endurance.19 The physical attributes of 
technologies are not improving as rapidly as the digital attributes. Therefore, future 
robotic systems will likely possess advanced sensors, autonomy, and decision-making 
abilities but will remain limited in range, payload, and endurance. On the battlefield, 
energy needed to power AI systems will be a limited resource, much like ammunition, 
water, and batteries are today. Robotic systems will likely increase, not decrease, 
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the SOF energy burden because—even if robotic teammates and exoskeletons can 
carry additional batteries and robotic systems can resupply teams rapidly—robotic 
tools require their own power, adding to the energy burden of small SOF teams. 
Energy burdens will have to be managed carefully, and some robotic systems may 
not be appropriate for long-duration missions or where regular battery resupply is not 
feasible. For some special operations missions, however, robotic systems will be a 
valuable addition and a force multiplier that increases mission effectiveness. 
Vignette: Increased Mission Effectiveness
The net effect of these technological additions to the SOF toolkit could be a significant 
change in the mission effectiveness of special operations forces. Forces that today 
are often limited by the carrying capacity of individuals could be augmented with 
robotic systems of various shapes and sizes, which could help expand the situational 
awareness, lethality, and firepower of SOF teams. The vignette below illustrates how 
these tools could come together to increase significantly the mission effectiveness of 
a notional SOF team conducting an operation. 
The SOF team infiltrates onto a beach that has already been secured by 
amphibious robotic systems that have autonomously searched the area, 
identified and flagged any potential mines or obstacles, and confirmed 
the absence of any personnel on the landing site. As the team arrives 
on the beach, a network of robotic systems surrounds its position 
giving the team early warning of any individuals approaching. On the 
water, low-profile sea-surface robotic vessels, networked with undersea 
robotic systems, warn of any potential threats approaching from the 
sea. On land, unattended ground sensors placed along likely avenues of 
approach warn of any foot or vehicle traffic, while, in the air, small aerial 
drones give the team a vantage point over the next terrain feature, 
giving them early eyes on any potential threats. 
A large-diameter robotic submersible ferries additional equipment 
to the beach, which the team offloads for overland movement to its 
objective. The team is equipped with exoskeletons to facilitate more 
rapid movement, wheeled robotic teammates to carry additional gear 
and to move with the team, and a swarm of small drones for increased 
situational awareness and reconnaissance. 
Robotic teammates and exoskeletons offload the weight burden of SOF 
personnel, allowing SOF to move rapidly to the objective. As the team 
moves, small ground and air robotic scouts patrol in front of, behind, 
and on either side of the team, giving advance warning of potential 
threats. This allows the team to reroute around individuals discovered 
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on the way to the objective, helping the team avoid detection and 
maintain the element of surprise. 
At the objective, robotic systems are used to augment the team in 
creating a security perimeter around the objective, acting as a force 
multiplier for the personnel on the ground. Ground and air robotic 
systems autonomously watch avenues of approach and egress out of 
the target building and warn SOF personnel of any movement. 
The SOF team uses a ground robot to breach the objective, allowing 
team members to remain protected, and then a swarm of small aerial 
drones enter the building. The drones navigate and map the structure 
quickly and autonomously, relaying back a three-dimensional map 
to the team members who remain outside. Machine-learning–based 
image classifiers on the drones autonomously locate any individuals 
inside the building and objects they are carrying (such as weapons) 
and identify any persons who have been preloaded into a biometric 
database using facial recognition. This information is also relayed 
to the team outside, which then has the precise location of any 
individuals (armed or otherwise) inside the building, their disposition, 
and real-time video footage of their movements, all without having to 
enter the structure. The team decides to deploy lethal force against a 
number of armed individuals in the building and nonlethal measures 
against individuals whose status cannot be determined. SOF personnel 
direct the drones to carry out these actions, and the drones do so by 
using onboard weapons and countermeasures. Once any potential 
threats have been neutralized, the team moves into the building to 
secure it and begin site exploitation. 
However, actions on the objective have compromised the team’s 
position, and enemy forces begin rallying to counterattack. Overhead 
drones monitoring the surrounding area identify groups of dismounted 
personnel and approaching vehicles and alert SOF team members. 
This information allows the team to direct airstrikes to protect their 
position while completing actions on the objective. The team also 
directs overhead drones to search along planned exfiltration routes and 
identify any personnel or vehicles on the route. By looking at a map 
showing available routes with overlays of surrounding activity, the team 
chooses the route with the least risk of attack. Robotic systems deploy 
smoke screens to mask the team’s movements, and large ground 
robotic teammates deploy ballistic shields to provide mobile cover as 
the team moves through an open area. Robotic decoys lure enemy 
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forces in the other direction, creating noise and movement away from 
the team’s egress route. 
During exfiltration, aerial drones identify an individual moving to 
intercept the SOF team. The team changes direction and sends a 
ground robot scout to intercept the individual. The individual detonates 
a suicide vest, destroying the robot scout, but leaving the team 
unharmed. Both air and ground robots secure the helicopter landing 
zone before the team arrives and provide situational awareness until 
the team is successfully extracted. If the SOF team had been pinned 
down in a firefight, robotic helicopters were on standby at a nearby 
forward arming and refueling point and could have delivered additional 
ammunition and extracted any casualties. 
As this vignette illustrates, AI and robotic systems will not replace military 
personnel or alleviate the need for humans to direct and conduct military missions, 
but they can augment human capacity in valuable ways, offloading various tasks and 
assisting humans in accomplishing the mission. 
Adversarial AI Uses
Artificial intelligence is a diffuse technology widely available globally to both state and 
nonstate actors. While cutting-edge AI research and development will remain limited 
to a small number of major global corporations, the AI research community is open 
and AI applications are freely available online for anyone to use and download.i Small 
drones have already proliferated widely and have been used by nonstate actors for 
attacks around the globe, and additional AI-based systems will likely follow suit.20 
Nonstate groups have already built and deployed homemade robotic systems in the 
Middle East, including Shia militias in Iraq possessing small armed ground robots and 
Syrian rebel groups using remote weapons stations.21 As robotic and AI technology 
becomes more widely available, nonstate groups will likely continue to repurpose 
commercially available systems or design their own homemade systems. 
In the near-term, the most likely impact of AI developments is that SOF will 
increasingly face aerial threats, as even actors with relatively modest capabilities 
will possess the ability to field simple drones for reconnaissance or aerial attack. 
These flying improvised explosive devices are unlikely to present a decisive threat 
to US forces, but they could effectively delay or hinder US troop movements or 
cause casualties. Drones could be particularly effective reconnaissance tools 
for adversaries, allowing them to pinpoint US units and lay in more sophisticated 
ambushes using other units or indirect fires. Drones equipped with explosives could 
i      There is an abundance of free and openly available online resources on AI and machine learning, including arXiv, Github, 
Google’s TensorFlow, Caffe, and other repositories for technical papers, trained models, datasets, and instructional resources
S T R A T E G I C  L A T E N C Y  U N L E A S H E D    |    407 
also be effective against high-value soft targets, such as aircraft, similar to the 2012 
Taliban attack on Camp Bastion in Afghanistan that damaged eight Marine Corps AV-
8B Harrier aircraft. Nonstate groups have already attempted such an attack. In 2018, 
a Syrian rebel group attacked Russian bases in Syria with 13 small armed drones. 
Russian forces brought down all 13 drones through a combination of direct fire and 
electronic warfare.22 Nevertheless, a similar but successful attack using massed small 
drones could disrupt operations, cause casualties, or damage high-value assets. 
One challenge with such a threat is drones could potentially deliver explosives with 
higher accuracy than mortars or rockets, allowing attackers to deliver more precise fire 
against key targets.
In the longer-term, autonomous self-driving vehicles pose a potentially significant 
terrorist threat to ground troops and installations, given ground vehicles have a much 
higher payload capacity than small drones. Fleets of autonomous vehicles could 
be laden with explosives or simply used for ramming attacks, as has occurred with 
human-driven vehicles against civilians in other settings. Autonomy increases the 
number of vehicles that could potentially be used in such an attack. Without the need 
for a human driver onboard the vehicle, a small group, or even a single individual, 
could launch a mass vehicle attack, overwhelming an installation’s defenses and 
causing casualties. 
AI developments will apply to not only robotic systems but also nonphysical AI 
systems, such as AI-based synthetic media (computer-generated text, audio, images, 
or video).23 Terrorist groups have adopted and exploited social media for propaganda 
purposes, and will likely continue this trend using synthetic media. Today, tailor-made 
“deepfakes,” fake videos created using deep learning, can be acquired online for 
$30.24 Presently, the quality of most deepfake videos is not particularly good, but it is 
improving rapidly as computing power continues to increase. Within the next several 
years, high-quality deepfake videos are likely to be widely available to malicious 
actors. Meanwhile, high-quality synthetic voice generation is possible today. While 
deepfake videos can currently be detected using machine learning-based detectors, 
long-term trends point to the creation and availability of detection-resistant fakes, 
which will have significant implications for disinformation, propaganda, and other 
information operations. 
Conclusion
AI, autonomy, and robotics technologies are evolving rapidly, presenting both new 
opportunities and challenges for SOF. The special operations community will need to 
adapt quickly to this new technology and the risks and opportunities it presents. A 
continual process of experimentation, rapid prototyping, and threat assessment will 
be essential to adapting to the AI revolution. 
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Weaponized Information: 
Influence and Deception in the Age of Social Media
David M. Perlman, CDR Pablo C. Breuer, and Sara-Jayne Terp
“All warfare is based on deception. . . . The skillful leader  
subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting.”
—Sun Tzu, The Art of War1
Introduction
Since the 2016 US presidential election, much of the world has developed a keen 
interest in what could collectively be referred to as “information disorder.” In the 
United States, “fake news” was the initial focus, before the term lost meaning 
through overuse. The news cycle has swept through “Russian election interference,” 
“Cambridge Analytica,” “microtargeting,” “misinformation,” “polarization,” “filter 
bubbles,” and countless other terms related to this topic. These trends reveal both 
a growing awareness that the information ecosystem (consisting of digital networks, 
traditional media, and human beliefs and communication) is a critical foundation for 
the politics and economy of a free and democratic society and that this foundation is 
crumbling. In the past, such efforts to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations 
would have resulted in war. Instead, today we find ourselves in a time of competition 
short of armed conflict. 
This chapter is for readers dedicated to the defense of a free and democratic 
society. Our target audience is readers who are grounded in the theory of military 
strategy and tactics based on traditional notions of the Westphalian nation-state and 
the diplomatic, military, information, economic (DIME) model of the instruments of 
national power. Many will also be familiar with military information support operations 
(MISO) and other perspectives on information and communication as a form of 
“support”—that is, support for kinetic superiority, which is traditionally the primary 
focus of military strategy in Western nations. For those with this background, it 
may be challenging to read that the new technologies of digital communication, and 
particularly social networks, enable persuasion that poses an existential threat not 
only to the United States but also to the very idea of a free and democratic society. 
How could a few Twitter botsi and targeted Facebook advertisements possibly count 
as an existential threat in a world with nuclear weapons and aircraft carriers? For 
readers with those questions, we include a vignette at the end of this chapter; but, in 
brief, the decisions about when and how to use our mighty kinetic weapons are made 
by groups of people utilizing technological information systems, and—given enough 
i   Fully automated accounts.
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data, computational power, and broadcast bandwidth—modeling, and at least partially 
controling, collective human behaviors and system outputs is surprisingly easy.
Some might object that controlling collective human behavior sounds suspiciously 
close to science-fiction ideas of “mass mind control” and flies in the face of ideals 
of free will and personal responsibility, but consider the analogy of a weather report: 
you can’t predict where and when one raindrop will fall, but you can certainly predict 
when it will rain, and that is usually all you need. Elections are routinely decided 
by less than one percent2; for that matter, many businesses live or die by 0.01 
percent changes in metrics on their quarterly reports. The philosophy of free will and 
responsibility is beyond the scope of this article, but we urge readers to set aside any 
reservations and follow along with our exploration of what can be accomplished by 
moving a few percent of a carefully selected demographic.
We will discuss fundamental differences about these new information attacks, 
explain what it means for an information ecosystem to be healthy or unhealthy, and 
what an “attack” looks like. We will also explore the kinds of consequences that 
can befall political and economic systems when the information ecosystem is under 
attack, and we hope it will be clear that such an attack is of paramount concern, not a 
mere matter of “support” to kinetic military activities. We will further discuss potential 
countermeasures and offer some overarching recommendations. We focus primarily 
on democratic, free-market societies, but we will not limit our discussion to “election 
interference.” The nation’s strength requires use of all of the instruments of national 
power. Democracies, in particular, require the citizenry believes in the legitimacy of 
their leaders’ power and understand how the government functions. An information 
attack that targets elections, and therefore casts doubt on the legitimacy of leaders, 
is an attack on the foundation of that democracy. 
History of Communication Technology and Society
“Every revolution has its medium, and every new medium creates its 
own new form of revolution.... But revolutions come with unexpected 
costs. Printing liberated humanity, but also triggered centuries of 
religious and political struggle.”
—Bill Kovarik, Revolutions in Communication3
Throughout history, military thinkers such as Sun Tzu, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Carl 
von Clausewitz have recognized the importance of misinformation. Deception is as old 
as warfare. New technology has always enabled misinformation. Technologists have 
rarely anticipated how their innovations could be abused for malice. The internet has 
completed a cycle in broadcasting to the masses that began with the printing press 
invented by Johannes Gutenberg and has fundamentally changed misinformation.
Until approximately 1445 CE, message transmission in the Western world was 
limited. While papyrus was invented around the second century BCE4 it was not 
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universally available until much later. Broadcasting and amplifying messages required 
that fascimiles be made by hand and transmitted separately. Further complicating the 
issue of transmitting to a mass populace, literacy was limited and messages could be 
transmitted only as far as they could be carried physically. Transmission of messages 
during this time period was limited mostly to nation-states or religious institutions. 
Although printing presses existed in China at the end of the first century CE5 not 
until the development of the Gutenberg press in approximately 1455 did transmitting 
messages to a large population become easier in the West. The cost of the press, 
materials needed for printing, and initial typesetting were expensive and time-consuming 
and served to limit who could afford to mass produce their message. Literacy was still 
limited, and messages still had to be hand carried. The Gutenberg press catalyzed an 
increase in literacy throughout the West, thereby increasing the population of who could 
receive a “transmitted” message. The change brought about by the Gutenberg press 
also represents the first time creators of a technology failed to account for how it could 
be used against them. The Catholic Church had no objection to Gutenberg’s first Latin 
Bible; but fifty years later, the Protestant Reformation thrived by embracing the new 
technology. The church was forced into a defensive strategy (presaging today’s media 
politics) that combined attempts to censor the new media with their own extensive use 
of the printing press for propaganda.6
In the 1830s, the invention of the telegraph became the next step in the 
information revolution.7 The telegraph allowed for near instantaneous transmission of 
messages over a long distance. The creation of the telegraph network infrastructure 
was initially expensive, and the transmission and reception of messages required 
knowledge of Morse code at both the transmitting and receiving stations. While 
messages could be retransmitted beyond the original source, telegraph remained 
a point-to-point medium not particularly well-suited for reaching a mass audience 
simultaneously. Transmitters had to know something about their intended recipient, 
and both message transmitters and recipients had to be able to reach a telegraph 
station. The need for infrastructure served as a gatekeeping function for who can 
transmit and receive messages. A government or company could simply refuse to 
transmit a message or deliver a transmitted message.
In 1896, the Guglielmo Marconi radio8 provided two game-changing capabilities: the 
abilities to broadcast to a populace without needing to know the recipient and to receive 
messages without the need for specialized knowledge. The capabilities allowed for the 
concept of a “universal” recipient. While transmission equipment of any real power was 
expensive, anyone with a radio receiver within range of the transmitter could receive a 
message. Instantaneous delivery of messages to a large population within a relatively 
large area became possible. Soon after realizing the power of radio broadcasts, nation-
states called for regulation at the 1906 International Radiotelegraph Convention in 
Berlin,9 and the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was established in 
1934.10 Nation-state regulation and the prohibitive cost of high-power transmission 
equipment limited who could transmit. The falling cost of equipment allowed the general 
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populace to receive messages from their own homes and led the radio to become the 
preferred source of trusted news and information; message reception had become 
democratized. The faith in the truth of radio transmissions was so ingrained that there 
was widespread panic in 1938 when an entertainment broadcast, The War of the Worlds, 
was mistaken for real-world news.11
In 1927, the invention of the television in the United States12 became the next 
innovation in the information revolution. The first commercial television station 
appeared in 1928, and for the first time, images could be transmitted to a mass 
audience. In 1936, Adolf Hitler used television transmission of the Olympic Games to 
convey his views of racial supremacy and to promote his form of government.13 By the 
1950s, television had become the premier way to influence populations, and access 
to this powerful medium was tightly controlled. As late as the 1990s, one needed a 
head of state to demand national television stations interrupt regularly scheduled 
broadcasts to carry a message. In the United STates, television broadcasts were 
limited to a small handful of networks who all abided by the “Television Code,” and by 
the 1980s, there was a well-established and uniform American national culture.14
While the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC) was created 
for the United States Army in 194315 and the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
Network (ARPANET) was created in 1969,16 computers did not fundamentally change 
the delivery of misinformation until much later. In the 1980s and 1990s, corporations 
introduced computers to a large portion of the populace. The internet became publicly 
available in 1991 and was widespread in US homes by 2001. While the ability to 
“broadcast” messages arguably started with Usenet groups in 1980, the first widely 
recognized social media platform was Six Degrees,17 which did not appear until in 
1997, followed by other platforms such as Friendster (2002), Facebook (2004), and 
Twitter (2006). While every previous advancement in communication technology 
democratized the receipt of information, transmission still remained in the hands of 
a select few. The internet and social media finally democratized the ability to transmit 
to a wide audience. We now live in a world where Katy Perry, an entertainer, can use 
Twitter to instantly reach twice as many people as the president of the United States. 
This democratization has had many benefits, but there are also costs. Audiences can 
no longer be provided any assurance of who originates a message, so provenance and 
authenticity of alleged facts and media is always in question. The loss of centralized 
coordination has led to a breakdown of shared national knowledge and identity in a 
nation as diverse as the United States.
The democratization of transmission to mass audience is not the only fundamental 
change that the internet provided to those that seek to conduct influence operations. 
The ability to measure the effectiveness of messaging is critical to all influence 
operations. In 1994, the first internet advertisement appeared when AT&T paid 
HotWired for space at the top of their homepage. The birth of internet advertising gave 
rise to tracking click-through rates as a measure of the effectiveness of any particular 
advertisement. On social media, beginning in 2009, Facebook’s “like” and Twitter’s 
414   |   D A V I S ,  G A C ,  R A G E R ,  R E I N E R  &  S N O W
“retweet” buttons allowed for similar measurement of messaging effectiveness on 
social media platforms. This near instantaneous feedback of message effectiveness 
allows for much more rapid AB testing and message honing than is available via 
traditional media and misinformation channels.
The rise of the internet and social media has fundamentally changed the delivery of 
misinformation. By democratizing transmission to a mass audience, social media has 
removed gatekeepers who might prevent transmission of harmful messages as well 
as removing any assurance that a message is being transmitted from an authoritative 
source. Additionally, the advertisement-driven model of the internet has led to the 
ability to track effectiveness of messaging in near real time and allow for rapid testing, 
evaluation, and honing of influence messaging. In short, the informational instrument 
of national power can now be wielded by a small group, or even an individual. Because 
of this, it is necessary to understand social media as a dual-use technology and to 
evaluate its potential for strategic latency.
The Structure of Social Media
“Move fast and break things.”
—Mark Zuckerberg18
The power of fully democratized mass communication makes social media a key topic 
from a strategic latency perspective. A social networking serviceii such as Twitter or 
Facebook consists of:
• A computer system (i.e., servers, custom software) designed for the primary 
purpose of facilitating human users sharing human-readable information 
(e.g., words, pictures) with each other.
• A population of users, including individual humans as well as other account-
holding entities.
• The collection of human-scale information hosted on the system (e.g., 
“posts,” “tweets,” “memes,” “hashtags”).
• The metadata stored on the servers that defines the graph relationships of the 
network, such as who is “friends” with whom and who has “liked” which posts.
ii    There is some ambiguity in usage of terminology. We use “social media” to refer to the collective sphere of socially 
oriented digital communication and “social networking service” to refer to a specific platform such as Twitter, Facebook, 
and WhatsApp. We use “social network” interchangeably as either an abbreviation for “social networking service” or in the 
social-sciences sense of a theoretical abstraction. The distinction should be clear from context.
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of a generic social networking service embedded in a larger context.
Every social network is also embedded in a larger society, including political, 
economic, and legal systems and a broader information ecosystem that includes 
traditional news and other media. This social context creates an additional category of 
“societal metadata,” which also constitutes a particular social networking service:
• The cultural connotations of the particular platform, e.g. Twitter is associated 
with news while Instagram and SnapChat are associated with millennials.
• The laws that constrain the service, such as fiscal or content regulations.
• The business model of the service, where the money to run it comes from. 
This is usually advertising for the services we are most interested in, but 
there are other possibilities as well.
• The various characteristics of the user population. For example, European 
users are highly concerned about privacy (consider General Data Protection 
Regulation); in some developing nations, labor for manual content promotion 
is affordable and readily available (“click farms”).
The embedding of a social networking service in a societal context also allows us 
to define “inputs” and “outputs.” The “inputs” are the pathways by which information 
enters the social networking service. Inputs can be organic, when users observe 
something in the world around them and post it onto the network; or, information 
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can be injected directly into the network, primarily in the form of paid advertising 
or “promoted” content. The “outputs” are the pathways by which the information in 
the social network (the users and the servers collectively) affect the world outside. 
Similar to inputs, outputs can be organic, in the form of users’ collective behaviors, 
resulting from what they have seen on the social network; or, information can flow out 
of the network in bulk, for example, when it is sold to advertisers or other enterprise 
customers, for purposes of marketing or research.
In Figure 2, the heavy double arrows represent the dense data flow within the 
social network itself, representing a constant feedback loop of users reading content 
out of and entering content into the network via mobile apps and desktop websites. 
Within this cycle, there are two kinds of “filter funnels.” While each user makes 
individual choices about what to post, the collective pattern of information selection 
from the user population into the platform is represented as a funnel of “social and 
cognitive filtering.” On the other side, a large volume of information is contained in the 
platform’s servers, where algorithms known as “recommendation engines” decide, 
on an individual basis, what to present to each user’s feed. The collective pattern 
of information selection from the servers to the user population is also represented 
as a funnel in our diagram. This funnel is often referred to as “the algorithm.” The 
inputs and outputs mentioned above are represented in the four corners of this figure. 
Finally, a social networking service’s computer servers also gather private user data 
such as geolocation, demographics, browsing behavior, and advertising statistics.iii 
iii  “Key performance indicators” or “KPIs”: “impressions,” “click throughs,” and “conversions” are some that you will hear 
frequently.
Figure 2. Information flow and filter funnels in a social networking service.
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Although this model certainly oversimplifies the complexity of a real social networking 
service, it contains enough essential elements to allow us to discuss the unique 
features of weaponized information in the age of social media.
Under normal circumstances, we might assume the content contained in a social 
network would, for the most part, accurately reflect the human users’ distribution of 
thoughts, beliefs, and experiences. For example, if a meme or hashtag is “trending,” 
this ought to mean that people do, in fact, really like (or, in some cases, hate) it. 
It resonated naturally with a large number of users, and they “liked,” shared, or 
took other actions to promote it. By design, social networks also allow business or 
political entities to use paid advertising as a traceable and accountable mechanism 
of influence. Content boosted through paid advertising can be vetted, and, in cases 
where abuse is discovered, the responsible parties can be identified immediately. 
While this equilibrium and transparency is maintained, the platform arguably serves 
the interests of a free and democratic society.iv The democratization of mass 
communication was an explicit goal of those who created new communication 
technologies such as the internet, and as long as this equilibrium appeared to hold, 
the internet and especially social media were celebrated as a humanitarian leap.19
Sociotechnical Systems and “Misinfosec”
“The lethal combination is when you exploit  
both people and technology.”
—Kevin Mitnick, 200220
A social networking service as we have described it is an example of a sociotechnical 
system (STS).21 In order to design, manage, or understand a sociotechnical system, it 
is necessary to combine social, cognitive, emotional, and technological perspectives. 
The Interaction Design Foundation writes, “Exploring a design problem by rising to an 
STS mindset can reveal further dimensions of a design’s use potential and inspire 
development.”22 This holds equally true for a system’s misuse potential and inspiring 
the development of exploits. In the security world, this STS mindset has always 
been implicit in the concept of “social engineering.” A social engineering attack is 
“the acquisition of information about computer systems by nontechnical means,”23 
specifically by using deception to manipulate human users and/or administrators.
Many people consider social engineering attacks to be the easiest and most 
common kind of cyberattacks,24 and they represent an enormous and growing problem. 
iv    Recently, many people have raised serious questions about this “attention economy.” When a platform’s profits depend on 
maximizing engagement, it creates an incentive to tune the algorithms to show more sensational, shocking, divisive, and 
even sometimes violent content. There are concerns that social networks’ relentless drive for engagement may trump good 
corporate citizenship and even national security. There are also privacy concerns about how social networks use the user 
data they collect. (Breaux, T. D., An Introduction to Privacy for Technology Professionals, International Association of Privacy 
Professionals, 2020). These are important issues and we certainly do not mean to dismiss them lightly. However, for the 
purposes of this chapter, we are only interested in exploring how hostile adversaries can misuse social networks. 
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In a social engineering attack, the vulnerability of the STS is some collection of cognitive 
biases or other human psychological weaknesses; the exploit is constructed from known 
techniques of psychological manipulation and deception; the attack vector is an email 
message, phone call, or other message targeted at an individual; and the outcome of 
a successful attack is generally that the attacker acquires a password or some other 
form of access to a computer system. But social engineering is only a tiny bit of the full 
scope of potentially exploitable vulnerabilities in sociotechnical systems. An emerging 
field of research and practice on sociotechnical security25 or “misinfosec”26 considers 
the massive scale of effects that are possible from attacks on sociotechnical systems 
when there are hundreds of millions of users and information can be spread to most of 
them within seconds. For the kind of attack considered by misinfosec, the vulnerabilities 
are the interacting collective of the human cognitive biases and the biases in the 
recommendation engines’ algorithms27; the exploits might include anything from 
traditional online ad campaigns to overseas troll farms, click farms, and sock puppets,v 
and even control of traditional media such as television or print; the attack vectors are 
memes, narratives, hashtags, and other forms of information trends that target entire 
populations28; and the outcome of a successful attack would consist of changes in 
behaviors and/or beliefs of those entire populations and the real-world effects of those 
changes, such as political or economic movements, or even mass murder.29
TABLE 1: SECURITY CONCEPTS MAPPED INTO “MISINFOSEC” DOMAIN
“Pure” Cyber Social Engineering Misinfosec
Risk  
exposure
Access to sensitive data,  
admin control of systems, denial of 
service, data loss, financial transfers
Political and economic effects,  
election results, market movements, protests,  
riots, genocide




Code bugs,  








Social psychology;  
social, economic, or racial 
injustice and unrest; mob 
instincts, social belonging,  
and group identity
Algorithmic 













sensationalism; clickbait; using 
nationalism, religion, race to 
provoke fear, anger, or violence




Persistence Hidden,  dormant code
Established trust 
relationships
Cult-like groups; penetration of 
pseudoscience or “alternative 
facts” into mainstream; 
demographics devoted to 
compromised news sources  
or public figures
Large  
follower counts,  
high search 
rankings
v   Manually operated accounts with fake identities.
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Marketing or Misinfosec: A Note on Dual-Use
“Strategic latency refers to the inherent potential  
for technologies to bring about significant shifts in  
the military or economic balance of power.”
—Strategic Latency and World Power, 201430
Persuasion has always been big business, and the rise of the internet and social media 
has led to unprecedented business and economic development.31 At least two of the most 
profitable businesses in the world—Facebook and Google—are, arguably, primarily digital 
marketing behemoths.32 All of the techniques we discuss in this chapter were developed 
for civilian purposes as a result of the tremendous business incentives, and all of them 
continue to be used primarly for legitimate business, or, in many cases, simple financially 
motivated fraud and scams. But any technology can be dual use; the key distinction is 
not the nature of the technology itself, but whether the intent is hostile and the result is a 
“shift in power.”33 Although it is possible, to a limited extent, to distinguish between ethical 
“white hat” and illegitimate “black hat” digital marketing activities,34 we focus only on 
how these technologies have the potential to “bring about significant shifts in the military 
or economic balance of power” without concerning ourselves too much about carving 
out exceptions for “legitimate” marketing or political campaigning. With that in mind, 
we will first give an overview of techniques that can be considered closely analogous to 
“exploits” in the domains of human cognitive vulnerability, and recommendation algorithm 
vulnerability, and then proceed to consider the larger-scale structure of digitally mediated 
mass persuasion and how new developments have made it far more powerful.
Cognitive Vulnerabilities and Exploits
“There’s a sucker born every minute.”
—Never actually spoken by P.T. Barnum
Salesmen, politicians, performers, and religious leaders have been refining 
psychological techniques of persuasion since antiquity.35 These techniques take 
advantage of “cognitive biases” and “cognitive fallacies,” predictable cognitive 
patterns that bypass rational thought and drive behavior.36 A complete study of 
psychological techniques of persuasion would be an enormous undertaking far beyond 
our scope, but we will mention a few particularly relevant ones to this chapter:
• The “foot-in-the-door” technique or “yes ladder”: starting with an easy point 
of persuasion and building it up one small step at a time.37
• The “door-in-the-face” technique, also known as “framing effects”: starting 
with an outrageous and unacceptable point so that subsequent offers or 
gambits seem reasonable in comparison.38
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• A picture is worth a thousand words: using visual media such as memes, 
GIFs, or fake videos to make content more compelling.39
• Kernel of truth: hiding items of disinformation among other items of verifiable 
information.40
• Halo effect or celebrity endorsement: making people believe a message by 
having a celebrity or respected figure deliver it.41
• In-group bias and social conformity: developing real or fake networks of accounts 
that make target audiences think this is what “people like me” believe.42
• Guilt by association and scapegoats: Discrediting individuals or accusations 
by deflecting onto members of a despised out-group.43
• Simple repetition: flooding a target audience with a message so it comes to 
believe the message without any conscious decision.44
• Push polls: using fake polls to make a certain position seem desirable 
because it is “popular.”45
• Competing narratives and “false equivalence”: promote real or manufactured 
debate between alternative messages, one or more of which is the “payload.”46
• “Whataboutism,” straw man, and other forms of misdirection: the adversary 
distracts from unfavorable facts by offering an emotional but unrelated reply.47
• Fear and hate mongering: uniting the masses behind a message by 
associating the message with strong negative emotions about a despised out-
group; for example, depicting Jews or immigrants as murderers and rapists.48
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Algorithm Exploits
“By far, the greatest danger of artificial intelligence is that people 
conclude too early that they understand it.”
—Eliezer Yudkowsky50
Recommendation algorithms (and other machine-learning/artificial-intelligence 
systems) are now so enormously complex that no one fully understands how they 
work or what they will do in any particular situation.51 This uncertainty has created 
an ongoing “arms race” between the companies who build the algorithms and 
marketers who are constantly developing new techniques to manipulate them.52 These 
techniques are generally referred to as search engine optimization (SEO) and social 
media optimization (SMO)53 and consist of passive techniques such as fine-tuning a 
website’s metadata or active techniques such as bots and spam, and everything in 
between. Some common and highly effective techniques to influence an algorithms’ 
content ranking include:
• Promotion by fake accounts: these include “bots,” “sock puppets,”  
and “cyborgs” (partial automation).
• Pay-per-click (PPC) and “phone farms”: real humans with real accounts are 
paid to “like” content.
• Social media spam: posting massive volumes of content directed at  
unwitting users.
• Keyword/hashtag hijacking or stuffing: adding many common keywords, or 
one currently trending keyword, to unrelated content.
• Impersonation: using accounts claiming to be someone famous and 
respected to promote content.
• Blog comment spam: using unmoderated, unsupervised comment forums on 
blogs, YouTube videos, newspaper articles, Google Maps, Yelp reviews, and 
other platmforms to promote content.
Insights from Digital Marketing
It is also helpful to understand some general terms and concepts from digital (and 
traditional) marketing. Any influence campaign, whether carried out by legitimate 
advertisers or a hostile entity, involves certain steps:
• Message selection and optimization: The message is based on the goals 
of the campaign, but there are many decisions to be made about the exact 
content and form, which will depend on the other choices in the campaign. It 
is particularly important to optimize a message for a target audience.
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• Audience selection and targeting: Likewise, all details of the audience will 
not be dictated by the goals; the exact audience may be refined based on the 
medium or other choices.
• Medium selection: The planners must choose which form of communication 
to use: Websites or social media? Or even TV or print? The choices of media 
fall into two categories, passive and active, and there are specific techniques 
for each category.54
-  Passive or broadcast media would be websites that might or might not 
appear in searches, or social media posts that might or might not be 
displayed in a user’s feed. This would also include more traditional 
broadcast or display media such as TV, radio, and billboards.
-  Active media or “direct marketing” would be anything that is intentionally 
delivered directly to a specific user. This could be search engine sidebar 
ads, paid targeted social media ads, or even email, phone, or postal mail.
• Targeting websites for direct display to users in sidebar ads is called 
“search engine marketing” (SEM)
• Targeting social media content for direct display as promoted ads is 
called “social media marketing” (SMM)
A campaign will be most effective if choices are made based on evidence. The 
primary tool for evidence-based optimization is “AB testing,” where two or more 
versions of a campaign are tested simultaneously and the response metrics 
compared. With traditional media, this testing process can be slow and difficult; one 
of the most transformative features of digital media is that the speed of computation 
and data transmission is now so great that AB testing can be done in a rapid iterative 
cycle, where dozens or hundreds of different approaches can be tested, measured, 
altered, and retested, sometimes even without human intervention.
A campaign will also be most effective with detailed and precise audience 
targeting. Another transformative feature of digital media is the enormous volume 
and detail of user data, especially on social networks. This allows extremely detailed 
and precise targeting of specific messages to narrow demographic slices or even 
individuals, which is called “microtargeting” (and has received a great deal of scrutiny, 
although generally not within a security context).55 
Even without resorting to “black hat” techniques, the power of rapid iterative AB 
testing combined with microtargeting is immense. Advertising “conversion rates”—
the percentage of users who take the desired action, per baseline statistic such as 
email count, page views, or number of times an ad is displayed—have traditionally 
been low, from a fraction of a percent to a few percent in the best circumstances.56 
But a campaign that uses the best available techniques in clever ways can achieve 
conversion rates greater than 50 percent.57 The structure and modeling of user data 
is key to the most powerful campaigns, so we will consider that next.
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Demographic Modeling and “Big Data”
“Andrew Hacker has suggested that the use of electromagnetic 
computers to simulate the political behavior of the real world has led 
to essentially trivial findings.... [But] its successful employment is a 
legitimate subject of concern in normative terms, as well as proof that 
Hacker was in error to dismiss it lightly. The history of science is full of 
evidence that solutions to old problems often create new problems”
—Joseph Bernd, 196658
The power to influence is closely connected with the power to measure. Population-
scale models of consumer and political preferences have existed as mathematical 
abstractions in the field of economics for generations. New developments in graph 
theory and computational social science can model the spread of information through 
social networks. Additionally, models from voting theory and market economics show 
how population preferences lead to political and financial “outputs.” All these models 
combined can now be fully fleshed out with the enormous volume and depth of 
personal user data aggregated by social network platforms. Combining these models 
with the armamentarium of new and old tactics and techniques for algorithmic and 
social/cognitive manipulation allows an unprecedented degree of power to test, refine, 
and implement influence campaigns from the earliest stages all the way to the desired 
outcomes of political changes. The result of the convergence of these developments 
is the emergence of influence campaigns with vastly greater complexity, scale, 
precision, and effectiveness—and dramatically lower cost—than ever before. 
This power results from the combination of huge collections of user data and 
the computing power to apply enormously sophisticated analyses and production 
algorithms, techniques variously referred to as “data science,” “machine learning,” 
or “artificial intelligence.” A collection of user or population data is both “wide”—that 
is, it describes a large number of individuals—and “deep”—that is, it contains many 
distinct pieces of information about each individual. A deep user database contains 
a shockingly diverse amount of information about individuals, such as demographics, 
purchasing habits, travel and movement habits, financial information, political 
preferences and affiliations, social connections, and even subtle metrics derived 
from application logs, such as how fast they read, how long their attention tends to 
stay on one thing, sleep-wake cycles, and even some kinds of health data. Such a 
database might contain ten thousand or a hundred thousand variables. Much of the 
art of working effectively with such data sets revolves around distilling this massive 
collection of numbers (which always contains many missing variables, errors, and 
redundancies) into something more meaningful on a human scale that can be used for 
tasks such as prediction and targeting. 
The mathematics of data science is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is 
important to evoke a general sense of how data scientists think. A large data set 
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can be thought of as having ten thousand dimensions (or whatever the number of 
variables). In order to make practical use of the data, the number of dimensions 
must be reduced to something manageable while still capturing the most important 
aspects of the overall data set. When discussing machine learning and data science, 
one customarily draws two-dimensional diagrams as generic representations of the 
data dimensions, without worrying about the details. For example, a representation 
of political voting data can be drawn as a cloud of points, where each point is an 
individual, the colors represent the actual vote or party affiliation, and the two-
dimensional space of the diagram is a simplified representation of however many 
variables in the reduced data set turn out to be relevant. 
These diagrams can be used to represent schematically the movements of 
population-aggregate beliefs and the outputs of market or political movements. In the 
future, this could be used to generate virtual tactical battlefield displays for planning, 
monitoring, or analyzing influence operations. We will use such diagrams to describe 
some theoretical advanced influence operations. But first, we will describe a useful 
heuristic for thinking about population beliefs and influence operations.
The Overton Window and Mass Influence
Joseph P. Overton described “The Overton Window” as the range of public political 
discourse tolerated within a given society’s media ecosystem.59 His original 
presentation of the concept considered any policy issue to be represented by a single 
dimension. The Overton Window is the “realm of the politically possible”: the range of 
positions that, say, a politician could express and hope for any possibility of success; 
in the original model this range of positions is represented by a single line segment 
along the single issue dimension. The idea of a unidimensional political spectrum is 
useful for simple rhetoric, but we will show here how it can be adapted to much more 
useful “Overton Blob” on the multidimensional population preference diagram.
The original presentation of the Overton Window merely used it as a device to 
describe how policies shift incrementally with changing societal norms. The Overton 
Window drifts slowly over time; lobbying and advocacy can steer that drift to some 
extent, but Overton’s original point was that ideas outside the “realm of the possible” 
were simply unattainable.60 Highly motivated lobbyists can achieve significant policy 
changes, but this can be expensive and may require extraordinary brilliance. For 
example, between 1980 and 2001, Enron achieved many of its policy goals around 
deregulation of energy futures trading using traditional methods of lobbying, campaign 
contributions, and advertising, including the innovative, award-winning “Metal Man” 
TV ad campaign.61 Although the desired change was well within the Overton Window 
of the time, Enron spent countless millions over decades to achieve it.62 But the 
enhanced power of the contemporary techniques we discuss in this chapter suggest a 
bolder approach to the Overton Window.63
Consider the challenge facing an entity who wishes to advocate a position far 
outside currently acceptable discourse. The straightforward, incremental approach is 
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essentially the “foot in the door”: advocate an incremental change and gradually work 
toward the desired shift in population preferences. But consider instead a “door-in-
the-face” approach. The entity would begin by establishing an extreme, even ludicrous, 
narrative. Once the extreme narrative has been injected into the public discourse, 
everything less extreme immediately becomes fair game; thus, the Overton Window 
has been expanded more rapidly than possible with an incremental approach.
To make this process work, two things are required: a detailed understanding of the 
preference landscape, to facilitate targeting of the fringe cluster in a way that supports 
the desired policy goals; and a reliable method for injecting extreme content into the 
public discourse, items well outside what would have been acceptable previously. Big 
data and demographic modeling have taken care of the first requirement. The second 
requirement is easier than ever before, thanks to the advanced influence techniques 
we have discussed. Worse, social media and the internet thrive on extreme spectacle; 
most people receive their news from Facebook, which provides ample opportunity for 
radical shifts in opinion through algorithmic and cognitive manipulation.
To illustrate how this might work, we present a tongue-in-cheek hypothetical 
scenario that builds on the real-world story of the “cinnamon challenge.” 
Figure 4: Moving the Overton Window.
The cinnamon challenge first appeared in 2001, but suddenly went viral in 
2012, with 70,000 mentions a day on Twitter at its peak, and more than 1.5 
million videos online—the most popular of which had 56 million views as of 
2020.64 There’s no reason to believe there was any hidden agenda other then 
the usual hype around sensational cultural phenomena, but what would it look 
like if it had been a part of an influence campaign of the type we just described? 
Consider an oregano manufacturer who wants to increase sales dramatically. 
An extreme approach would be an ad campaign promoting the consumption of 
heaping spoonfuls of oregano, but it would be challenging to directly convince 
426   |   D A V I S ,  G A C ,  R A G E R ,  R E I N E R  &  S N O W
people of such a ridiculous idea. However, eating a spoonful of cinnamon is not 
only ridiculous but also agonizingly painful and even potentially fatal, which makes 
it ideal fodder for a media ecosystem driven by sensation. Our imaginary oregano 
supplier could easily manufacture a cinnamon challenge trend, starting with 
staged videos, then promoting them using familiar techniques such as botnets  
and perhaps a celebrity tie-in.
Persistence in Digital Influence: Conspiracies and Cults
Briefly popular, the cinnamon challenge faded away almost as fast as it appeared. 
An adversary who desires large-scale, ongoing influence would want to establish 
a persistent campaign. The most obvious ways to do this would be to buy news 
stations, film studios, and the loyalties of talk show hosts, and, in fact, both 
Russia and China currently have extensive stakes in various American media.65 
More subtle approaches to persistence also exist. In the cinnamon challenge 
story, the Overton Window expands not because everyone participates but because 
enough individuals engaged in the same activity to bring it to the level of public 
discourse. This phenomenon can be represented diagrammatically as a small, 
dense cluster well outside the main population. In reality, the cinnamon challenge 
population was only bored teenagers who quickly moved on to the next fad. But 
for purposes of persistence, one might imagine a “cult of cinnamon” that could 
cause the cluster to remain cohesive. In order to accomplish this, an adversary 
would have to inspire and unite a significant number of individuals by constructing 
narratives of identity and otherness.
The 419 scam/conspiracy narrative technique is particularly well suited to this 
purpose. Large-scale promotion of implausible conspiracy theories is a potentially 
powerful way to allow particularly credulous individuals to self-select into an ideological 
identity group, united by an “us-against-the-world” mentality and other cultlike patterns. 
The group identity and demographics would have to be constructed in such a way 
that the adversary is able to reactivate the cluster for ongoing influence activities by 
feeding them information directly; for example, an aspect of the group identity might 
be loyalty to media sources under the adversary’s influence. An adversary who knew 
how to “hack ten million useful idiots”66 and establish such a persistent, controllable 
population cluster—a “Weaponized Useful Idiot Demographic”67—for purposes of 
political and social influence would be powerful indeed. 
Detecting and Defending against Disinformation Campaigns
There are many published “solutions” to disinformation attacks and social media 
protection.68 While they are all useful, it is foolish to think any one of them will solve 
the disinformation problem single-handedly. Proposed solutions often address small 
pieces of an attack, are intractable, or do not scale. Disinformation campaigns 
are whole-system attacks, and to solve them, one must examine whole-system 
solutions. We need a “thousand bullet,” not a “silver bullet,” solution. 
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Models and Frameworks
We provide an overview of models and frameworks that we have developed (or 
repurposed) to allow defenders to better understand the nature of an incident, and 
to map out the space of potential solutions. We can look at the solution space in 
several different ways. One is as a human space, in which we are engaged in narrative 
warfare. Human communication is generally at the level of stories, or narration: we 
tell each other stories about the world, as sentences, image sequences, or memes. 
Each person bases their sense of self (“identity”), their belonging to different groups 
(“in-groups”), and exclusion of others (“out-groups”) on narratives. Narratives are 
typically personal, emotionally charged, deeply entrenched, and difficult to shift 
directly. In this space, it becomes important to track and disrupt narratives and 
their components (e.g., memes, stories, sentiments) not by countering them directly 
with “facts” but with “information aikido.” It is easier to redirect an angry mob to a 
different house than it is to disband the mob. Narrative warfare is a growing field,69 
and its techniques are a useful component in countering disinformation. Using natural 
language-processing techniques, like topic modeling and gisting, to track narratives 
from disinformation actors and highlighting narratives to potential target audiences 
have also proved useful.
Figure 5: Misinformation Pyramid
The misinformation pyramid is another view of this space. In it, we have the 
different views of creators of misinformation (“attackers”) and the people trying to 
counter them (“defenders”).vi Attackers create incidents (e.g., MacronGate), which 
vi   The third group involved, the targets of the misinformation (“populations”), are not part of this diagram.
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often form part of long-term campaigns (e.g., destabilize French politics). Narratives 
are the stories on which we base our beliefs. To transmit these stories, we need 
artifacts: for example, the user accounts, tweets, images, and connections between 
them, visible in each attack. While the attacker sees the whole of the pyramid from 
the top down, the defender usually sees it from the bottom up, working back from 
artifacts to understand incidents and campaigns (unless they are lucky enough to 
have good insider information or intelligence). The pyramid layers are about not just 
information but also action. Most contemporary misinformation work is at the artifact 
or narrative level; analysis of operations tends to be at incident or campaign levels. 
Figure 6: Adversarial Misinformation and Influence Tactics and Techniques (AMITT) Framework
A useful view of a disinformation incident is as a collection of the objects 
seen within it, including the techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) that the 
attacker used. We created the Adversarial Misinformation and Influence Tactics 
and Techniques (AMITT) framework model to describe common disinformation 
TTPs and the misinformation kill chain of which they are a part. We distilled AMITT 
from examining the US Department of Defense’s Joint Planning process (JP 5-0)70 
and Information Operations publication JP 3-1371; MITRE’s Adversarial Tactics, 
Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK)72; and other models of mass 
influence, including advertising models. The model is designed to be a logical 
extension of ATT&CK and was populated by down-selecting from 68 real-world 
incidents to the 22 with the most varied TTPs.
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The top line of AMITT lists the stages necessary for conducting an attack: planning, 
preparation, execution, and evaluation. Within planning, strategic planning forms a 
commander’s intent, specifically, the overall objective of the misinformation campaign. 
The second line lists the steps of the misinformation kill chain. Below each link of 
the kill chain are TTPs that support completion of that link. Not shown are the tasks 
performed at each of these steps, and counters to each of the steps and techniques.
Figure 7: STIX Object connections.73
Disinformation incidents are rarely isolated events. The AMITT TTPs are part 
of richer description languages drawn from information security, including STIX 
(Structured Threat Information eXpression), that allow analysts to share and 
compare information about shared threat actors, narratives, TTPs, artifacts, potential 
countermeasures, and other objects in each incident and campaign. 
Countermeasures
Now that we’ve presented several models to facilitate thinking about attack planning 
and the defensive kill chain, we will address countermeasures and tools. Adversary 
tactics move quickly in this arena, so it is impossible to present a comprehensive 
and authoritative list of tools and countertactics, but the basic spaces and 
categories are more consistent. Any of the offensive techniques we have already 
discussed can be adapted for defensive or counter-offensive use. In addition, the 
current counter landscape includes: 
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• Detecting artificial amplification. Many disinformation campaigns rely on 
signal amplification, either through “useful idiots” or by raising message 
visibility using nonhuman traffic (bots and botnets). Databases of known 
bad online and state-sponsored actors, with data from pages and social 
media feeds from these actors, have proven useful places to look for 
emerging narratives and links to new actors and artifacts. Increased efforts 
in disinformation detection, mitigating advertising click fraud, and other 
platform integrity concerns has driven adversaries to adapt and focus more on 
protecting their assets, which makes tracking bots and botnets more difficult. 
But there is still value in simple bot/botnet detection techniques including 
analysis of similarities across accounts linked by topic, hashtags, retweets, 
and references, and time-series analysis to check for sleep-wake patterns and 
activity correlations, especially with adversaries new to this space. 
• Fact verification. Fact verification can be done manually or in an automated 
fashion. Manual verification does not scale to the internet. Automated 
verification via natural language programming (NLP) scales better but is 
insufficient to deal with the vast amount of information on the internet. 
Additionally, automated fact verification cannot handle satire or editorials. 
• Social-graph analysis. There have been attempts to detect misinformation 
via social-graph analysis, but a suitable model has not yet been suggested. 
Most social-graph analysis is geared to examining human networks, as 
opposed to social networks. In human networks, people make friends and 
connections at a much higher rate than they lose them. This model is well 
explained by scale-free networks. In misinformation, however, the governing 
characteristic is link destruction, which often results in bifurcating a 
population. No current social model explains this phenomenon.
These counters are insufficient to work on an internet scale, and these 
defenses will show results only after misinformation is consumed. Once consumed, 
counternarratives must overcome their own cognitive friction, bias, and cognitive 
dissonance. Finally, these counters address only a small portion of the kill-chain and 
have historically not been synchronized. The AMITT work on counters covers the whole 
misinformation kill chain.
Conclusion
Misinformation is as old as warfare, but the internet and social media platforms 
have allowed for revolutionary changes in its delivery. While it was relatively simple 
to attribute the source of mass influence campaigns in the past, the democratization 
of reaching mass audiences has added to the challenge of attribution. The ability 
of a nation-state to govern its own internal affairs free from external influence is a 
condition of peace under the Westphalian model. Adversaries such as Russia and 
China have leveraged the complexity of the internet and the social media battlefield 
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to fray the edges of international norms, as laid out by the traditional Wesphalian 
definition of a nation-state, but their recent actions to affect internal affairs of other 
countries have not resulted in war. This fact yields two conclusions: 1) we are in 
a perpetual state of competition short of armed conflict (war); and 2) we are now 
entrenched in a post-Westphalian world. These conclusions necessitate states either 
reestablish old international norms or define new ones.
Appendix
Department of Defense Duffer Cloud: A Disinformation Vignette
When the DOD awarded Duffer Corporation the contract for unified general-purpose 
cloud services, many hailed the move as a long-overdue modernization that would 
improve efficiency, interoperability, security, and economies of scale. Disappointed 
competitors inevitably grumbled, but Senator Forethought, head of the Armed Services 
Committee (ASC), General Backsight, head of US Central Command, and Senator 
Swinton, the senior senator from Duffer’s home state, all supported the decision. The 
trio held regular press conferences to express the importance of the contract to the 
US military and to express their total confidence in Duffer. On the other hand, Senator 
Boer preferred to tweet about “this unholy alliance of the Deep State and globalist 
corporate elites,” but she had always been somewhat fantastical and conspiracy 
minded, and few officials took her seriously. In any case, some officials were already 
questioning her unusual friendliness with the foreign nation Incidentambia. Conversely, 
analysts saw clear signs of concern among US adversaries, including Incidentambia. 
Many of the adversaries were known to take cyberwarfare, digital communication, and 
other emerging leveling technologies seriously and were sensitive to trends in US 
military modernization, all of which were also widely considered a sign that we were on 
the right track. 
One day, an unusual video is posted in several fringe social platforms and goes 
viral when Senator Boer mentions it favorably on Twitter. Blurry and taken from an 
awkward angle, but clearly audible, the video appears to show the Duffer Corp. CEO 
and the director of the NSA joking about Duffer’s cloud services participating in mass 
surveillance of US and foreign customers. Within 24 hours, Duffer holds an emergency 
press conference to announce the video is fake and backs up their claim with clear 
and incontrovertible forensic analysis. Most pundits acknowledge the proof and praise 
Duffer’s rapid response and transparency, but the additional news coverage only 
serves to spread the story to a wider audience. In any case, most people ignore the 
careful attempt at rational persuasion and merely double down on their beliefs.
Almost as soon as the press conference ends, Duffer’s public-relations team 
becomes aware that another video—this one in French—has appeared overseas, 
showing the head of Duffer’s European headquarters having a similar conversation 
with European Union intelligence officials. Officials quickly debunk the video, but 
another one appears on a similar theme. Then, stoking the confusion, yet another 
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video appears to show a meeting of Duffer executives with a notorious strongman 
dictator in an oppressive state. Duffer debunks each video almost as soon as it 
appears, but the tedious technical details fail to reach a wide audience, while botnets 
and clickbait sites continue to boost the wild tales. Although the fakery seems 
obvious and the narrative self-contradictory, the pundits’ eagerness to promote their 
own explanation merely keep the “Deep State Duffer” story in the news.
Eventually, the mainstream news cycle largely moves on. Senator Boer continues 
to preach deep-state conspiracy stories to her own Twitter choir, and variations on 
the theme bubble and stir on the fringes. Public-relations teams have done what 
damage control they could, and social media sentiment analysis suggests the Duffer 
Cloud is being rehabilitated. Within a year, DOD and Duffer begin the long and slow 
upgrade process. Service members and staffers complain about inconvenience and 
technical difficulties. Much of the grumbling takes place on Facebook and various 
other online forums, but complaining is an ancient and harmless military tradition, 
and this raises no red flags.
Without warning, a protest convenes in front of the US embassy in the friendly, but 
somewhat unruly, nation of Waschout. The protestors shout demands and slogans 
based on a dubious but viscerally compelling mutation of the Deep State Duffer story 
in which a terrifying international cabal engages in exploitation and human trafficking 
at the expense of the locals. Embassy security disperses the protest, but the 
protesters reconvene in front of the local Duffer Corp. office. They remain there, as the 
local police appear hesitant to take aggressive action.
Unknown to anyone in the United States, human-staffed “phone farms”—funded 
via cryptocurrency from untraceable sources—have been building up WhatsApp groups 
dedicated to conspiracy theories and diligently testing variations on the Deep State 
Duffer theme. The protests receive little coverage in the United States at first. Senator 
Swinton and some Duffer executives hold a small town hall near headquarters 
to reassure the employees their coworkers in Waschout are safe and the US is 
unwavering in support of the employees. As the town hall is ending, a confrontation 
breaks out: a man shouts something incoherent about human sex trafficking. 
Unwisely, a Duffer executive moves closer to see what the ruckus is all about; when 
the man catches sight of him, he pulls out a gun and declares his moral duty to make 
a citizen’s arrest for these crimes. Panic breaks out; people scream and run away as 
Senator Swinton’s security moves to confront the interloper. He is clearly a few cards 
short of a “well-regulated” deck; his poor trigger discipline leads to an accidental 
discharge, and security has no choice but to take him down. No one else is hurt, and 
mainstream news reports are sober and factual. 
But over the next few days, anonymous posters on fringe forums make a 
connection between the Waschout protests and some newer, more exciting rumors, 
and soon Deep State Duffer 2.0 is trending, darker and more compelling than before. 
As the story goes, Duffer and Swinton are part of a ring of human trafficking and 
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international exploitation backed by the NSA and a sinister globalist cabal; the man at 
the town hall was a hero for uncovering the truth, and the cabal killed him for it.
Social networks are having a field day, and the top search results for Duffer and 
Swinton are clickbait sites full of ludicrous, extravagant, and salacious stories, 
boosted by social media bots. Legitimate mainstream news networks initially resist 
giving in to the temptation of these sensational stories. But then, sensing opportunity 
in the midst of chaos, Duffer’s main competitor Drift announces a lawsuit claiming 
the bidding process for the DOD contract was rigged. Coincidentally, Senator Boer 
has been receiving extensive campaign contributions from a complex network of 
entities with ties to Drift, and she shows strong support for the lawsuit by questioning 
the procurement process—as well as making frequent oblique references to the 
widespread ludicrous rumors. Mainstream reporters and pundits, aware that their 
audiences are largely unfamiliar with the new round of rumors, carefully attempt to 
explain the context without giving it weight. But once the Deep State Duffer train has 
made the jump from internet-fringe to mainstream media, there is no going back. 
Soon the airwaves are filled with talk shows hosting “experts” on “both sides” of the 
“controversy,” and average citizens are discussing the most outlandish conspiracy 
theories about Duffer Corp. as if they have elements of truth. 
Meanwhile, many reasonable people discuss the merits of the Drift lawsuit. In 
the midst of a debate about delays and inefficiencies, a shocking document appears 
on the internet. No one is quite sure where it came from, but the Complaint Catalog 
is an extensive list of candid complaints from service members, running the gamut 
from ordinary inefficiency to rude and unfriendly customer service, all the way up to 
inexcusable levels of incompetence and even hints of misappropriation and fraud. 
Investigation easily reveals that most of the complaints were accurately scraped from 
service members’ public social media posts. Some of them were gathered, by unknown 
means, from ostensibly semiprivate forums like LinkedIn and NextDoor; these, too, are 
mostly traced to their original sources and verified. Some of them cannot be traced to 
a specific online source, but reporters track down a number of the individuals involved, 
who are mostly pleased with the attention and happy to confirm that, yes, they vaguely 
remember that maybe something like that happened at some point.
The repeated appearance in the news of further items leads almost everyone to 
accept the Complaint Catalog as authentic. Eventually, a few of the more dedicated 
investigative journalists and analysts point out that the 5 percent of unverified 
complaints happen to include a significantly higher proportion of severe allegations, 
but this is a subtle and boring warning that gets little traction. The narrative of a 
“mostly verified” Complaint Catalog that “contains allegations of fraud” takes root in 
the fertile ground prepared by the widespread coverage of Deep State Duffer stories. 
The gambit (for the truth is, the Complaint Catalog is an artifact of deception) is so 
successful that it becomes a point of pride for those who like to think of themselves 
as “skeptical intellectuals,” who believe they can make a nuanced distinction between 
the Deep State Duffer conspiracy—which is obviously a bunch of nonsense that only 
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“those other people” believe—and the Complaint Catalog, which has gone through a 
transparent and accountable process of verification. Ironically, those who question the 
authenticity of the Complaint Catalog are now ridiculed as conspiracy nuts.
A handful of forward-thinking security specialists have figured out by now that 
this whole process is most likely an attack campaign planned and executed by 
Incidentambia; they warn future similar attacks are likely. But without terms of art, 
frameworks, and an established community, they find the problem difficult to explain 
to those outside their own small community. Starting a conversation by describing 
a handful of artifacts is easy enough, and figuring out stories that the artifacts bind 
together is not too hard, but climbing up a sort of “pyramid of pain” to explain how 
and why a collection of stories constitutes the elements of an intentional, goal-
directed campaign is a challenge. Without any sense of process and progression, 
explaining how an adversary might be able to plan and execute such a thing, let 
alone how to fight or prevent it, is even harder. To make matters worse, conversations 
frequently break down into arguments about word definitions. For the most part, 
defense, business, and political leaders remain unaware of even the possibility of 
a through line tying together all the events around the Duffer Cloud contract and 
pointing back to Incidentambia.
Back at Duffer Corp. headquarters, the mood is grim. A few financial analysts have 
published speculative projections that, despite the large cash value of the DOD Cloud 
contract, the company may be a loser in the end if its stock goes down much more. 
Contractors find the DOD personnel they work with increasingly hostile and sensitive 
to the smallest problems. The initial strong support from Senators Forethought and 
Swinton has dwindled. Senator Swinton has been steering clear of the topic altogether 
since the town-hall scare. General Backsight no longer feels free to comment 
publicly now that the topic has been politicized. Forethought is still supportive, but 
more reserved in public, and increasingly burdened with sharp questions about 
the Complaint Catalog from officials on Capitol Hill. Competitors other than Drift 
have been emboldened to file their own legal challenges, each one celebrated and 
publicized by a jeering Boer, and Duffer’s legal team is increasingly concerned about 
the prospect of an actual court hearing. Unbeknownst to all of them, the agents of 
Incidentambia, lurking in the shadows, are preparing the next attack in this campaign, 
more brutal than anything so far.
It is just over a year before Senator Forethought is up for election when 
accusations of an affair with a staffer hit the news. The accusations are supported 
by the carefully choreographed release of a series of photos, videos, chat transcripts, 
and screenshots. Each time one artifact is identified as a forgery, another one 
appears just in time to draw attention from the debunking. Another former staffer, 
attractive and photogenic, appears on TV with damning, and fundamentally 
unfalsifiable, accusations. The narrative of impropriety spreads like wildfire, boosted 
by bots and other mechanisms, while the public remains mostly unaware that all the 
evidence was forged. In theory, it is no secret that the former staffer is now a political 
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operative for an opposing party, but Forethought’s own party strategists warn that 
attacking the “victim” will most likely backfire. Senator Forethought is left floundering 
with no effective response to the setup.
Throughout the planning and execution of the propaganda and protests in 
Waschout, the Incidentambia team used methods from market research to evaluate 
and refine their procedure for inspiring anti-US protests abroad. Now, while the US 
news media are consumed with the manufactured Forethought scandal, they trigger 
protests at three other US embassies and one military base abroad, in selected 
cities where Duffer also has offices. Once again, embassy and base security 
effectively disperse the protestors, but a little bit more force is used this time, 
and, by the time the mobs reassemble at the Duffer offices, the protestors are 
angrier and the local police even less sympathetic to the rich US corporation taking 
advantage of their fellow countrymen.
Into this heated environment comes the biggest bombshell so far, as social media 
accounts appearing to belong to General Backsight send out a tirade of confessional 
and accusatory messages about the misdeeds of Duffer Corp. and the US military: 
mass surveillance at home and abroad and shocking stories of civilian casualties 
covered up in, as it happens, the very nations where the protestors are already near 
the boiling point. The impostor accounts are taken down within minutes, but networks 
of bots and click farms spread the content rapidly across multiple platforms. The 
protests turn into riots, and the Duffer offices are ransacked. US officials evacuate the 
embassies because the rioters are rumored to be heading back their way. Back in the 
United States, the message spreads fast, thanks to automated amplification by bots, 
as well as a few unfortunate retweets by Senator Boer. As soon as the news reaches 
his office, General Backsight makes his first public appearance in months to disavow 
the messages and plead for peace, but a short, out-of-context clip of his tearful 
message is shared extensively by fringe conspiracy communities and taken as proof 
positive that his message is coerced, fanning the flames higher. 
Work on the Duffer Cloud has now entirely ceased. Weeks go by, with the stock 
tumbling. A video leaks, showing the CEO cursing a DOD representative; to everyone’s 
surprise, this turns out to be an entirely authentic self-motivated leak by a real, 
uncompromised employee. In fact a large contingent of employees now oppose their 
own company’s involvement with the US government. While they have not fallen for the 
outlandish conspiracy theories, as an expression of their rationalism and moderation, 
they have given equal weight to the arguments on “both sides” and concluded with 
a position somewhere in the middle. Unfortunately, since a hostile adversary entirely 
manufactured one of the sides, the “middle” is neither accurate nor moderate. 
After the shock of the first incident, the lawyers and board advisers dictated 
two things: Duffer Corp. needs to be more secretive about their large contracts 
in the future; and the company ought to accept the lucrative offer of another 
huge contract from Incidentambia. Thanks to a well-established and wide-ranging 
infrastructure of information control, which includes firewalls and strict censorship 
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of all communications, as well as advanced techniques of psychological engineering 
of cultural and social norms, their responsibility for these events remained a secret, 
and they were able to continue to do business in the United States with one hand 
while exercising “sharp power” with the other. As a result of these multiple layers of 
secrecy, few are aware of the irony when Duffer Corp. yields to the pressure from its 
employees, lawyers, accountants, risk managers, and board of directors—as well as 
the total collapse of topcover from Backsight, Forethought, and Swinton—and pulls 
out of the cloud deal entirely. 
Drift Corp. swoops in to fill the vacuum, and within a year, it has taken over the 
contract, this time with as little publicity as possible. However, over the following 
two years, a similar campaign plays out, and eventually they, too, drop the contract 
like a hot potato. By the time any significant progress is made on the actual system 
upgrade, so many years have passed that the word “cloud” itself sounds quaint 
and old-fashioned. Politicians rail for real military modernization, the kind that is 
only possible with the cutting-edge technologies flowing out of Incidentambia. The 
adversary has achieved a multiprong victory: US military operational capacity has 
been substantially impacted by years of information-technology disruption; the US 
economic base has suffered because the tech sector lost a substantial portion of 
its ability to compete with Incidentambia in the critical cloud services sector; and 
Incidentambia’s cloud services sector developed deep relationships with multiple US 
companies—and benefited from quite a bit of technology transfer along the way.
After these lessons had been dinned into my soul millions and millions 
of times, so that I could never forget them, a strange thing came to 
pass—there was a kaleidoscopic change—I had another dream.
—Major General Sir Ernest Swinton, The Defense of Duffer’s Drift74
General Backsight awoke from a feverish nightmare with an urgent sense that 
the emerging DOD Cloud project was in danger. As he contemplated this, he recalled 
other images, from real life—diagrams, tables, pyramids, and flowcharts—from a 
recent briefing he had largely ignored, some vendor with a clever name talking about 
security and social media. He recalled another recent meeting, a consultant from that 
vendor exhorting him to create his own Twitter account, and LinkedIn, and Facebook, 
and so on, which he had also ignored; he was never much one for self-promotion. 
He also recalled, of course, extensive news coverage of “election interference” that 
seemed to come down to a certain adversary buying ads on Facebook, but no one 
had tried to convince him that the ads actually changed enough votes to matter, so 
he had largely ignored that hullabaloo as well; anyway, politics wasn’t his business. 
He recalled a briefing with slides titled “Disinformation 101,” but it seemed like 
a mere review of the psyops he had learned about decades ago. Another memory 
came to him, the movie Inception, which he had enjoyed greatly but considered 
a guilty pleasure, with its silly notion of real people fighting dream battles with 
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real consequences. Dream battles on a dream battlefield. The sixth dimension of 
battle, maybe. He heard Rod Serling saying, “A dimension not of sight and sound, 
but of mind,” and, suddenly, he understood how all the pieces fit together as a new 
dimension of battle, or maybe “security” was a better word, with its own kinds of 
tactics, countermeasures, and so on.
Later that day, he met with his old friend Senator Forethought who had seen 
many of the same briefings (and also liked Inception and The Twilight Zone). He 
explained his new understanding of these briefings, how they were talking about a 
new dimension of security, a field so new that the teams giving these briefings didn’t 
even use the same words as each other: “disinformation,” “misinfosec,” “cognitive 
security.” He shared his intuitive grasp of how the newest communication technologies 
created a highly mobile ocean of ideas, beliefs, and identities—real, stolen, and 
synthetic—and that the movement of waves in this ocean represented the changing 
priorities and motivations of millions of individuals all at once. Anyone with sufficient 
cleverness and modest resources could learn to make waves in this ocean and, thus, 
exercise enormous power. With this shared understanding, they developed the outline 
of a plan to protect the Cloud project, which ultimately led to these preparations: 
• Pursuing a wide range of approaches to developing better relationships 
between defense and the technology sector, including quietly but widely 
seeding the idea that, at the very least, tech companies should not work with 
adversarial foreign nations instead of the United States.
• Taking advantage of improved relations to develop regulations and policy 
guidelines to limit the most potentially harmful forms of mass amplification 
on social networks, especially amplification that takes place entirely behind 
encryption, by limiting the size and forwarding rate of groups on individual 
messaging platforms, for example.
• Promoting a culture in all levels of the defense community to exercise 
widespread and vocal transparency about national security–relevant evidence-
based policies, emphasizing in particular that the duty to stay out of partisan 
politics does not trump the necessity for evidence-based national security 
policies and practices. In other words, if a politician says the earth is flat, you 
have a duty to contradict him if the topic at hand is satellite navigation.
• Investing more in publicizing official documents of national security strategy 
and priority, so the general public (and elected officials) are less confused 
about who exactly our allies and adversaries are, and developing social 
norms in the defense community around remaining loyal to that distinction.
• Reiterating the traditional assertion that high-quality education is a primary 
national security priority, including education on media literacy and critical 
thinking, and particularly awareness of cognitive fallacies, such as “false 
equivalence,” and how they feed into journalism. 
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• Taking deepfake-identification technology out of the lab and running it in 
real time; this didn’t work very well at first but was funded in hopes it would 
become more effective over time.
• Mandatory monitoring of social network identities—on every possible platform, 
of everyone above a certain level of authority—to prevent impersonation.
• With consent, monitoring defense personnel’s individual social media profiles 
for mass collection by suspicious entities.
• Tasking SIGINT with a “listening station” to monitor mentions of defense-
relevant topics on social networks, with ongoing research to identify signals 
of coordinated campaigns.
• Studying past campaigns to understand the psychological and operational 
aspects of composing and propagating narratives and counternarratives to 
achieve (or prevent) predictable demographic movements and behaviors.
General Backsight and Senator Forethought were enthusiastic about their novel 
defensive plans, so they were somewhat disappointed when the first wave of Duffer 
Deep State Deepfakes hit, and they were pretty bad. They were alerted to the first video 
almost immediately, and took it down from several platforms, but, nevertheless, it spread 
widely. However, when the deepfake train finally ended, the damage was limited. After 
the first few videos, communication between the listening station and the platforms 
started to run smoothly, and the last few videos were taken down quickly enough to 
restrict their spread. Senator Boer amplified the narrative and received a significant 
amount of criticism in return, from both sides of the aisle. Sensationalism won out in the 
mainstream news, and the rumors were nearly ubiquitous, but after the initial news cycle, 
they seemed to fade a bit more quickly than previously and there was more of a backlash 
against those who embraced the hoax. One could see the video campaign as a failure 
of the defense, but careful analysis suggested that the countermeasures had at least 
succeeded in imposing greater costs on the various actors involved. 
Things got considerably worse when the riots hit Waschout. By now, General 
Backsight had no specific recollection of his dream, but he was certain that these 
developments were bad, with multiple casualties and damage to both the embassy 
and Duffer Corp. offices. Eventually, investigators determined the agents of 
Incidentambia had been quite concerned when they learned of the new limitations 
on group size, and so allocated ten times the funding to this operation. They hired 
an army of locals as phone-farm operators, and with such large numbers, a few of 
them turned out to have a real knack for the operation and joined the Incidentambia 
agents in planning the strategy. As a result, the campaign benefited from a fine-tuned 
understanding of local culture and customs, which the US defensive team lacked. In 
the end, this round may have gone poorly, but it provided a valuable lesson.
Over the next few years, the various scenarios played out, and as Backsight reviewed 
the outcomes, he felt confident that this was a stand-up fight and not the one-sided 
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nightmare he recalled dimly. Backsight was now a highly respected expert in misinfosec. 
He was praised when the IC found evidence that his preventive countermeasures had 
caused Incidentambia to abandoned plans to wreak havoc by impersonating senior US 
military social media accounts. General Backsight was convinced that the outcome 
would have been devastating, although he could never quite say why he was so sure. 
As Duffer Corp. neared completion of the main installation, Backsight and the narrowly 
reelected Senator Forethought found themselves having a late-night chat about the 
strange story of Backsight’s warning dream. 
“War is never easy,” said Backsight, “and that’s exactly what this is. I remember I 
used to think, who cares about some tweets and some Facebook ads? That stuff is 
for kids! But with all I’ve seen, I know that entire nations can fall on this battlefield.”
“Yes, it’s been a rough ride, and frightening at times,” said Forethought. “Do you 
think it will ever be over? Will we win?”
Backsight thought a moment. “I don’t think this is the kind of conflict that ends,” 
and although Forethought looked crestfallen, Backsight was merely thoughtful. “It’s 
like asking, will the police ever win? Will we ever defeat crime? Might as well ask, 
will we ever defeat bad weather!” He laughed. “No, this is a security matter, not a 
traditional war. There’s no ‘adversary’ to defeat... or, rather, anyone who wants to 
can play the role of adversary. Anyone can afford to get in on this game, that’s what 
technology has brought us to,” he said, staring into space as he took another sip 
of his drink. “I honestly don’t know what to think. The analogy of defeating crime, 
that’s apt. There’s an old saying, police work is only easy in a police state. Or,” he sat 
back, “‘The Price of Freedom is Eternal Vigilance’. Back when I had that dream, we 
weren’t vigilant at all. We weren’t prepared. I think that what I saw in my dream was a 
potential future where we didn’t even put up a fight because we didn’t even know how 
to find the battlefield. But I think you must agree, we’re solidly in the game now.”
Forethought nodded, listening intently. “I feared we would be sitting ducks, but we 
are putting up a real fight. And maybe we aren’t on our way to winning once and for all, 
but neither are we on our way to losing. I think we can stay a half-step ahead of the 
bad guys for a while yet. And if that’s what my career gives to my country, then I can 
sincerely say I’m proud. I did my best.” 
With that, they raised their glasses and finished their drinks. Not too much later, 
General Backsight retired and moved back to his hometown of Dreamdorp, where he 
took up fishing as a hobby, and his children and grandchildren soon became quite sick 
of hearing the same social engineering joke every time they saw him.
Authors’ note: In 2019, when we wrote about both the imaginary Senator Boer 
spreading baseless conspiracy theories and the attack on the US embassy in the 
imaginary nation of Waschout, we were concerned that we might have gone too far 
for anyone to find the scenarios believable, but, in the wake of the attack on the US 
Capitol on January 6, 2021, we became concerned that we might not have gone far 
enough and hope our readers find our scenarios to still be relevant.
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Irregular as the New Normal: How Technology Will Change  
the Prevalence and Character of Irregular Warfare
Richard A. K. Lum and LTC Edwin Churchill
As the world moves through a period of multiple, simultaneous transitions, a number 
of technology-related trends and emerging issues are increasing the likelihood that 
irregular warfare will not only be more prevalent in the future but also take on new 
and challenging forms. Confronting these evolving and proliferating challenges will be 
the job of special operations forces (SOF), who today need to focus more—not less—
attention on the ways in which irregular warfare will evolve and play key roles in the 
many conflicts to come.
Introduction
The present is a period of transition. Geopolitically, we have witnessed the end of 
an era of US primacy and anticipate the crystallization of a new one. Not unrelated, 
we are also observing the rapid emergence and evolution of multiple technologies, 
each of which would pose tremendous disruption on their own; taken together 
and in coevolution they portend a massive shift in economy and society. As we 
contemplate this transition, many in the military realm are solidifying a frame of 
reference that uses “state versus state,” “great-power conflict,” or “conventional 
battle” as one of the primary frames. When using this frame, “irregular warfare” 
is necessarily sidelined as a future challenge and a key competency as we change 
our perspectives and our military posture to counter large conventional military 
threats. We believe this is a mistake. History has shown that irregular warfare 
is historically the most common form of armed conflict among humans. Even a 
cursory review of recent trends would suggest irregular warfare will become more 
revalent in the future.
This chapter adopts the Department of Defense definition of irregular warfare 
as, “a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and 
influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and 
asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other 
capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”1 Using this 
US definition, we will explore briefly some of the reasons why we anticipate more 
irregular threats in the future and how technology may impact the possibilities for 
irregular warfare in the future.
Foresight: Anticipating Change
This chapter takes a “futures studies” approach to considering how and why 
the futures of irregular warfare may look considerably different than its present 
configuration. An often misunderstood academic field, futures studies concentrates 
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on understanding and anticipating change in society and using that insight 
(foresight) to help people reframe their expectations and preferences for the future. 
Here we will briefly introduce a few key futures concepts that inform this chapter.
Building Blocks for Foresight
Foresight is not prediction but perhaps best thought of as insight into how and 
why the future could be different from the present. Within the field of futures, 
researchers use many approaches and methodologies to study change, generate 
forecasts, and develop foresight. Two of the most important building blocks are 
trends and emerging issues. Of the two, trends will be the most familiar to readers. 
They are descriptions of history. Trends describe past changes that we have 
measured. Examples of trends include the shrinking middle-class population and 
rising health-care expenditures.
While trends are extremely important building blocks for foresight, they are 
far from the only things to consider. All trends bend or break at some point. One 
of the reasons they do so is what we call emerging issues. In contrast to trends, 
which are historical, emerging issues are things that may mature to importance in 
the future, such as emerging technologies, future policy issues, and new ideas or 
concepts. Useful emerging issues are things that, while fringe or experimental today, 
might have a meaningful impact on the future if they survive, mature, and enter 
the mainstream. Historical examples of what were once emerging issues and have 
become critical parts of everyday life include environmentalism, cellular phones, 
in vitro fertilization, and social media. Each of these were once considered fringe 
thinking or just plain futuristic.
Mapping Possible Futures of High Change
While everyone asks questions about the future, they are often asking different 
questions. Some folks take a telescopic view of the future, trying to see a specific 
thing more clearly at a farther distance. In contrast, a panoramic view of the future 
takes in a broad sweep of the emerging landscape. Those taking a panoramic view 
are concerned with getting a sense of the general contours of the landscape and the 
directions that can be taken. It is less about zooming in on the details of a specific 
tree and more about understanding that the forest ends and canyons take over.
This chapter takes a panoramic approach to exploring the emerging landscape. 
In doing so, we focus our efforts on exploring the more divergent, logical future 
possibilities. Divergent, disruptive scenarios allow us to explore a broader sweep 
of a specific emerging landscape, as represented conceptually in figure 1, below. Of 
our foresight building blocks, emerging issues are particularly valuable for taking 
us out into the bands of high change. Thus, emerging issues are the focus of our 
exploration and discussion.
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Figure 1: Focusing on mapping high-change scenarios.2
Trends: Technological Change Driving the Growth of Irregular Warfare
A number of ongoing global changes suggest irregular warfare will become more 
important in the future. Some of these trends, such as climate change, promise to 
impact most categories of human conflict. Others, such as the growth in societal 
surveillance systems, will play significant roles in shaping particular irregular threats 
and operations. Technological trends in particular are shaping the future character 
and likelihood of irregular warfare.
At the global level there are a number of changes underway that may impact 
the general propensity for and the character of future conflict. These shifts affect 
the broader contexts for conflict and also relate to the kinds of irregular threats 
and operations with which we are already familiar. Climate change will increasingly 
put pressure on littoral communities, water and food systems, and human health. 
Urbanization continues to progress rapidly, with attendant stress on governance 
systems, housing, and human health and increased opportunities for criminality. 
Trends in growing numbers of migrant and refugee flows point to increased stress on 
recipient states and risks for activities such as human trafficking and recruitment for 
violent movements (see figure 2). Finally, the growth in global illicit trade suggests 
greater weakening of governance in some regions and growing world markets to 
supply irregular threats such as insurgents and terrorists.
Past Present
Range of possible futures
High change senarios
systems change; Black swans
emergence, wild cards, unknown
Low change scenarios
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Figure 2. New displacements associated with conflict, violence, and disasters (2008–2018).3
A Changing Landscape
Geopolitically, the global landscape has shifted in important ways. Today, we 
confront aggressive peer and near-peer competitors intent on reshaping norms and 
reality on the ground. Russian hybrid-warfare operations and Chinese gray-zone 
strategies are innovations in the modern pursuit of state interests, challenges 
we have only recently begun to address. In an environment of technologically 
sophisticated, nuclear-armed, and aggressive competitors, traditional diplomacy will 
be increasingly challenging, while direct military confrontation will continue to be 
undesirable. In this context, clandestine and covert approaches will continue to grow 
more attractive to policy makers.
In terms of our built environment, technology has always played a major role in 
altering the shape and character of the places in which we live. As we push deeper 
into the digital era, technology is dramatically reshaping a deceptively familiar 
landscape. Society is rapidly digitizing itself, shifting more and more functions to the 
digital environment of computers and the internet. The Internet of Things (IoT) is the 
trend of embedding computing power and internet connectivity into every conceivable 
human-made object around us. From watches to phones to household appliances 
and cars, the built environment around us is rapidly becoming densely interconnected 
and inherently aware of our presence and our actions. Across these sprawling, digital 
ecosystems move a growing number of soft machines, programs that carry out 
automation, learn on their own, and even evolve in competition with one another. 
In this digital era, therefore, a layer of digital life—some of which is directed 
by humans and a growing amount that is not—mediate our daily experiences. 










Disasters Conflict Linear (Conflict)
S T R A T E G I C  L A T E N C Y  U N L E A S H E D    |    451 
shape what we see and hear, perceive and think, and are able (and incentivized) to 
do. Thus, the built environment around us looks like the world we remember and yet 
is aware, calculating, and responsive in a way we traditionally only ascribed to the 
natural world. Further, it can be subtly and invisibly manipulated by others in ways 
unique to the current era. Our cities and homes are becoming digital jungles at once 
familiar and uniquely alien.
Across this changed landscape data has become the new electricity, the lifeblood 
of virtually all activities. Data flows across all digital connections, and understanding 
how to generate, acquire, and process this data is key to thriving in this evolving 
landscape (see figure 3). While social and economic disparities of the present 
understandably loom large in the public mind, moving forward, those who do not 
understand and are not able to use data will be left behind rapidly.
Figure 3. Digitization of the landscape.4
Diffusion of Capabilities
One of the most pronounced impacts of technology on conflict has been the diffusion 
of (previously) statelike capabilities to the smallest actors. While technology 
has often had a leveling effect in history, the nature of the tools available today 
to a growing number of actors, coupled with the changing nature of the conflict 
environment, offers small groups and individuals the opportunity to acquire the 
power to produce genuinely strategic effects. From a foresight perspective, we want 
to examine these technologies early for both their positive and negative potential. 
Technologies are not inherently good or bad; they become so in their application. 
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To avoid assuming that all emerging technologies are threats to us, we have to 
anticipate their emergence and shape their development. 
The pervasive digitization of society makes cyber tools particularly attractive to 
actors looking to conduct a broad range of operations, from intelligence gathering 
to theft and direct disruption. Somewhat related, the importance of social media in 
daily life across the world offers actors of all types unprecedented opportunities for 
information gathering, profiling, narrative influence, outright disinformation, and global 
recruitment. Continuing advances in areas such as computing and robotics lead to 
trends like the decreasing cost and increasing sophistication of unmanned systems. 
Digital fabrication offers hobbyists and professionals alike the ability to custom 
manufacture everything from spare parts to entire homes. Through commercial 
services, do-it-yourself systems, and crowdsourcing (see figure 4), the average person 
can access impressive levels of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). 
And through crowdfunding, individuals and groups can—literally—acquire millions of 
dollars of volunteered investment to fund anything imaginable, from children’s books 
to terrorist innovations.
Figure 4. Growth of Crowdfunding.5
Across the long course of human history, only an incredibly small percentage of 
people played a role in innovating tools and techniques within warfare. This number 
grew slightly during the Enlightenment and then accelerated during the Industrial 
Revolution. Today, because of our changed technological landscape and because of 
readily available, adaptable, and largely digital tools, virtually anyone can acquire the 
means and knowhow to attack or undermine an opponent or provide support to those 
who do so. Thus, potentially everyone of us is an innovator in ways that matter to 
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Emerging Issues: Anticipating the Truly Disruptive Potential of Technology
In the wide landscape of possible futures, there are many potential emerging issues 
that could play key roles in shaping the character of irregular warfare. The following 
are a select few, each of which is driven strongly by technology and, should they 
mature to become part of a new normal in the future, will have deep implications for 
irregular warfare and for the challenges (and opportunities) facing SOF.
Mechanized Warlords
Given the current pace of development in robotics and machine intelligence, and 
given how quickly automation is expanding across all functions in society, the 
possibility exists for one person being able to assemble and command a veritable 
army of machines. Anticipating that the cost for computing power continues to fall, 
and that related technologies such as digital fabrication continue to advance rapidly, 
we expect to see instances of small groups—even individuals—able to assemble 
considerable machine forces. One-person armies composed of networks of air, 
ground, and sea systems; layers of machine intelligences that specify, collect, and 
analyze data; and customized programs that help plan, offer counsel, and provide 
management assistance will comprise these armies. Add the ability for machines 
to create machines, en masse, and one can anticipate terribly complicated and 
prolonged conflicts.
Armchair Campaigns
Today, in the span of just a few hours to a few days, a person can go online to 
register a new company, crowdsource start-up funding, outsource product design, 
contract for marketing and communications, set up automation to engage with 
prospective customers and provide customer service, locate and secure offshore 
manufacturing, and handle shipping and payments. In the preinternet era, this would 
have taken weeks to months. In a similar vein, and drawing upon many of the same 
types of online platforms, it is easy to see how future actors, availing themselves of 
even greater degrees of automation, machine intelligence, and a worldwide IoT will be 
able to design, organize, launch, and manage a variety of irregular operations quickly 
and anonymously. Such campaigns would not be the one-off attacks traditionally 
planned by lone-wolf extremists; these would represent sophisticated and prolonged 
efforts to undermine governments (and companies), assist insurgents, and 
destabilize communities.
Objects of Hostile Intent
The IoT is rapidly becoming a pervasive reality across much of the world. As more 
and more of the built environment is connected to these networks, and as future 
objects and built structures are designed for these systems, the time will soon 
come when we must see the built environment—the buildings and everyday objects 
around us—as interactive and as alive as the natural environment. It will no longer 
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serve to assume that the structures we move through and the objects we move 
past are either inert or dumb. They will comprise entire ecosystems that will detect, 
assess, and respond to us. Some of this behavior will be intentional and controlled 
by adversaries and some of it will be the unexpected and unpredictable emergent 
behavior of complex systems of systems. Thus, warfighters will have to understand 
and account for the natural terrain, the human terrain, and the machine terrain as 
well as how they overlap and interact. In a world managed via artificial intelligence 
(AI) and with abundant biometric data a given, no one will be able to move invisibly or 
unopposed through a built environment.
Biosynthetic Ecosystems
Synthetic biology is a rapidly developing field that promises to enable us to modify 
living things radically at the genetic level, and even to engineer entirely novel life-
forms. Already, scientists can modify the structure of plants to act as sensors for 
specific conditions, while other researchers and even amateur experimenters have 
been working on creating chimera species of animals. With continued advances 
in these areas, and coupling the capability to engineer biology with other future 
developments in areas like soft and hybrid robotics, we anticipate the ability of future 
actors to design and deploy entire ecosystems composed of engineered life-forms 
and hybrid machine systems. Thus, capable actors could create entire forests or 
underwater spaces as living ISR and defensive ecosystems, evolving and perpetuating 
themselves with little to no human maintenance. Since scientists can also now cross 
the germ line with genetic changes, such biosynthetic ecosystems could easily take 
on a life of their own, for good and ill.
Immortal Leadership
Today, companies offer to deploy machine learning on an individual’s social media 
postings, personal stories, and memories (recounted) to develop an intelligent 
avatar that can continue to post messages and interact with other people after 
the individual dies.6 In the future, companies will be able to draw on the massive 
amounts of data generated by individuals over a lifetime in an intensely digital 
society to create interactive—and even adaptive—simulacra that can communicate 
with the world forever. The simulacra of revered leaders and devout martyrs alike can 
continue to actively inspire, denounce, and pronounce long after they have passed 
away. Thus, individuals will be able to continue to provide guidance and their wisdom 
can even evolve along with a changing world. Therefore, we anticipate digital avatars 
created through machine learning will be able to impersonate individuals across 
social media in perpetuity.
Other Notable Emerging Issues
The previous five paragraphs examine only some examples of an ever-growing list 
of potential emerging issues being driven by rapid advances in multiple lines of 
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technological development. When we contemplate the futures of irregular warfare, 
we need to consider critically the many ways in which technology is going to upend 
assumptions about society and conflict. The following are other notable examples of 
additional emerging issues:
• Smart Feral Cities: urban areas ungoverned by a state but suffused with 
smart city technologies and connectivity, providing nonstate actors with 
dramatic new possibilities for governance, control, and combat.
• Conflict-in-a-Box: modularized technologies such as digital fabrication, 
robotics, distributed energy production, synthetic biology, and AI will enable 
endlessly customizable packages of conflict tools and resources.
• Nation-Sourcing: the twenty-first century levy en masse, a disruptive 
combination of digital fabrication and universal coding skills; this represents 
the possibility of every household able to become a factory or cyber node 
instantly.
• Involuntary Militia: as civilian populations and infrastructure are increasingly 
targeted, personal digital entourages for self-defense will necessarily engage 
in defense and counterinformation operations. This will further blur the lines 
between civilian and combatant, creating engaged civil combatants.
• AI Irregular and Mercenary Forces: as machines continue their rapid (and 
directed) evolution, they will be deployed increasingly in semiautonomous 
and autonomous defensive and offensive roles across human conflict.
• Chimeric Pandemic: the possibility of chimera creatures developed by 
irresponsible actors using advanced and easy-to-use genetic engineering 
tools escaping into the world, posing both direct physical threats as well as 
threats to existing habitats and ecosystems.
SOF Leadership: Looking Forward, Not Backward
Senior leaders reach their positions because of their skills, perspectives, and 
unique ways of getting things done. It is, therefore, inherently difficult to ask them to 
question—and potentially abandon—some of the assumptions and understandings 
that have served them well previously. Yet, given the trends and emerging issues we 
have discussed, that is exactly what leaders need to do. To do anything else would be 
to ignore or, at worse, deny the challenges (and opportunities) we see emerging in the 
world around us.
The future (multiple) operating environments into which we will send operators 
will reward teams selected and prepared for those environments. The SOF operators 
we will need in 2030 will not be those we deployed in 2005. As much as the 
counterterrorism teams deployed in 2005 were arguably the best trained and 
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equipped on the planet, how could those same teams with their same equipment 
and support platforms perform against adversaries fielding biosynthetic ecosystems 
surrounding hostile-built environments and who are continually inspired by their most 
revered (and now virtual) immortal leaders?
As we contemplate the challenges of the 2020s and beyond, we must question 
key assumptions about the special operations forces. In ten years, what should a 
US Army Ranger look like? What will make an effective SEAL? When we think about 
operations in the future, like stacking at the door, we have to start asking, what is the 
“stack” and what is the “door” of the future? In fact, in getting to the X and getting 
off the X, we have to ask, “what exactly might the X be?” In the future environments 
we now contemplate, we seem likely to need more than just brute force to achieve our 
objectives and keep our operators safe.
As we begin questioning our assumptions, we also must revisit the SOF Truths. 
Some of these core tenets might need to be redefined for the coming era. And 
then again, perhaps not. People remain more important than hardware, and yet 
the emphasis might now be on recruiting and developing the right people. We 
have insisted that we cannot mass produce SOF, and yet we see humans teaching 
machines that then teach humans. Where might such developments go for SOF in 
the years ahead? This reflection is neither simple nor easy, and yet it is critically 
important as the world changes rapidly.
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Intelligence for Special Operations Forces
John Tullius
Until fairly recently, US HUMINT collectors have maintained a decisive technological 
advantage over foreign services, augmenting virtually every facet of conducting 
clandestine operations. However, the global diffusion of technologies—social 
media, biometrics, closed-circuit television (CCTV), artificial intelligence (AI) and 
machine learning (ML), and others—has significantly complicated efforts to develop 
credible cover stories, travel in alias abroad, and meet clandestinely with assets 
and communicate with them remotely. To redress these issues, and accelerate the 
adoption of operationally relevant capabilities, virtually every intelligence community 
(IC) and Department of Defense (DOD) component has established “innovation” 
centers in Silicon Valley and other technology corridors. While this is a necessary 
step, these centers have largely failed to fulfill the promise of delivering capabilities 
to operators rapidly for a variety of reasons. This chapter delves into these issues, 
providing some thoughts on how to mitigate them. 
HUMINT’s Critical Role, Sensitivities, and Tradecraft Considerations
While many government agencies conduct human intelligence (HUMINT) overtly, 
this chapter focuses on the IC and DOD’s clandestine efforts to develop and recruit 
human sources, or “assets,” based on the inherent sensitivity of these operations 
and potential compromise via technological means. Additionally, this form of HUMINT 
is essential because it is the only “Int” that can provide insight into an adversary’s 
plans and intentions.1 For example, media reports on the alleged Kremlin insider who 
provided information on Vladimir Putin’s intentions to meddle with the US elections, 
and his motivations for doing so, illustrate the utility, and extreme risks, of running 
such sources.2 
This type of granular insight on a foreign leader’s intentions is almost certainly 
something that none of the other collection platforms—signals, geospatial, and 
open-source intelligence—can provide. Most often, information derived from these 
disciplines can provide early indicators and warnings, or address critical information 
gaps, but they almost always lack the precision and context that HUMINT affords. For 
example, imagery of an adversary’s tanks massing along a border are merely a picture 
that could have many interpretations; e.g., is it just a training exercise or an imminent 
attack across the border? Similarly, signals intelligence (SIGINT) reports often tend to 
be fragmented and ambiguous, rarely containing the thoughts and intentions of foreign 
leaders given the heightened security practices employed by most adversaries. And 
while open sources can provide a high percentage of the low-hanging fruit, enhance 
situational awareness, and provide leads for other collectors, adversaries are not 
going to openly highlight their plans and intentions on the most sensitive issues. 
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Consequently, information derived from clandestine sources remains essential to 
addressing the most critical intelligence gaps, but since espionage is a treasonous 
act punishable by death or lengthy prison terms, it also entails some of the greatest 
risks to both the case officer and the source. Operational compromises inevitably will 
have tragic results, while also hindering efforts to develop and recruit new sources. 
HUMINT collectors, therefore, are neuralgic about preserving “sources and methods,” 
taking every measure to protect sources’ identities.3 
HUMINT collectors are trained to use sound tradecraft (or TTPs) to protect their 
sources, which refers to the methods used to operate securely. This includes every 
facet of operations, from establishing cover identities (masking a case officer’s true 
work affiliation with a more benign assignment like “State” or some other entity), 
traveling in alias (using fake names and corresponding travel documents), and 
meeting clandestinely and communicating securely with assets, as well as transferring 
sensitive information.4 Every detail of the operational plan is carefully scrutinized 
to determine risks of compromise by a foreign government service, including the 
surveillance detection routes (SDRs) and safe houses to conduct meetings, types of 
covert communications devices utilized, and means for passing information. 
Technology Diffusion and Its Potential Impact on HUMINT Operations
Until fairly recently, US HUMINT collectors have employed a range of technological 
gadgets to enable virtually every facet of their operations, providing significant 
advantages over other foreign services. However, a number of our near peer 
adversaries, and even much less technologically astute countries, are utilizing a 
variety of capabilities, most often readily available commercially, that are hindering 
efforts to conduct clandestine operations. Ironically, many of these technologies have 
been deployed since the 9/11 attacks, with US backing, to enhance border security 
and public monitoring. 
The cumulative impact of this technological diffusion has created significant 
challenges for clandestine operators, and a number of authors have rightly flagged the 
potential impact on virtually every facet of conducting an operational activity, starting 
with the ability to create effective cover stories for case officers.5 The availability 
of online information, facial-recognition software, and rapidly advancing computing 
capabilities have made establishing credible cover stories extremely difficult. As 
Edward Lucas rightly notes, “a cover identity that would have been almost bullet proof 
20 years ago can now be unraveled in a few minutes.”6 Similarly, former CIA directors 
John Brennen and Mike Pompeo have commented publicly on the challenges of trying 
to match agency officers’ digital history with their cover stories.7
Even if a credible cover is established, the diffusion of biometrics globally 
complicates HUMINT collectors’ efforts to travel in alias and reenter countries using 
different identities. International travelers, even to developing regions, are most often 
greeted by visa officials armed with a range of identifying biometric capabilities, such 
as digital fingerprinting, retinal scans, and facial recognition. These countries also 
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have much greater computer-programming capabilities than they did even five years 
ago, enabling them to store and analyze such data to discern potential threats and 
traveler anomalies. As Kate Brannen notes, “gone are the days of entering a country 
with a false passport and wearing a wig.”8 Thus, once this data is collected, a HUMINT 
operator may experience difficulties reentering a given country in true name or under a 
different alias, even when equipped with legitimate-looking travel documents.9
Once HUMINT collectors are in country, their movements can be tracked readily 
with the ubiquitous CCTV monitors found in virtually every international city, hampering 
efforts to go “black” (evading foreign surveillance) and safely conduct clandestine 
meetings with sources. As an operator begins an SDR, their movements—as well 
as the sources’—presumably can be fairly easily tracked by foreign services. This 
omnipresent camera monitoring also complicates efforts to meet at designated safe 
houses, conduct brush passes on the street, and pass information at “dead drops.” 
All of this is further compounded by capabilities that enable services to track cell-
phone patterns and use sophisticated software programs to determine movement 
patterns and correlate that with other cell phones of interest.10 It is also a safe bet 
that many countries have, or soon will acquire, sophisticated drones to augment their 
surveillance capabilities.
Looking ahead, rapidly advancing 5G and AI/ML capabilities undoubtedly will 
unleash new capabilities that will exacerbate these operational challenges.11 China, 
for example, is working on sophisticated crowd-control algorithms that will complicate 
HUMINT operators’ ability to move freely.12 As Lucas notes, “the same algorithmic 
techniques that digital security experts use to spot malware on networks and 
computers can easily be tweaked to highlight other unusual behavior—sometimes 
much more effectively than human analysts could do.”13 
Finally, to minimize the risks of face-to-face meetings with assets, HUMINT 
operators often rely on covert communication (CovCom) devices to communicate 
securely and pass information. The security of these systems is paramount because 
any breaches undoubtedly will compromise the source, and potentially other sources 
using the same system. But what if we are up against a technically savvy service that 
can potentially hack these systems? Increasingly, that may be the reality in many 
countries, as foreign services quickly adopt new capabilities to identify and decrypt 
CovCom systems.
Some Concrete Examples
These potential impacts are not just theoretical concerns; a growing body of evidence 
indicates such technological advances are already complicating significantly efforts 
to conduct sensitive operations, not just for the United States but for other countries 
as well. Most likely, the publicly available examples captured in this chapter comprise 
only a subset of additional cases that remain unacknowledged. 
Most troubling, a number of recent press reports suggest US operators have a 
significant CovCom problem, which may already be complicating efforts to interact 
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clandestinely with remote assets. For example, press reports allege, sometime around 
2010, the Russians effectively hacked communications systems in use by the FBI’s 
counterintelligence surveillance teams operating domestically.14 Similarly, other press 
reports allege, from about 2009 to 2013, the Chinese government cracked CIA’s 
internet-based CovCom system, resulting in the imprisonment and execution of many 
sources.15
Other technical advances are also impacting US operations. For example, 
following the CIA’s alleged 2003 rendition of Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr off the 
streets in Milan, Italian authorities reportedly used a version of Analyst Notebook to 
correlate cell-phone metadata to identify, and convict in absentia, nearly two dozen 
CIA officers.16 In 2018, a criminal group reportedly used drones to disrupt an FBI 
operation,17 an event FBI deputy assistant director Scott Brunner seems to allude to in 
his 2018 Statement for the Record to the Senate.18 
There are also a number of reports of other countries’ operations getting 
compromised through technological means. In 2009, following the Mossad’s alleged 
assassination of Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai, UAE authorities 
apparently used a variety of means, including cell-phone tracking and CCTV coverage, 
to identify the suspected Israeli operators.19 Similarly, British investigators reportedly 
used CCTV to identify Russian agents suspected of poisoning Sergai Skripal and his 
daughter with a Novichok agent in 2018.20 In Syria, insurgent groups have repeatedly 
attacked Russian troops with armed drones, reportedly incorporating swarm tactics to 
increase potential lethality.21
Ongoing Efforts to “High Tech” Our Way out of the Problem
The growing realization that we are losing our technological edge has led to a 
proliferation of IC and DOD “innovation centers,” the flavor du jour for engaging with 
high-tech industries to accelerate technology adoption and develop operationally 
relevant capabilities more rapidly. The purpose is not to provide a list of these 
entities, although a quick internet search reveals that most IC and DOD commands 
have established innovation outposts in Silicon Valley and other technology hubs. 
Most of these organizations have been established as nonprofits aligned with their 
respective DOD or IC patron, and they incorporate a variety of operational models. 
Some of them operate using a venture capital model to identify promising companies 
and provide seed funding for operationally relevant work, whereas others actively seek 
mature capabilities that can be immediately procured. 
These innovation centers offer, potentially, myriad advantages to expedite 
the discovery and transfer of operationally relevant technologies.22 Foremost, as 
nonprofits, they have more flexibility than government to engage with industry because 
they are not encumbered by federal rules that hinder effective engagements and quick 
contracting actions. For example, they have the ability to hire experts and let contracts 
expeditiously, while also enhancing opportunities to get promising technologies to 
market, and in the hands of operators, much more quickly. 
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This approach also allows DOD-affiliated nonprofits to hire business-savvy 
managers, who have a better understanding of IT companies, their challenges as 
start-ups, and their more immediate needs to meet margins. Suffice to say, most 
federal procurement offices, more accustomed to dealing with the much smaller 
subset of larger, well-established contractors, likely have only a vague notion of how to 
work constructively with start-ups. 
Since most of these smaller IT companies lack experience working with the federal 
government, the nonprofits can play an essential role helping companies better 
understand federal contracting practices and setting expectations. Most important, 
given their connections to government entities, their experience with federal 
procurement processes, and understanding of the market, these nonprofits can play 
a vital mentoring role to help companies traverse the “Valley of Death.” They can also 
play a critical role helping companies identify dual-use applications for their products, 
providing opportunities for other revenue streams and provide greater incentives for 
working with the government. 
But Are They Delivering?
While these innovation centers have great potential, anecdotal evidence based on 
discussions with experts working in this domain suggests that, at best, they are 
having mixed results. To be fair, most have been established within the last five years 
or so, and so they may need additional time to germinate. However, a number of 
common factors seem to be limiting the impact of the innovation centers: insufficient 
requirements, sporadic feedback to companies during product development, and 
suboptimal user inputs throughout the product lifecycle. 
Additionally, even when these centers identify useful applications, they often need 
to find potential end users within their communities. Another, potentially bigger, pitfall: 
once a user group is identified, the actual contracting may need to be handled through 
established acquisition offices that may not be nimble enough to manage the transfer 
rapidly. Some of this stems from institutional biases toward big projects and finding 
“enterprise-wide” solutions or big-ticket projects that will become programs of record. 
Or, contracting offices may be encumbered with time-consuming, ossified contracting 
rules that preclude quick procurements. 
Fixing the Problem: New Business Models for the IC and DOD
The foregoing suggests innovation centers are a necessary but not sufficient solution 
and that we need to adopt a more agile approach that fosters more flexible acquisition 
practices. While most IC and DOD seniors echo these sentiments, and voice support 
for closer integration with industry, scant attention seems to be paid to finding 
solutions for optimizing the innovation centers’ effectiveness. Below, I offer a few 
thoughts on this.
Foremost, DOD and IC entities need to ensure the “backend” processes are 
equipped to match the innovation centers and their industry partners’ need for speed 
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and agility because many companies, especially smaller start-ups, will not have 
the patience to wait endlessly for project approvals. Potential gatekeepers that can 
significantly impede progress include technology-transfer offices, contracting officers, 
comptrollers, and legal departments. In my experience, many of these staff officers 
are long-tenured and often lack the basic understanding of new DOD and IC business 
models, requiring a crash learning course for them, or a changing of the guard.
We also need to jettison the inclination to seek enterprise-wide solutions or big 
program-of-record initiatives, as these usually are too slow and cumbersome. As a 
personal example, I managed open-source collection efforts for Europe and the Middle 
East from 2011 to 2016 during the height of the Arab Spring, the migration of foreign 
fighters to the region, and the emergence of ISIS. All these issues had a large social 
media component, requiring automated exploitation and analytic tools. However, as 
of 2016, these capabilities had not materialized for overseas use, resulting in our 
officers having to review, compile, and analyze relevant content manually. 
These delays stemmed from myriad management and cultural issues, including 
having former National Reconnaissance Office managers overseeing these 
development efforts, who were accustomed to developing expensive satellites that 
took years to deliver, with zero risk tolerance. This approach, however, was anathema 
to the rapid adoption of the capabilities my unit required. Ultimately, we required a 
“fail fast” mentality that let us explore many tools, accepting that if only one out of 
20 was deemed viable, this would be a success. Although we identified potential 
applications in the host country, we were not allowed to procure and test them, even 
in a “sandbox” that was not connected to our servers. Moreover, even though my 
staff identified software engineers who could automate some of our work, we were 
prohibited from developing tools in the field. 
On a related note, we also need to recognize efforts to find one-size-fits-all 
solutions are self-defeating because we should never expect to use the same gadgets 
across all of our operational environments. The alleged Chinese hacking of the CIA’s 
CovCom system illustrates this point. The breach reportedly occurred when operators 
used a system designed for much more permissive environments in a country that 
was much more technologically savvy.23 This example indicates strongly the need to 
tailor our approach carefully to the prevailing threat level, with more flexible options to 
meet the operational requirement. In some places, a 60 percent solution that can be 
traded out quickly for other systems may suffice, whereas in others, we will need more 
robust capabilities. 
Perhaps most important, the successful development of new capabilities requires 
extensive operator inputs throughout the entire development cycle, starting with clear 
requirements and regular feedback during the development and testing phases to 
enhance product viability. If companies take a year to develop a new capability without 
sufficient user inputs, the odds grow longer for a successful outcome. Conversely, 
having an operator iterate throughout the process can provide invaluable insights on 
whether the product is too heavy, not user friendly, lights them up too much at night, 
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or whatever the case may be. As a corollary, we need to enable field units to identify, 
test, and develop tools, rather than relying solely on headquarters-designed solutions 
that may miss the mark. 
What about Going Low-Tech: Back to the Future? 
The ongoing rush to better integrate with industry seems to presume the IC and DOD 
will be able to regain our decisive technological edge; however, even with significant 
improvements, we might not ever widen that gap substantially with our adversaries. 
China, for example, is reaping years of state planning and investment in IT companies: 
as of 2013, only two Chinese firms ranked in the top 20 globally, but within five years, 
the number had increased to 9.24 Similarly, other countries have fostered competitive 
IT companies that are vying for market share. Additionally, even for countries that 
lack a strong IT base, the commercial availability and relatively cheap cost of many 
of these capabilities virtually ensures they will be readily employed and continue to 
challenge HUMINT collectors. 
Consequently, we may need to accept these operational realities as our new 
normal and rethink our reliance on, and perhaps complacency with, seeking the holy 
grail of technology superiority. Ultimately, we need to reevaluate our tradecraft and 
TTPs, perhaps adopting old-school espionage practices that obviate the need for 
high-tech solutions or seeking hybrid solutions tailored specifically to the operational 
environment.25 While these old-school practices may be more exacting and time 
consuming, we may not have many other great options to maintain our ability to collect 
HUMINT on our highest-priority national security issues. As such, it is paramount for 
HUMINT collectors to identify creative new solutions to meet these challenges. 
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C H A P T E R  3 2
Systems-of-Systems:  
Coping with Pervasive Technology in Operating Areas
Mark W. Maier and LTC Edwin Churchill
In this chapter, we define systems-of-systems (SoS), consider their role in special-
operations missions, and speculate about how the future special operator will need 
to regard an environment that contains not only systems designed to either benefit 
or threaten, but also systems designed and operated for other purposes entirely that 
may be used in the SOF environment.
Introduction: An Environment of Systems-of-Systems
In 2018, in a curious case of genetic forensics, police in California had DNA samples 
from a serial rapist and murderer, identified as the Golden State Killer and known to 
have committed numerous crimes in the 1970s and 1980s. The cases were cold. 
The DNA profile appeared in no database, preventing identification of a suspect. 
An investigator thought to look at the growing databases of DNA data, largely 
crowdsourced and built significantly by genealogy hobbyists, from people tracking their 
ethnic and family origins. The DNA sample did not appear in any of these databases, 
but samples with sufficient match to indicate possible family relationships did. A 
team of law enforcement officers and private genealogists built large family trees 
from DNA and other public genealogy databases, then crossed that information with 
other evidence to narrow a list of possible suspects, eventually to a single person. 
The individual’s DNA was obtained clandestinely by law enforcement and was a solid 
match. Law enforcement arrested and charged the individual with the crimes.1
The technique used in the Golden State Killer investigation has been used 
subsequently to solve numerous cold cases. From one perspective, this story shows 
how new technology enables a significant new capability. More interesting, however, 
is that 1) none of the component technologies used by investigators were intended 
for tracking criminal suspects and 2) the government did not own or operate most of 
the component systems. Investigators cracked the case by assembling independently 
owned and operated parts. The “system” that identified the subject emerged from the 
interaction of many systems. Nobody built the system that tracked the Golden State 
Killer; rather, it emerged from the interaction of systems built and operated for other 
purposes. This is a “system-of-systems” in operation.2
New technology has changed, and will continue to change, special operations 
environments. From small drones to miniaturized sensors, smart medical devices, 
satellite navigation, and countless other inventions, the special operator has myriad 
new tools to use but also faces threats from such tools. SoS will not be confined to 
the developed world; indeed, they might be more common in the developing world. 
Some of the most striking examples of SoS enabled capabilities are emerging in West 
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Africa. In Ghana, there is a widely deployed smartphone app that allows ambulances 
to navigate to the location of a smartphone that has made an emergency call with 
25 centimeters accuracy, more accurate than available in most developed countries. 
Elsewhere in West Africa, there are many innovative medical systems that combine 
cell phones, apps, and logistics based on local resources, such as motorcycles, to 
deliver perishable resources, such as blood, reliably, despite difficult local travel 
conditions.3
Emergent SoS and their capabilities will be important to special operators (whether 
in the developed or developing world), as risks, threats, opportunities, and targets or 
as resources to defend. Unlike traditional systems, SoS will not have clear ownership 
or control. No central authority will exist to collaborate with, attack, or defend. 
Because no central authority owns or controls SoS, governments and militaries can 
build SoS using components owned and operated by others. Threats may appear by 
surprise; people or groups may be able to string together capabilities to accomplish 
something unexpected. Operatives may be able to leverage large investments by 
others to produce unexpectedly dangerous capabilities. It may be difficult to attack 
the underlying component systems because they may be part of local infrastructure, 
perhaps even part of US infrastructure.
What Is a System-of-Systems?
Most people understand a “system” to be a collection of components that jointly 
exhibit functions not possessed by any of the components. A transistor does not 
provide computational function. However, a collection of transistors forming a 
computer processor provides rich computational functions. Typically, a “system” has 
an owner and/or operator. Somebody specified the system, had it built and deployed, 
and operates it to gain desired capabilities. The system might be complicated 
with a great many components and interactions, but it has well-defined ownership 
and operational authority, and that authority manages the system for well-defined 
purposes. Military systems usually fall into this category, unless the acquirers have 
deliberately chosen to spin out control, partially or completely, to others to accomplish 
a higher-order goal.
As defined in “Architecting Principles for Systems‐of‐Systems”4 and elaborated 
in subsequent literature by Sage and Cuppan and Sage and Biemer,5 among many 
others, a “Collaborative System” or “System-of-Systems” is a collection of systems 
with three key features:
1. The systems interact with each other to produce results none of them can 
achieve alone. Jointly, the parts form their own system.
2. The SoS continues to fulfill useful purposes on its own (operational 
independence of the elements) even if a member is disconnected from the 
collective.
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3. While interconnected, the constituent systems continue to be managed 
for their own purposes independently of the collective, at least in part 
(managerial independence of the elements).
An Alternative Perspective: China’s Concept of “System Confrontation”
This chapter concentrates on how infrastructural systems not specifically owned 
and operated by militaries may be used as either threats against or opportunities 
for the SOF operator. From a broader perspective, a body of Chinese writing exists 
that describes military conflict as a confrontation of systems.6 The writing discusses 
moving away from seeing military conflict as confrontations between specific 
platforms—for example, one aircraft type versus another, or a missile type versus a 
ship—and, instead, examining the confrontation in terms of larger targeting, strike, 
and countermeasure systems comprising aircraft, ships, missiles, sensors, and other 
components. During a large-scale, peer-to-peer military conflict, the SOF operator 
constitutes a component of reconnaissance and strike systems. We take this up in 
the discussions of unconventional and special reconnaissance missions and how 
different modalities may be enabled, or disabled, by the presence of the system-of-
system environment.
Even when considering nation-state systems, one should notice most nations 
make wide use of commercial communications and computing infrastructure even 
for national security missions. The United States has long utilized its civilian 
communications infrastructure as part of important military systems.7 Other nations 
do also, a fact sometimes exposed by outsiders.8 So, the focus of this chapter on the 
exploitation of nonmilitary infrastructure as part of a SoS has a considerable history.
Why Now for Systems-of-Systems?
The SoS concept is not new; it has been part of the general environment for at least 
a century. Both transportation networks (such as railroads) and power networks are 
systems-of-systems. The most relevant systems-of-systems militarily are Command, 
Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) systems. These systems allow coordination among distributed forces, find 
and track opposition forces, and allow precision direct and indirect fires. Historically, 
C4ISR systems have been built, deployed, and operated by militaries as dedicated 
military systems. This is no longer the case, and it is likely to be less and less 
the case in the future (especially in special operations environments) because 
key building blocks for C4ISR systems are increasingly present in operating areas 
without being placed there by militaries. Pervasive digital communications systems, 
distributed computing, and sensing systems are now commonly present regardless of 
military deployment or presence. 
Not many years ago, only nation-states would have satellite communication, space 
surveillance, and drones. Today, even a modestly funded nonstate group may have all 
the above. Some nonstate actors are figuring out how to integrate these technologies 
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and use them in innovative ways, a potentially dangerous development for the SOF 
operator. It could also provide new opportunities for exploitation, attack, and co-option.
Operating in the SoS Environment
The ancestor of today’s SOF operator likely operated in an austere or “barren” 
environment with limited communications, power, and monitoring coverage. From 
World War II to the War in Afghanistan, SOF have operated in relatively technology-poor 
environments. The SOF operator’s opposition had access only to communications, 
data, and computing capabilities far below what the operator could use. However, 
today’s operator likely operates in an area blanketed by cell phones, satellite 
communications, space and other surveillance, and other networks. Operators can 
use those networks, and those networks can be used against them. If the networks 
can be used against them, operators may want to attack or co-opt the networks. If 
those networks are not attacked, the gap between the data and computing services 
the operator can access and those accessible to the opponent will have shrunk 
dramatically. Attacking the networks may have far-reaching consequences beyond the 
immediate battlespace.
To get a sense of the scope of global deployment of the building blocks for 
systems-of-systems, consider the following:
• As of 2019, approximately two-thirds of the world’s population has mobile 
connectivity.
• Two-thirds of the population without internet access is in range of 3G and 4G 
mobile services.
• As of 2019, the Iridium satellite system is available globally to mobile 
devices; Globalstar devices are available to most of the world.
• By 2025, five or more global satellite providers of high-speed internet 
services to mobile and handheld devices could exist. Not all planned satellite 
communication networks will fly, but the success of even a fraction will 
ensure global competitive access. By 2025, other means of providing data 
service in barren areas, such as long-endurance aircraft or balloons, will 
likely be in use.
• Ultra-high-speed computing resources (e.g., Amazon or Google cloud 
services) are available everywhere internet services are available, meaning 
where most of the world’s population lives.
• City and other local governments are increasingly deploying wide-area 
imagery surveillance networks.
• GPS precision location services are available globally. European and Russian 
GPS are, or are becoming, available. Chinese and Japanese built systems 
with regional, and potentially global, services are also coming on line.
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• Companies have announced multiple global imaging satellite constellations 
with resolutions as good as one meter and revisit times as fast as 30 
minutes (though deploying both simultaneously as a commercial system  
is unlikely).
As a result of the spread of the aforementioned technology, few places on the 
globe are largely “barren” of infrastructural services (at least data and computing 
infrastructure). Most rural areas will be significantly connected, even if they lack 
reliable grid power and clean water, and urban areas will be densely connected. 
Physically, satellite services reach the entire globe, although the limitations of radio 
propagation in dense jungles and complex terrain mean a few areas remain barren 
of service. Urban areas and the coastal zones, where most of the world’s population 
lives, will likely be covered by overlapping satellite and terrestrial communications, 
overlapping location systems, subject to surveillance from multiple types of system, 
and thickly connected to cloud-computing services. Thus, extensive communications, 
computing, and surveillance capabilities will soon be in place, a full infrastructure 
onto which command, control, intelligence, and reconnaissance can be added. Such 
rich services will not be available in remote areas, but the expansion of satellite 
(and possibly balloon and aircraft) services will continue to shrink the areas entirely 
unserved and connect most operating areas significantly.
Emerging Space and Airborne System-of-System Components
Space and airborne (especially drone) components represent among the most 
important enablers of future systems-of-systems of concern to the SOF operator. 
Historically, space systems have been the province of governments. For most of the 
space age the sole exception has been geostationary communication satellites, 
primarily relevant to large, fixed, ground installations, not mobile operations. In the 
twenty-first century, the commercial viability of constellations (tens to hundreds of 
identical satellites) flying in low earth orbit (LEO) and operating together to provide 
services has ramped up dramatically and is poised to increase even more. 
In 2019, three major such constellations—Iridium, Globalstar, and ORBCOMM—
operated communications services to mobile terminals (devices from phone to pager 
size), with many more in various stages of development. As of 2019, companies have 
written numerous proposals for much larger low earth orbit constellations, mostly 
numbering in the hundreds of satellites and targeted at delivering high-speed internet 
services to underserved areas of the globe. In the late 1990s, companies such 
as Teledesic made similar proposals but never launched the systems. Many of the 
currently proposed constellations will also never launch, but some almost certainly 
will. If competing large LEO constellations go into operation, the environment for 
building distributed systems-of-systems will change radically. Multiple sources will 
exist for the required fundamental communications infrastructure, and those sources 
will not be controlled directly by nation-states.
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Already, nation-states control multiple deployed positioning-navigation-and-timing 
(PNT) satellite systems. The best known, the US GPS, is poised to move to third-
generation satellites that will provide more accurate and robust service to both civilian 
and military users. The Russian GLONASS and the European Galileo systems are 
in operation, albeit not always at full capability. As of 2019, China, Japan, and India 
operate regional systems. By the early 2020s, the Chinese BeiDou system will have 
global coverage. Thus, multiple sources of positioning data from space are already 
available, independent of any terrestrial infrastructure, with more coming.
The increasing internationalization and commercialization of space-based 
communication and PNT services enhances the SoS environment. If only one nation 
provided all the services, they would likely become targets in a peer-level conflict.9 
With multiple providers over different nations the situation is more complex. As noted 
previously, there are three to six PNT systems at various levels of development from 
nation-states or international consortia. Would a peer-peer conflict lead inevitably to 
all of them being targeted? A large constellation of wide-bandwidth communication 
satellites with overlapping antenna footprints has a signal processing structure similar 
to that of PNT systems. If the clocks on the satellites were synchronized precisely 
enough, the signal structure could also be used for positioning. It is easy to imagine 
more heterogeneous solutions for PNT that fuse partial information from commercial 
satellite systems and local infrastructure that break dependence on government-
owned positioning systems. 
While satellite communication and navigation services have been available globally 
and not restricted to government users for some time, the same is not true for remote 
sensing. Recently, a variety of proposals and deployments for global remote-sensing 
systems have proliferated. As of 2019, there are commercial systems with imagery 
capabilities better than 0.5 meters.10 As an example of what may be available to the 
system-of-system designer in the near future, the PlanetScope/Skysat systems now 
in operation (and planned for expansion) provides comprehensive daily coverage with 
on-demand imaging with submeter resolution.11
Threats and Opportunities
This collection of communication and surveillance capabilities will be supplied by 
a system-of-systems in the classical sense. The components will be independently 
owned and operated. Some will be supplied by governments (local or foreign). Some 
will be supplied by corporations, some US-based and some not. Some may be 
supplied by nongovernmental, noncommercial organizations. Governments will likely 
have uneven, if any, control over suppliers. 
From the SOF operator’s perspective, we can think of the impact of the SoS and 
their components in several different ways. We can organize SoS by threat and 
opportunity or attack and defense.
• SoS as a threat: An opponent may fuse components into their own system 
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and use the SoS to threaten the SOF operator. The SOF operator must 
defend against the threat of a C4ISR and strike system built from the 
infrastructural components.
• The opportunity to use components as part of the SOF operator’s 
capabilities.
• The need to defend those capabilities against attack. An element of FID 
may be to defend communication, computing, and surveillance infrastructure 
when targeted by a threat.
• The need to attack the infrastructure, possibly by nonkinetic means, because 
it is the target for tactical or strategic direct action.
We discuss each approach at greater length below. They involve building a 
surveillance-strike system (from other’s components), being targeted by such a 
surveillance-strike system, or countering or disrupting such a constructed system. 
This needs to be understood in the context of the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) 
loop (extensions to which are called “left-of-bang”i operations) and the emerging role 
of machine learning.
The OODA loop might have been articulated clearly and named in the 1970s, but 
it is far older.12 Exploiting OODA superiority was as much a key for Subutai in the 
thirteenth century as it was to German development of “infiltration tactics” in World 
War I or the command of mechanized forces in Iraq. An information-rich and firepower-
heavy expression of this in the late twentieth century was network-centric warfare.13 
Nation-states pursuing these concepts have done so by building dedicated systems 
that include wide-area secure communications (usually combining satellite-based 
and other modes), multimodal sensing systems, positioning and locating systems, 
information fusion and integration (requiring significant computational infrastructure), 
and integration of fire-control systems. Each component system is a dedicated 
government system, and the integrating elements are likewise developed by the 
government using the system.
The history of warfare since 1990 provides extensive lessons both in the 
effectiveness of such systems and how asymmetric opponents can degrade or avoid 
the capabilities. SOF operators have played key roles in both the overall network-
centric system and attacking opponents net-centric systems (as in the early days 
of both Iraq conflicts). Most think of the OODA loop in the context of active combat. 
We observe the tactical environment, orient ourselves to the situation, decide what 
tactical action to take, and take it. However, if we apply this thinking only when 
shooting is happening, we are too late. One post-2000 development has been a 
shift in emphasis from using C4ISR to control lethal force to a more predictive and 
preemptive “left-of-bang” concept.14 This concept means using the rich information 
i   “Left-of-bang” is shorthand for acting before (“to the left”) something dangerous/lethal (“the bang”) happens.
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generated by surveillance of all types, coupled to machine learning and other pattern 
recognition, to predict, and enable countermeasures against, an attack or other 
violence. While the left-of-bang concept is different in operation and implementation, 
the infrastructure that supports it—data generated from many sensors aggregated 
with powerful computation—is the same.
The proliferation of nongovernmental communications, computing, and surveillance 
systems means constructing a lethal or nonlethal C4ISR system is no longer the 
exclusive capability of a nation-state. Nongovernment systems may well be better 
than government systems. First, since the military has typically built first-generation 
communications, computing, and surveillance systems, civilian entrants can take 
advantage of what has been learned in the process. Second, the commercial 
businesses are willing to throw away systems when they are no longer technically 
leading edge. The system turnover and technology insertion rate are typically much 
faster in civilian systems. Civilian actors have built complex information-gathering 
and -integration applications in health care, supply-chain management, marketing, 
and other fields. New capabilities enabled by the infrastructure are discovered, such 
as the criminal genetic forensics that opened this chapter. This is the systems-of-
systems world that concerns the future SOF operator.
Being Targeted by the SoS
SOF operators have become concerned with being targeted by lethal network systems 
that could not have existed only a few years ago. As a historical example, consider 
the 1993 US operations in Somalia, culminating in the Battle of Mogadishu, made 
famous by the book and film Black Hawk Down (1999, 2001). If Mogadishu had been 
wired with extensive cellular networks, and if the militias had many wireless enabled 
video cameras and improvised explosive devices of sophisticated design, how much 
more hostile could the environment have been for American operators? It is easy to 
imagine catastrophically more dangerous scenarios in which traditional operations 
would be untenable. High-capacity cellular networks already exist, and they will be 
tied increasingly to ground infrastructure (they will be satellite supported and from 
multiple sources). Miniature surveillance devices, such as cameras, are deployed in 
many urban areas. Furthermore, the engineering knowledge for improvised explosives 
and other lethal devices continues to spread, with many new technologies possible. 
Therefore, the first challenge to consider for the SOF operator is defense against the 
SoS-enabled opposition capabilities. On the surface, the situation seems grim, but a 
variety of approaches can be taken, including:
• Not assuming the enemy is better than they are.
• Traditional means: jamming, spoofing, corruption, and destruction.
• Architectural attacks.
• Switch strategies and tactics.
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Building Robust Systems Is Hard
Building an effective C4ISR system—one that operates reliably under stress and 
attack—is difficult. Building it on top of infrastructure you neither own nor control 
is even harder. Few complex systems work well under stressful conditions unless 
they have been tested under such conditions, which has historically been a major 
problem in engineering complex military, especially C4ISR, systems. It is difficult to 
create realistic test environments for C4ISR systems, especially ones that incorporate 
the full range of unpredicted opponent actions and countermeasures that will be 
encountered in real operation. Realistic testing is difficult with nation-state resources; 
it is nearly impossible for nonstate actors using public infrastructure.
Incompletely tested systems present challenges, such as unreliability, to both 
the possessor (the user of the system) and anybody seeking to counter it. But the 
system owner and those challenged by the system might have asymmetric views 
on the acceptable probability of success. The US military would probably regard 
as low quality a system with 50-60 percent probability of success. However, to a 
nonstate actor with different expectations, such a success rate might be acceptable. 
Nonetheless, an incompletely tested system may be harder to counter than a 
completed one because its behavior may be unpredictable and there may be limited or 
no opportunities to collect data on its operation.
The complexity of developing reliable complex systems is related to the issue 
of how artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML) will play a role in future 
systems. The AI applications attracting the greatest attention are predominantly ML 
applications, software systems that learn to perform complex functions, sometimes 
at superhuman levels of performance, by observation. We can examine the operation 
of state-of-the-art ML systems that achieve superhuman performance in gaming.15 
Such software is constructed as a neural network that inputs the state of the “game” 
estimate and predicts (with probabilities) the outcome of the game (who wins, with 
what probability) coupled to a move generator that generates all legal next moves in 
the game. The move generator is not a neural network and is not trained; it is built 
based on game understanding. The combination is used to play many games with 
moves selected at random (known as Monte Carlo trials), but the random selection 
adjusts based on the neural network’s prediction of likely outcomes (bias toward 
outcomes in which the player wins). A large body of game play is used to update the 
neural network predictions, and the process repeats. If the process converges, the 
neural network will be trained to predict outcomes accurately as a function of game 
state, and moves will be selected that maximize the probability of winning. In a variety 
of games, from chess to Go and poker, the process has resulted in programs with 
superhuman abilities.
The process described above depends on a simulation environment that mimics 
results in the real world accurately, relatively easy in a case such as chess. The game 
has a finite number of states; there is a deterministic process for generating moves; 
and the only potential mismatch between the Monte Carlo play and play against actual 
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humans is the possibility humans might access playing strategies that cannot be 
reliably discovered by the self-play search process that trains the neural network. For 
games such as chess and Go, this is apparently not an issue. However, if we try to 
apply the same logic to military systems in which the state and the move-generation 
process are largely unbound, by the time one tests the machine-learning algorithms in 
the real world, no recourse exists if the real-world differs in some critical detail from 
the simulated training environment.
Traditional Means: Jamming, Spoofing, Decoys, Corruption, and Destruction
All the traditional means of counter-command and control and counter-ISR are 
available for a SoS-based threat, with a few twists and with the limitations typical for 
SOF operations. For an SOF operation, bringing to bear the full set of resources used 
in a conventional operation would not be possible. Regardless, all the traditional 
means have some applications.
Jamming: Jamming the components of hostile SoS is an attractive option. First, 
jamming is nondestructive, so no risk exists of permanently destroying what may 
be important local infrastructure (unless the jammer is powered to the level of a 
directed energy weapon). Second, jamming SoS components is likely easier than 
in a conventional military context. While modern cellular systems do have some 
interference rejection capability akin to antijam design, no economic case exists to 
build in protection against deliberate jamming. Strong antijam protection in wireless 
transmission systems requires extra bandwidth and inefficient modulation, and both 
are at odds with the need in commercial systems to make the most effective use of 
expensive bandwidth.
Spoofing: This means inserting decoys or masking the real objects of interest 
so they appear to be things of noninterest. Using decoys is often an effective, if 
underrated, technique, especially when coupled to a rapid pace of operations and 
other techniques (such as jamming or destruction). When parts of the system are 
inoperative, operators tend to focus on what they can see; if the pace of operations is 
rapid enough, by the time decoys are recognized for what they are, the opportunity to 
act may have been lost or resources already expended. 
Corruption: C4ISR systems generally rely on some form of information fusion. If 
the fusion itself can be attacked and corrupted, then the operational picture available 
to users will be corrupt and the whole system will likely be rendered ineffective. 
Destruction: In conventional military operations, one might attack key nodes 
kinetically. This technique is available for SoS as well, though the targeted 
infrastructure has many users and its physical destruction may be operationally 
untenable for that reason. This concern is not new, as demonstrated by the 
development and use of the graphite-wire “soft bomb” technology as early as the 
first Gulf War.16 This device scatters fine wires over an electrical substation to cause 
extensive short circuits. It brings down electric power in a region, but not permanently 
and without the actual destruction of infrastructure.
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Architectural Attacks: Nonlinear Breakdown
A hostile C4ISR system used against SOF operators must be capable of tracking 
multiple objects of interest, discriminating between the objects of interest and those 
not of interest, and doing so sufficiently close to real time to be useful in conducting 
an operation. Such systems can work effectively when the environment complexity 
(e.g., number of objects, sensor measurement quality relative to object density) is 
relatively low; effectiveness can continue to stay high as the environment gets more 
complex, and then effectiveness can suddenly drop.17 This phenomenon usually 
happens when the system or the operators start to associate measurements with 
objectives incorrectly. That is, a measurement that came from object A is credited 
to object B (and vice versa). Consider the operation of an air-traffic-control system: 
Suppose the identity of each airplane cannot be uniquely determined from the sensor 
return but has to be inferred from its original location or other measurements. When 
the aircraft density is low, each aircraft can be tracked individually and unambiguously. 
But, if the density is high enough, tracks will intersect, and identities may be swapped. 
If this starts happening, the quality of the situational picture will collapse.
More broadly this phenomenon reflects the tendency of users of situational-
awareness systems to see what they expect to see and interpret out-of-the-
ordinary occurrences in an expected context. This can be exploited by presenting a 
combination of an operational environment and some combination of spoofing and 
attack that results in gross misinterpretation of the situation by the C4ISR system’s 
algorithms or by the operators looking at the algorithm results.
Switch Strategies
Finally, the most macrolevel approach to defeating an opposing C4ISR system 
assembled from infrastructural components is to switch strategies (i.e., use 
the opponents’ resources to gain the information or cause the effect instead of 
intervening directly). If the environment of concern is rich with communications and 
sensing resources that another party is repurposing, re-repurpose those resources 
back at them, preferably remotely, and accomplish the operational aims. This 
perspective leads us directly to exploiting the opposing SoS instead of attacking it.
Exploiting SoS
SoS that use digital communications, surveillance sensors, and computing 
infrastructure are both threats to and opportunities for the SOF operator. The SoS 
is a large infrastructure of important capabilities that does not have to be deployed 
or maintained but are available for possible use by the SOF operator, nevertheless. 
Opportunities for the SOF Operator in this regard include:
“Warm Start” and Preparation of the Battlefield: Since infrastructural SoS do 
not have to be deployed or supported (they are already present), they can contribute 
to “warm start” and preparation of the battlefield. Both the risks and the burden of 
exploiting the infrastructure to gather information in advance are low, at least relative 
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to deploying government-unique systems. Given the importance of avoiding “cold 
start” for the SOF operator, this is an important opportunity.
Contribution to “Left-of-Bang” Operations: Achieving a “left-of-bang” capability 
means gathering either large volumes of data from which machine learning and 
humans can extract nonobvious patterns or acquire exquisite intelligence. A pattern-
recognition approach requires large amounts of data, requiring large collection and 
communication networks and computational resources. Infrastructural SoS in the 
target’s space are the logical sources for this kind of collection.
Future Unconventional Warfare: One of special forces’ origin missions is 
“unconventional warfare,” working with indigenous forces to attack or counter an 
opponent, usually a nation-state. Exploiting foreign SoS would fall under this category. 
Indigenous infrastructural systems do not have to be transported, installed, or 
supported. They exist already in the operational areas of interest, and their owners 
will be loath to turn them off or compromise their operation. The challenges of using 
them opportunistically include testing and assurance. There will be limited opportunity 
to experiment and test prior to use. There will not be an easy solution to this, 
although advanced extensive experimentation with representative non-US components 
will be important.
Working with or against preexisting SoS provides additional opportunities in 
unconventional warfare. First, the content of the SoS (e.g., social networks) is itself 
a battle space. To the extent we pursue hybrid warfare, enabled by SOF, the cyber 
battlespace will be of high importance. Many key targets will have targetable cyber 
profiles in the SoS, in which cases cyberattacks may be more effective than physical 
attacks. Second, in peer-to-peer conflict, the SoS cannot be neglected as a primary 
target because it comprises and operates so much strategic infrastructure. 
Defending the SoS
The third SoS aspect connects to the FID mission. As an example, consider 
Russia’s threat to Ukraine. Part of the conflict is directly military, namely Russia 
used hybrid warfare tacticsii to invade and occupy Crimea and other portions of the 
Ukraine.18 But aside from military threats, Russia has engaged in complex attacks on 
Ukrainian infrastructure, including power networks, telecommunications, and election 
apparatuses.19 FID has been thought of as counterinsurgency warfare. But future FID 
may focus on defending the infrastructure of SoS on which societies depend. Defense 
of Ukraine against the Russian “insurgency” involves many more aspects than the 
traditional counterguerrilla aspects.
Readers are already familiar with concept of attacking power networks and 
telecommunications networks and election systems. Future attacks could 
include focus on food or public health networks. FID has traditionally focused on 
counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and other security and nation-building activities 
ii   Hybrid warfare does not mean indirect attacks, but direct attacks that target different sorts of infrastructure.
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in the face of nonstate threats to nation-state order. In the future, SOF may defend 
against a nation-state threat, but one in which a nation-state uses hybrid attacks—
some directed against the core infrastructure of a nation-state—instead of direct 
military threats. These future threats are unlikely to be kinetic, since kinetic attacks 
would be far too obvious. However, nonkinetic attacks are not necessarily less 
dangerous than kinetic ones. 
Attacking an SoS
The SOF direct action mission is to attack high-value targets during times of conflict 
where those targets require SOF unique capabilities. An SoS in another nation-state 
might well be such a target and might fall into the SOF direction role in high-intensity 
warfare and especially to counter anti-access strategies. In some cases, SOF may be 
the preferred, or even only, alternative. Because of the infrastructural ties of typical 
SoS, the use of purely kinetic, destructive means may be not preferred. The long-term 
consequences may be too serious or the escalation risks too great. SOF approaches 
can more readily include nonkinetic means and more precise control of effects.
Conclusion
For the entire modern era, military and irregular forces have built their own systems 
and used other infrastructural systems, in many cases owned and operated by others, 
a phenomenon now referred to as building a system-of-systems. Before the 1990s, 
C4ISR components were almost exclusively military, while the shared infrastructure 
was logistical. In the decades since the 1990s, as mobile communications have 
become ubiquitous and space systems more widely available, SoS has expanded in 
scope to C4ISR and will certainly accelerate radically in the future. In the past, basic 
infrastructure such as roads and power extended only partially into developing areas; 
now, powerful communication, computing, and surveillance systems—often space-
based and inherently global—stretch into otherwise remote areas. The continued 
development of these systems will enable the construction of complex intelligence 
and strike-support systems. 
As with most technology and infrastructure changes, future SoS developments 
will be both a threat and opportunity, especially to and for SOF operators. First, 
the world will be increasingly connected through communications and surveillance 
systems, some areas more so than others. This will change the threats, necessary 
countermeasures, and opportunities for constructing our own systems. Second, SOF 
operators will face the problem of attacking versus preserving infrastructure. Third, 
SoS will open new frontiers for FID and direct action as those systems become 
targets, either to be defended or attacked.
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C H A P T E R  3 3
The Whole World Is Watching:  
Special Operations in a Ubiquitous Surveillance Environment
George duMais
A growing commercial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) market will 
soon make global situational awareness possible for both state and nonstate actors. 
The availability of commercial ISR offers special operations forces (SOF) opportunities 
to enhance their situational awareness significantly, but it also requires them to take 
extraordinary measures to thwart the use of commercial ISR against them.
The Expansion of Commercial Overhead Capabilities
Omnipresent tactical surveillance via in-place terrestrial sensors and drones is already 
a fact of life for SOF. But surveillance is expanding rapidly beyond the local to persistent 
global coverage by not only a few countries with national satellite programs but also a 
host of both US and foreign civilian firms. The boom in the commercial space industry is 
leading to the development of a robust and sophisticated civilian overhead ISR network 
that will, by 2030, drastically alter the way all military operations, including those by 
SOF, have to be conducted. Given the rapid growth in the commercial space industry, 
anyone, anywhere will soon be able to obtain affordable, nearly real-time imagery and 
radio frequency (RF) data about any location on the earth. In addition to the increase in 
available raw data, companies are developing commercial analytic tools and services to 
interpret and fuse raw data with other sources at impressive speeds. Global situational 
awareness is becoming a commercial product.
Commercial overhead surveillance systems have been evolving in size, variety, and 
sophistication. Commercial overhead imagery has been available for several decades. 
Until recently, however, such systems had low resolution, large data latency, and long 
revisit rates. In addition, the high cost of such imagery meant only governments or 
large corporations could use it practically on a large scale. A new generation of small 
satellites, compact sensors, and inexpensive launchers is altering the market. Not only 
has the capability of imagery sensors increased,i but also additional modes of sensing 
are in use.1 For example, at least 17 commercial hyperspectral sensors are now on orbit 
or scheduled for launch.2 Also, four high-resolution (less than one meter) commercial 
synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) systems exist, which offer day-and-night all-weather 
imagery.3 At least one firm also offers commercial RF data services, such as RF tag and 
beacon tracking and frequency-usage monitoring.4 Moreover, revisit rates are decreasing 
rapidly. For example, Planet Corporation images the entire globe at least once a day, and 
BlackSky intends to provide on-demand imagery to clients within a half hour.5
Networks and data-analysis services have also evolved. For example, firms such as 
OneWeb and Amazon have announced plans for large-scale space-based networks to 
i   As of 2019, 18 commercial imagers with submeter resolution have been developed, some of which have video capabilities.
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provide high-speed data analysis and internet services on orbit. Furthermore, Orbital 
Insight and BlackSky sell analytic services that fuse nearly real-time overhead data 
with other sources of real-time information to provide high-speed situational updates 
on and predictions for everything from crop yields and petroleum reserves to revenue 
projections for various retailers and industries.6
Many nontraditional and non-US firms are playing significant roles in these 
developments. For example, eight of the 17 commercial hyperspectral sensors 
currently on orbit or scheduled for launch belong to Satellogic, an Argentinian firm; 
similarly, Spanish, Italian, and South Korean firms have launched very-high-resolution 
(<0.5m) SARs.7 Additionally, several nonaligned or potentially adversarial countries 
strongly encourage the domestic development of commercial space industries, 
indicating the profusion of overhead data will likely mirror the global spread of the 
internet or the smartphone. Moreover, the proliferation of overhead products, along 
with exploitation tools and myriad distribution networks, means commercial ISR will be 
extremely robust and hard to disrupt. The complexity and number of provider pathways 
will make denying or disabling access to these goods and services extremely difficult.
 
The Exploitation of Commercial Overhead Imagery by Nontraditional Actors
The growing availability and affordability of overhead imagery has already affected 
how many nations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) use space-based 
reconnaissance data. For example, the NGO Oceana uses commercial imagery and 
automatic-identification-tracking signals received by commercial satellites to identify 
illegal open-ocean fishing; using artificial intelligence, they can even identify the type 
of fishing methods being used.8 Additionally, terrorist groups have long used satellite 
imagery. In 2002, the Central Intelligence Agency director testified before Congress 
that terrorist organizations, as well as foreign military and intelligence agencies, 
used commercial imagery to plan and execute their activities.9 According to press 
reports, during 2006 raids of insurgents’ homes in Iraq, British military personnel 
discoved numerous Google Earth images and maps apparently being used to identify 
weaknesses of, and plan attacks on, British and allied bases in the area.10 In the 
near future, drug cartels, and other international organized crime syndicates, may use 
commercial space data for not only operational planning but also private indicators 
and warnings systems about law-enforcement activities.
Legitimate uses of surveillance technology will effect military planning and 
operations, including those of SOF. Current activities by NGOs, news media, academics, 
and various watchdog groups can and are impacting military and intelligence issues. 
For example, 38North, a group of academics who study North Korea, has begun using 
commercial satellite imagery to analyze activity at North Korean missile and nuclear 
sites. Figure 1, taken from the 38North website, is an image used in the group’s 
analysis of activity at the Yongbyon nuclear complex.11 Similarly, ThePrint, an online 
Indian newspaper, provides commercial imagery of China to a retired Indian army officer 
who specializes in photo interpretation; he uses the imagery to identify and analyze 
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Chinese military facilities. Figure 2 shows one of the images he used in his analysis of 
a purported Chinese electromagnetic pulse (EMP) test site.12
Analysis of satellite imagery by news media and watchdog groups has started 
to effect public perception of official reporting. For example, in 2019, India staged 
airstrikes in the Pakistan-held Kashmir region against what it claimed to be terrorist 
targets. India also stated the strikes had destroyed their intended targets; however, 
two independent websites used Planet Corporation imagery to analyze the area where 
the strikes occurred, and both published analyses of the imagery disputing the official 
Indian version.13 Nongovernmental analysis of satellite imagery has also influenced 
actions by military or paramilitary groups. A 2012 incident in Sudan shows how such 
analysis and publication can effect operational outcomes. During the border conflict 
between Sudan and South Sudan, the Harvard-based Satellite Sentinel Project (SSP) 
released an image that showed a construction crew building a tank-capable road leading 
toward an area occupied by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the army of the 
Republic of South Sudan. SSP’s goal was to warn civilians about the approaching tanks 
so they could evacuate. However, the SPLA saw the images and, as a result, attacked 
the road crew, killing some of them and kidnapping the rest.14
While no known groups exist that publicly post similar analysis of US-military–
related installations and activities, one must assume such observation and analysis 
is happening and will become more prevalent in the future. National security analysis 
is becoming a do-it-yourself enterprise.
Figure 1. Commercial image and annotation appearing on the 38North website and used to monitor activity at 
North Korean nuclear facilities.
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Figure 2: Commercial image and annotation taken from the ThePrint website,  
used in its photo analysis of a purported Chinese EMP test facility.
Implications of Commercial ISR for SOF
The proliferation of commercial space capabilities offers considerable opportunities 
for SOF but also causes serious challenges to operational security and force 
protection.
The Plus Side
On the positive side, the wealth of commercial overhead (and related) data promises 
to be an extremely useful supplemental source of intelligence for planning and 
operational purposes. These resources represent a new level of open-source 
information that can combine with traditional ISR sources to give a more complete 
and timelier picture of what is happening in areas of interest. They also offer SOF the 
opportunity to gather intelligence analysis more proactively than possible previously; 
SOF can work with commercial firms to develop focused information gathering 
and analysis that may not be readily available through traditional means. By using 
commercial sources creatively, SOF may establish their own specialized channels 
of information tailored specifically to both their immediate and long-term needs. 
Moreover, combining both traditional ISR information and commercial data will provide 
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a more robust intelligence-validation process, resulting in heightened confidence in 
situation assessments. 
The US government neither owns nor controls commercial ISR sources, meaning 
SOF cannot rely on their availability in times of crisis or conflict. But the growing 
number of companies offering off-the-shelf spaceflight hardware and software 
provides an alternative path: the development and deployment of affordable organic 
space assets for SOF use. The growing affordability and expanding capabilities of 
small satellites mean SOF will be able to develop constellations of small satellites 
tailored to specific operational scenarios and functions, with the expectation these 
constellations can be deployed in a timely fashion to support specific missions. 
This possibility will increase sharply as launch-on-demand services, such as those 
planned by Rocket Lab and SpaceX, become available. Additionally, as organic assets, 
these satellites can be optimally configured to perform specific missions. Since 
they will be under the complete control of the operational unit, there will be no need 
for deconfliction with other users or the long lead times normally required to obtain 
tasking priority. 
The Challenges
Special operations require stealth, secrecy, and surprise. Ubiquitous overhead 
surveillance will make all three harder to achieve.
Perhaps the most significant change from the ubiquity of overhead surveillance will 
be the “loss of home-field advantage.” In the future, it will not be possible to know 
with confidence whether SOF training exercises, mission rehearsals, or other sensitive 
activities in CONUS are being monitored from above. In all likelihood, everyday 
activities at known SOF facilities will be monitored, and any changes in routine, tempo, 
location, or configuration will be detected and analyzed. Moreover, overhead data will 
be fused with terrestrial data (from cell phones, social networks, and other sources) 
to identify and track SOF personnel, provide detailed analysis of activities at known 
SOF facilities, and identify and expose classified locations and activities. 
Under these circumstances integration of overhead security with cyber, physical, 
and other operational security measures will become critical. Additionally, denial and 
deception (D&D) will become an increasingly important element of SOF operations. 
The use of concealment, camouflage, decoys, and obscurants will have to become 
more sophisticated and widespread than it is currently. For example, surfaces of 
decoys will have to be designed with spectral signatures identical to those of real 
objects when viewed by overhead hyperspectral sensors. Also, such decoys must have 
some active capacity, such as the ability to mimic some of the behavior (such as the 
vibrational signature) of real equipment.
Tactical and strategic D&D must merge. Practicing D&D for a particular mission, 
operation, or campaign only will no longer be enough; it will be required throughout the 
entire operational regime, including logistics and training, transport, and acquisition. 
Thus, SOF may have to increase the use of underground facilities, and virtual reality 
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may often have to substitute for physical settings. Elaborate methods of communication 
and social-media management and misdirection will need to be employed on an 
unprecedented scale. It may be necessary, for example, to prepare for—or appear to 
be preparing for—numerous missions at once to create confusion and doubt about 
intentions. SOF components will need to monitor commercial overhead capabilities and 
activities diligently, looking not only for explicit postings of concern but also less direct 
indicators of interest in their activities, such as unusual tasking behavior or changes 
in the distribution patterns of commercial firms providing analytic services based on 
overhead data. SOF must also develop tactical counter-space capabilities. Furthermore, 
SOF will likely need portable equipment and methods for defeating overhead 
surveillance, including jamming, spoofing, and inserting false data. Special operations 
competencies will have to expand to include counter-space skills.
Conclusions
Like all new technologies, ubiquitous overhead ISR is a two-edged sword. It offers 
great opportunities to enhance SOF capabilities but also presents a unique set of 
challenges for negating its use by adversaries. 
I have argued both offensive and defensive uses of space assets and counter-
space capabilities must be established to develop operational and analytic expertise 
to maximize the benefits of commercial ISR and to minimize the threat it presents 
to SOF missions. Because SOF operations have different focus points than those 
of the strategic ISR mission (for example, national technical means of verification, 
nuclear detonation detection, strategic warnings and indications), the evolution of 
SOF overhead-related requirements will probably be significantly different from that of 
national-level ones. Therefore, as a result of the increase in 24/7 commercial ISR and 
associated analyses, strategic overhead reconnaissance and surveillance will largely 
become detached from tactical ISR. This means overhead support to the warfighter 
will increasingly become the duty of warfighters themselves (including SOF), rather 
than a support function provided to them by the intelligence community. 
Finally, while I have set out the general features of the expected impact from 
commerical ISR technology, the field will likely evolve in unexpected ways. Not all of 
its implications can be foreseen at this time. Therefore, SOF operators must begin 
investigating the possibilities for, experimenting with, and mastering the use of this 
novel technology as soon as possible to be at the forefront of both exploiting it and 
minimizing vulnerability to it.
Disclaimer: The views, opinions, and findings expressed in this article are solely those 
of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of FTS International.
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C H A P T E R  3 4
The Growing Importance of Subterranean Warfare  




As the US Army prepares to face an evolving operational environment, a broad spectrum 
of new threats greatly complicate the battlespace. Recent combat experience in Iraq, 
Syria, and Afghanistan, as well as ongoing national security threats from North Korea, 
Iran, and elsewhere suggest that innovation in underground facilities (UGFs) presents 
a major challenge for US forces. Adversary groups and nations are leveraging complex 
terrain to exploit operational advantage. The US must match such innovation to defeat 
enemies who use UGFs and subterranean (SubT) environments for military purposes.1 
This chapter outlines the UGF challenge and suggests ways to address it.
Operationally, the subterranean environment comprises tunnels and UGF that 
can be constructed in naturally occurring environments, such as caves and caverns, 
as well as human-made structures, ranging from simplistic tunnel systems to 
extremely complex facilities designed for advanced military applications.2 Much has 
been learned from UGFs constructed for smuggling purposes, as well as historic 
experiences with UGFs in Vietnam and elsewhere. For our purposes, we are interested 
in UGFs that are utilized for military activities.
Because of geographic limitations and the need to conceal activities from US 
intelligence collection, US adversaries have utilized underground tunneling and 
construction technology to design and create increasingly sophisticated subterranean 
structures.3 A wide range of regular and irregular forces are innovating in the 
construction and use of “hard and deeply buried targets” (HDBT) and UGF, which can 
include modified natural and human-made structures ranging from hardened-surface 
bunker complexes to deep tunnels. These facilities typically incorporate the attributes 
of “concealment, self-sustainment, multifaceted communications, strong physical 
security, modern air defenses, and protective surrounding—often in mountainous or 
urban terrain to enhance their suitability for military application.”4 
In contrast to the rudimentary UGFs employed by insurgent groups such as the 
Vietcong, modern HDBTs are often well-connected networks housing operational 
capabilities used to support leadership protection, intelligence, planning, weapon 
production, basing, and command and control of ground operations. In the case of 
weapon production, UGFs can be used to support assembly, storage, and deployment 
facilities for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and antiaccess/aerial denial 
defense systems.5 In Syria and Iraq, ISIS utilized tunnel systems to initiate attacks 
on coalition forces and launch drones for intelligence collection activities.6 The role 
of state sponsorship for nonstate actors such as al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, or 
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ISIS often determines the level of investment and sophistication of their UGFs and 
associated logistical support for operations utilizing them. 
The use of UGFs by foreign governments and nonstate organizations to conceal and 
protect critical military and civilian assets has increased in recent years, according to 
the intelligence community. Countries such as China, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Russia, 
Pakistan, and Lebanon (in this case used by Lebanese Hezbollah) all have active 
underground programs.7 A significant trend has emerged in which countries of concern 
are basing ballistic and cruise missiles and other systems designed for antiaccess/
area denial weapons within UGF.8 In light of this trend, US forces have begun preparing 
to counter these efforts, driven in part by priority missions such as counterterrorism 
and counterproliferation that could require US combat forces to enter UGF.
The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates 10,000 known or suspected HDBTs 
exist worldwide. Of this number, roughly 20 percent of these facilities support a major 
strategic function and are in or near highly concentrated urban areas. These HDBTs 
are used to protect senior leaders, command-and-control functions, and storage of 
WMD, among other purposes. Some are reportedly buried in hard rock at depths 
greater than 300 meters.9 US strategy cannot afford to accept the invulnerability of 
these critical facilities and must therefore develop options for holding them at risk, 
and striking them if necessary. Both deterrence and defense depend on it. 
Overwhelmingly, the US strategy for holding UGF at risk depends on specialized 
aerial-delivered munitions such as the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP). The 
limitations of this technology have motivated the DOD to develop more options, 
specifically involving the application of ground forces to clear HDBT and UGF. To 
address this issue, special operations forces (SOF) have maintained a small force 
with limited capabilities, but the need for a more robust force with a broader range of 
capabilities is clear. However, the growing number and diversity of UGF are outpacing 
US efforts to develop response options. As the intelligence estimates demonstrate, 
the number of UGF targets requiring US ground-force-response options are on the rise 
because either the depth of the structure negates penetrator weapons effectiveness 
or the likelihood of a potential release of chemical, biological, or radiological 
containments makes kinetic strikes highly undesirable.10 When considering the 
continued proliferation of UGFs and the limits of kinetic weapons to destroy these 
facilities, expanding US ground-force-defeat options should be a top priority. 
New Directions and Possible Solutions
Widespread use of tunnels and UGF to gain tactical advantage is becoming more 
sophisticated and increasingly effective, increasing the likelihood that US forces will 
encounter military-purposed subterranean structures on future battlefields. However, 
three main factors limit the DOD’s current abilities to address this trend: 1) Current 
counter-UGF capabilities are centered on precision-strike weapons, 2) limited SOF 
ground-force options exist, 3) and locating and characterizing UGFs is difficult. 
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To overcome these obstacles, DOD, the Army, and SOF need to expand conventional-
force UGF options. In addition to providing needed technology and resources, existing 
capabilities are available to address many of the shortfalls. For example, specialized 
training could be expanded to larger segments of the force, including general-purpose 
ground forces. Such training would cover the following areas:
• Mission Command: UGFs present a degraded environment for navigation, 
communications, visibility, and control. Advancements in communications 
are needed to maintain command authorties and guidance in underground 
structures. Sensors and autonomous vehicles can help navigate where 
visibility is impaired. Equipping and training ground forces in the use of these 
technologies is essential.
• Intelligence: To address the problem that overhead systems cannot reliably 
detect underground structures and related activities, dedicated, advanced 
overhead systems should be available to inform ground forces of the 
existence and characteristics of UGFs. Drones, multispectral imagery, and 
ground-penetrating radar all provide critical information on UGFs, but too 
often such information and analysis is not available in real time to ground 
forces. This type of reach-back support is especially relevant for troops 
who unexpectedly encounter UGF and must engage enemies who are 
utilizing them. In addition to technological breakthroughs, training in these 
intelligence capabilities and how to access them could improve situational 
awareness and real-time decision-making for US forces encountering UGFs. 
Timely intelligence is especially critical where the presence of WMD is 
suspected.
• Movement and Maneuver: UGFs often present a baffling maze of channels, 
chambers, obstacles, barriers, and hidden compartments—made even more 
treacherous by booby traps and other defensive measures. Expanded training 
is needed to familiarize more US forces with these physical challenges and 
provide them with a suite of proceedures and defeat/bypass options for use 
against UGFs. Breaching tools should be a focus of innovation, as well as 
robotics.
• Force Protection: Wherever possible, US forces should have advance 
familiarity with acoustic thresholds and blast overpressure limitations of 
UGFs, especially in relation to various US and foreign weapon systems. 
Relatedly, the characteristics of air quality inside UGFs and their associated 
HVAC capabilities should be available to US forces, along with appropriate 
protective gear to enable operations in toxic environments. A specialized UGF 
training program could better prepare a larger number of US forces to cope 
with these contingencies. 
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Several USG organizations are making progress on various aspects of the 
subterranean warfare challenge. The US Army Asymetric Warfare Group, DARPA, 
the National Ground Intelligence Center, SOFWERX, and other innovation hubs 
are sponsoring research and development to address the UGF challenge. Several 
training centers such as the US Army Muscatatuck Urban Training Center in Indiana 
are cultivating new doctrines and operational concepts for subterranean warfare.11 
Advancements in autonomous vehicles will be central to many of these innovations. 
However, these advancements and innovations will have limited impact unless they 
are extended to a much wider population of general-purpose forces (GPF), in addition 
to the specialized units who have traditionally benefited from them. Similar to 
counterterrorism and counterproliferation operations, the integration of GPF with SOF 
would greatly advance our preparedness to conduct subterranean operations.12
As the likelihood grows of US forces encountering military-purposed subterranean 
structures, key pieces of an effective response are missing. Gaps in doctrine and 
training prevent the types of improvements outlined here, incuding the requirment for 
interoperability of SOF and GPF.13 The path forward depends on making SubT warfare a 
training requirement for both SOF and GPF. This process could begin with the TRADOC 
G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) defining the subterranean environment as 
a training priority for both GPF and SOF. From this training, a habitual partnership 
with specific GPF and SOF units could be developed. The training plan should include 
integrating best practices and sound Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) from 
the USSOCOM community and an update of the Subterranean Handbook to address 
historic and emerging challenges of SubT warfare.14 
The Path Forward
The Army is capable of implenting the measures outlined here. Its own Joint Capabilities 
Integration Development Systems process lays out a method that could be used to 
prepare for future SubT warfare. Here is a brief summary of how this process could work. 
• Doctrine: Current publications should be updated and integrated into training 
and planning.
• Organization: Key positions could be empowered to ensure the development 
and integration of SubT technologies and TTPs. This will be critical with 
respect to interoperability. 
• Training: Require development of programs of instruction, mission rehearsal 
exercises, and home-station training concepts. Performance will be judged on 
preparedness for SubT operations. 
• Material: Specialized equipment such as the technologies cited above must 
be prioritied for R&D and fast-tracked for rapid deployment.
• Leader Development and Education: Add to selected officer/
noncommissioned officer courses modules on the UGF threat and begin 
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development of tactical competence in this operational environment. Support 
Professional Military Education research on SubT warfare. Conduct table-top 
exercises (TTX) to explore a wide range of UGF defeat scenarios.
• Personnel: Citations and advancement to incentivize SubT warfare skills, 
knowledge, and experience. 
• Facilities: Build additional underground training facilities and use advanced 
simulation techniques to model and red-team different UGF scenarios.15 
If integrated with current SubT qualified SOF, GPF must be capable of conducting 
decisive operations, including synchronized combined-arms maneuver in a joint/
combined and interagency environment to gain access to and seize control of 
targeted UGFs. This will be especially important for WMD sites, where procedures to 
confirm or deny the presence of WMD materiel, establish conditions for exploitation 
and elimination activities (by more technologically equipped and specialized forces), 
defend against ongoing hostilities, and exfiltrate US forces along with any seized 
articles. To achieve this, a wider population of GPF must understand the mission, 
develop core competencies, integrate maneuver and technical forces, assess C2 
requirements (for information, data flow, and communications), practice operational 
sustainment, train in underground facilities, and master the use of new technologies 
developed to support the SubT mission.
If projections for the proliferation of UGF and more extensive use of the SubT 
domain hold true, the steps outlined here would provide the United States with the 
robust SubT warfare capabilities that are required to achieve US national security 
objectives.
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Chaos and Constraint:  
Special Operations and “The Convergence”
LTC James D. Leaf
“The price you pay for the refusal to make an assessment is that  
when the reality occurs it will be much less manageable”
—Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Fort Bragg, 20151
In a world buffeted by change, the emerging operating environment (EOE) will be the 
most complex and lethal yet experienced by US special operations forces (SOF). 
Complex factors are bringing global change comparable to the introduction of the 
printing press to Europe half a millennium ago, which spread knowledge and upended 
institutions, society, and kingdoms.2 In the emerging environment of the twenty-first 
century, the Cold War is long over, the post-9/11 global war on terror is winding down, 
and powerful rising and revanchist nations are challenging the United States and the 
world order it created. In this setting, US SOF finds itself at the vanguard of US foreign 
policy, conducting legacy missions altered by the emerging “new normal.”
As change sweeps the world, it brings chaos globally, while institutional limitations 
constrain governments, militaries, and other organizations as they attempt to adapt. In this 
emerging global setting, any opponent—nation-state militaries and security organizations, 
nation-state proxies and surrogates, nonstate actors, and even individuals—will have 
access to any advanced technology. In short, they will be able to have “statelike” 
capabilities, which will challenge SOF in every warfighting domain. Opponents with equal or 
overmatching statelike capabilities will be a norm. This is the world of “The Convergence,” 
the point where the gap between nonstate- and state-actor capabilities diminishes and the 
risk to force and mission success increases significantly. To ensure mission success, US 
SOF must “harden.” It should prepare to face and thrive against statelike actors because 
this level of capability will be ubiquitous in the twenty-first century, regardless of opponent.
Thought Piece: “Convergence” 1950s Style 
In March 1954, the North Vietnamese guerrillas introduced statelike 
capabilities—massed artillery and antiaircraft guns—against the French at the 
battle of Dien Bien Phu. To achieve this, it took the North Vietnamese months 
and the work of thousands of its personnel tunneling through mountains and 
dragging cannons by hand. The artillery was foreign military aid from the Soviet 
Union and other nations. Such was “Convergence” in the 1950s. In the twenty-
first century, this can be done with a credit card, bitcoin, and access to Amazon 
or the “dark web.” How does US SOF prepare for such a situation?
S T R A T E G I C  L A T E N C Y  U N L E A S H E D    |    493 
One approach to gain understanding of the EOE is to forecast using a near-term, 
five-to-seven-year focus. Or using US Department of Defense (DOD) budgetary jargon: 
“Program Objective Memorandum” (POM); this time frame can also be refered to as 
“POM+.” This gives current decision-makers and practitioners concrete information to 
use when making resource decisions and incentivizes the forecaster; in five years, the 
forecaster’s work can be “graded” for accuracy. While valuable, using a longer forecast 
perspective risks being of limited immediate practical value for decision-makers, no 
matter how insightful the analysis. It lacks a “so what?” What does the busy SOF 
leader do with analysis of “urbanization” or “demographic shifts” in 2050? How does 
such information help future-focused decision-making happening now?
This is important because “Convergence” is happening now. The twenty-first-
century operating environment will depart dramatically from the past. Complex 
global factors are not only rapidly changing our daily lives but also the future US SOF 
battlefields. The specific missions our nation’s leaders will expect of SOF in the near 
future are unlikely to change much, but the “new reality” of the twenty-first century 
EOE will reshape them. Legacy SOF missions will continue, but the environment in 
which they will occur will be different.
Global Themes: “Chaos and Constraint”
Throughout history, technology has been a driver of change. In our era, the rate of 
technological advancement and accompanying change is exponential. This unrelenting 
pace brings sudden and radical transformation that disorders traditions, norms, and 
beliefs. People and institutions struggle in this tumult. This is chaos.
A natural result of this chaos is the breakdown of economic, political, and 
diplomatic institutions that have been the foundation of the global post–World War 
II order. This phenomenon upends the lives of individuals and nations. Government 
institutions resist change and are slow moving and bureaucratic, undermining 
adaptation and reform attempts. These dynamics constrain nations. In this chaotic 
world, a nation so constrained risks failure to understand, let alone succeed at, core 
missions like national defense.
Global Factors
Globally, many significant factors occur and interact in unpredictable ways to shape 
the EOE. To better comprehend the EOE, US SOF should focus on technology spread, 
global competition, expanded competitive space, urbanization, resource realities, 
and legacy institutions. The global competition between powerful nation-states is 
expanding the competitive space, from the bottom of the oceans to outer space. 
This competition helps drive technology proliferation, which increases the risk of 
capability overmatch and domain superiority. Operating with increasingly constrained 
resources while conducting twenty-first-century operations in urbanized landscapes 
with twentieth-century institutions will increase the challenges US SOF will face.
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Thought Piece: “Gray Zone” or Great Game?
The “Great Game” was a sixty-year competition in central Asia between the Russian 
and British Empires in the nineteenth century. It was short of major war but far from 
peaceful. It featured the use of spies, proxies, surrogates, and mercenaries and 
included four “minor” wars, the deposition of local leaders, the destruction of a British 
field army, and changes to national boundaries as the British and Russians created 
and annexed nations. Observers have labeled our era of state competition for local 
and even global supremacy the “gray zone.” In reality, is this actually a new “Great 
Game”? In a global competition conducted mostly outside of declared war zones, 
how is SOF to be used, and does it have the capabilites and, more importantly and 
perhaps less understood, the authorities to operate outside of declared war zones?
 
Technology Spread
States no longer drive technological innovation. Gone are the Cold War days when DOD, 
Department of Energy, and NASA programs drove technological innovation. These days, 
the commercial sector—represented by Google, Apple, Amazon, and others—dominate 
and make available advanced technology to anyone who can buy, borrow, or steal it.
Thought Piece: Who Uses What?
Early in the twentieth century, the British army implemented a groundbreaking 
and complex capability by creating the Royal Machine Gun Corps, a new branch  
of technicians to use a new technology.
Like the machine gun, are drones, cyber operations, or robotics things 
best left to specialists or capabilities every soldier will use eventually? In the 
emerging world of the Internet of Things and proliferation of artificial intelligence, 
can any soldiers or units afford to be “offline?”
Advanced military technology is also proliferating as nations compete for regional 
and global position. In the global competition between nuclear-armed nations, the 
importance of surrogates to achieve policy goals in lieu of uniformed military forces 
will increase, and so will their capabilities. US SOF will face relatively indistinguishable 
and, at times, possibly superior capabilities, regardless of the opponent. Therefore, 
the decades-old assumption is gone that the United States possesses technological 
and capability overmatch. Technological superiority and overmatch are not US 
birthrights. The low cost, availability, and ease of use of advanced technologies allows 
adversaries to purchase and field new technologies rapidly. ISIS “beta tested” this 
reality with their unexpected use of drones in Syria in 2017. In the emerging EOE, this 
phenonenom can be expected regarding the capability of any enemy.
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Global Competition
The 2018 US National Defense Strategy describes unambiguously: “Long-term 
strategic competitions with China and Russia are principal priorities for the 
Department [of Defense].” This ongoing global competition is a continuous economic, 
diplomatic, information, and military effort to gain and maintain positional advantage: 
a form of global siege warfare. Nuclear proliferation makes full-scale interstate war 
unlikely. States will employ military capabilities, proxies, surrogates, and other means 
to secure geopolitical advantages rather than traditional destruction of enemy forces 
on a battlefield. Critical infrastructure, societal cohesion, and even basic government 
function are targets. In this environment, US SOF utility is wide ranging. The highest 
long-term concerns for the United States are Russia, China, and terrorism. This is 
noted not to limit SOF to these threats but to highlight the relevance of US SOF with 
regard to these threats.
Russia is a shadow of the former Soviet Union. It is not a US “peer competitor” 
but a well-armed and capable rogue nation willing and desirous to disrupt the 
international order and the United States’ global position, but it knows it cannot 
control either. Given the limitations of Russia’s power and its dangerous nature, US 
SOF can play a critical role in countering Russian actions, especially in “phase 0.” 
The size of China’s population, economy, and publicly stated global ambitions 
make China unlike any other competitor the United States has ever experienced. 
China’s military transformation from an ill-equipped, largely ground-focused military to 
one using advanced technology with regional, global, and space impacts is arguably 
the biggest modern national security concern. Equally true is that the Chinese 
military lacks the United States’ recent and institutional military experience and last 
fought (and lost) a war in 1979. There has been no Chinese Grenada or Eagle Claw, 
let alone a Desert Storm. More broadly, China is trying to transition from a land to 
a maritime power. History records such efforts as rarely succeeding. Nonetheless, 
countering China’s ambitions will test US ability to maintain its global position and 
the current global order. Given the stakes involved, SOF has a crucial role in what 
could be the critical US strategic security concern of the twenty-first century.
In the EOE, terrorism remains a priority. Its occurrence is unpredictable, it targets 
civilians, and its impact is disproportionate. The impacts of 9/11 are well known and 
profound. In earlier decades, terrorism deeply impaired both the Jimmy Carter and 
Ronald Reagan presidencies. In 2019, US SOF killed the leader of and eliminated 
the physical “caliphate” in Syria and Iraq of ISIS, an organization unheard of before 
2014. This counter-ISIS campaign came three years after a US president had 
fulfilled a campaign pledge to withdraw all US forces from Iraq. Terrorism remains a 
US priority because of its unpredictable nature and risk of significant impact. With 
capabilities developed and optimized by continuous operations since 2001, SOF can 
be ideal leaders for countering terrorism in the twenty-first century EOE.
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Success in the Twenty-First Century Requires Change for US SOF 
The Cold War and especially World War II are the cultural and intellectual touchstones 
for how Americans view conflict. Our government’s structure and national security 
policy-making functions are legacies of those conflicts. Another is represented by 
the organizations, major platforms, activities, and functions of our military. The 
EOE requires a departure from these cherished and well-understood traditions. For 
the twenty-first-century global nation-state competition, something more relevant 
to examine than the post–World War II United States might be the limited dynastic 
conflicts of eighteenth-century Europe, when war’s goals were limited and nations 
competed but did not seek to destroy the existing order. “Tech wizards” of that day 
like the engineer Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban or a military innovator such as 
Frederick the Great may not resonate with Americans the way George S. Patton or 
William Halsey do. However, how these leaders and organizations leveraged techology 
and developed means to achieve objectives without the destruction of opponents are 
worthy subjects to explore.
Expanded Competitive Space
Having largely created the world order, the United States is now defending the status 
quo while multiple powerful competitors look to disrupt it and their place within it. 
For the US military, the domain dominance of the post–Cold War unipolar world is 
gone. For US SOF, operating in contested domains against opponents with roughly 
equal capabilities will be the norm. However, this is not a significant departure 
historically for what US SOF has done or been expected to do, operating in denied 
areas, outnumbered and at a tactical disadvantage. US SOF have experienced this 
phenonenom and were as in fact created to operate successfully within a contested 
enviornment.
However, SOF leaders and practitioners must better understand and analyze the 
EOE. In a global competition between powerful nation-states, the competition reaches 
everywhere. Space is one critical domain. Both in the commercial and governmental 
realms, human activity in space is growing and diversifying. Commercially available 
small and inexpensive satellites are now a reality.3 In 2019, India joined the United 
States, Russia, and China as nations who have successfully targeted and destroyed 
a satellite. In time, will commercial antisatellite systems also be available? How 
might great-power competition in space affect SOF operations? US leaders should 
heed Chinese military writing that speaks of targeting communication, early warning, 
and reconnaissance satellites to “Blind and deafen the enemy” (italics added).4 SOF 
must understand and prepare for operational impacts to US forces as it prepares its 
personnel and develops capabilities for the twenty-first century. The Air Force, Navy, 
and recently established Space Force will dominate US space efforts, but SOF should 
also understand this domain, contribute to its requirements, and, where appropriate, 
make niche additions to organic capabilities.
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Thought Piece: The New High Ground?
China’s ambitions for a permanent space presence are unambiguous. Prominent 
in these plans is the moon because, “Whoever first conquers the Moon will 
benefit first.”5 A permanent moon base gains access to the moon’s resources, 
supports deep-space travel, denies adversary access, and enables creation of a 
space-based solar-power system for the earth.6
A solar panel array built on high ground illuminated nearly year-round on the 
moon’s poles could provide the steady power source required to make a permanent 
moon base a possibility. These areas, called the “peaks of eternal light,” may be 
key terrain in twenty-first century state competition.7 Created to operate in denied 
areas and for missions with strategic impact, SOF could have a role in securing this 
new ultimate high ground. What capabilities would such SOF require? 
Urbanization
Since World War II, the modern world has urbanized dramatically. As of 2018, 55 
percent of the world’s population was urban.8 For the fist time ever, most humans 
live in cities, the result of an urban population surge from 751 million in 1950 to 
4.2 billion in 2018.9 Analysis published in 2018 places over 12 percent of the 
earth’s population living in one of 33 megacities (10 million inhabitants), with the 
United Nations projecting the number of megacities will increase to 43 by 2030.10 
Correspondingly, post–Cold War conflict has been largely urban: Khafji, Grozny, 
Sarajevo, Brazzaville, Baghdad, Mumbai, Beirut, Aleppo, Mosul, Raqqa, Gaza, 
Mogadishu, Donetsk, and Sanaa. War is a human endeavor, and a rapidly urbanizing 
world naturally features fighting where the people are: cities.
This ubiquity of urban landscapes means SOF will operate in them. Megacities, 
increasing in both size and number, are complex operating environments. These 
cities can serve as incubators of disruptive social movements and supply terrorist 
and criminal networks with a near limitless pool of unemployed, underemployed, 
disillusioned, and left-behind individuals. SOF operating in these cities will have to 
navigate in mazelike terrain at street level, underground, and in multistory structures 
that will degrade C4 systems. Enemy advanced technology, urban sprawl, and a desire 
to minimize civilian casualties will limit US SOF technological overmatch, firepower, 
and other legacy advantages.
Resource Realities
An obvious component of national defense is the ability to fund it. For financial and 
demographic reasons, the United States faces significant challenges in the near future. 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) analysis found that by the end of 2018, the 
debt-to-GDP ratio of the US federal budget was predicted to exceed the historical 
World War II–era high of 106 percent in 13 to 20 years.11 GAO analysis projects that 
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the depletion of key entitlement funds will start in 2026.12 In 2019, GAO analysis 
showed that Health and Human Service (Medicare, Medicaid), Social Security 
Administration, Veteran’s Administration, Defense, and debt-payment spending 
consumed over three-quarters of the federal budget.13 The longer term outlook is even 
less positive. Before the Covid-19 pandemic, GAO projected the debt-to-GDP ratio 
would exceed 100 percent by 2030 and continue to increase well beyond historic 
highs.14 At the same time, significant demographic changes are also occurring. By 
2030, the entire baby-boomer generation, 20 percent of the US population, will be 
at least 65 years old.15 By 2030, the US population will no longer be “triangular” 
(i.e., many young people and fewer old) and instead become “square,” with the 
under-18 population and over-65 populations being nearly symmetrical (75.4 and 
73.1 respectively).16 These demographic trends will continue throughout the twenty-
first century with impacts on everything from military recruiting, entitlement spending 
growth, and tax-revenue collection. 
In the decades ahead, the combination of finance and demographic realities 
will constrain US defense resources and require pragmatic and difficult decisions 
regarding priorities and reforms in acquisition, pay, pensions, and force structure. 
The costs of defense have grown consistently, even as the size of the overall defense 
force has shrunk. Costs for operations and maintenance and compensation for both 
active-duty and retired military personnel have grown dramatically, with the latter cost 
doubling since 2000.17 It is an unfortunate but a certain planning assumption that, 
barring a significant state-on-state conflict, the US defense budget will not increase 
significantly. Sustaining present force structures and capabilities will likely prove 
difficult. Also, of concern for SOF are the impacts on recruiting as the US population 
ages and the pool of available and interested young people decreases. What the 
United States needs a “commando” to be and to do will likely be different in the 
twenty-first than the twentieth century. Adhering to legacy conceptions of SOF is an 
unaffordable luxury in an environment of constrained resources and numerous and 
capable opponents.
Thought Piece: What Are Commandos Now?
In earlier eras, “special operations” meant special capabilities (e.g., rifled 
muskets), techniques and tactics (e.g., patrolling, close-quarter battles), and/
or missions (e.g., working with indigenous forces, counterterrorism) that later 
proliferated to the wider force. In the twenty-first century, what does it mean to be a 
commando, and what unique capabilities and missions does a commando have?
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Legacy Institutions
Starting late in World War II, the victorious allied nations led by the United States laid 
out the diplomatic and economic framework and institutions of the postwar order. US 
defense, intelligence, and foreign policy institutions are creations of the era and have 
remained largely unchanged since then. Created for the Cold War, security institutions, 
policies, and systems focused on maintaining global stability. Nuclear conflict was a 
real and immediate possibility. Other than strategic air and naval forces, US military 
would primarily operate within declared war zones operating overtly under United 
States Code, title 10.
These legacy systems are problematic for a dynamic world of global competition 
between nuclear-armed great powers where full-scale war is limited but competitive 
acts—intelligence, cyber, information, space, maritime, and surrogate/proxy 
activities—will be routine. In this “gray zone”—the normal state of affairs between 
nations when not at war—legacy Cold War institutions and systems constrain SOF as 
a tool of national power. For the twenty-first century, SOF ability to operate outside war 
zones agilely in the emerging global environment would increase its utility to policy 
makers. To do this, a paradigm shift of the sort that occurred in the late 1940s, with 
the passing of the national security act of 1947, would be a good first step.
Conclusion
The twenty-first century will be singularly challenging for the United States and the 
world order it helped create. Complex factors are changing nearly every aspect of 
nations, institutions, and people’s lives. Powerful nations (e.g., Russia and China), 
rogue nations, and nonstate groups seek to undermine or displace the United States. 
The emerging operating environment is complex, highly lethal, and one where anyone 
can access advanced technology and have “statelike” capabilities. This is the world 
of the “The Convergence.” By 2030, what capabilities can a “mere” guerrilla force 
possess? The possibilities are limitless and troubling.
The years ahead will test the United States. The US military will be critical in 
countering nations in competition short of war, to prevent war, and, if necessary, 
to wage war in the event of conflict. US SOF will be at the forefront to support 
national policy and the joint force. Starting now, SOF must “harden” to face the most 
dangerous threat: the state actor. It is clear where enemy capabilities are heading, 
and, knowing this, SOF must prepare to meet this coming reality.
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Few Weapons Are as Deadly as a Good Clock:  
Military Implications of 1:10^19 PNT
Robert G. Kennedy III
A soldier must shoot, move, and communicate
—US Army doctrine.1
Preface and Approach
The organizers of this book defined “strategic latency” as “the inherent potential 
of S&T to produce powerful tools capable of changing the balance of power.” Fair 
enough. They elaborate: “we use the term ‘strategic latency’ to describe technologies 
that have significant potential to be transformed by a nation, group, or individual for 
strategic effects.” This writer had thought of “strategic latency” as a portmanteau of 
“strategic surprise” (e.g., Pearl Harbor, Sputnik, or 9/11) combined with the concept 
of latency from epidemiology, or that which is inherent in technological shifts. These 
shifts, playing out over timeframes of four decades, more or less, usually surprised 
people with unanticipated/unintended consequences during the evolution of the 
innovation. Even the architects/inventors can be surprised and generally have little to 
no appreciation of the full ramifications of their invention.2i In the United States today, 
social media is the most salient example, an instrumentality turned against its owners 
by adversaries, like the airliners of 9/11 were.
What might special operators have to deal with by 2050? To see one facet of 
this possible future, we turn to the humble watch, in particular, the emergence of 
distributed position, navigation, and timing (PNT) infrastructure at the 1:1019 level, 
made possible by quantum metrology. (“Watch” is used in the same tongue-in-cheek 
sense that those pocket supercomputers are called “phones.”)
This chapter is a work of synthesis. In it, we combine epidemiological and systems 
engineering approachs to innovation. Not all innovations succeed, as a look at the Dead 
Media Project illustrates.3 How to sort the wheat from the chaff? This is the kernel of 
systems engineering. Assessing the future is less about verification than validation—
verification seeks to answer the question, “did we build the thing right?,” whereas validation 
answers the question, “did we build the right thing?” The answer to the second question 
cannot be known for a long time. Despite the breathtaking change in human affairs 
since the Industrial Revolution, certain constants exist that we can learn from, to put 
bounds around what our readers, including special operators, may expect, and by when.
i   For example, Alexander Graham Bell imagined the telephone as a means to bring high culture, such as live music concerts, to 
people in the hinterlands (i.e., a bit like cable radio today). Because industry could not imagine large numbers of women working 
in nondomestic or technical roles, the first telephone operators were teenage boys who turned out to be foul-mouthed terrors. It 
took no time for the nascent phone industry to fix that mistake by replacing the boys with much more responsible well-mannered 
people, i.e., cultured middle-class women. Additionally, without doubt, Bell did not imagine phone sex numbers.
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The Nature of Technological Revolutions
Historical Overview and Examples
Figure 1. 40-year characteristic time for mainstreaming (  ) of major infrastructure in the United States.4
Figure 1 illustratres both a common timescale, 40ish years, from invention to 
widespread adoption (“mainstreaming”) and that the timing (sequencing, phasing) 
of the political and economic impacts is predictable. Cesare Marchetti’s studies of 
long economic cycles and diffusion of innovation and Arnulf Grübler’s examination of 
diffusion of infrastructure showed these phenomena follow logistic curves.5 In addition, 
there is network effect, also known as “Metcalfe’s law,” in which marginal value of 
innovation grows as N-squared. Fax machines in the 1980s are a good example of this 
law.6ii Full appreciation of a revolution often occurs only a considerable time after its 
inception, as noted in the footnote about Alexander Graham Bell and the telephone. 
About the S-Curve, and Regions on It
Where did “learning curve,” or “experience curve,” come from? It started with an 
obscure paper in Franklin D. Roosevelt–era sociological agronomic research. A 1943 
study of the adoption of hybrid corn seed in Iowa by Bryce Ryan and Neal Gross 
solidified prior work on diffusion into a paradigm that would be cited consistently 
in the future, in numerous contexts, and enter common speech.7 The study also 
introduced terms such as “early adopter.” 
ii   “An example put forth by Rogers in Diffusion of Innovations was the fax machine, which had been around for almost 150 years 
before it became popular and widely used. It had existed in various forms and for various uses, but with more advancements 
in the technology of faxes, including the use of existing phone lines to transmit information, coupled with falling prices in both 
machines and cost per fax, the fax machine reached a critical mass in 1987, when “Americans began to assume that ‘everybody 
else’ had a fax machine.” 
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Figure 2. Sigmoid, or “S,” curve, introducing social terms from Ryan & Gross (1943).8 
Figure 3. Sigmoid curve or “S-curve,” with social cohorts from Ryan and Gross, left.  
Innovation cohort is dark gray, market penetration in light gray. Figure 4. Regions on the logistics curve, right.9 
As early as 1890, in The Laws of Imitation, Gabriel Tarde described the spread of 
new ideas through “imitative chains” and “imitative contagion.”10 He identified three 
main stages by which innovations spread: 
• The first corresponds to difficult beginnings, during which the idea has to 
struggle within a hostile environment full of opposing habits and beliefs; 
• The second corresponds to the properly exponential growth of the idea,  
with f(x) α 2x; 
• The third is logarithmic, with f(x)=log(x), corresponding to when the impulse 
of the idea gradually slows down while, simultaneously, new opponent 
ideas appear. This halts or stabilizes the progress of the innovation, which 
approaches an asymptote.
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Human experience progresses naturally from past to future. We resist noticing 
changes and altering our perception of the world. We typically do not appreciate 
where we are on the sigmoid curve. (Consider for example, the “Duckweed Problem,” 
in which a body of water is being overtaken by the fast-growing aquatic weed. At only 
10 percent coverage, say, an unscientific observer does not realize the lake is only 
three doublings away from ecological crisis.) As a result, we tend to emphasize past 
behavior of the curve and not look ahead to its changing nature. 
In region 1 of Figure 4, the innovation has occurred, but life stays the same. There 
is not enough absolute change to be observed by ordinary people. Consider the 
Human Genome Project (Figure 5), which was initially projected to take 100 years. 
Doublings existed, but they were not recognized, since doubling a small number yields 
a result that is still small.
In region 2, change is detectable by experts but not recognized as exponential, 
even though it is and always has been exponential, like all organic processes. The 
introduction of a “better mousetrap” stimulates an enormous amount of research and 
development, which leads to dramatic improvements in quality and quick reductions 
in unit cost. Hence, the terms “learning curve” or its inverse, “experience curve,” are 
synonyms for “logistic curve.”
Figure 5. Gene sequencing on logistics curve.11 
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Explosive exponential growth is the theme in region 3.iii The investments in region 
2 lay the groundwork for a period of rapid industry growth. Everyone, including 
nonexperts, recognizes the phenomenon, much like the growth of the stock market in 
the years before October 1929. There appears to be an infinite amount of work to do. 
Production capacity to meet the demand is limited by hiring and training constraints. 
Halfway between this region and the next, the savvy observer notices growth is 
slowing 1 or 2 doublings before the midpoint, which is 1 doubling period away before 
everyone really notices. Easy opportunities for product improvement or cost reduction 
(“low-hanging fruit”) become exhausted. At the far end of this zone, there are no 
margins because every penny of cost is being wrung out of production, like $1 solar 
power or $2-per-gigajoule fracked gas. Only bottom feeders are hiring.
Region 4 spans from the inflection point halfway to saturation. The derivative 
(slope) of the curve is maximum at the inflection point. It forms a normal distribution 
that has a fairly narrow width, on order of two doubling periods (half-width is one 
doubling period). The rate of growth in absolute terms begins to invert (slow down) 
after the inflection point then crash because the product or process are in widespread 
use with few remaining potential new customers. Half the workers are laid off every 
doubling period. The only new starts are extremely low-margin heroic schemes to give 
the increasingly idle stranded capacity something to do, like the Depression-era Works 
Progress Administration (WPA) projects. 
Region 5 is everything after that, an exponential decay to Region 6: saturation. 
Using the penetration of solar in the nation’s electricity sector as an example of this 
region, this author believes this level is equivalent to 40 percent of all generated 
electricity, say 2,000 terawatt-hours. This proportion may increase if a good method 
of storing electricity is developed. If that innovation comes before the crash, it would 
extend the life for the solar industry; if not, the carpetbaggers will clean up, as they 
did after the stock market crash of 1929. 
With respect to the technology that is the subject of this chapter—quantum 
metrology enabling PNT at the 10-19 level—this writer assesses humanity is just 
entering region 2.12 At this level, especially as a ubiquitous distributed infrastructure, 
PNT should be considered still latent with full strategic effects yet to play out and 
become visible.
Time and Space
The Admiralty and the Longitude Problem, or,  
Few Things in Life Are as Useful as a Good Clock
A clock is nothing more than a way to count beats. First, find a simple local physical 
phenomenon—be it the falling of a droplet of water, the swinging of a pendulum, the 
staccato oscillation of an escapement, or the buzzing of a crystal of quartz. Next, 
iii   As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, a lot more Americans have developed a feel for this phenomenon.
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relate that counting to an objective external phenomenon, such as the motion of 
celestial bodies. The key is that the external phenomenon be regular—reasonably 
frequent and observable everywhere—and the local phenomenon be reliably 
repeatable, regardless of variations in local conditions such as heat/cold, altitude, 
humidity, or motion. The combination is called frequency stability. Put the two together, 
and you have a clock. (In physical terms, the clock mechanism is its own reference 
frame; so without the external relationship, you have a metronome.)
Centuries ago, hundreds of seafarers per year died as a direct or indirect result 
of navigational error. While mariners have known how to determine their latitude for 
at least three millennia, utilizing a variety of simple astronomical devices, doing the 
same for longitude eluded all until three centuries ago. At that time, the best clocks 
in the world, based on the anchor escapement mechanism, were accurate to 10 
seconds per day, or roughly about one part in 10,000 (1:104).13 In response to the 
Scilly disaster of 1707, in which the Royal Navy lost four top-of-the-line warships and 
at least a thousand sailors because they did not know where they were and crashed 
into a submerged hazard, the British Admiralty established the Board of Longitude, 
and offered £20,000 prizeiv to solve the longitude problem.14
Unlike the simple exercise in geometry with celestial bodies to find one’s position 
in the north-south direction, finding one’s position in the east-west direction boiled to 
a problem of time, to wit, measuring time to an unprecedented degree of accuracy. The 
solution was a marine chronometer, i.e., a ruggedized clock suitable for oceangoing 
sailing ships, precise to better than one part in a million (1:106). Such a clock 
loses about one second every 12 days. These machines became ubiquitous—one 
essential feature of a true 
technological revolution—
when, by the mid-1700s, the 
autodidactic genius John 
Harrison had shrunk the size 
of the instrument from bigger 
than a steamer trunk (the 
“H1”) to a large pocketwatch 
(the “H4”). (Along the way, 
by necessity, he invented 
numerous mechanisms  
still in use today.) 
Figure 6. Harrison’s H1, left, and H4, right.15
Britain’s world-spanning empire was based on its navy, for which no real rival 
existed for well over a century.v Had Napoleon Bonaparte come from a naval instead 
iv   Equal to $3 million today; for “determining longitude within 30 nautical miles (56 km; 35 mi).”
v   Another world-spanning maritime commercial power protected by the seas; that is, the United States.
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of a (land-based) army background, he might have been more appreciative of another 
nautical innovation of the time, steam power, as (apocryphally) proposed to him by the 
American Robert Fulton, and history would be different. (Napoleon did commission 
Fulton to build the world’s first submarine, the man-powered Nautilus, which sailed the 
Seine in Rouen in 1800.)16 
A Brief History of Timekeeping
At the turn of the century, just as Guglielmo Marconi was developing his radio, a 
Yankee pocketwatch mass produced by the Waterbury Clock Company could be had 
for one dollar17 (a lot of money at the time; about a day’s wage for a skilled worker). 
On the eve of World War I, the winding stem of the watch was relocated from the 12 
o’clock to the 3 o’clock position, with two metal loops added to the outside case 
to hold straps, and the wristwatch was born. By the time radio became mainstream 
between World Wars I and II, the nature of the oscillating heart inside a timepiece 
had changed from mechanical (escapement) to electronic (vibrating quartz crystals); 
further, a timepiece’s precision had improved and form factor had shrunk dramatically 
again.18 More important for our purpose, by the 1960s, the cost of such precision had 
dropped so far that a wristwatch by Timex (successor to Waterbury) could still be had 
for a dollar. (By this point, after six decades of inflation, about an hour at minimum 
wage, a truly democratic price point.) On the fashion front (i.e., not “cheap”), the 
Swatch (contraction of “second watch,” “not one’s primary watch”) was developed 
in response to the “quartz crisis” of 1970s and 1980s, when Asian companies built 
giant machines to produce high-precision digital wristwatch guts by the million at 
an extremely low marginal cost, which allowed digital watches to outsell traditional 
mechanical watches made by European companies.19
Figure 7. Accuracy of timekeeping through history, from Warren Marrison’s 1947  
Gold Medal address to British Horological Society in London.20
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Shortly after World War II, about the time Warren Marrison was giving his Gold-
Medal–acceptance address to the British Horological Society for his seminal work on 
quartz oscillators, Isidor Rabi, one of the Manhattan Project physicists, suggested 
that a clock could be made based on atomic transitions. A decade later, away from 
hoi polloi, scientists at the National Institute of Standards and Technology laboratory 
in Boulder, Colorado and elsewhere learned to measure vibrations of molecules and, 
then, vibrations of electron shells around atoms. Step by step, the state of the art in 
timekeeping precision progressed by six more orders of magnitude over Harrison’s 
achievement, to 1:1012, or one in a trillion. Such a clock loses about 1 second in 
30,000 years, about five times longer than all recorded history. About the time that 
cheap Timex watches appeared on people’s wrists specialized, atomic clocks based 
on cesium became commercially available, for use as industrial calibration standards, 
to coordinate the machines underpinning humanity’s increasingly complicated 
interwoven global society and to support the calculations that led to the Moon 
landings. These clocks were at the heart of the first generation of navigation satellites 
(hence the old name “Navstar”) in the Global Positioning System (GPS).
Figure 8. Comparison of atomic clocks at National Institute of Standards and  
Technology (NIST) since World War II.21 
A generation later, by the time the 1989 Nobel Prize in Physics was awarded to 
Norman F. Ramsey for developing atomic clocks, accuracy had improved several orders 
to a level of 1.7:1015, or 2 parts in a quadrillion. Such a clock loses about 1 second 
in 20 million years, not as far back as the dinosaurs, but long before humans, or even 
hominids, appeared on the scene. 
Optical transitions are even quicker than electronic ones. Therefore, devices based 
on optical phenomena promise to be even more accurate by an order of magnitude 
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or two, which places that lost second before the dinosaurs, or even before the 
emergence of photosynthesis.
All the foregoing occurred in the realm of pretwentieth-century classical physics, 
the science pioneered by Isaac Newton for the macroscopic world that we can see. 
“Quantum” is a term used to distinguish phenomenon that operate in the subatomic 
world according to the principles of quantum mechanics (Werner Heisenberg) and 
relativity (Albert Einstein). Quantum devices are emerging that have demonstrated a 
frequency stability in the lab of 1 part in 1019.22 Theoretically, a clock running on this 
principle (which does not exist yet) would lose about 1 second in 300 billion years, 20 
times longer than the age of the universe.
What can practically be done with a quantum clock? We can attempt to forecast 
the effect of precision measurement in time by analogy with the known and soon-
expected effects of precision measurement in space presented in the next section.
A Brief History of “Spacekeeping”
Immediately after World War II, people were considering how to obviate expensive 
terrestrial infrastructure with satellites in space. For example, in 1945, Arthur C. 
Clarke (not yet famous) invented23 the geosynchronous communications satellite 
(“comsat”), revealing his novel idea to the world24 in a hobbyist magazine. A year later, 
the obscure R and D department (later to become famous as the RAND Corporation) 
of the Douglas Aircraft Company wrote a report for the US Army Air Forcevi about 
stationing surveillance assets (“spysats”) in space.25 In the early 1960s, Soviet 
scientists in the OKB-1 design bureau of the legendary Chief Designer S. P. Korolyov 
developed the Molniya (“Lightning”) series of telecommunications satellites26 flying in 
eponymous orbits to obviate the expense of long-distance landlines.vii Using advanced 
technology to bypass traditional costly infrastructure becomes important to our 
narrative later.
GPS is fundamentally nothing more than a bunch of really good clocks. In the early 
1990s, positioning from the GPS constellation (“satnav”) for military users provided a 
precision (hence “P-code”) of about 30 meters (m), while satnav precision for civilians 
using the same system was deliberately degraded to ~100 m (“selective availability” or 
“SA”). In 2000, the US government switched off SA, making military-grade positioning 
freely available to all users with a compatible device. No doubt the emergence of 
competing systems (e.g., Soviet Union’s/Russia’s GLONASSviii and the European Union’s 
Galileo), had much to do with the decision (not to mention China’s BeiDou or Japan’s 
vi   Prior to its spinoff as a coequal branch of the US military in the Harry Truman administration’s National Security Act of 1947.
vii   From the Soviet Union’s perspective, being situated far to the north, a Molniya orbit provides a viable alternative to out-of-view 
geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) over the equator. Both orbits are highly inclined to serve high latitudes and highly elliptical to 
maximize long dwell times over the service area at apogee. Unlike single comsats in GEO, continuous coverage must be provided 
by multiple birds in sequence like a carrousel.
viii   For ГЛОбальная НАвигационная Спутниковая Система, or globalnaya navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema.
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satnav augmentation system QZSS,ix or regional systems such as India’s IRNSSx). The 
trend of redundant competing systems will also only accelerate in a multipolar world. 
Since the events described above, the basic precision of satnav without 
augmentation has improved to about 10-15 m. In the late 1990s, static ground-based 
systems emerged that appropriated the nominal GPS signal, averaged out errors over 
time, and rebroadcast another, better signal within a limited area, such as airports,  
at first providing ~1 meter accuracy, but recently with centimeter (cm) accuracy.
In practical terms for a motorist:
• 100-meter accuracy is enough to know which major highway or  
city block one is on;
• 30 meters is enough to know which cross street is coming up—and, hence, 
when to slow down for the turn—but not enough to actually make the turn 
with eyes closed;
• 10 meters is enough to make the turn successfully if no other cars are around;
• 1 meter is enough to make the turn into one’s own driveway and still stay out 
of the neighbor’s front yard; or, 
• 1 centimeter is enough accuracy to do confidently all these things with eyes 
closed (or even asleep)—that is, under full automation. The Society for Automotive 
Engineers developed a humorous mnemonic for the five levels of automation xi
For nonhuman operators (i.e., robots):
• 1-meter is enough to land a commercial plane on autopilot, which was one  
of the first uses of differential GPS; and, 
• 1 meter is just about enough for an airborne drone to deliver a pizza through 
the correct apartment window.
What could a robot do with wide-area 1-cm accuracy? What does it portend for 
special operators when virtually everyone has such capability, when the change has 
fully proliferated throughout all infrastructure and every environment is permeated  
with it, like author Vernor Vinge’s “locators”?27
ix   For Quasi-Zenith Satellite System.
x   For Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System.
xi   Level 0: Automated system issues warnings but has no sustained vehicle control.
 Level 1 (“hands on”): Driver and automation share control of vehicle.
 Level 2 (“hands off”): Automated system takes full control of vehicle (accelerating, braking, and steering).
 Level 3 (“eyes off”): Driver can safely turn attention away from driving.
 Level 4 (“mind off”): As above, but no driver input required for safety (i.e., driver may sleep or leave seat).
 Level 5 (“steering wheel optional”): No human intervention is required at all (e.g., robotic taxi).
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At about the same time as the proliferation of GPS into civil life, soon after the 
end of the Cold War, space-based photoreconnaissance, previously almost exclusively 
a military province, also underwent technical, economic, and political revolutions 
in resolution, response time, and, most important, cost (free) and availability 
(ubiquitous). Almost exactly the same political dynamic occurred for space-based 
imaging as for satnav, at about the same time and for similar considerations: better to 
liberate a disruptive technology and hope to retain some control over its direction than 
to abandon the stage to other actors.28 (This writer had the honor to be instrumental 
in that.29) Result? Companies like Google and Planet Labs provide (what once was) 
a fusion of satnav and military-grade imagery of any place on Earth, at near-real-
time availability, all conveniently displayed (plus an admixture of near-real-time user 
feedback; see Metcalfe’s Law) to three billion usersxii on their pocket supercomputers 
(which they insist on referring to as “phones”). 
The Quantum World
For two identical clocks to keep the same time or “stay in phase,” they must be in 
the same gravitational field. For ordinary everyday purposes, Earth’s gravitational field 
is the same everywhere. But for sufficiently accurate devices, this assumption is not 
true. The pull of Earth’s gravity falls slightly with altitude or increases slightly over 
mountains or toward the poles. The effect of gravitation also changes according to the 
speed of the clock if it is moving, as has been demonstrated to many decimal places 
in low earth orbit, such as in the recent “NASA twins” experiments.30xiii Time, space, 
and gravity are just aspects of the same thing, the Einsteinian space-time continuum, 
connected by general relativity (GR). As a clock is moved faster, or up out of a gravity 
well, local time slows down. A clock up high runs slower than a clock down low, but 
until recently, this effect was not easily measurable. When atomic clocks on the 
big GPS satellites were operating at the one-in-a-trillion level based on macroscopic 
devices, their operators had to correct for local variation in the gravitational field using 
GR. Easy enough to do when you have an accurate enough clock. 
This connection of time and gravity via GR works both ways. GR in the form of 
aerial “gravity surveys” has been used for decades by geophysicists to prospect for 
oil, minerals, or geothermal resources. Earth’s seabed was mapped using satellites, 
detecting the subtle shifts in timekeeping aboard the satellite to find hidden mass 
concentrations, such as seamounts or chasms, below the waves. It has often been 
said that we know more about the moon above our heads than the ocean floor. 
however, the resolution of this underwater topography is constantly improving, with 
oceanographers announcing remarkable new discoveries almost every month. This is 
why Google Maps displays such pretty topography beyond the shore, rather than the 
featureless blue of globes a generation ago.
xii   Almost half the world’s population. Thus, in the middle of the logistics curve.
xiii   Astronaut Scott Kelly is now a bit younger than his identical twin brother, Mark Kelly, on the ground.
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This trend will only continue, but beyond the macroscopic and microscopic into the 
subatomic realm, wherein quantum mechanics rules. Recall that Harrison’s H4 got a 
sailor to within 56 km of his true position. Today, with state-of-the-art 10-14 clocks, we 
can identify a difference in altitude of 3 m (10 feet), one story in a building, using GR. 
We call this fusion of time and space the quantum world, hence the term “quantum 
clocks.” With quantum clocks at the 10-19 level, the entire surface of the Earth could 
be accurately mapped to better than 1-centimeter absolute accuracy.
Ubiquity and Decentralization
The famous “atomic clock” in Boulder, Colorado is a centralized system that 
broadcasts a time/frequency reference signal everywhere for terrestrial computer 
networks. The trouble with a central system is that communication can be cut or 
the central transmitter physically destroyed by hostile action. Likewise, GPS “birds” 
in space are big, about the size of a car. Satnav from space can be knocked off the 
air in a limited area on the ground by relatively low-power jammers; the platforms in 
space would be physically vulnerable as antisatellite (ASAT) capabilities continues 
to proliferate. After the United States, openly demonstrated ASAT capability, three 
countries—Soviet Union/Russia, China, and India, in that order—followed suit. There 
is little doubt ASAT capability is much more widespread, either clandestinely (Israel is 
at the top of this writer’s list) or latently by a dozen others, especially against targets 
in closer orbits. 
The long secular trend of miniaturization continues in the satellite realm, too. 
Planet Labs operates hundreds of imaging satellites in polar sun-synchronous orbits, 
each occupying a “3U form factor,”xiv (i.e., no bigger than a loaf of bread). They 
provide “line scan of the entire Earth” once a day, at submeter resolution, replacing a 
capability once needing a bird the size of a bus. Various companies have announced 
grandiose plans for constellations of thousands or tens of thousands of satellites. 
Most of these birds would be even smaller chipsats. However, an essential difference 
of future highly precise timekeeping is that it will be distributed. This is not merely a 
difference in degree (i.e., quantitative) but in kind (i.e., qualitative). 
Based on an invention about two decades ago, the first prototype chip-scale atomic 
clock (CSAC) was demonstrated by NIST, in an effort funded by DARPA to “provide 
improved location and battlespace situational awareness for dismounted soldiers when 
the global positioning system is not available” (italics added).31 In 2011, atomic clocks 
on a microchip began to be manufactured in large numbers.32 At just 16 cubic cm and 
35 grams (a little over an ounce), Symmetricom’sxv SA.45 miniaturized atomic clock is 
smaller than a York Peppermint Pattie, consumes a tenth of a watt, and cost $1,500 
when introduced ($2000 now, but expected to drop to $200 in volume). It gains/loses 
half a microsecond per day (i.e., an accuracy of about 1:1011). A radiation-hardened 
xiv   NASA defines a 1-U cubesat as occupying a volume of 10 x 10 x 10 cm, or 1 liter.
xv   Acquired by Microchip Technology Inc. of Chandler, Arizona.
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(rad-hard) variant (Figure 9) made by Microsemixvi is now qualified for use in space. Its 
makers anticipate eventual integration into a smartphone.33 
Figure 9. Space-rated rad-hard chip-scale atomic clock.34
Phased-Array Radars (PARs) and Software-Defined Radios (SDRs)
The frequency (ν), expressed in hertz (Hz), and wavelength (λ) of an electromagnetic 
wave is related by the simple equation: ν × λ = c (the speed of light, ~300,000,000 
meters per second). The higher the frequency, the shorter the wavelength (one handy 
memnonic is that light travels one foot in a billionth of a second):
• A 100-megahertz (MHz) signal—such as that received by a car radio—
measures 3 meters from crest to crest.
• A 1-gigahertz (GHz) signal (for cell phone use) is ten times shorter—30 cm; 
about 1 foot.
• A 1-terahertz (THz) signal is a thousand times shorter—0.3 millimeter 
(mm)—about 7 sheets of paper—or 300 “microns” (μm; millionths of a 
meter)—and is called submillimeter radiation.
• Infrared (IR) radiation (i.e., heat) extends from about 1 mm to near IR at:
• The red end of human vision, roughly 0.7 μm, or 700 nanometers (nm, 
billionths of a meter); the blue end of human vision is about 0.4 μm,  
or 400 nm.
• Below this wavelength is ultraviolet (UV) radiation, extending down to about 
10 nm, where it is called extreme (EUV).
• Below this is X-ray region, of increasingly higher energy, from “soft” to “hard.”
• Note the Active Denial System, a sublethal directed-energy weapon 
sometimes nicknamed “pain ray,” developed and fielded by the United 
States, operates at 95 GHz, or a wavelength about 3 mm. 
xvi   Also acquired by Microchip Technology Inc. of Chandler, Arizona.
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Anyone who has been at an airport or on a big ship has likely seen a rotating metal 
radar dish in which the beam of radio-frequency (RF) energy is steered mechanically. 
Typically, these operate in the microwave region, somewhere between 300 MHz (1 m) 
and 300 GHz (1 mm). PARs accomplish this steering to an arbitrary bearing and/or 
elevation electronically, a process called “scanning.” A series of static antenna are 
pulsed in sequence so as to emit a synchronized series of spherical waves that build 
up a considerable amount of RF energy by superposition, in effect an artificial beam 
pointing in the desired direction, as shown in Figure 10. In exchange for a tolerable 
loss of efficiency (some RF energy spreads uselessly in space), the physical response 
of PARs (“slew rate”) becomes almost instantaneous because of the elimination of 
the massive slow mechanical steering apparatus. 
Figure 10. A phased array process.35
The phasing trick depends on precise synchronization, which is to say, good 
clocks. For a phased array operating at a given wavelength, the rule of thumb is 
that any errors in synchronization need to be no more than 1/10 that wavelength. 
For airport radars, this corresponds to a timing precision of three billionths to three 
trillionths of a second. Current CSACs on the market can already satisfy this. Though 
demonstrated in the lab over a century ago, PARs did not take off practically until the 
Cold War. They are well known to the military, especially for early-warning or battle-
management applications. Complete multielement PARs, working in the 30-50 GHz 
range (i.e., centimeter wavelength), were implemented by DARPA on a single silicon 
chip in 2007. This leads to the next important piece.
Another technological development during the Cold War was SDRs, in which discrete 
physical hardware components—such as detectors, filters, amplifiers, modulators/
demodulators, and mixers—are instead instantiated in software, i.e., bits not atoms. 
At around the same period, fractal antennas were developed both to get around the 
size and weight limitations of traditional antennae and because traditional fixed-length 
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antennae can best receive or emit only one wavelength and are less efficient at every 
other. SDR and fractal antenna made the mobile-phone revolution possible.
We now have all the pieces. 
If 1-centimeter accuracy is enough to “drive” blindfolded, what services might be 
cheaply available when the timing component of PNT improves by another six orders of 
magnitude and, furthermore, becomes distributed and ubiquitous? Would people take 
a millionfold improvement in these combined technologies for granted, as they learned 
to do with computers and communication? Technological revolution or technological 
dead end? The answer depends on the degree of acceptance of the innovation and 
the uses (or misuses) to which the improvement is put. To see what we may become, 
looking in that “mirror darkly,” we must turn to science fiction.36
Conclusion: Implications for the SOF in 2050
What You (or the Bad Guys) Might Do with Really Good Ubiquitous Clocks
Drone swarms have already been demonstrated, flying uncannily accurate formations 
in a series of high-profile public-relations stunts, such as the Opening Ceremony 
at the 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, South Korea.37 By 2050, this sort of 
demonstration will be old hat, and will probably be how most people will get their fast 
food delivered.xvii However, this writer has something more ominous in mind.
Since the days of the Manhattan Project, it has been known that small explosions 
can be coordinated to shape big pressure waves precisely. Back then, the key was 
timing the point detonations with small switches called klystrons. The idea is to 
coordinate multiple hits, each by itself sublethal, with distributed assets individually 
below the threshold of detection, into a simultaneous strike that is lethal, capitalizing 
on the n-squared scaling effect of multiple hits, as seen in trauma medicine.xviii The 
key for maximizing shock value is simultaneity, which, in turn, requires exquisite 
coordination. To the best of this writer’s knowledge, an attack mode fully extrapolating 
this concept has been explored only in science fiction—for example, in Kim Stanley 
Robinson’s 2312 (2012).38 This writer conjectures (i.e., asserts without proof) the 
phenomenon of the shock effect of simultaneity exists across scales, analogous to 
xvii   A trend no doubt to be greatly accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic.
xviii  The Injury Severity Scale has a sum of squares in the calculation. “Baker and associates evaluated 2,128 victims of motor vehicle 
crashes over a 2-year period in Baltimore. For each patient, the anatomic areas with the highest AIS scores were tabulated. In 
analyzing these data, a nonlinear relationship was found, such that mortality increased disproportionately with AIS rating of the 
most severe grade. Also, patients with similar scores sometimes differed greatly in injury severity. For example, a patient with 
a ruptured spleen (AIS 4) and a pneumothorax (AIS 3) will have different survival probability, compared with a patient with an 
aortic rupture (AIS 5) and a rib fracture (AIS 2), even though they both have a total score of 7. So, a linear equation would not 
predict outcomes. Because the simplest nonlinear relationship in mathematics is quadratic, they applied this model to the data 
and found better correlation of severity and mortality. By taking the sum of the squares of the three highest AIS scores, the best 
correlation was achieved.” See https://www.orthobullets.com/trauma/1055/trauma-scoring-systems accessed 25 Oct 2019, 
and http://www.acrm.org.my/ntrd/documents/literatures/1999.%20Trauma%20Scoring%20Systems%20%20A%20Review.pdf 
accessed 25 Oct 2019
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Lanchester’s laws governing small-unit combat.39 A sufficient number of simultaneous 
attacks against a formation would get inside the target command’s OODAxix loop. 
The energy carrier need not be material—for targets within short range in a 
terrestrial environment, the attack can be conducted with energy, either as shock 
waves propagating through a medium (e.g., Joe Haldeman’s “shatterguns”40—which 
could be implemented now with state-of-the-art clocks) or as directed radiant energy 
outright. The amount of energy contained in ionizing radiation is surprisingly small—a 
lethal dose (LD) sufficient to kill 90 percent of those receiving it (LD90, 60 grays of 
radiation, times 70 kilograms for an average adult human) amounts to just 4,200 
joules or 1,000 small calories (which is 1 large calorie, same as in a Tic Tac breath 
mint). This tiny bit of energy would not even noticeably warm up a cup of coffee. 
Recall that the “pain ray” operates at 95 GHz, in the middle of the range of airport 
radars (and microwave ovens), and that existing CSACs with 1-part-in-100-billion 
precision are sufficient for synchronizing emitters in this range. The existence of these 
pieces, albeit separately, suggests an awful synthesis or fusion is already possible. 
This chapter conjectures it is only a matter of time before someone implement a “pain 
PAR” with SDR. One can further imagine such devices could be mass manufactured, 
borrowing techniques from the photovoltaic industry, particularly thin-film solar, which 
can be installed almost as readily as carpet or wallpaper. As unappealing as it is to 
contemplate a building, say, or vehicle that can remotely and soundlessly inflict pain 
on trespassers automatically (or heaven forfend, innocent passersby further off), the 
scenario gets worse.
Improving timing precision by another six to seven orders of magnitude, which has 
already happened in the lab, can transform the merely unpleasant into a truly lethal 
capability. Instead of 3-mm software-defined pain phased arrays (SDPPAR—needs a 
catchier moniker), are 3-nanometer (soft X-rays) emission networks possible? Compared 
to days of yore, when conversion efficiency of electricity into photons was on the order of 
a percent or two, light-emitting diodes have become highly efficient (and cost effective). 
Furthermore, the range of radiation that can be generated efficiently by solid-state LEDs 
continues to expand. A low-pressure mercury-vapor lamp now converts about 60 percent 
of its input to useful UV-C photons,41 and even 300-nm UV would be a serious hazard 
to eyes and skin. While ionizing radiation is strongly absorbed by metal as well as air, 
limiting the putative weapon’s range, long-wave ultraviolet can pass through sea-level air 
for quite a long ways, otherwise sunburns would not occur. 
A helpful way to think of phase-coherent directed-energy weapons is “radio 
astronomy in reverse.” Instead of gathering miniscule amounts of energy from a 
vast area concentrated into a useful signal, small amounts of emitted energy are 
coordinated from widely dispersed sources—perhaps even individually undetectable 
sources—in order to arrive at the target simultaneously with devastating effect, and 
with no warning and no fingerprints. 
xix   Short for “observe-orient-decide-act.”
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Initially manufactured as discrete components like CSACs are now, a mesh of 
SDPPAR nodes could be embedded in a thin-film fabric appliquéd to walls. Mostly 
photovoltaic in function, the substrate would generate and store electricity for 
the distributed nodes. PV generation might even be their ostensible purpose, 
totally unremarkable in the not-too-distant future, with the lethal-capability bit 
kept clandestine. Walls obviously can have a lot of surface area—some all-glass 
skyscrapers in London are notorious for melting plastic cars parked across  
the street.42 
If one can process ultraviolet, one can certainly process light at visible 
wavelengths. One can imagine a change in absorbed scene could wake up the ever-
watching array. As the absorbed imagery meets certain fuzzy criteria (e.g., silhouette, 
color) the weapon arms itself and, upon a close enough match, discharges. If the 
system were able to process sound (even though that is a longitudinal wave, not 
transverse like electromagnetic), then language detection is a possibility, making the 
biblical shibboleth real once again. Furthermore, these criteria could be messaged any 
time after installation as a “software patch,” making the system completely protean. 
Processing visible light in either direction means the weapon could project 
photons to form an arbitrary image, not just absorb photons to charge itself up. 
Perhaps obnoxious ubiquitous “active surface” advertising, or active camouflage, 
might be the path on the technological roadmap to this destination. 
Further in the future, the devices will have gotten smart enough to self-bootstrap 
their internodal network after application (locating themselves in 3-space with 
respect to each other using just GR without the need for external references), like 
Vinge’s “localizers.” At that point, individual nodes might be small enough to pass 
through a nozzle; thus, a lethal energy-weapon coating could be sprayed on walls 
like shotcrete, and even later than that, sprayed on walls like Vinge’s polka-dot 
paintxx in the hands of young hooligans, because hi-tech almost always proliferates 
to consumers in the developed world and then the developing world. This kind of 
graffiti would really send a message! Consider that such a capability as described 
could also process human gaits, which are as unique as fingerprints. Now imagine a 
two-way wanted poster that zaps its subject if he is unlucky enough to walk by it at 
the post office.
Imagine a milieu completely imbued with such automation, and then consider if 
that entire environment were to become hostile (like in the last installment of Hunger 
Games)43 with the reader immersed in it, a Durchseuchungxxi of death.44 Invoking 
Clarke’s third law, such a capability would appear magical to the unsophisticated or 
unprepared recipient. It might fairly be called a “Finger of God.”45
xx   Vernor Vinge, Marooned in Realtime, St. Martin’s, 1986. In this future sci-fi murder mystery, the “Low-Techs” used a graffito, 
“low tech don’t mean no tech,” applied in polka-dot spray paint, to let the detective know the antiproliferation regime of the 
“High Techs” was leaky and that one of the “High Techs” was cheating.
xxi   “Infestation,” a wonderful word to use at every opportunity. 
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Where SOF Might First Encounter this Phenomenon
Where might SOF encounter such state-of-the-art, yet distributed innovative lethal 
applications? The great powers would be the first to deploy them. But after the cat is 
out of the bag, then what? Based on this writer’s personal experience building cutting-
edge technology teams in east Africa, the entire continent could be early adopters. 
Africa is the avant-garde of five great demassifications46 of bureaucracies underway, 
leapfrogging sclerotic state systems that do not work anyway. It is the center of 
decentralization: 
• Phone (the continent has leapfrogged landlines, going straight to cell)
• Banking (already done—mobile money)
• Roads (sidestepping with drones and novel yet simple three-word addressing 
schemes47 to deal with the typical lack of physical addresses and the 
intractability of lat/lon to eight decimal places for ordinary people)
• Power and clean water (solar)
• Health care (essential community preventative health amplified with 
smartphone apps)
Figure 9. Africa is way bigger than many people think, left, and where most of the young people will be, right.48
By 2040, two out of three young people will live in Africa. Any enterprise not 
paying attention to the continent is by default not paying attention to the future. 
Africa has thousands of languages. Setting aside the former Soviet Union, China, 
and India, the African continent has the most space and the most scope for things 
to happen that would be of professional interest to the special operator. So, one can 
expect Africa is where conflict and other matters requiring the attention of special 
operators will be focused. 
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Recommendations
A far more detailed examination of technological progress in this seemingly unsexy 
but enabling area is warranted, with particular watches on:
• events in the commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) world that would change the 
environment,
• determination of the numeric threshold (by accuracy) that enables particular 
devices or operations, and
• what may be possible to engineer for military-only applications supported by 
a COTS economy.
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Megacities and Special Operations Forces
Margarita Konaev
The future of US special operations forces (SOF) is intertwined deeply with the future 
of conflict and violence in the world’s largest cities. By 2030, the United Nations 
estimates 43 megacities will exist around the world, where nearly 9 percent of the 
global population will live.1 Megacities—cities with a population of over 10 million 
inhabitants—are the strategic centers of gravity and engines of economic growth 
for nations and even entire regions. Global cities like New York, Tokyo, Los Angeles, 
London, and Shanghai will lead the world in projected GDP because of their strong 
banking and finance sectors, international transportation and commerce hubs, 
massive entertainment industries, and technological innovation ecosystems. But 
megacities in the developing world are also claiming their place as emerging economic 
powerhouses. The high-quality talent pool in Bangalore, India, for example, has turned 
the city into a breeding ground for tech start-ups, while a single district in Lagos, 
Nigeria, can be a market the size of an entire country like Botswana.2 
That said, unplanned urban population growth is overwhelming existing 
infrastructure. Many developing countries are struggling to provide their urban 
residents security, housing, water and sanitation, health, education, and functional 
transport networks. People continue flocking to Tehran, Iran, for instance, but the 
city’s population now exceed its capacity by more than 70 percent—meaning that it 
can provide only 2.3 million of its 8 million residents with basic services.3 Around 75 
percent of homes in Kinshasai are in slums. Meanwhile, Jakarta, Indonesia, with a 
projected population of 38 million by 2035, is likely to lose its status as Indonesia’s 
capital because rising sea levels and poor water infrastructure management are 
effectively sinking the megacity. 
As the world’s urban population has grown, we have also witnessed an upsurge 
in violence and conflict in cities. Wars in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Ukraine, and Gaza have 
led to immeasurable human suffering and the wholesale destruction of cities. Mass 
protests against government corruption, rising inequality, and unemployment have 
engulfed Baghdad, Beirut, and Santiago.ii The predominantly urban-based Mexican 
drug war shows no signs of abetting, whereas Brazil, plagued by extreme criminal 
violence, is home to 14 of the world’s most violent cities. Cities across Europe and 
Africa have repeatedly been targeted by terrorists linked to or inspired by the Islamic 
State, while the threat from far-right extremism is on the rise across Western Europe 
and the United States. 
i   In the Democratic Republic of the Congo
ii   In Iraq, Lebanon, and Chile, respectively.
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The urbanization of violence and conflict around the world, coupled with the growing 
risk of natural disasters fueled by climate change hitting densely populated coastal 
areas, means US forces will increasingly be called upon to conduct a range of military 
operations in cities and megacities. US SOF—tried and true in hostile, denied, and 
politically or diplomatically sensitive envrionments—possess the core capabilities for 
achieving mission objectives in these urban settings. 
The economic, political, and environmental significance of megacities, especially 
those located in strategically important regions for the United States, necessitate 
unique considerations and capabilities. The combination of high population density 
and high cell-phone penetration in urban environments, for instance, makes it difficult 
to operate unobtrusively. As such, SOF small footprint and experience in conducting 
low-visibility operations in contested environments is crucial for reducing the risks of 
detection and political blowback. Precise tactical-level training, unique technical and 
military capabilities, and detailed intelligence allow SOF to use force accurately and 
discriminately, which is essential in densely populated urban areas with a high risk 
of civilian casualties and collateral damage. Knowledge of cultures and languages 
and relationships with local allies and forces are also vital attributes, considering 
the diversity and complexity of human relationships and networks in large cities and 
megacities. Moreover, since they are often at the forefront of employing emerging 
technologies in battlefield conditions, SOF can leverage advances in military robotics, 
autonomy, and artificial intelligence (AI) to shape the operational environment in 
megacities in their favor.
Still, to say megacity operations will strain even the most prepared and well-
equipped forces is an understatement. There are no historical examples of US 
operations in a megacity. Nonetheless, American urban operations in Manila, Huế, 
Mogadishu, Fallujah, Ramadi, Baghdad, and, most recently as part of the coaliton 
campaign against the Islamic State, Mosul and Raqqaiii reinforce the conventional 
wisdom about urban warfare being a protracted, resource intenstive, highly violent 
fight that results in massive military and civilian casualties and widescale destruction 
of cities.4 But even Baghdad, with a 2003 population of approximately 6 million, does 
not compare to the scale, density, and complexity of massive population centers like 
Cairo, Dhaka, or Mexico City.iv 
For SOF, the key challenges in megacity contingencies will likely be avoiding 
detection amid robust urban surveillance networks and large numbers of people 
eager to share any and all information online, sustainment in high-attrition 
conditions with limited logistical support, and crafting and disseminating impactful 
messages for psychological and information operations in a highly contested 
information envrionment. The SOF community is certainly familiar with these 
iii   Manila, Philippines; Hue, Vietnam; Mogadishu, Somalia; Fallujah, Ramadi, Baghdad, and Mosul, Iraq; Raqqa, Syria.
iv   In Egypt, Bangladesh, and Mexico, respectively.
524   |   D A V I S ,  G A C ,  R A G E R ,  R E I N E R  &  S N O W
challenges. But the difference in scale between megacities and other urban areas 
can become a difference in kind. 
Understanding Megacities
Special operations forces have two main sets of missions. The first are precision-
strike activities that include the rapid deployment of forces for activities such as 
raids, kill/capture operations, hostage rescue, and strategic sabotage or to secure 
critical materials or facilities. The second set refers to special warfare, focusing on 
psychological operations and providing support to host-nation forces or nonstate 
actors whose political or military objectives align with US interests. Should a megacity 
contingency arise, each mission set can be used independently, in conjunction with, or 
in support of conventional military operations. 
Regardless of the mission, operating effectively in cities and megacities requires 
an understanding of these environments. Military strategists and urbanism scholars 
typically conceptualize megacities as a “layered and interacting series of complex 
adaptive systems involving actions, interactions, and transactions,” or as a “complex 
living organism with its own flows, networks, and rhythms.”5 Many frameworks exist for 
categorizing the factors that characterize the megacity environment and, in turn, shape 
the conduct and success of military operations writ large and special operations in 
specific. One straightforward approach, developed by the chief of staff of the US Army 
Strategic Studies Group, hones in on context, scale, density, connectedness, and 
flow.6 The following discussion contextualizes these factors for SOF. 
Context
History, culture, geography, and politics at the local, regional, and international 
levels are all important factors to consider when developing a contextualized 
understanding of a megacity. The economic development and population growth 
of cities—whether slow and planned or rapid and largely uncontrolled—influence 
the quality of urban infrastructure, the ability of the government to provide basic 
services, and the relationship between local and national authorities and the city’s 
vulnerable and disenfranchised populations. These factors, in interaction with weak 
or corrupt state structures, economic crises, and high rates of unemployment and 
inequality, are often linked to urban unrest, violence, and conflict. Research on the 
1992 Los Angeles riots, for example, shows the growth of the nonwhite community 
and inequality indicators such as nonwhite unemployment and the relative nonwhite 
homeownership rate correlated with the outbreak of riots.7 Planning for special 
operations should therefore pay close attention to the socioeconomic, ethnic, racial, 
and political nuances that underpin the relationship between the local authorities, 
the population, and relevant threat actors. 
The national, regional, and global significance of megacities is another significant 
dimension for SOF to consider. Seoul, for example, is a megacity where the US 
military has maintained a presence for over six decades and is required to protect 
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under the Mutual Defense Treaty with South Korea. Seoul is the political, cultural, 
and economic center of a key US ally, with more than 25.6 million people residing 
in the greater metropolitan area, including thousands of US citizens. In an event 
of a conflict with North Korea, actions needed to defend Seoul would span the 
entire spectrum of military operations.8 Therefore, SOF will likely play multiple 
roles, including deploying as part of an early contingency response to assist with 
noncombatant evacuation of US citizens, intelligence and fires support, sniping, 
directing close air support, and countering weapons of mass destruction operations. 
Geography affects the drivers of instability in cities and will influence the type 
of missions SOF could be called upon to execute. Large population centers are 
predominantly concentrated on the coasts, and, thus, they are more vulnerable to 
severe weather events; megacities like Shanghai, Dhaka, Calcutta, and Manila are 
some of the cities most at risk of flooding. Meanwhile, Tokyo, Los Angeles, Tehran, 
and Mexico City are particularly vulnerable to earthquakes. Rapid population growth, 
uncontrolled planning zones, and unsustainable environmental policies amplify the 
adverse effects of climate change, increasing the risk of natural disasters. Where 
US strategic or economic interests are at stake, SOF could be called to support 
humanitarian relief efforts and assist with the evacuation of US citizens.
Scale
The scale of megacities—the size of their populations and land areas—differentiates 
them from other urban environments and presents unique challenges to military 
operations and specific considerations for SOF. Most basically, urban warfare doctrine 
has traditionally called for isolating and enveloping a city, with forces advancing from 
the periphery inward to either besiege the urban area until the enemy surrenders 
or penetrate and storm the city to capture it if necessary.9 The scale of megacity 
populations, however, raises serious questions about the feasibility of this approach. 
Furthermore, as urban populations have grown, the land area covered by cities 
and megacities has expanded at an even higher rate. Urban sprawl is indicative of 
poor land management and inefficient energy consumption, a cause of pollution, 
and an amplifier of inequality and exclusion, with long-term potential to exacerbate 
social and political unrest and vulnerability to natural disasters and other health 
hazards.10 Again, attempting to control physically a population of tens of millions of 
people spread over hundreds of square miles in a highly complex urban environment 
necessitates a military force the size of which few, if any, nations could muster, let 
alone sustain. For instance, the US Army Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, based 
on analyses of historical counterinsurgency campaigns such as the British in Malaya 
and Northern Ireland, advises a ratio of 20 to 25 soldiers for every 1,000 people 
in the area of operations. Based on this formula, counterinsurgency operations in a 
megacity of 20 million would require 400,000 soldiers. 
Force-sizing calculations are perhaps less relevant from an SOF perspective. 
But the issue of scale is imperative. SOF are not structured for attrition warfare or 
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traditional force-on-force tactics and have limited assets of their own. Therefore, 
many SOF missions require support from other forces, including airlift, intelligence, 
communications, influence activities, medical, and logistics. The scale of 
megacities will inevitably strain the ability of the conventional forces to provide 
such support to SOF. This, in turn, will affect both SOF ability to operate effectively, 
and, more fundamentaly, policy decisions about whether SOF capabilities are 
appropriate altogether. 
Density
Density is the overarching element of the urban environment, and it affects all types 
of operations in a megacity.11 Both population and vehicle density limit movement and 
maneuverability even for small, agile forces. Millions of cell phones, laptops, tablets, 
and other web-enabled devices produce a signal-dense environment that creates 
bandwidth congestion, reduces the effectiveness of signals-intelligence collection, and 
complicates signals-based targeting. 
As Russell Glenn puts it, density is reflected not only in “the number of structures, 
firing positions, avenues of approach, enemy, noncombatants, friendly force units, 
key terrain, and obstacles per cubic kilometer” but also in “the number of small unit 
engagements, troop movements, and interactions with noncombatants per minute 
within that space.”12 More structures, people, and activity also mean that situations 
change rapidly, requiring the unit commander to make decisions faster.13 SOF are well 
trained for dynamic environments and high-paced engagements. But the cumulative 
effects of urban density can create a sensory and capability overload that should not 
be underestimated when planning the scope and contours of SOF megacity missions. 
Connectedness
Modern cities are connected to their external environment (national and global) through 
a complex web of goods, services, people, information, and capital. These connections 
underpin national and global trade, commerce, finance, migration (legal and illegal), 
entertainment, and myriad other economic and social transactions across the world, all 
conducted at an ever-increasing pace and on a continuously growing scale. Cities are 
also connected internally through the urban and periurban network of roads, rail lines, 
waterways, and power lines, as well as through the flow of information enabled by the 
proliferation of cell phones and the widespread availability of internet access. 
Real-time global news coverage by traditional media outlets deepens 
connectedness. The advent of social media, however, has fundamentally altered how 
people access, consume, and share information. The influence of traditional news 
networks is arguably declining compared to the growing power of “citizen journalists” 
sharing real-time content from their neighborhoods and cities to millions of followers 
on YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. 
Damaging the conduits of physical connectedness between cities and their 
surroundings can have severe humanitarian consequences, which, in turn, likely 
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complicate military operations and SOF missions. In 2018, for example, the 
International Crisis Group warned that a United Arab Emirates–backed attack on the 
port city of Hodeida in Yemen would not only harm the city’s population but also leave 
“an estimated 18 million highland Yemenis without supplies of staples like wheat 
and rice, or fuel, which Yemen imports by sea,” predominantly though the Hodeida 
port.14 Such disruptions to urban infrastructure and services have ramifications for 
special operations—from interruptions to communications and reliable intelligence 
to alienating local partners and undermining the legitimacy of core messages in 
psychological and influence operations. 
The connectivity among cities enhances their economic and strategic importance. 
Combined with media saturation and the flow of real-time information, connectivity 
threatens SOF’s ability to conduct discreet operations that deliberately reduce 
the signature of US involvement. These dynamics also have a negative impact on 
psychological and information operations in support of beleaguered governments. 
Indeed, state information efforts are now at a serious disadvantage when competing 
with individuals or opposing groups on social media.15 
Flow
Flow is the movement of people, resources, or things into, around, through, or out of 
the megacity. Food, water, commodities, people, money, vehicles, information, and 
services all flow constantly, but these flows differ in terms of points of origin, length, 
duration, intensity, direction, and route, as well as with pulses within the flows.16 
Legal and necessary flows maintain and protect the healthy, sustainable functioning 
of the city. But cities also inevitably experience the illicit flow of guns, drugs, 
contraband, and trafficked people that special operations forces could be sent to 
block or interdict. Notably, illicit flows are often deeply embedded within licit flows. 
This is especially true in areas where criminal elements are thoroughly intertwined 
with the local economy and effectively control the slums, as is the case with 
organized crime and drug trafficking in Mexican cities such as Tijuana and Acapulco, 
Rio de Janeiro in Brazil, or Cali in Colombia.
Making sense of the various flow systems and understanding how disruption or 
even abrupt changes in flows can impact lives and livelihoods is essential when 
preparing for special operations in megacities and other dense urban areas. For 
instance, points where different flows converge, such as transportation hubs and 
markets, are both essential for the city’s health and vulnerable targets for attack. 
Because of the density of people and the interconnectedness of urban structures 
and infrastructure, even rapid direct-action operations can interrupt normal flows, 
which risks exposing SOF to hostile local residents and political backlash. Restoring 
the flows in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, military action, or a natural disaster 
should be a priority and a key element of successful messaging in psychological and 
information operations.
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SOF Capabilities and Challenges in Megacities 
Special operations in urban environments vary significantly depending on the 
mission set and whether SOF are deployed independently or as part of a larger 
campaign. That said, SOF capabilities in both special warfare and more conventional 
surgical strike activities are uniquely positioned for a range of missions in 
megacities and other dense urban areas. 
Small SOF units are organized, trained, and equipped for decisive tactical 
success. The intense physical and mental training of SOF emphasizes small-unit 
tactics and close combat for high-tempo engagements in austere environments with 
limited support. This training is relevant because success in modern urban warfare 
requires a high degree of skill and experience in small-unit tactics and specialized 
training for the physical and psychological challenges of intensive, highly violent, and 
fast-paced fighting in close quarters.17 
Moreover, because of the nature of urban terrain, ground operations often 
become decentralized as forces needs to advance through the city’s streets, alleys, 
and courtyards; enter buildings and underground tunnels; and proceed through a 
maze of corridors, stairways, and rooftops. These conditions demand leaders at 
lower levels of command to make independent decisions in complex and highly 
uncertain environments. Rigorous SOF training and mission rehearsals inculcate 
and reinforce unit cohesion, which enables discipline, trust, and effective leadership 
in high-risk situations. Therefore, SOF’s operational formation, training, and core 
capabilities are well matched for urban environments. 
SOF excel in adaptability, improvisation, and innovation, valuable skills in cities 
and megacities—constantly changing, adapting, and complex systems—particularly 
at times of unrest when atypical movements of people disturb normal rhythms and 
flows. These changes affect communications and transportation networks and 
exude pressure on the city’s infrastructure. As the Mosul Study Group observed, 
“even by the hour of the day, operations physically changed the landscape, the 
populace migrated, and the electromagnetic spectrum adjusted.”18 These changes 
have immediate implications for situational awareness, intelligence, and targeting 
decisions. The urban environment is alive, and the ability to adapt, change course, 
and act quickly and decisively is essential for conducting effective operations. 
Special operations forces are also distinguished by their close knowledge of 
the regional and local dynamics in their area of operations and their ties with 
local partners and proxy forces. Their expertise and relationships help secure 
intelligence, build trust in civil-military interactions with the local population, and 
execute synchronized and mutually supportive security-force assistance missions 
effectively. The premium on such capabilities is even higher in urban missions, 
considering the political, economic, social, ethnic, racial, religious, and cultural 
diversity of megacities and the complexity of social networks that characterize 
these massive population centers. 
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Finally, SOF, and particularly US Army Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and 
Special Forces have a deep understanding of the human domain and are well-suited 
for population-centric conflicts.19 The presence of a sizable civilian population is 
the distinct feature of the urban environment and arguably the most challenging 
aspect of urban military operations. Understanding the demographic and cultural 
characteristics of the urban population is essential when planning operations. But 
managing the media and communications landscape and influencing the perceptions 
of different social groups is a highly complex undertaking. SOF interoperability 
with conventional US forces and ability to collaborate effectively with international 
allies and partners, as well as local partners and proxies, are critical for conducting 
psychological operations, administering civil affairs, and influencing the perceptions 
and behaviors of the local population. 
That said, special operations cannot solve all security challenges in dense 
urban areas and megacities. Moreover, changes in the security and information 
environments point to potential contingencies in megacities for which SOF are not well 
prepared. As one example, Africa has seen a dramatic expansion of SOF activities 
since 2014. Special Operations Command Africa has about 1,000-1,200 operators 
and enablers in approximately a dozen nations with the primary goal of countering 
terrorism and enhancing stability by, with, and through African partners. Meanwhile, 
urbanization in Africa is unfolding at an unprecedented rate, with 14 cities expected to 
surpass the 10 million person threshold by 2050. And as Africa urbanizes, violence, 
conflict, and terrorism across the continent are also shifting to cities.20 
Insofar as SOF remain active in Africa—even if their mission is merely to 
maintain a posture to respond to crises that could affect US citizens, interests, or 
security in a narrow sense—they will likely operate in cities and megacities. Special 
operations in African cities and megacities—where 75 percent of the population 
lives in slums, governance is contested, transportation and communication systems 
are fragmented, and unregulated urban growth has amplified a host of social, ethnic, 
and political grievances—will require significant sustainment and logistical support. 
There is, however, little sustained conventional US military activity in Africa, and, 
therefore, no conventional logistics network for SOF to leverage.21 
SOF are among the most expeditionary of all military forces, capable of providing 
their own specific sustainment. In the twenty-first century, however, SOF have 
been engaged predominantly in mostly overt and highly kinetic counterterrorism 
activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, where conventional US forces maintained a 
sizable presence and provided extensive logistical support. Furthermore, the scale 
and density of megacities inevitably undermines SOF self-sufficiency. Surgical strike 
activities require fine-grained and continuously updated intelligence, precise and 
discriminate application of force, and reliable transportation for safe exit—all of 
which require close support. And as the Army Special Operations ADP 3-05 manual 
makes clear, deficiencies in supportability could affect the chances of mission 
success or even invalidate the feasibility of using SOF.22
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Even with extensive logistical support, special warfare missions to train, assist, 
enable, and support a partner nation’s security forces or nonstate actors in the 
context of urban military operations present additional challenges. Indeed, local 
partners and proxies often pay a terrible price when fighting in cities. For example, 
the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service, a force of less than 8,000 elite troops built and 
trained by the United States, suffered up to 60 percent casualties in Mosul.23 
Despite these challenges, the indirect approach to employing SOF through 
missions such as psychological operations and support to nonstate proxies or 
threatened governments via military training, is expected to see more play in the era 
of great-power competition.24 Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the 
war in eastern Ukraine, NATO special forces have been working with SOF partners 
in the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as well as Poland to help 
train their forces to fight a war of resistance against a potential Russian invasion 
and occupation. US SOF are also working with these countries as well as Romania, 
Ukraine, and Georgia to help strengthen their national capabilities, including the 
development of their own special operations forces. 
US national security decision-makers must better understand the limits and costs 
of special warfare missions in urban settings. In thinking about deterring and fighting 
a peer adversary like Russia, the US military has arguably not paid enough attention 
to defensive urban operations.25 Defense has the advantage in urban warfare. But if 
the destruction of Grozny, Chechnya, and the indiscriminate bombardment of Syrian 
cities indicate anything, the costs of Baltic capitals like Tallinn, Estonia, and Riga, 
Latvia, mounting a defense against Russian aggression will be high.26 
Finally, the complexity of SOF efforts to disrupt the enemy’s ability to command and 
control forces and to influence the population will be magnified in megacities because 
of the sheer numbers and diversity of social groups and the intricacy of networks. 
Moreover, the high population density and connectedness of megacities combine with 
ubiqutous cell-phone use, widespread access to the internet, and the growing power 
of social media to create an environment ripe for misinformation, disinformation, and 
adversary influence operations.27 
During Israel’s 2014 Operation Protective Edge, for instance, Hamas took 
advantage of Gaza’s high levels of cell-phone penetration to communicate with citizens 
about how to post messages in support of its campaign using a number of hash tags, 
including #GazaUnderAttack, #PrayForGaza, and #StopIsrael.28 Fact-checkers, however, 
soon noticed some images from #GazaUnderAttack were from previous conflicts or 
from violence not involving Gaza.29 While Israel maintains a relatively sophisticated 
public-relations apparatus, its messaging had a limited effect on the internationals 
stage, let alone in Gaza. Regardless of their profiency in psychological and information 
operations, SOF will likely face some of the same challenges governments currently 
experience in trying to maintain uniformity of message and keep pace with ongoing 
events in crisis situations in urban environments. 
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The Promise and Perils of Emerging Technologies 
Special Operations Command can lead in operationalizing and deploying emerging 
technologies such as AI and machine learning to increase the speed and accuracy of 
intelligence processing and exploitation, enhance situational awareness, and improve 
decision-making in high-stakes environments, including megacity contingencies. In 
fact, the most high-profile example of AI on the battlefield to date, Project Maven, used 
computer vision and machine-learning algorithms to comb through hours of full-motion 
drone surveillance videos looking for suspected terrorists and insurgents to provide 
intelligence for drone strikes or special operations raids in the campaign against the 
Islamic State. Maven used SOF data to train their algorithms, and SOF integrated the 
technology into their forward-most locations.30 
SOF are either already using or could potentially apply a number of promising 
technologies in urban missions. For one, cities produce immense amounts of data. 
With advances in big-data analytics, machine learning, image recognition, and natural 
language processing, military and intelligence analysts can exploit thousands of 
publicly available datasets for insights into the demographic, social, economic, and 
logistical characteristics of cities and their populations.31 Naval Special Warfare 
elements and Army SOF are already using the Army’s One World Terrain software that 
compiles detailed 3D digital maps from drone scans of specific areas of interest. 
The 3D software allows operators to do both line-of-sight and route analysis to avoid 
detection and battle-damage assessments to limit collateral damage, critical activities 
for urban operations planning.32 Wall-penetrating radars, through-wall virtual imaging, 
and other see-through-wall technology that allow soldiers to detect people and 
potential threats inside closed rooms could be a game changer in an urban fight.33 
For command-and-control applications, AI could be used to fuse data from different 
platforms and military assets and distill into a common and comprehensive operating 
picture, which could improve and accelerate decision-making in time-sensitive 
missions.34 Future advances in recommender systems technology could provide SOF 
with options based on real-time analysis of the battlespace, shifting computation 
support from reactive to predictive.35 
Technology, however, can be a double-edged sword for SOF in urban environments. 
Facial recognition, biometrics, and signature management technologies already make 
conducting low-visibility military activities harder, and AI is likely to make it even more 
difficult for SOF to operate in the shadows during proxy conflicts or in other politically 
sensitive settings.36 Remaining in the shadows will become effectively impossible in 
megacities. China, which has six of the world’s 33 megacities, has an estimated 200 
million surveillance cameras—four times as many as the United States.37 Moscow, 
which already has 160,000 cameras watching the city’s 12 million people, aims 
to integrate AI and facial recognition technology to be able to search for people on 
different wanted lists, to count people, and to evaluate behavior. Persistant urban 
surveillance, coupled with cell-phone penetration and real-time sharing of information 
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on social media channels, could deny SOF both the element of surprise and the 
ability to operate discreetly. 
Furthermore, nonstate actors have proved capable of using civilian technology to 
their advantage in complex urban environments. During the 2008 Mumbai attacks, 
for example, Pakistani terrorists from Lashkar-e-Taiba used Skype, cell phones, and 
satellite phones to communicate with their commanders in Pakistan, who, in turn, 
provided real-time updates to the assualt team based on information circulated 
on Twitter, by satellite, and on cable news. The Indian forces were unable to cut 
communications between the assault team and their command-and-control node in 
Karachi, which allowed the terrorists to withstand the early loss of their team leader, 
evade Indian police and counterterrorism units, and besiege one of the world’s largest 
cities for almost three days.38 
In Mumbai, terrorists used easily available civilian technology to gain advantage 
in the city. But it is possible to imagine a scenario of armed groups or adversary 
states using the city’s own technology to further their military or political objectives. 
Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, such as Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s power grid, 
can upend the city’s normal flows, fueling confusion, fear, misinformation, unrest, and 
other unpredictable disturbances that could seriously undermine SOF ability to execute 
their mission in an already complex and dynamic environment. Planners must weigh the 
costs and benefits of relying on potentially vulnerable technologies in an environment 
where the terrain, the people, and the technology itself can quickly turn hostile. 
Conclusion
Megacities both fascinate and deeply alarm the US defense community. This can 
partly be explained by the fact that, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. 
Mark Milley noted, “the Army has been designed, manned, trainned, and equipped 
for the last 241 years to operate primarily in rural areas.”39 While conventional US 
forces have seen their share of urban combat in the twenty-first century, they are not 
optimized for it. SOF, on the other hand, bring a range of core capabilities that have 
proved valuable in urban missions, including extensive training in small-unit tactics 
under physically and mentally grueling conditions, a small footprint in politically 
sensitive environments, and deep exterprise in the human domain. 
But policy makers should also be cognizant of the limits SOF will likely face in 
megacity contingencies. First, although generally self-sufficient, SOF in megacities 
will inevitably require sustainment support because urban operations amplify attrition 
rates on people and equipment. Potential deficiencies in logistical support should lead 
planners to reassess the scope or viability of the mission. Second, when employing 
SOF for unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, or security-force assistance 
in the context of urban operations, policy makers and military planners should prepare 
for high losses among partner or proxy forces and significant collateral damage. These 
losses will affect SOF’s ability to yield strategic results.
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Third, urban operations are marked by a highly contested information environment 
where nonstate actors and ordinary civilians impacted by the military operations often 
have an advantage over states. SOF psychological and information operations will be 
particularly demanding and complex in these environments, requiring nontraditional 
thinking in terms of both messaging and partners. Finally, while SOF should lead 
in operationalizing emerging technologies for megacity missions, attention should 
also be paid to countering adversary use of AI-enabled intelligence and surveillance 
capabilities and resilience in communications-degraded environments. Designing 
an SOF strategy for the future requires a thorough understanding of the megacity 
environment, the type of capabilities SOF can leverage for megacity missions, and the 
limits of SOF in these environments.
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What Have We Learned? Strategic Latency and  
the Future of Special Operations Forces
Zachary S. Davis
“In my technicolor childhood 
We burned incandescent dreams 
Illuminatin’ on these future things 
That didn’t turn out like we thought they would 
Now we’re doin’ things we never dreamed we could”
“Bit Logic,” by the Bottle Rockets (2018)i
Introduction
Think differently, or face the consequences. Many of the assumptions we have taken 
for granted about how the world works must be reexamined in the light of current 
events. It’s not just the latest pandemic, broken institutions, global instability, or the 
onslaught of new technologies that are causing radical change. The world is being 
transformed physically and politically. Technology is the handmaiden of much of this 
change. But since the sweep of global change is transforming the face of warfare, 
United States special operations forces (SOF) must adapt to these circumstances. 
Fortunately, adaptation is in the SOF DNA. 
This book examined the global changes affecting SOF and offers possible solutions 
to the complexities challenging many long-held assumptions. The authors are a mix of 
leading experts in technology, business, policy, intelligence, and geopolitics, partnered 
with experienced special operators who either cowrote chapters or reviewed them 
to ensure accuracy and relevance for SOF. Our goal was to provide insights into the 
changes around us and generate ideas about how SOF can adapt and succeed in 
the emerging operational environment. In this wrap-up chapter, I try to pull together 
the strands to present a broad overview of what we have learned. We don’t cover 
everything in this book, but there’s a good chance we know the right people and can 
put you in touch with them. 
Questioning Assumptions: Has Everything Changed? 
Our challenge required us to distinguish between those things that are constant and 
those that are in a state of flux and require new thinking. For example, the laws of 
physics have not changed, although we are discovering new ways of using them to our 
advantage. The chapters on biology, material science, and cyber operations offer new 
insights from the sciences. But many fundamental characteristics of our surroundings 
remain unchanged, starting with human nature. 
i  The Bottle Rockets are an American alt-country band formed in 1992. 
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Not Everything Has Changed
Modern humans are driven by the same motivations that have inspired philosophy, 
creativity, discovery, and conquest for eons. This is important because so many things 
depend on human behavior, including the future of war, politics, and technology. The 
changes we see around us do not diminish the role of fear, insecurity, compassion, 
and creativity in defining the human condition. With the possible exception of 
artificially manipulated mass movements (which are addressed in the chapter by 
Herb Lin and Trisha Wyman), human nature remains the fundamental building block 
of global order. Therefore, protection from aggressive neighbors remains a primary 
motivation for humanity, and security is an enduring universal preoccupation. 
Another constant is the way people organize for their security. Nation-states are 
undergoing many important changes, but they persist as the fundamental building 
blocks of international order and the primary providers of security to the vast majority 
of people on earth. This is true despite the limitations of sovereignty challenging the 
ability of nation-states to provide security for populations under their authority. The 
security dilemma that drives nations to defend themselves inevitably threatens other 
nations. Deterrence, therefore, will endure as a primary means for states to prevent 
aggression. The chapter by Brad Roberts shows how deterrence functions as a 
centerpiece of global order and outlines the role of SOF in reinforcing that order. 
Another constant is civil conflict within states, as aggrieved groups challenge 
existing governments. Groups and individuals will inevitably resort to terrorism as a 
means of expressing displeasure with more powerful adversaries. New weapons and 
tactics may empower violent extremist organizations, complicating but not diminishing 
the SOF role in countering terrorism and supporting allies with foreign internal defense 
(FID) and other core mission capabilities.
Global competition for power, authority, territory, and resources is relentless, and 
war remains the final arbiter of unresolvable conflict, as it has throughout human 
history. The addition of new domains of conflict in outer space, cyber space, and the 
gray zoneii complicate this fundamental reality. With these underlying conditions firmly 
in place, long-standing practices of statecraft—diplomacy, alliances, and deterrence—
remain essential to the maintenance of order. What is less certain is the future role of 
the international norms and multilateral institutions that have restrained the uses of 
force and imposed boundaries on violent conflict. Those appear to be changing.
Another global reality—one that is less rooted in antiquity but has gradually 
asserted itself as a defining aspect of global order—is globalization. The inevitable 
result of a global population approaching 8 billion people, globalization connects 
people and places in ways that are producing unprecedented physical and geopolitical 
conditions. We are more interconnected in more ways than ever before, making 
us more vulnerable, yet in some ways more powerful, in our interdependence. The 
ii  The Cambridge English Dictionary defines the gray zone as “activities by a state that are harmful to another state and are 
sometimes considered to be acts of war, but are not legally acts of war.” (https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/
gray-zone) 
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Covid-19 pandemic of 2020 demonstrated how interconnected the world has become, 
overwhelming governments, institutions, stock markets, and global health systems. 
Several chapters in the book examine the consequences of this interconnectedness, 
which affects everything from communications, supply chains, food security, migration 
flows, and disease transmission. Globalization must be considered as the backdrop 
for future military operations. Intense global connectedness affects many aspects of 
the special operations mission set directly. 
Strategic Latency for SOF: Changes in Technology,  
the Balance of Power, and the Rules of Warfare
“If looks could kill, they probably will.” 
“Games without Frontiers,” by Peter Gabriel (1980)
With these basic elements of the operating environment firmly in our sights, what 
are the new and unfamiliar factors of which we should be aware? Which of our 
assumptions should be adjusted to fit changing circumstances? These dependent 
variables reflect the changing balance of global power, measured in terms of military, 
economic, technological, cultural, and other elements of power. Prediction is hard, 
but forecasting can provide key insights, as shown in the chapter by Richard Lum 
and Ed Churchill. How will the convergence of known and unknown factors shape the 
operational environment and create risks and opportunities for SOF? 
We define Strategic Latency as the potential for these dynamic factors to align 
in ways that shift the global balance of power. We use the word strategic to identify 
factors of power that have truly consequential significance for world affairs, as 
opposed to merely important or interesting developments. For example, nuclear fission 
held latent potential to shift the global balance of power, which was realized by the 
Manhattan Project and fully weaponized in 1945. Nuclear weapons changed the world. 
The military applications of aircraft, missiles, computers, the internet, and space 
technology might also qualify to be included in this category of strategic effects. 
Other candidates might include genetic engineering, artificial intelligence, quantum 
computing, and autonomous vehicles. Quite often, the convergence of technologies 
creates transformative effects, as in the combination of nukes and missiles, drones 
and artificial intelligence, and big data with social media. The strategic latency of 
many key emerging technologies was evaluated in these chapters, viewed through the 
lens of their potential relevance for SOF. Our hope is that the SOF community will find 
these insights to be relevant to its missions. 
Technology is a dynamic function of human innovation, and, thus, one of the 
primary changing aspects of the operational landscape. Strategic latency focuses 
on the role of technology in world affairs. What other dynamic factors could define 
the operational environment for SOF? While the essence of human nature stays the 
same, cultures and organizations evolve. Nation-states follow their historic destiny, 
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experiencing periods of success and failure. Civilizations rise and fall. Individual and 
group identities are also changing, as described in the chapter by Jennifer Snow. New 
forms of identity and association beyond nationality complicate the role of nation-
states and add complexity to the global landscape. What new groups will organize 
themselves to express shared interests, sometimes challenging national power and 
legitimacy? Will SOF be tasked to counter or support such nonstate actors? 
The Shifting Landscape: A New Balance of Power
Other forces are also at work. Nationalist, authoritarian, and populist movements are 
reshaping political allegiances and changing the fate of nations. Nationalist leaders 
across the globe demonize minority groups and foment hatred based on religious and 
ethnic association. SOF is already navigating these troubled waters. At the same time, 
great-power competition has reemerged as revisionist powers seek to undermine the 
post–World War II international order. China is seizing this moment to redefine the 
Indo-Pacific balance of power and assert itself on the world stage. It is using massive 
investments in critical technologies to build its economic and military strength. The 
chapter on Chinese biotech advancements by James Giordano and L. R. Bremseth 
highlighted the challenge we face with Beijing’s rapid transfer of strategic latency from 
basic science to military applications for use in nonkinetic warfare. Elsa Kania and 
Peter Wood examined Beijing’s concept of operations for gray-zone warfare. Meanwhile, 
Vladimir Putin’s Russia may not be as adept at channeling economic power into military 
might but competes by matching its strengths to US shortcomings, by picking political 
and technological sweet spots to exploit US and Western vulnerabilities. The chapter 
by Glenn Chafetz, Jonathan Fagins, and Michael Nacht highlighted some of the ways 
Russian SOF are innovating in modern unconventional warfare. 
Russia and China are not alone in welcoming a sweeping realignment of global 
power. Iran, North Korea, and others are seizing the moment to diminish American 
influence and advance their own interests and ideas. Sometime allies such as Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan appear less committed than previously to longstanding ties 
with the United States and actively seek new partners for a new era. Rising powers 
such as India and Brazil seek to increase their influence in the emerging multipolar 
jumble. Some trusted allies may question the United States’ long-term reliability and 
seek new options. Old alliances are being reshuffled, and new ones are forming. 
Whatever new alliances are in store, SOF must be prepared to embrace the chaos and 
complexity of the new world order. This too plays to SOF strengths in working with and 
adapting to local conditions.
Expanding Our Concepts of the Operational Environment
Fundamental changes in weather and climate also pose important new challenges for 
SOF. Hurricanes, wildfires, environmental hazards, and rising sea levels all have direct 
consequences for military operations. Shortages of food, water, and energy increase 
political instability and may lead to conflict, and will certainly affect issues of access, 
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sustainability, and partnerships. How will SOF operate in these conditions? Our chapter 
on food security by Molly Jahn and her team described how food systems have become 
a contested domain for a wide range of subconventional warfare. These nontraditional 
security issues have become central features of the SOF operating environment. 
One big takeaway from the events surrounding the COVID-19 outbreak is that 
soldiers and sailors can’t fight as intended if they are sick.1 The specter of whole 
battle groups being put out of commission because of sickness or deterred by 
pestilence-infested war zones raises troubling questions for force protection and 
human performance. In that vein, the chapter by Diane DiEullius and Peter Emanuel 
examined issues related to human enhancement and performance, including scientific 
and moral prospects for cyborg soldiers. Giordano and Bremseth speculated about 
the use of biological agents for hybrid warfare. SOF units may be better prepared 
to cope with such onerous environmental hazards and already possess specialized 
capabilities to enable them to operate under increasingly challenging circumstances. 
But there may be surprises ahead, and hidden costs associated with the technologies 
we use to cope with these adversities. 
Technology always has at least two sides, divided between peaceful and military 
applications. In their chapter about new forensic techniques, Brad Hart and Brian 
Souza identified opportunities for detecting health threats that can also be used to 
track individuals. For SOF this translates into possible force protection applications 
and uses in tracking high-value targets. When combined with a variety of ubiquitous 
surveillance methods and big-data-driven artificial intelligence, as described in 
the chapter by Paul Scharre, might it be possible to know the health status and 
whereabouts of every person on earth? How might SOF deal with these trends? John 
Tullius outlined what a convergence of these developments could mean for intelligence 
collection, analysis, and operations. When we add to the picture the element of 
geospatial transparency—the all-seeing eye in the sky—as described in the chapter 
by George duMais, it is clear that many operational concepts will need to be modified, 
especially with respect to covert action. 
Changing global and national demographics also have implications for SOF, as 
aging populations and youth bulges shape the destiny of nation-states and peoples, 
causing internal and regional instability across the globe. Migration and refugee 
flows are already affecting outcomes in the Middle East, Europe, across Africa, and 
spanning Asia. The fate of the Kurds, Rohingya, Huthis, Yazidis, and other ethnic 
minority groups have already figured prominently into SOF thinking. Planners and 
operators must increasingly find ways to maneuver in such challenging human 
terrain. Rita Konaev’s chapter on megacities examined the challenges that massive 
concentrations of humanity pose for SOF. Not all these changes are new, nor are they 
necessarily all bad for SOF. Urban warfare is not new, and working with minority groups 
under difficult circumstances is part of the SOF playbook. 
There are opportunities to be gleaned, and strategic latency to be exploited, from 
all these vectors. In his groundbreaking chapter, Marshall Monroe proposed a new way 
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of thinking about innovation that could accelerate SOF’s ability to envision the future, 
be the first to adapt to emerging trends, train for over-the-horizon battlefields, and ride 
the wave of change to victory. 
Declining Influence of Rules, Norms, and Treaties and the Future of WMD
Beyond the physical environment, changing norms of behavior increasingly define the 
political environment. On a global scale, the laws of warfare and prohibitions on the 
acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) may be losing influence. 
At the same time, access to WMD technology could make such weapons increasingly 
available to nations, groups, and individuals. The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons 
Convention all face significant challenges, especially with respect to verification 
and enforcement. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are poised to break 
out of these restraints to make a dramatic comeback from being outlawed to 
being widely viewed as essential tools of national defense. The widespread use of 
chemical weapons in Syria, Russian and North Korean assassinations using WMD 
materials, and the continued growth of nuclear stockpiles in a number of countries 
all suggest WMD will feature prominently in future conflict. Whether naturally 
occurring or unleashed as weapons of war, biological pandemics greatly complicate 
the operational environment. 
Now that SOCOM has expanded its role in countering these weapons, what is 
needed to ensure success? In his chapter, Brendan Melley assessed SOCOM’s 
approach to the countering WMD mission and reviews preparations for a world 
where WMD shape the battlefield as never before. Michael Greene and I examined 
what it means for SOF to win and lose under such circumstances, where WMD are 
increasingly prevalent. 
Beyond flagging controls and growing interest in WMD, established global 
standards governing trade, commerce, intellectual property, scientific research 
practices, corruption, building standards, and law enforcement could lose their 
influence in the emerging global disorder. Without a consensus among powerful states 
to promote and enforce norms of behavior, rules become voluntary, and rule breakers 
can be expected to seek advantage from lax standards of conduct. At the same time, 
disinformation campaigns further erode confidence in goods, services, governments, 
and national purpose. Cooperative international organizations depend on support from 
powerful nations for their legitimacy, and wither when they are neglected. Even the 
poster child for international cooperation, the United Nations (UN)—and its affiliated 
agencies—appears to be losing its former authoritative place in the world order. The 
UN Security Council, once a bastion of US and Western influence, has become a victim 
of competing worldviews. How will changes in attitudes toward multilateral cooperation 
and the rule of law affect SOF? Here too, there are risks and opportunities. 
Moral and ethical codes of conduct shift naturally along with the balance of 
power, less reflecting the Western values that inspired the creation of international 
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treaties and multilateral organizations and increasingly challenged by rising powers 
and revisionist states eager to cast off the strictures of American influence. A new 
global outlook on longstanding ethics and norms is poised to shape the operational 
environment. 
The Multi-Domain Battlefield
“Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.”
—attributed to Albert Einstein2
While war is a constant of international competition, the locations where and methods 
by which it is prosecuted are expanding. The battlefield now includes the deepest ocean 
trenches, vast subterranean lairs, drone-infested airspace, every nook and cranny of the 
electromagnetic spectrum, the polar regions, the gray zone, and outer space. Autonomous 
systems can fight in any of these domains, evoking science-fiction visions of robot armies. 
In his chapter, Michael Alexander illuminated what these trends mean for subterrain 
combat. DuMais extended the discussion to the space domain. A tsunami of information 
about the entire battlespace informs and misleads. What is the collective effect of 
multidomain conflict on SOF operations? What is the SOF role in these new domains?
The cyber domain has become a primary focus of global competition, as described 
in the chapters dedicated to illuminating the SOF role in cyber conflict. The chapter 
by Philip Reiner and Whitney Kassel outlined how SOF can integrate cyber training 
into its FID mission. David Bray and Vint Cerf showed how open societies fall prey 
to cyberwarfare. Further, Lin and Wyman illuminated the offensive and defensive 
challenges for SOF in the use of social media for influence operations. The chapter 
by Pablo Breuer, David Perlman, and Sara-Jayne Terp looked at the implications of 
weaponized information, and the chapter by Peter Singer examined the broader strategic 
implications of the weaponization of so many aspects of civil society. Offensive and 
defensive cyber tools have become indispensable additions to the SOF toolkit.
Many technologies that do not immediately appear to have relevance for SOF are 
revealing their latent military value. The introduction of 5G wireless opens a floodgate 
of information across domains, as described by Toby Redshaw in his chapter on the 
implications of 5G for SOF. Girish Nandakumar and Jon Cederquist reviewed how 
blockchain technology could affect SOF, and Scharre analyzed the effects of artificial 
intelligence on the SOF operational environment. Even things as seemingly basic 
as accurate timekeeping could have unanticipated operational consequences, as 
described by Robert G. Kennedy III in his chapter on quantum clocks. 
Across all domains, an internet of military things links millions of sensors that feed 
massive amounts of data to warfighters, planners, analysts, and decision-makers. This 
data can help locate, track, and target people and objects. But the expansive concept 
of boundless warfare also further blurs the distinction between combatants and 
noncombatants, drawing civilian populations into a web of undeclared combat zones. 
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Equipping the Hyper-Enabled Operator
Which new technologies are best suited to help SOF succeed in this complex 
geopolitical and technological ecosphere? Leo Blanken and Phillip Swintek examined 
SOF’s role as an innovation hub. As early adaptors, special operators are often on the 
cutting edge of strategic latency. 
Lawrence Bronisz and Dominic Peterson showed how additive manufacturing (or 
3D printing, as it is often called)—with its vast potential for using different materials 
and novel engineering designs, coupled with its portability—is a game changer for 
the SOF—and our adversaries. Nanotechnology is not the end-all, but as Randall 
Schunk related in his chapter, it is certainly a core enabler that has lived up to much 
of the hype of the early 2000s and is now ubiquitous in military systems, including 
advanced communications, novel sensors, new armor materials, and in situ medical 
treatments—with more to come! Energetic materials are, by definition, “disruptive.” 
Bryce Tappan and Patrick Bowden revealed how the future of advanced energetics 
is rich with new chemistry and designs to tailor the disruptive effects, to suit the 
needs and imagination of the SOF. Michael Valley reported in his chapter that 
although a Harry Potter invisibility cloak does not exist (yet), metamaterials—namely 
natural materials fashioned creatively to deliver unconventional properties—present 
unprecedented opportunities to manipulate energy, be it sound, light, radar, or 
shock. Thus, metamaterials offer radical possibilities in the SOF battlespace. Brian 
Holmes and Michael David showed flexible electronics are a new paradigm for the 
warfighter, with many applications in place or underway, such as antennas, sensors, 
and RF circuitry. The world is experiencing a revolution in compact, lightweight 
power sources, like lithium-ion batteries and advanced fuel cells. Karen Swider-
Lyons, Joshua Lamb, and Yet-Ming Chiang clarified that this presents enormous 
potential for the SOF, but it is not without challenges, since key raw materials are 
not controlled by the United States. Finally, Robert Skaggs and Frank Gac showed 
the armor of the future is ripe with possibilities that build on not only new and 
advanced materials but also the entire suite of developments described in the “The 
Materials World” section of the book. This offers the potential to equip the soldier 
of the future with protection, power, communications, and incredible awareness 
of the environment. Thus, we truly are entering a new age of innovation and 
experimentation to identify mission-specific applications.
Big changes in the commercial world also have immediate impacts on SOF, 
especially for efforts to partner with companies to support critical mission 
requirements such as tailored technology needs for SOF teams. Snow, Brad 
Chedister, and Tamberin Bates reviewed the efforts of SOFWERX and other 
innovative platforms to find reliable commercial partners for SOF. The chapter by 
Sara Dudley showed how cryptocurrencies are being used to evade controls and 
support criminal enterprises. Success in identifying the right technologies for 
the mission, developing them into SOF capabilities, and fielding them effectively 
depends on understanding the private sector and finding the right partners. 
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We offer several big picture perspectives on the future role of SOF. Marveling 
at the massive complexity of this multi-domain “system of systems,” Mark Maier 
and Churchill gave us ideas about how to conceptualize the SOF niche within the 
broader context of global military operations. The chapter by Lum and Churchill 
takes a future-studies approach to forecast major trends in irregular warfare and 
technology innovation that will shape the SOF mission. Dan Leaf tied it all together by 
orienting the future of modern-day commandos within the emerging global operational 
environment, including the many constraining political and economic factors that will 
limit SOF freedom of action. These strategic analyses of the SOF future integrate the 
geopolitical and technological trends projected throughout the volume. Understanding 
the chaos is a necessary first step to getting the right tools to train and fight 
effectively within it. 
Changes in technology, geopolitics, and the commercial sector have important 
consequences for core SOF activities, including FID, civil affairs, military information 
support, counterproliferation, psychological operations, security forces assistance, 
counterinsurgency, and humanitarian assistance. To exploit the strategic latency 
of developments in these areas, SOF benefits from cultivating networks of trusted 
experts who can provide substantive knowledge that is directly tied to mission 
requirements. The chapters here represent such a network. We have endeavored to 
link expert knowledge and operational experience to SOF’s core functions and tie them 
to emerging challenges and opportunities. Our goal is for the SOF community, along 
with the broader military and intelligence communities who work with them, to find 
this to be a useful resource for understanding tomorrow’s challenges and stimulating 
discussion about ways to exploit strategic latency for US advantage. 
Endnotes
1 Gilsinan, Kathy, “An Unhealthy Military Is Struggling to Fight COVID-19,” April 3, 2020, Atlantic,  
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/04/coronavirus-us-military-pandemic/609367;  
Cancian, Mark, “How Coronavirus Could Hurt U.S. Military Readiness,” 11 March 2020, Forbes,  
https://www.forbes.com/sites/markcancian/2020/03/11/will-covid-19-devastate-military-readiness/#4b0efd7b1e10.
2 Quote Investigator, May 13, 2011, https://quoteinvestigator.com/2011/05/13/einstein-simple/.
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demonstrated skill in miniaturization, ruggedized packaging, and field testing of 
complex systems delivered to the Department of Defense. He has designed and 
delivered assemblies ranging from 18 milligrams to 19 tons.
Bronisz has received five LANL team distinguished performance awards by leading 
a blast-wave guide-wall team and contributing to seismic sensing, a forensic sample-
collection device, ARIES stockpile reduction weapons disassembly automation, and 
robotics for the Human Genome Project.
Bronisz is coinventor on 3 surgical robot patents and 11 others, including 
magnetic infrasound sensing, enhanced petroleum extraction, automated chemistry 
modules, and electropolishing of substrate materials for superconductors. He has 
pending patent applications for deployable space structures and megavolt insulators 
for x-ray applications. He holds a BS degree in mechanical engineering from the 
University of California, Davis.
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Joseph Byrum 
Joseph Byrum is currently chief data science at Principal Financial Group. He was 
recruited to build and manage a first-of-its-kind artificial intelligence tool for equity 
trading. Dr. Byrum left his previous position as global head of Product Development 
(Oilseeds) and head of quantitative sciences at Syngenta when it was acquired by 
ChemChina in 2017, at the time, the largest acquisition ever made by a Chinese 
company. At Syngenta, Dr. Byrum initiated and led the company’s investments in 
data-centric R&D. As global head of product development (Oilseeds) and head 
of quantitative sciences, Dr. Byrum led operational, administrative, and financial 
oversight of R&D operations spanning the Americas. Dr. Byrum holds a PhD in 
genetics from Iowa State University, an MBA from the Stephen M. Ross School of 
Business at the University of Michigan, and an MS in genetics and a BS in science, 
crop and soil science from Michigan State University. 
LTG (Ret.) Edward Cardon
Lieutenant General (Retired) Edward C. Cardon’s service to the United States spans 
over 36 years. He honed his profession both domestically and internationally, 
including in Germany, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and the Republic of Korea. Since 
retirement, General Cardon has created a wide portfolio focused on helping individuals 
and teams solve hard problems.
Jon Cederquist 
Jon Cederquist is the strategic accounts director at Clearspeed, a San Francisco–
based artificial-intelligence enhanced voice-analytics technology designed to assess 
human risk, identify fraud, and insider threat. He focuses mainly on the Latin America 
market, serving military, intelligence, government, and commercial organizations. 
Additionally, Jon is an associate at Vision Foresight Strategy, a foresight and strategic-
analysis firm based in Honolulu, Hawaii. Jon holds a BS in civil engineering from the 
Virginia Military Institute and is a retired Navy SEAL with 24 years of service.
Vinton G. Cerf
Vinton G. Cerf is vice president and chief internet evangelist for Google. Cerf has held 
positions at MCI, the Corporation for National Research Initiatives, Stanford University, 
UCLA, and IBM. He served as chairman of the board of the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and was founding president of the Internet 
Society. He served on the US National Science Board from 2013 to 2018.
Widely known as one of the “Fathers of the Internet,” Cerf received the US 
National Medal of Technology in 1997, the Marconi Fellowship in 1998, and the 
ACM Alan M. Turing Award in 2004. He has been awarded the Presidential Medal 
of Freedom (2005), the Japan Prize (2008), and the Queen Elizabeth II Prize for 
Engineering (2013). He is a fellow of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers, Association for Computing Machinery, the American Association for the 
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Advancement of Science, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American 
Philosophical Society, the Computer History Museum, and the National Academies of 
Engineering and Science.
Cerf holds a bachelor of science degree in mathematics from Stanford University 
and master of science and PhD degrees in computer science from UCLA and holds 29 
honorary degrees from universities around the world.
Brad Chedister
Brad Chedister is the chief technology officer of DEFENSEWERX—in partnership with 
the Department of Defense (DOD)—leading multiple innovation facility locations 
and teams across the United States and serving as a special advisor for bio-tech/
med-tech/human-performance-optimization technologies for SOFWERX, Special 
Operations Command’s partner. Chedister serves as a cochairman for the Warfighter 
Sustainment and Performance Working Group (NDIA/DOD entity), a cochairman 
of the automobile industry’s Exoskeleton Working Group (current and future 
technologies subgroup), an advisory member of the Cognitive Performer Working 
Group, a member of Northwestern University’s Kellogg Institute TWIN, and a member 
of ERGO Global Futures.
From 2013 to 2016, Brad Chedister was the lead engineer and subject matter 
expert (SME) supporting USSOCOM HQ Commander’s Science and Technology 
Initiative, the Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit (TALOS) joint task force. He spent 
2004-2016 as a technology scout and SME supporting multiple SOCOM priorities. 
From 2005 to 2017, he served as the research-and-development (R&D) lead for 
several SOCOM programs. Additionally, Chedister was selected to lead a brainstorming 
group for the Ebola crisis dealing with key technologies in collaboration with the World 
Health Organization and White House R&D leadership. Chedister held the position of 
Warfighter Systems Architect director at MIT-affiliated Draper Laboratory from 2016 
to 2018. Before joining USSOCOM in 2005, he played professional baseball for the 
Houston Astros organization. Chedister is a biomedical engineer by training and holds 
a double master’s degree in engineering management and technology management.
Yet-Ming Chiang
Dr. Yet-Ming Chiang is a Kyocera Professor in the Department of Materials Science 
and Engineering at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where he researches 
advanced materials, electrochemical energy storage, and clean-energy technologies. 
Current research topics in his group include solid-state batteries, high-energy-density 
rechargeable batteries for electric vehicles and electric aviation, and large-scale 
energy storage for stationary applications. He received his PhD in ceramics in 1984 
and his BS in materials science and engineering in 1980, both from MIT. He has 
cofounded several companies based on his MIT research, including the energy-storage 
companies A123 Systems, 24M Technologies, and Form Energy. He is an elected 
member of the United States National Academy of Engineering.
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Edwin A. Churchill II
LTC Edwin A. Churchill II is the former director of Joint Special Operations Command’s 
innovation cell, named JSOC-X. He led a team dedicated to implementing emerging 
technologies and advanced research and development projects into the current and 
future needs of special operations forces across the full spectrum of operations. The 
efforts focused on bridging the gap between current operational capabilities and the 
future state the Department of Defense (DOD), interagency, and allied partners will be 
operating in to create a strategic advantage over US adversaries. 
Prior to his assignment with JSOC, LTC Churchill worked in the research and 
development of cannon caliber munitions in Picatinny Arsenal, as well as a scientist/
engineer working on unmanned aerial systems and Future Vertical Lift transmission 
research and development at NASA Glenn Research Center. His work has resulted in 
several patents, publications, and awards in innovation. LTC Churchill has presented 
his work to leaders at all levels of government, including the DOD intelligence 
community, congressional members and staff, and senior members of military 
agencies, highlighting the importance of DOD partnering with nontraditional industry 
partners to maintain US strategic advantage in an environment of rapidly emerging 
advanced technologies.
Thomas E. Creely
Dr. Tom Creely is creator and director of the Ethics and Emerging Military Technology 
Graduate Certificate Program and associate professor at the United States Naval War 
College. He works with the Department of Defense Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, 
Defense Innovation Board, and National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. 
In the Brown University Executive Master of Cybersecurity Program, he is the lead for 
cyber-simulation curriculum. Tom serves on the board of directors of the Association 
for Practical and Professional Ethics and the Boston Global Forum AI World Society 
Standards and Practice Committee and editorial board of Shaping Futures magazine. 
He served on the NATO Science and Technology Organization technical team. A retired 
Navy chaplain, his Navy career included sea, ashore, overseas, and the Marine Corps, 
as well as having served as an enlisted sailor. His earlier work experience included 
banking and restaurant industries and as a principal of a consulting business. 
Michael W. David
Dr. David has served on the faculty of the Oettinger School of Science and Technology 
Intelligence at the National Intelligence University (NIU) since 2014. He teaches 
courses on cyber and data-analytics issues. Prior to joining NIU, he worked as a 
subject-matter expert in the Washington, DC area. He focuses on cyber, supply-chain, 
and energy-infrastructure security issues. Previously, Dr. David worked for the Cubic 
Corporation of San Diego and served as vice president for international operations in 
Tokyo, New York City, Singapore, and Brussels. He has traveled extensively throughout 
Asia, the European Union, the Middle East, and North Africa. 
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Dr. David served on active duty in the US Army from 1971 to 1981 and in the 
Army Reserve from 1981 to 1999. While on active duty, he served in reconnaissance, 
special forces, and Army Security Agency (ASA) units, including the 400th ASASOD, 
1st SF Group. His last reserve-duty service was with the US mission to the United 
Nations in New York at the rank of lieutenant colonel. He is fluent in Japanese and 
possess basic French-language skills.
Zachary S. Davis
Dr. Zachary S. Davis is a senior fellow at the Center for Global Security Research 
at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and a research professor at the 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, where he teaches courses on 
counterproliferation. He has broad experience in intelligence and national security 
policy and has held senior positions in the executive and legislative branches of the 
US government. His regional focus is South Asia.
Davis began his career at the Congressional Research Service at the Library of 
Congress and has served with the State Department, congressional committees, and 
the National Security Council. Davis was group leader for proliferation networks in 
LLNL’s Z Program and in 2007 was senior advisor at the National Counterproliferation 
Center in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. He is the author of 
numerous government studies and reports on technical and regional proliferation 
issues. He leads a project on the national security implications of advanced 
technologies, focusing on special operations forces.
Davis’s scholarly publications include articles in Orbis, Asian Survey, Arms Control 
Today, Security Studies, and the American Interest and chapters in numerous edited 
volumes. He was editor of the widely read 1993 book The Proliferation Puzzle: 
Why States Proliferate and What Results. His edited book on the 2002 South Asia 
crisis was published by Palgrave Macmillan. He is the editor of two recent books on 
emerging technology: Strategic Latency and World Power: How Technology Is Changing 
Our Concepts of Security (2014) and Strategic Latency Red, White and Blue: Managing 
the National and International Security Consequences of Disruptive Technologies 
(2018). Davis holds a doctorate and masters in international relations from the 
University of Virginia.
Diane DiEuliis
Dr. Diane DiEuliis is a senior research fellow at National Defense University (NDU). 
Her research areas focus on emerging biological technologies, biodefense, and 
preparedness for biothreats. Specific topic areas under this broad research portfolio 
include synthetic biology, the US bioeconomy, dual-use life sciences research, disaster 
recovery, and behavioral, cognitive, and social science as it relates to important 
aspects of deterrence and preparedness. 
Prior to joining NDU, Dr. DiEuliis was the deputy director for policy and served as 
acting deputy assistant secretary for policy and planning in the Office of the Assistant 
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Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), US Department of Health and 
Human Services. While there, she coordinated policy in support of domestic and 
international health emergency preparedness and response activities, including 
implementation of the Pandemic All-Hazards Preparedness Act, the National Health 
Security Strategy, and the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures 
Enterprise (PHEMCE).
From to 2007 to 2011, Dr. DiEuliis was the assistant director for life sciences and 
behavioral and social sciences in the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) 
in the Executive Office of the President. During her tenure at the White House, she 
was responsible for developing policy in areas such as biosecurity, synthetic biology, 
biotechnology, social and behavioral science, scientific collections, human subjects’ 
research, and STEM education. Dr. DiEuliis also worked to help coordinate the 
interagency response to public health issues such as the H1N1 flu pandemic.
Prior to working at OSTP, Dr. DiEuliis was a program director at the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), where she managed a diverse portfolio of neuroscience 
research in neurodegenerative diseases. She completed a fellowship at the University 
of Pennsylvania in the Center for Neurodegenerative Disease Research and her 
postdoctoral research in the NIH Intramural Research Program, where she focused 
on cellular and molecular neuroscience. Dr. DiEuliis has a PhD in biology from the 
University of Delaware.
Sara Dudley
Col. Sara Dudley graduated with a bachelor of science degree in economics from 
the United States Military Academy. She also holds a master’s degree in business 
administration from Harvard University and a master’s of arts degree in financial 
integrity from Case Western Reserve Law School and was an Army War College fellow 
at Yale University in the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs. She currently serves 
as the United States Army Special Operations Command comptroller. Sara was 
commissioned in 1998 as a second lieutenant and has served 22 years in the Army 
Finance and Comptroller Corps.
George duMais
Dr. George duMais recently retired from the Central Intelligence Agency after thirty-
three years of service. For the final six years he was assigned to the National 
Reconnaissance Office, where he worked on the development of clusters of small 
satellites from national security missions. He is currently a consultant at FTS 
International, where he continues to support the development of space technology 
for intelligence and defense applications. He holds a BS in physics and a PhD in 
philosophy, both from the University of Maryland.
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Peter Emanuel
Dr. Peter Emanuel is the senior research scientist for bioengineering at the US Army’s 
Combat Capabilities Development Command Chemical Biological Center (formerly 
US Army Research, Development and Engineering Command Edgewood Chemical 
Biological Center [ECBC]). In this role, he advises Army leadership on emerging 
technologies in synthetic biology and bioengineering and exploitation of these new 
fields for applications that support national defense. He maintains active research 
programs focusing on developing a fundamental understanding of the synthesis, 
directed self-assembly, and hierarchical organization of naturally occurring materials. 
This understanding is used to engineer new biologically enabled artificial materials for 
applications in chemical and biological agent detection, protection, and remediation.
Emanuel previously served six years as the chief of ECBC’s BioSciences division, 
where he led the biological research program for the nation’s premier nonmedical 
research institute for chemical and biological defense. Prior to assuming this role, 
he served three years in the Bush and Obama administrations as the assistant 
director for chemical and biological countermeasures within the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the President. In this position, Dr. Emanuel 
advocated for the role of science and technology at policy coordinating bodies within 
the White House and throughout the interagency community. 
Dr. Emanuel received a BS in microbiology from the University of Maryland at 
College Park in 1988 and a PhD in molecular and cellular biology from Penn State 
University in 1994. 
Jonathan Fagins
Major Jonathan Fagins is a visiting scientist at the Center for Global Security 
Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. His CGSR research 
interests include pathway-to-defeat methods, countering weapons of mass 
destruction, nonproliferation, defense policy, and nuclear deterrence projects. 
Jonathan authored “Maintaining Presence: How Do Special Operations Forces 
Contribute to the Deterrence and Assurance Mission in Europe?” His research 
highlights how the core activities of special operations forces may complement 
traditional deterrence and assurance in Europe. 
Jonathan is a US Army Special Forces officer with 19 years of service. His 
deployments include Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Niger, and Burkina Faso. He holds 
a bachelor of science degree in general science from the United States Naval 
Academy. Additionally, Jonathan received a master of science degree in defense 
analysis (irregular warfare) from the Naval Postgraduate School in 2019 and a 
master of science degree in international relations (national security affairs) from 
Troy University in 2020.
He is married to Teah Fagins, and together they have three children. Jonathan 
enjoys myriad activities, including hiking, CrossFit, surfing, and camping with his 
family. He also enjoys coaching youth sports.
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Frank D. Gac
Dr. Frank D. Gac retired in 2014, after an exciting and productive 38-year career 
with the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). During that time, he served as 
an executive advisor to the principal associate director for Global Security; led 
the Ceramic Science and Technology and International Research, Analysis, and 
Technology Groups; and was on intergovernmental personal assignments with various 
components of the US government. He devoted the majority of his materials research 
to ceramic processing, the development of advanced ceramic matrix composites, 
armor system design and analysis, in situ corrosion research under extreme 
environments, and nanoscience and technology. He is a guest scientist with LANL and 
a consultant to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Center for Global Security 
Research. Dr. Gac has been involved with the Strategic Latency project since its 
inception in 2009.
Dr. Gac has BS and MS degrees in ceramic engineering from the University of 
Illinois and University of Missouri–Rolla (now known as the Missouri University of 
Science and Technology), respectively, and he holds a PhD in materials science and 
engineering from the University of Washington.
James Giordano
James Giordano, PhD, is professor in the Departments of Neurology and 
Biochemistry, chief of the Neuroethics Studies Program, and codirector of the 
Program in Brain Science and Global Health Law and Policy of the Pellegrino Center 
for Clinical Bioethics at Georgetown University Medical Center. He is senior fellow 
of the Project on Biosecurity, Technology, and Ethics at the US Naval War College, 
consulting bioethicist to the US Defense Medical Ethics Center, and distinguished 
visiting professor at the Coburg University of Applied Sciences in Coburg, Germany. 
He chairs the Neuroethics Subprogram of the IEEE Brain Initiative; is a fellow of the 
Defense Operations Cognitive Science section, SMA Branch, Joint Staff, Pentagon; 
and is an appointed member of the Neuroethics, Legal, and Social Issues Advisory 
Panel of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).  
Professor Giordano has previously served as Donovan Senior Fellow for 
Biosecurity at US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and task leader of 
the EU-Human Brain Project Sub-Program on Dual-Use Brain Science. He was 
JW Fulbright Visiting Professor of Neuroscience and Neuroethics at the Ludwig-
Maximilians University, in Munich, Germany, and an International Fellow of the 
Center for Neuroethics at the University of Oxford.
Professor Giordano is a former US naval officer, holding designations as an 
aerospace physiologist, research physiologist, and research psychologist, and he 
served with the US Navy and Marine Corps. In recognition of his achievements, he 
was elected to the European Academy of Science and Arts and named an Overseas 
Fellow of the Royal Society of Medicine (UK).
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Mike Greene
A recognized subject matter expert on counter proliferation (CP) and counter weapons 
of mass destruction (CWMD), Mike Greene brings deep technical knowledge and 
more than 25 years of real-world military experience to his work with CEOs, academic 
institutions, and senior government officials. While on active duty Mike deployed to 
combat in the Middle East on numerous occasions, earning four bronze stars (one “V” 
for valorous actions). He graduated from Explosive Ordnance Disposal School, Dive 
School, Defense Language Institute (Arabic), National Intelligence University (BSI), and 
UNC Kenan-Flagler Business School (MBA). 
Mike served seven years at Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU)—
considered to be the most elite unit in the US Navy and Department of Defense. 
While at DEVGRU, Mike managed Special Programs that targeted adversarial WMD 
programs, developing and deploying technology to disrupt WMD development, respond 
to and neutralize WMDs during crisis events, and protect and decontaminate US 
personnel and equipment when required. 
Mike coordinated efforts up the chain of command to the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense and across the US government with the Departments of Justice, Energy, and 
Homeland Security. In addition to collaborating across the US government, academia, 
and industry, Mike has significant experience coordinating efforts with various 
coalition partners to develop and deploy technology against programs that posed 
significant threats. Mike possesses conversational fluency in Arabic and Spanish.
Michael S. Gremillion
Colonel Michael S. Gremillion is the deputy director of Weather, Headquarters US 
Air Force, Washington, DC. He is responsible for assisting the director in developing 
and implementing weather and geoscience doctrine, policies, plans, programs, 
and standards. He plans, programs, and budgets for Air Force Weather resources 
and manages the execution of the $300-million-per-year weather program. He 
interfaces with the Air Force and Army regarding full exploitation of weather resources 
and technology. He also directs interagency activities with agencies such as the 
Department of Commerce, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the 
Federal Aviation Administration. Colonel Gremillion also has served as a field-agency 
staff officer, fighter-wing weather officer, a Pentagon staff weather officer, space-launch 
staff meteorologist, a flight commander, and intelligence operations officer. He holds a 
BS in atmospheric science from the University of Kansas, an MS in meteorology from 
Texas A&M University, and an MBA from Regis University.
Brad Hart
Since 2018, Brad Hart has been the program manager for Global Security Principal 
Directorate’s Z Program at LLNL. The role of Z Program is to apply the complete set 
of LLNL’s science and technology capabilities to support the intelligence community 
in overcoming its most difficult challenges. Brad leads a diverse, multidisciplinary 
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team of intelligence professionals to deliver comprehensive analysis, policy, and 
operational support in areas where technology research and development are critical 
to national strategic priorities. These priorities range from combating weapons of 
mass destruction and cyber security to space and other emerging and disruptive 
technologies and include detection and analysis that anticipates consequences and 
contributes to US government actions to preserve and enhance national security.
Brad began his career in 2001 as a postdoc at LLNL in the Chemistry and 
Materials Science Directorate. He served as a staff scientist in the Forensic Science 
Center (FSC) from 2003 to 2008, at which point he left the laboratory to serve as a 
branch chief within the Defense Intelligence Agency. While there, he oversaw many 
global technical collection activities, as well as the operation of multiple forensic 
laboratories in active theaters of operation. Brad returned to LLNL in 2011 to serve 
as the director of the FSC. He holds a BS in chemistry from the University of Kansas 
and a PhD from the University of California, Irvine.
Brian T. Holmes
Dr. Holmes is the dean of the Oettinger School of Science and Technology Intelligence 
at the National Intelligence University (NIU) in Bethesda, Maryland. The school is the 
focus for science and technical analytic education, research, and external engagement 
across the intelligence and national security communities. 
Dr. Holmes holds two patents with the US Navy, has published numerous peer-
reviewed scientific papers, and received the Deputy Director of National Intelligence 
for Analysis Distinguished Analysis Award, a National Intelligence Meritorious Unit 
Citation, and the 2018 NIU Faculty Research Award. His career includes stints as a 
scientific researcher at the US Naval Research Laboratory, an intelligence analyst for 
the Defense Intelligence Agency, an intelligence officer in the US Navy Reserves, and a 
professor at NIU.
Molly M. Jahn
Dr. Molly Jahn is the founding principal of the Jahn Research Group and professor of 
Agronomy at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, where she teaches Systems Thinking 
(on leave 2019-2020 for government service). She is adjunct senior research scientist 
at Columbia University’s Earth Institute and a Special Government Employee at NASA. 
From 2006 to 2011, she was the 12th dean of the University of Wisconsin’s College 
of Agricultural and Life Sciences and director of the Wisconsin Agricultural Experiment 
Station, and from 2009 to 2010, deputy and acting USDA Under Secretary of Research, 
Education and Economics. Crop varieties from her vegetable breeding programs at 
UW–Madison and Cornell University are grown commercially and for subsistence on 
six continents under more than 60 commercial licenses. She has authored more than 
100 peer-reviewed scientific publications and a series of high-impact reports with 
government and private-sector collaborators, including Lloyd’s of London, Thomson 
Reuters, and Cargill. Dr. Jahn has trained dozens of students now working all over 
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the world and has been awarded honorary doctor of science degrees in both the 
United States and United Kingdom. She consults globally for business, universities, 
governments, philanthropic organizations, and international multilateral institutions in 
agriculture, food security, risk in food systems, life sciences, and environment.
Budhikka “Jay” Jayamaha
A faculty member at the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Jay 
brings his political science and security studies background to the study of human 
and food-system security. At the Jahn Research Group, he examines how internal 
conflict dynamics in countries with weak institutions influence the food system and 
shape multistate food crises. He also brings his experience and interests in the use 
of geospatial data in complex humanitarian emergencies from international crisis 
mappers. Jay holds a PhD in political science from Northwestern University, where 
he researched how combatant-state relations shape wartime authority structures, 
with case studies in Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkey, and Nepal. Prior to his studies at 
Northwestern, Jay served in the US Army as an airborne infantryman in the 82nd 
Airborne Division during the Iraq War and the war on terror.
Elsa B. Kania
Elsa B. Kania is an adjunct senior fellow with the Technology and National Security 
Program at the Center for a New American Security. Her research focuses on Chinese 
military strategy, military innovation, and emerging technologies. Ms. Kania also 
serves as an officer in the US Navy Reserve and works in support of the US Air 
Force’s China Aerospace Studies Institute through its associates program. She is a 
nonresident fellow in Indo-Pacific Security with the Institute for the Study of War and 
is a nonresident fellow with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s International 
Cyber Policy Center. She serves as an adjunct policy advisor for the nonprofit Institute 
for Security and Technology, contributes to the Party Watch Initiative at the Center for 
Advanced China Research, and cofounded the China Cyber and Intelligence Studies 
Institute, a nonprofit research collaboration.
Ms. Kania was named an official “Mad Scientist” by the US Army’s Training and 
Doctrine Command and was a 2018 Fulbright Specialist in Australia with the Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute. Her writings and commentary have appeared in Foreign 
Affairs, Foreign Policy, Lawfare, Politico, and Defense One. Ms. Kania is a PhD candidate 
in Harvard University’s Department of Government and a graduate of Harvard College 
(summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa). Her book Fighting to Innovate is forthcoming.
Whitney Kassel
Whitney Kassel is vice president and head of cyber event management for North 
America at Morgan Stanley. As part of the firm’s Fusion Resilience Center, the cyber 
event management team orchestrates responses to major cyber events that threaten 
the firm’s clients, assets, and reputation. Prior to joining Morgan Stanley in 2018, 
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Whitney led engagement efforts with key government clients at Palantir Technologies, 
a data analytics and integration company. From 2011 to 2015, Whitney was a senior 
director at the Arkin Group, a business intelligence and private-investigations firm, 
and she wrote a regular column for Foreign Policy magazine. She has also written for 
Foreign Affairs, Just Security, Defense One, the Atlantic, the Baltimore Sun, Huffington 
Post, and others. From 2007 to 2011, she served in the Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Policy, where she focused on Pakistan, Afghanistan, special operations, 
and counterterrorism. During this time, she served in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Whitney 
holds a master’s degree in international relations and international economics from the 
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a bachelor of arts from 
Barnard College. She speaks French and Russian and lives in Brooklyn.
Aaron M. Kelly
Aaron is a research specialist at the Jahn Research Group. He is currently earning a 
BS in applied mathematics, with an emphasis in computer science, at the University 
of Wisconsin–Madison.
Robert G. Kennedy III
Robert G. Kennedy III PE is a polyglot systems engineer with Tetra Tech and general 
chairman of the Asilomar Microcomputer Workshop. Trained as a mechanical engineer 
specializing in robotics and Soviet studies, he worked in artificial intelligence for the 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory and manufacturing for the Douglas Aircraft Company. 
In 1994-95, he served as an American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
congressional fellow, spending his year in the House Subcommittee on Space, 
focusing on commercial remote sensing and Russian space matters. He was 
instrumental in the formulation and evolution of Presidential Decision Directive/
NSC 23, the Commercial Remote Sensing Policy. He has participated in the Hackers 
Conference and was a web security analyst doing counter-cracking with other white-hat 
hackers just prior to 9/11. In 2011, his published research in geoengineering resulted 
in a personal invitation by academician Yuri Antonovich Izrael to come to Moscow 
as a guest of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Roshydromet (Russian weather 
service) to participate in an international scientific conference on the problems of 
adaptation to climate change.
Kennedy is president of the American branch of the Institute for Interstellar 
Studies. He has worked for the Navajo Nation helping it develop big solar. He has also 
worked in Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda on behalf of USAID and the British 
Foreign Office to build resilient interdisciplinary teams of young African geoscientists 
and engineers to develop their vast and indigenous renewable energy resources. 
He takes pride in speaking enough foreign languages to start a bar fight just about 
anywhere in the world.
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Margarita Konaev
Dr. Margarita Konaev is a research fellow at Georgetown’s Center for Security and 
Emerging Technology (CSET) interested in military applications of artificial intelligence, 
urban warfare, and Russian military innovation. Previously, she was a nonresident 
fellow with the Modern War Institute at West Point, a postdoctoral fellow at the 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and a postdoctoral fellow at the University 
of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House. Before joining CSET, she worked as a senior 
principal in the marketing and communications practice at Gartner.
Margarita’s research on international security, armed conflict, nonstate actors, 
and urban warfare in the Middle East, Russia, and Eurasia has been published by the 
Journal of Strategic Studies, the Journal of Global Security Studies, Conflict Management 
and Peace Science, the French Institute of International Relations, the Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, Lawfare, War on the Rocks, Modern War Institute, Foreign Policy 
Research Institute, and a range of other outlets. She holds a PhD in political science 
from the University of Notre Dame, an MA in conflict resolution from Georgetown 
University, and a BA from Brandeis University.
Megan Konar
Megan Konar is an assistant professor in the Department of Civil and Environmental 
Engineering at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Professor Konar’s 
interdisciplinary research focuses on the intersection of water resources and food 
supply chains, drawing from hydrology, environmental science, and economics. Dr. 
Konar received a PhD in civil and environmental engineering from Princeton University 
in 2012; an MS in water science, policy, and management from Oxford University in 
2005; and a BS in conservation and resource studies from the University of California, 
Berkeley in 2002. She was awarded the NSF CAREER award and early-career award 
from American Geophysical Union Hydrologic Sciences.
Joshua Lamb
Dr. Joshua Lamb is a principal member of the technical staff with the Advanced Power 
Sources R&D organization at Sandia National Laboratories. He primarily oversees the 
Battery Abuse Testing Laboratory (BATLab) team, which focuses on the development 
of inherently safe lithium-ion batteries by understanding the consequences and 
mechanisms of failure, developing cradle-to-grave battery testing, and developing 
new materials for use in battery systems. Joshua earned his PhD in metallurgical 
engineering in 2008 and his BS in chemical engineering in 2002 from the University 
of Nevada. Since joining Sandia in 2011, Joshua has researched advanced techniques 
for determining the stability of lithium-ion batteries and the development of advanced 
battery abuse and safety tests.
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Herbert Lin
Herbert Lin is senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for 
International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and 
Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University. His research interests 
relate broadly to policy dimensions of cybersecurity and cyberspace, and he is 
particularly interested in the use of offensive operations in cyberspace as instruments 
of national policy and in the security dimensions of information warfare and influence 
operations on national security. 
In addition to his positions at Stanford University, Lin is chief scientist, emeritus 
for the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council 
(NRC) of the National Academies, where he served from 1990 through 2014 as 
study director of public policy and information technology projects; adjunct senior 
research scholar and senior fellow in cybersecurity (not in residence) at the Saltzman 
Institute for War and Peace Studies in the School for International and Public Affairs, 
Columbia University; and a member of the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin 
of Atomic Scientists. In 2016, he served on President Barack Obama’s Commission 
on Enhancing National Cybersecurity. In 2019, he was elected a fellow of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science. Prior to his NRC service, he 
was a professional staff member and staff scientist for the House Armed Services 
Committee (1986-1990), where his portfolio included defense policy and arms control 
issues. He received his doctorate in physics from MIT.
Richard A. K. Lum
Richard is an academically trained futurist and chief executive of Vision Foresight 
Strategy LLC (VFS), a foresight and strategic analysis firm based in Honolulu. He has 
conducted foresight and strategy work on projects for organizations such as US Indo-
Pacific Command, US Special Operations Command, the Office of Naval Research, 
the European Commission, the UK government, NASA, and PepsiCo. Richard is the 
author of 4 Steps to the Future: A Quick and Clean Guide to Creating Foresight (2016) 
and his contributions were featured in the book Thinking about the Future: Guidelines 
for Strategic Foresight (2006) and A Careful Revolution (2019; coauthored with Anne 
Gibbon). His work has been published in the Journal of Futures Studies, the journal 
Futures, International Journal of System of Systems Engineering, World Future Review, 
and Small Wars Journal. Richard is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. 
He holds a PhD in political science from the futures studies program at the University 
of Hawai’i. His dissertation research focused on developing a conceptual framework 
for designing future governance systems. 
Mark W. Maier
Dr. Mark W. Maier is a technical fellow at the Aerospace Corporation and an author 
and a practitioner of systems architecting (the art and science of creating complex 
systems). He is coauthor, with Dr. Eberhardt Rechtin, of The Art of Systems Architecting 
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(3rd ed.), the mostly widely used textbook on systems architecting, as well more 
than 50 papers on systems engineering, architecting, and sensor analysis. Since 
1998, he has been employed by the Aerospace Corporation, a nonprofit corporation 
that operates a Federally Funded Research and Development Center with oversight 
responsibility for the US National Security Space Program. His position of technical 
fellow is the highest technical rank in the company.
At the Aerospace Corporation, Maier founded the systems architecting training 
program (an internal and external training program) and applies architecting methods to 
government and commercial clients, particularly in portfolios-of-systems and research-
and-development problems. He received BS and MS degrees from the California 
Institute of Technology and engineer and PhD degrees in electrical engineering from 
the University of Southern California (USC). While at USC, he held a Hughes Aircraft 
Company Doctoral Fellowship, where he was also employed as a section head. Prior to 
coming to the Aerospace Corporation, he was an associate professor of electrical and 
computer engineering at the University of Alabama at Huntsville.
Brendan G. Melley 
Mr. Melley is the director of the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(CSWMD), National Defense University. He joined CSWMD in 2011 as a senior 
research fellow and led the center’s support to USSOCOM and the intelligence 
community for countering WMD and counterproliferation and was CSWMD’s 
coordinator for countering WMD policy support. Prior to joining the center, he was vice 
president of the Cohen Group, an international business consulting firm.
Mr. Melley served as a director on the National Security Council staff from 2001 to 
2005 in both the intelligence programs and proliferation strategy offices and managed 
the development and implementation of the Proliferation Security Initiative. 
Previously, Mr. Melley had senior staff assignments at the President’s Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and was a 
professional staff member on the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the US 
Intelligence Community. Mr. Melley served on active duty as an infantry officer in the US 
Army’s 25th Infantry Division (Light) and as a military intelligence officer at the DIA. He 
graduated from both Providence College, Rhode Island and the Postgraduate Intelligence 
Program at DIA and has an MS in WMD studies from Missouri State University.
Marshall Monroe
Marshall Monroe is founder and chairman of Marshall Monroe MAGIC, a creative 
technology incubator and strategic design studio headquartered in New Mexico. The 
firm leverages its ongoing research in the fields of innovation excellence and global 
markets to formulate new transformation plans and advise select clients in areas of 
visioning, advanced concepts, mission transformation, business development, and the 
meeting of grand strategic challenges. MMMagic’s clients include Cirque du Soleil, the 
Michael Jackson estate, Legendary Entertainment, HBO, DIRECTV, NASA, USSOCOM, 
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multiple national laboratories, Paul Allen’s Vulcan Ventures, the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency, and MITRE Corporation. Monroe is founder of the Magic Canyon 
Institute and has briefed white papers from that research arm to multiple US national 
labs, the Pentagon, UK special forces groups, and the State Department. 
Monroe spent 14 years as a creative executive with the Walt Disney Company and 
was a founding member of the Disney research-and-development division. He holds 15 
patents for entertainment technologies. He is well known for designing Blizzard Beach, 
the wildly successful $100 million water park in Walt Disney World, Florida. Monroe 
is a former member of the US Director of National Intelligence’s Intelligence Science 
Board and was the founding chairman of the New Mexico Governor’s Council on Film 
and Media Industries. Monroe has a degree in mechanical engineering and fine art 
from Stanford University. 
Seth C. Murray
Dr. Seth C. Murray, professor and Eugene Butler Endowed Chair in Agricultural 
Biotechnology, Department of Soil and Crop Sciences, Texas A&M University. Dr. 
Murray received his PhD from Cornell University and a BS from Michigan State 
University. His research program focuses on new approaches in high throughput 
field phenotyping (including unoccupied aerial vehicles, [i.e. drones]), quantitative 
genetic discovery, gene to phene data analytics and applied maize (corn) breeding 
in Texas. He has released nine maize lines, some having been licensed and being 
grown by Texas farmers, including proprietary hybrids for whiskey. He has coauthored 
64 peer-reviewed articles and served in leadership roles for the American Seed 
Trade Association (ASTA), the Crop Science Society of America (CSSA), the National 
Association of Plant Breeders (NAPB), and the North American Plant Phenotyping 
Network (NAPPN). He is a fellow of CSSA and was named a Blavatnik Young Life 
Sciences finalist. In 2016-2017, he served as the senior advisor of agricultural 
systems in the Office of the Chief Scientist at the USDA. He also founded and serves 
as editor of the Plant Phenome Journal.
Michael Nacht
Michael Nacht is the Thomas and Alison Schneider Professor of Public Policy in the 
Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley. He was dean 
of the Goldman School from 1998 to 2008 when US News and World Report ranked 
it the nation’s number one graduate school in public policy analysis. From 2009 to 
2010, he was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs when he 
chaired the NATO High-Level Group that advises the NATO alliance on nuclear posture 
and policy issues. He is the author, coauthor, and editor of numerous publications, 
including two volumes on latent technologies and national security coedited with 
Zachary Davis of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
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Girish Sreevatsan Nandakumar 
Girish Sreevatsan Nandakumar is a PhD candidate in international studies at Old 
Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia. He majors in international political economy 
and development and minors in modeling and simulation. His dissertation explores 
the political economy of global private currencies. He was a fellow at USSOCOM’s 
Donovan Group and currently works at the Virginia Modeling, Analysis, and Simulation 
Center (VMASC).
Tony Nguy-Robertson
Dr. Nguy-Robertson is the Water Security program manager and a project lead in 
the Geospatial Epidemiology Program in the Predictive Analytics Pod within NGA 
Research. The Water Security program seeks to fill operational gaps in hydrology 
for the intelligence community and Department of Defense by leveraging academia 
and industry. Projects have included topics in groundwater, crop irrigation, surface 
water dynamics, and water quality. His work in the area while at NGA has included 
publications by the National Academies of Science, peer-reviewed literature, and 
operational tools. Dr. Nguy-Robertson’s efforts in the Geospatial Epidemiology 
program seek to leverage environmental data to understand and predict future 
disease outbreaks that threaten national security. Prior to joining NGA Research, Dr. 
Nguy-Robertson worked in the Office of Geomatics supporting natural hazard and 
environmental models used in operations. His work has included the examination 
of the environmental causal factors of the Arab Spring and Ebola outbreaks. These 
results have been shared at international conferences. He has also convened 
sessions on the topic of environmental influences on food, water, and health security. 
He collaborates across the US government, academia, and industry.
Dr. Nguy-Robertson received his PhD from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln 
in natural resources, MS from Indiana University in geology, and BS from Purdue 
University in biochemistry. His graduate work has focused on hyperspectral remote 
sensing of harmful algal blooms and crops with the goal of taking close-range sensors 
and applying them to airborne and satellite sensors. His postdoctoral research at the 
University of Nebraska–Lincoln involved relating eddy-covariance flux data to remote 
sensing models and developing crop-disease risk models. He has more than 25 peer-
reviewed publications. 
William L. Oemichen 
William L. (Bill) Oemichen is a principal in the Jahn Research Group and a senior 
research fellow in Food Systems Security and Preparedness at the University of 
Wisconsin–Madison Law School and College of Agricultural and Life Sciences. Oemichen 
previously served as Wisconsin Health Emergency Preparedness and Response 
director, as Wisconsin Trade and Consumer Protection administrator, as deputy 
Minnesota Agriculture commissioner, as CEO of the largest all-cooperative business 
trade association in the United States, and as a staff member of the US House 
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of Representatives, Minnesota Senate, and Minnesota House of Representatives. 
Oemichen earned a JD from the University of Wisconsin Law School and a BA in 
economics from Carleton College with a concentration in science, technology, and 
public policy and served as a policy fellow at the University of Minnesota’s Hubert H. 
Humphrey School of Public Policy. Oemichen taught as an adjunct professor at the 
University of Minnesota School of Population and Clinical Sciences and served on the 
chancellor’s Board of Visitors for UW-Madison. Oemichen currently serves on a number 
of corporate and federal, state, and local governmental boards, including the board of 
the education and insurance arm of the $340 billion American Farm Credit System.
David M. Perlman
David M. Perlman, PhD, formerly of Twitter, has worked on fighting back against 
disinformation, market manipulation, and digital deception since 2016. He has 
presented to defense officials and business leaders on social networks and 
psychological influence, led a workshop for NATO officials in London, and presented on 
corporate risks of misinformation security at the Black Hat cybersecurity conference. 
In his previous career, he studied physics, electrical engineering, information 
technology, and game theory. For his doctorate in cognitive science, he used 
functional MRI brain imaging, biometrics, and methods from behavioral economics to 
study attention, emotion, and identity. His personal career highlight was presenting his 
research one-one-one to His Holiness the Dalai Lama at a monastery in India. He is a 
data scientist and security researcher at Leviathan Security Group.
Dominic Peterson
Dominic Peterson earned his PhD in chemistry from the New Mexico Institute of 
Mining and Technology. After completing a postdoctoral fellowship at Lawerence 
Berkeley National Laboratory, he joined Los Alamos National Laboratory as a staff 
scientist in the chemistry division. His early career focused on the development of 
separation and detection methods for radioactive analytes in a variety of environments 
and on techniques for nuclear forensics. He then became a team leader in the 
materials sciences and technology division for a team that focused on developing and 
understanding soft materials used in nuclear weapons. Next, he became the group 
leader for the engineered materials group, where he focused partly on how to increase 
the capabilities of the group in polymer additive manufacturing. Dr. Peterson returned 
to science and is focusing on nuclear nonproliferation. His research interests include 
plutonium materials, additive manufacturing, separations science, and applications of 
science to solve national problems.
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Michael J. Puma
Dr. Puma is director of the Center for Climate Systems Research, part of Columbia 
University’s Earth Institute and colocated with the NASA Goddard Institute for 
Space Studies. The center has over 30 scientists and staff working closely with 
NASA on earth science and climate impacts research. Dr. Puma’s research focuses 
on global food security, hydroclimatology, and human migration. He is especially 
interested in understanding the sensitivity of complex, socioeconomic systems to 
nonpredictable extremes, including megadroughts, volcanic eruptions, wars, and 
trade restrictions. Dr. Puma’s research has been funded by a variety of institutions 
including the National Science Foundation, NASA, the US Department of Defense, the 
United Nations Development Programme, and the Columbia World Project “Adapting 
Agriculture to Climate Today for Tomorrow” (ACToday). His efforts on global food 
security also have been supported through a fellowship from Columbia’s Center for 
Climate and Life.
Toby Eduardo Redshaw
Toby Redshaw is responsible for Verizon’s Enterprise Innovation and 5G Solutions 
area. He previously ran 5G Ecosystems, Innovation, and Product Development, 
AR/VR, and Location Services/Geo Intelligence Business. Prior to joining Verizon, 
Toby was chief executive officer of Kevington Advisors, a leading-edge consultancy 
offering services in enterprise-technology strategy and transformation, coaching 
start-ups and various government and military engagements.Toby previously held 
global chief information officer positions at American Express and Aviva PLC. He 
had simultaneous product, marketing, strategy, venture, diversity, and technology 
responsibilities during his six years at Motorola, while also working as executive 
chairman of a start-up portfolio company. 
Toby is the founding chairman (emeritus) of the Kellogg Innovation Network 
(originally at Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern University, now 
TWIN Global). He cochairs the working group on scale disruptive technologies at the 
Council on Competitiveness and sits on the Dell IT and the Lake Nona Impact Forum 
advisory boards. He was born and raised in Mexico City and is proud to have become 
a US citizen in 2014. Among Toby’s recognitions, InfoWorld named him a Top CTO 
25—Most Influential IT Leader and InformationWeek a Top 50 Global CIOs.
Philip Reiner
Philip Reiner is the CEO and founder of the Institute for Security and Technology, 
a San Francisco Bay Area–based nonpartisan nonprofit that works to outpace 
emerging security threats posed by advanced technologies by bridging technical 
experts and national security policymakers. He previously served in the Obama 
White House as Senior Director for South Asia on the National Security Council 
(NSC) staff, the senior advisor for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and a director for 
Pakistan on the NSC staff. He was a civil servant in the Office of the Under 
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Secretary of Defense for Policy at the Pentagon—where he received the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service—and for a number of 
years at Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems, working in their electronic warfare, 
remote sensing, and vision systems business units.
Philip is as a member of the advisory board for the AI Security Initiative at the UC 
Berkeley Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity, an affiliate with Stanford’s Center for 
International Security and Cooperation, the director for advisory at AETOS Strategy 
and Advisory, and the owner of a personal consulting business, where he advises 
both public and private clients on business, tech, and international security with a 
predominant focus on India, China, and Japan. His writing has appeared in Foreign 
Affairs, the Cypher Brief, War on the Rocks, and C4ISRNet. He obtained his master’s 
degree in international relations and international economics from the Johns Hopkins 
School of Advanced International Studies and a bachelor of arts in comparative 
religions with a minor in history from the University of California, Santa Barbara, 
focusing on both East and South Asian history. He routinely guest lectures on 
emerging international security risks at UC Berkeley and Stanford University and lives 
in Oakland with his wife and two daughters.
Brad Roberts
Brad Roberts is director of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory in California. From April 2009 to March 2013, he served 
as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy. In 
this role, he served as policy director of the Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture 
Review and Ballistic Missile Defense Review. From September 2013 through December 
2014, Dr. Roberts was a consulting professor and William Perry Fellow at the Center for 
International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Prior to joining the Obama 
administration, Dr. Roberts was a member of the research staff at the Institute for 
Defense Analyses and an adjunct professor at George Washington University.
Jean-Paul Rodrigue
Jean-Paul Rodrigue received a PhD in transport geography from the Université de 
Montréal (1994) and has been at Hofstra University since 1999, initially at the 
Department of Economics and Geography and then at the Department of Global Studies 
and Geography. Dr. Rodrigue sits on the international editorial board of the Journal of 
Transport Geography, the Journal of Shipping and Trade, the Asian Journal of Shipping 
and Logistics, and the Cahiers Scientifiques du Transport. He is a board member of the 
University Transportation Research Center, Region II of the City University of New York 
and is a lead member of both the PortEconomics.eu initiative and the International 
Association of Maritime Economists. Dr. Rodrigue was a member of the World Economic 
Forum Global Agenda Council on the Future of Manufacturing (2011-2016). In 2013, 
the US secretary of transportation appointed Dr. Rodrigue to sit on the advisory board 
of the US Merchant Marine Academy, a position he held until 2018. He is also the New 
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York team leader for the MetroFreight project about city logistics. He regularly performs 
advisory and consulting assignments for international organizations and corporations 
and is interviewed by the media about transportation-related matters.
Matthew A. Rose
Matthew A. Rose is a cleared technologist and national security expert currently 
working for the US federal government as a civilian. He is assigned to the leadership 
team at the General Services Administration’s Centers of Excellence, a White 
House effort to accelerate enterprise technology modernization across government. 
His current assignment requires that he lead and oversee cloud optimization, 
customer experience, data and analytics, development of a functional contact 
center, program management, and the artificial intelligence work units. Mr. Rose 
is also a commissioned officer in the US Army Reserve, where he serves as the 
National Capital Region innovation officer, assisting the Army Futures Command, 
bridging the gap between DOD innovation requirements and the private sector. 
In past assignments, Mr. Rose incorporated advanced analysis and visualization 
tools to improve legacy systems and processes, saving the Joint Force and the 
government time and money, while improving the user experience enterprise wide. Mr. 
Rose maintains DOD and USAID Planner Certifications and several DOD all-source 
intelligence certifications. He has also completed the IC Advanced Analysis Career 
Program and teaches executive leadership to industry and nonprofit C-suite leaders.
Paul Scharre
Paul Scharre is a senior fellow and director of the Technology and National Security 
program at the Center for a New American Security. He is the award-winning author 
of Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War, which won the 
2019 Colby Award and was one of Bill Gates’s top five books of 2018. Dr. Scharre 
worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the George W. Bush and Barack 
Obama administrations, where he played a leading role in establishing policies on 
unmanned and autonomous systems and emerging weapons technologies. He led 
the Department of Defense (DOD) working group that drafted DOD Directive 3000.09, 
establishing the department’s policies on autonomy in weapon systems. He holds 
a PhD in war studies from King’s College London and an MA in political economy 
and public policy and a BS in physics, cum laude, from Washington University in St. 
Louis. Prior to working in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Scharre served as 
an infantryman, sniper, and reconnaissance team leader in the Army’s Third Ranger 
Battalion and completed multiple tours to Iraq and Afghanistan. He is a graduate 
of the Army’s Airborne, Ranger, and Sniper Schools and Honor Graduate of the 75th 
Ranger Regiment’s Ranger Indoctrination Program.
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P. Randall Schunk
P. Randall (Randy) Schunk received his PhD in chemical engineering and 
materials science in 1989 from the University of Minnesota. He has worked at 
Sandia National Laboratories for more than 30 years and was most recently 
promoted to the position of senior scientist. His technical work has focused on 
manufacturing-process science and engineering, including metallurgy and ceramics, 
nanomanufacturing, roll-to-roll printing and coating, and polymer processing. Since 
2008, he has also served as a national laboratory professor in the Chemical and 
Biological Engineering Department at the University of New Mexico (UNM). His 
research group at UNM specializes in developing advanced models for materials-
manufacturing processes.
Peter Warren Singer
Peter Warren Singer is strategist and senior fellow at New America. He has been 
named by the Smithsonian as one of the nation’s 100 leading innovators, by Defense 
News as one of the 100 most influential people in defense issues, by Foreign Policy 
to its Top 100 Global Thinkers List, and as an official “Mad Scientist” for the US 
Army’s Training and Doctrine Command. Peter is the author of multiple best-selling, 
award-winning books. His nonfiction books include Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the 
Privatized Military Industry (2007), Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict 
in the Twenty-First Century (2014), Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs 
to Know (2014), Children at War (2015), and LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social 
Media (2018), which explores how social media has changed war and politics. Both 
Amazon and Foreign Affairs named it book of the year.
Peter is also the coauthor of a novel type of novel, using the format of a 
technothriller to communicate nonfiction research. His first, Ghost Fleet: A Novel of 
the Next World War (2015), was both a top summer read and joined the professional 
reading list of every branch of the US military, leading to briefings everywhere from 
the White House to the Pentagon. His latest such novel is Burn-In: A Novel of the Real 
Robotic Revolution (2020). 
S. Robert (Bob) Skaggs
S. Robert (Bob) Skaggs attended the International School of Nuclear Science and 
Engineering at Argonne National Laboratory after receiving his BS in mechanical 
engineering with honors from the New Mexico College of Agriculture and Mechanic 
Arts (now New Mexico State University) in 1958. Commissioned as a 2nd Lt US Army 
reserve as a distinguished military graduate, he was assigned to further his education 
at the Defense Atomic Support Agency at the Nevada Test Site. Upon completion of 
this school, Bob moved to Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (now Los Alamos National 
Laboratory; LANL) where he worked on plasma diodes and simultaneously pursued 
an MS in nuclear engineering at University of New Mexico–Los Alamos, graduating in 
1967. He then resigned from Los Alamos and went to graduate school full time at the 
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University of New Mexico main campus in Albuquerque, earning his doctorate in 1971 
from the Department of Chemical Engineering with an emphasis in materials science. 
In 1972, Dr. Skaggs returned to LANL, where he evaluated the vulnerability of atomic 
weapon components to nuclear radiation, led research on advanced ceramic matrix 
composites for high-temperature applications, and served as the program manager for 
armor in the National Armor/Anti-Armor Program. 
Dr. Skaggs retired from LANL in 1993 and pursued private consulting for the 
following 20 years, retiring from active work in 2013. His final technical contribution 
was coauthoring the chapter entitled “Armor of the Future: Spider Webs, Buckyballs, 
Nanotubes, and Beyond,” for this book. He passed away on February 20, 2020.
Jennifer Snow
Lt. Col. Jennifer “JJ” Snow is the AFWERX innovation officer for the US Air Force, Air 
Force Materials Command. She serves as the military representative for technology 
outreach and engagement, bridging the gap between government and various technology 
communities to improve collaboration and communications, identify smart solutions to 
wicked problems, and guide the development of future technology policy to benefit the 
US Air Force, Department of Defense (DOD), interagency, and allied partners.
Prior to her current assignment, Lt. Col. Snow was the Donovan Group innovation 
officer for US Special Operations Command and the SOFWERX innovation team. She 
is a distinguished graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School. Her work has been 
presented to members of the National Security Council, the White House, and key 
seniors across the DOD, intelligence community, and interagency to highlight emergent 
risks and opportunities involving technology and technology-influenced environments.
Brian Souza
Since 2017, Brian Souza has served as the group leader for Biosecurity and 
Bioforensics in LLNL’s Physical and Life Sciences Directorate, where he leads 
multidisciplinary teams that develop and deploy world-class science and technology to 
help intelligence and warfighter communities counter vulnerabilities to biological threats. 
Additionally, he has served as the deputy director for the Center for Biosecurity within 
the Global Security Directorate and was responsible for program development, including 
support to the warfighter and USSOCOM for almost twenty years.
During his 20 years at LLNL, Souza has held senior research positions in the 
Biology and Biotechnology Division, the Forensics Science Center, and International 
Assessments as a counterterrorism analyst. He currently develops programmatic work 
within the Global Security Directorate that uses intelligence to inform science-based 
discovery to provide support to the operations community.
“20 years after starting at LLNL as a research biologist, I continue to be amazed 
at the contributions of my fellow scientists and the opportunities we all have to serve 
our nation. I remain grateful for all that LLNL continues to offer—mission, resources, 
interdisciplinary science, and great friendships.” 
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Karen Swider-Lyons
Dr. Karen Swider-Lyons holds a joint appointment as the director of US Naval 
Research Laboratory’s Laboratory for Autonomous Systems Research (LASR) and 
the head of the alternative energy section in the chemistry division. Her career has 
focused on energy materials for batteries and fuel cells and how to integrate them 
into autonomous systems. Her work on fuel-cell-powered autonomous systems started 
in 2003 with the Spider Lion unmanned aerial vehicle, and later the Ion Tiger UAV and 
the Hydranox unmanned undersea vehicle. She earned her PhD in 1992 in materials 
science and engineering at the University of Pennsylvania and holds a BS in chemistry 
from Haverford College (1987).  
Philip Swintek
Philip Swintek is a special forces officer in the United States Army. He graduated 
from the Naval Postgraduate School, holding a master’s of science in space systems 
operations and a master’s of science in defense analysis.
Bryce C. Tappan
Dr. Bryce C. Tappan is a staff scientist in the High Explosives Science and Technology 
group (M-7) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). He was a recipient of the 
LANL Agnew National Security Postdoctoral Fellowship and is associate editor of the 
International Journal of Energetic Materials and Chemical Propulsion and editorial 
board member of the Journal of Energetic Materials. His research interests include 
production of new energetic materials and the study of the decomposition of energetic 
materials, including the combustion synthesis of nanostructured metal foams and the 
development of a new solid rocket propulsion system. He is the principle investigator for 
the development of propulsion systems for small satellites, funded by the LANL-LDRD 
program. He has a patent related to that subject and has published extensively and 
received numerous awards, including the R&D Magazine’s prestigious R&D100 Award.
In the fields of high explosives science and combustion synthesis, Dr. Tappan 
has given numerous presentations nationally and internationally and authored or 
coauthored over 60 articles, reviews, and conference proceedings. While completing 
his PhD at the University of Delaware, under the supervision of advisor Dr. Thomas B. 
Brill, Dr. Tappan did pioneering work in the development of nanostructured energetic 
materials through a novel process involving a sol-gel to cryo-gel synthesis. Other 
research specialties include the investigation of thermal decomposition of energetic 
materials by various methods, including in situ gas-phase FT-IR spectroscopy. As an 
undergraduate student, he performed research at the Sandia National Laboratories 
Explosive Components Facility. He also had an undergraduate student appointment at 
LANL in the High Explosives Science and Technology group. He studied chemistry as 
an undergraduate at the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology and worked at 
the Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center (EMRTC).
S T R A T E G I C  L A T E N C Y  U N L E A S H E D    |    571 
Sara-Jayne Terp 
Sara-Jayne Terp builds frameworks to improve how autonomous systems and 
human communities work together. Fusing her work as a data scientist and 
information-security expert, she examines the light and dark sides of the human-
artificial intelligence (AI) interface, building algorithms that enable autonomous 
systems to accelerate the creation of shared situational awareness in crises and 
applying information-security principles to counter the impact of misinformation and 
disinformation campaigns on human systems. She runs Bodacea Light Industries, 
is a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council, and chairs the Cognitive Security CoLab. 
Previously, she taught data science at Columbia University, served as chief technology 
officer of UN Global Pulse (the United Nation’s big-data initiative), and designed 
machine-learning algorithms and unmanned vehicle systems at the UK Ministry of 
Defense. Sara holds degrees in AI and neural networks.
Gregory F. Treverton
Gregory F. Treverton stepped down as chairman of the National Intelligence Council 
in 2017. He is a senior adviser with the Transnational Threats Project at the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a professor of the Practice of 
International Relations at the University of Southern California. Earlier, he directed 
the RAND Corporation’s Center for Global Risk and Security and, before that, the 
Intelligence Policy Center and the International Security and Defense Policy Center. 
Also, he was associate dean of the Pardee RAND Graduate School. He served in 
government for the first Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He has taught 
at Harvard and Columbia Universities and has been a senior fellow at the Council 
on Foreign Relations and deputy director of the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies in London. He holds an AB summa cum laude from Princeton University and 
an MPP and PhD in economics and politics from Harvard.
John D. Tullius
John serves as a vice president for open-source intelligence programs at Orbis 
Operations. He retired from the CIA after serving as the National Intelligence Chair at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS; 2016-2019), where he taught a variety of intel-
related courses and worked with student teams on technology initiatives to address 
Department of Defense operational requirements.
Prior to NPS, John managed the Open Source Enterprise’s bureaus in the Middle 
East (2014-2016) and Europe (2010-2014), overseeing regional collection efforts and 
working with liaison partners to develop capabilities. From 2007 to 2010, he managed 
a group of analytic methodologists that used social network, geospatial, and temporal 
analysis to address complex problems. John also served as a nuclear expert working 
on the top U.S. priority issue for a U.S. mission in Europe (2005-2007) and managed 
a team of analysts (1997-2005) that covered East Asia proliferation and science-and-
technology issues.
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John served as an Army infantry officer in the Oregon National Guard from 1990 to 
1997. He has a PhD in political science (University of Oregon, 1997) and an executive 
MBA from Georgetown University (2001).
Michael Valley
Dr. Michael Valley is senior manager for the materials science research and 
development group, part of Sandia National Laboratories’ Material, Physical, and 
Chemical Sciences Center. He leads broad research programs that seek knowledge 
of materials structure, properties, and performance and the processes to produce, 
transform, and analyze materials. He is also deputy director for Sandia’s Science 
and Technology Products program area, which bridges science and technology with 
national security applications. Prior to joining Sandia Labs, he was an assistant 
professor in the Mechanical Engineering Department at New Mexico State University 
and an officer in the US Air Force. He has chaired more than two dozen international 
conferences and has over 100 publications. Dr. Valley received a BS from the United 
States Air Force Academy and his MS and PhD from New Mexico State University.
Peter Wood
Peter Wood is a defense analyst at BluePath Labs. He has published over 100 
articles and studies on Chinese military and foreign affairs, including China’s 
Military Civil Fusion Strategy: A View from Chinese Strategists (2020), with Alex 
Stone; China’s Aeroengine Industry (2020), with Alden Wahlstrom and Roger Cliff; 
and China’s Aviation Industry: Lumbering Forward (2019). Mr. Wood received an MA 
in international studies from the Hopkins-Nanjing Center for Chinese and American 
Studies and a BA in political science from Texas Tech University. He spent four years 
studying in China and is proficient in Mandarin Chinese.
Trisha E. Wyman
Major Trisha E. Wyman is a visiting scientist at the Center for Global Security 
Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and a leader in 
psychological and special operations for the US Army Special Operations Command. 
She also trained and is educated in intelligence and chemical, biological, radiological, 
and nuclear fields. She has nearly two decades of military service with deployments 
and assignments around the world. Trish is a Distinguished Honor Graduate of the 
US Army’s Psychological Operations qualification course and holds the Meritorious 
Service Medal, NATO Medal, and other awards and decorations. 
Major Wyman holds a bachelor’s degree in global studies with a concentration in 
political science from Methodist University and a master’s degree from the George 
Washington University in security and safety leadership. She earned a master of 
science in information strategy and political warfare from the Naval Postgraduate 
School. In addition, Trish also graduated from the Naval War College, Joint 
Professional Military Education with distinction. 
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Major Wyman’s recent CGSR research focuses on Russian disinformation and 
includes a thesis titled “Social Media and Strategic Nuclear Weapons: The Russian 
Case.” Trish also explores media tactics and methodologies in support of security 
strategy, including deterrence and coercion. She has also coauthored a chapter titled 
“Special Operations Forces and Cyber-Enabled Influence Operations” in a book for the 
US Special Operations Command.
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This compendium of valuable concepts from some of the brightest minds 
in national security offers current and future SOF leaders and operators 
solutions for a complex, uncertain, and dangerous special operations 
battlefield. This book will stimulate discussions from the team room to the 
board room and serve as a valuable resource for SOF imagineers, policy 
makers, planners, and operators for years to come.
Douglas H. Wise
Former Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency 
and retired clandestine operator from CIA’s Senior Intelligence Service
“
”
SOF has always been an accelerator—propelling the Defense Department 
forward in tactics, strategic approaches, people selection, and in dozens 
of other ways. The coming technology revolution will be no different. This 
excellent book draws on world-class expertise to highlight the many ways 
SOF can do this. Must reading for not only future SOF leadership but indeed 
all security leaders and policy makers.
General Joseph L. Votel
Former commander, United States Central Command and  
president and CEO, Business Executives for National Security
“
”
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